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Abstract
Why was the Kimberley Process (KP) able to devise a soft law institution ‘with 
teeth’ whereas the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) failed? In 
various policy fields and particularly in the extractive industries, multi-stakeholder 
initiatives (MSIs) are becoming more important for regulating business behaviour. 
However, International Relations (IR) has as yet failed to explain why some 
succeeded in designing a strong international institution whereas others failed.
To answer the research question the thesis first establishes a methodology for 
assessing strong and weak institutionalisation of MSIs. I argue that functional regime 
theory is inadequate at assessing MSIs as it does not capture institutional variety 
within soft law. Based on the Global Governance literature, the thesis establishes 
four indicators -  membership, obligation, monitoring and enforcement, which allow 
us to evaluate the degree of institutionalisation.
How can we account for institutional variety of MSIs? Mainstream IR 
theories are not able to explain the differences between the two case studies as they 
gloss over the differences in normative and material structures assuming that 
complete rationality and concerns for efficiency are critical when determining 
institutional design.
I argue that norm entrepreneurs push for strong institutionalisation by the 
social mechanism of norm diffusion. Succeeding in diffusing the norm by using 
political strategies such as framing and structural power galvanises support for strong 
institutionalisation. Nevertheless, norm diffusion can fail when political opportunity 
structures empower norm opponents rather than norm entrepreneurs. I argue that the 
impact of norms varies, depending on distinct structural settings. Thus I unveil the 
circumstances under which new norms do not gain acceptance from the international 
community. In summary, when accounting for the MSI institutionalisation process, 
we not only need to pay attention to political strategy and agents, but must include in 
the analysis normative and material structures as drivers of or constraints to norm 
diffusion.
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C h a p t e r  1
Precious Stones, Black Gold and Institutional Design
On 1 January 2003 the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) came into 
effect. Not only was it the first attempt to seriously address the issue of trafficking 
natural resources but it was also negotiated in a multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI), in 
which states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the industry negotiated 
with equal rights. The KPCS is essentially a rough diamond trade regime which 
came into existence in response to an international NGO campaign against conflict 
diamonds -  these being rough diamonds from Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Liberia. They are exploited by rebel groups to finance 
conflicts which are aimed at undermining legitimate governments (Global Witness 
1998; Le Billon 2001). Since 2003, every rough diamond that is legally traded has to 
gain certification that it was mined legally. Although being a soft law agreement, the 
KPCS has now developed into a rigorous global agreement with strong monitoring 
and enforcement requirements.
The same year, another MSI came into existence attempting, again, to 
regulate the operations of the extractive industries. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a revenue transparency regime which uncovers 
revenue flows from global resource companies to host governments. The initiative 
aims to decrease corruption and the potential for civil conflict in resource-rich 
developing countries. Like the KPCS, the EITI is a response to an international NGO 
campaign, Publish What You Pay (PWYP). However, while the EITI can be 
considered as a partial success, the agreement that was negotiated is far less rigorous 
than the KPCS. Given that the EITI was supposed to replicate the success of the 
Kimberley Process (KP), this variance might come as a surprise.
While MSI are becoming more and more prominent not only in the extractive 
industries sector but throughout international relations, International Relations (IR) 
as a discipline has as yet failed to explain why some of these new modes of 
governance succeed in designing strong international institutions whereas others fail 
in this endeavour.
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This study addresses this research gap by advancing our understanding about 
the factors accounting for variance in the institutional design of new forms of 
governance. With the rise of non-state actors (NSAs) in international relations and 
the increasing importance of private and public-private governance, this question is 
of crucial importance for both IR scholars and practitioners. If new forms of 
governance are to stay in global politics, we need to know how to design them in a 
way that guarantees their policy impact.
The issue of institutional design is not a new one for regime theory, looking at 
intergovernmental regimes. However, it is novel when addressing new forms of 
governance -  in particular MSIs, a policy field where research is still in its infancy. 
Given the novelty of this research focus, my research question first requires me to 
establish a methodology for assessing the institutional design of MSIs. As we see 
later in this thesis, existing analytical frameworks are inadequate at capturing the 
institutional variety of soft law mechanisms like MSIs.
Once we have established institutional variety, the more interesting question is, of 
course, how can we account for it? I argue that norm entrepreneurs push for strong 
institutionalisation with the help of a social mechanism known as norm diffusion. 
Success in diffusing the norm by political strategies - such as inciting learning or 
adaptation processes - galvanises support for strong institutionalisation. However, 
norm diffusion can fail when political opportunity structures (POS) empower norm 
opponents rather than norm entrepreneurs. I contend that the impact of norms varies 
depending on distinct structural settings. Thus, more fundamentally, I unveil the 
circumstances in which ideas do not become accepted by the international 
community. When accounting for the institutionalisation process of MSIs, not only 
do we need to pay attention to political strategy and agents but we must also include 
in the analysis normative and material structures as drivers of or constraints to norm 
diffusion. Later in this chapter, we see that conventional IR approaches, focussing 
either on interests or power, are unsuitable to account for our research puzzle. 
Overall, the study contributes to an understanding of international institutions which 
exceeds the limits of neo-liberal institutionalism by looking at material and 
normative structures that constrain or inform actor behaviour. Explaining complex 
social phenomena often requires the use of multiple theories connected within a 
common framework. Not only does my approach combine two levels of analysis,
16
POS and the agency-related political strategies to diffuse norms, it also uses concepts 
from different approaches. We return to this later in the chapter.
As with any academic endeavour, this research is constrained by a number of 
limitations which ultimately help to maintain the analytical focus and elaborate a 
parsimonious theoretical account. In this study, I develop and test an approach to 
account for the variance of institutional design of two MSIs. Therefore, firstly, and 
conversely to many other norm-related studies, the prime focus of this thesis is not 
norm adoption. The thesis looks at norm adoption, but it only serves to explain a 
specific institutional design as I consider it to be a precondition for 
institutionalisation. Accepting a certain institutional design ultimately gives evidence 
for having adopted the underlying norm. Opposition to specific institutional design 
features demonstrates that the underlying norm is still contested. Secondly, the level 
of analysis is international. I do not examine how the initiatives are implemented at 
the country level. Domestic politics are only significant for my analysis when 
helping to shed light on the institutional design preferences of certain stakeholders. 
Thirdly, as further elaborated on in Chapter 2, the focus is institutional design, not 
effectiveness or compliance. Moreover, my thesis makes no claims about the 
accountability of MSIs.1 Finally, the MSIs studied here consist of a broad range of 
actors. To give an example, more than 40 countries were involved in the negotiations 
of the KPCS. For reasons of parsimony, the empirical chapters focus only on actors 
that were crucial in determining certain institutional design features rather than 
tracing the preferences of all actors that were involved.
There are six main parts to this introductory chapter. Firstly, it introduces the 
policy focus of this study, the problem of opacity and the precarious role of the 
extractive industries in resource-rich developing countries. In this respect, it also 
sheds light on the increasing importance of the transparency norm put forth by 
NGOs. The choice of this focus is motivated by the increasing attention of both 
academics and policy-makers on the consequences of extractive industries operations 
in host countries and the question of how negative consequences could be averted. 
The chapter then moves on to the theoretical inquiry of this study. It scrutinises to 
what extent existing theoretical approaches can help in answering our research 
puzzle. Subsequently, I introduce my theoretical approach, looking at the interaction
1 As I mention in Chapter 2, accountability of MSIs is, of course, a crucial issue. With regard to 
accountability and natural resource extraction, see Newell and Wheeler 2006.
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of institutional design, norm diffusion and POS. Given that norms play a crucial role 
in understanding the institutionalisation process, the fourth sub-chapter discusses my 
thin rationalist understanding to norms and ideas which constitutes the ontological 
basis of my research. In the fifth part, I present the methodology on which the study 
is based. The chapter concludes with an overview of the thesis.
1.1 The Extractive Industries, Conflict and the Transparency Norm
The extractive industries play an ambivalent role in resource-rich countries. On the 
one hand, they are central to the economic development of Southern countries, and 
not only because they are the main foreign direct investment (FDI) contributors. 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are also vital as they provide jobs and technical 
know-how. On the other hand, however, research suggests that MNCs, especially the 
extractive industries, very often have a negative impact on developing countries 
because they contribute to bad governance. Recently, the role of business in weak 
zones of governance has been taken up by a flourishing research programme (e.g. 
Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005; Wenger and Mockli 2003).
Why do global resource companies contribute to bad governance in resource- 
rich developing countries? First, companies dealing with natural resources have to 
meet with very specific challenges when operating in host countries. In terms of 
where they operate, they have no choice, as they must go where the resources are 
located. Consequently, they very often operate in conflict-ridden countries, such as 
Angola or Nigeria. Most MNCs claim to adopt a politically neutral position in host 
countries. Yet, many of them contribute knowingly or unknowingly to armed conflict 
and corruption. Large oil companies especially have been involved in several high- 
profile disasters. They have been accused of providing logistical and financial 
assistance to repressive state security forces (e.g. Manby 1999), contributing to 
corruption and civil conflicts by trading natural commodities stemming from conflict 
zones (Smillie 2005c) or by funding war economies through payments to 
governments (Swanson 2002).
Second, the way they operate contributes to conflict and corruption. Both the 
(diamond) mining and the oil sector are very opaque businesses in the host countries. 
In the oil sector, the principle of contract confidentiality ensures that both the
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governments and the companies do not disclose the most basic information about 
revenue flows. Thus, civil society is not able to hold their governments to account 
over the amount of resources available, their rate of exploitation, the revenues 
governments receive and how they are used (Karl 2007). Petro-states are rentier 
states2 and the opacity of the oil industry reinforces this characteristic by enabling 
corruption. In the case of oil companies, the lack of financial transparency is one of 
the main enabling factors for corruption and the support of the war economies. 
Angola serves as a good example of how conflict is linked to natural resources and 
opaque business procedures. The ruling elite used the oil reserves not only for 
personal enrichment but also to set up oil-for-arms deals. Thus, government officials 
and their international business partners benefited from the civil war. The opacity of 
these arrangements between the oil companies and the government made public 
scrutiny impossible (Swanson 2002; Hayman and Crossin 2005).
The diamond business also builds on secret traditions and customs. Before the 
launch of the KPCS, most of the deals were made trough extralegal contracts without 
providing written records. As the origins of diamonds could easily be concealed, 
opacity facilitated the trade with illegal goods such as conflict diamonds.
Hence, in both industry sectors, secrecy has become a structural feature.3 For 
companies and individual diamond dealers, it represents a possibility to decide how 
to account for their costs, what profits to report and, to evade taxes. In theory, the 
regulation of the extractive industries should not raise special problems in the 
application of international law. Governments should ensure that actors operating 
within their territory act in accordance with international obligations. Yet, existing 
political institutions, such as international public law, are weakened by regulatory 
and political gaps that have arisen through globalisation (Kaul et al. 1999: xxvi ff). A 
jurisdictional gap arises as states, not MNCs are the addressees of international 
public law. States, however, have an incentive for free-riding rather than finding 
collective durable solutions to transnational problems such as the regulation of 
MNCs operating abroad. Southern governments are reluctant or unable to regulate 
host companies since the extractive industries play a key role in resource-rich
2 Rentier states derive all or a substantial portion of their income from the exploitation of natural 
resources rather than through the taxation of their citizens. The consequences for the governance of 
states of adopting a rent-seeking behaviour are discussed at length in 6.1.2.
3 Opacity in the diamond and oil industry is discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 6.
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developing countries. Moreover, opacity offers a window of opportunity to 
governmental agents for personal enrichment. Given the inability to regulate these 
issues by hard law, only a small number of these initiatives are legally binding 
treaties, most of which are only binding on states, such as the Alien Torts Claims Act 
(ATCA) in the United States (US). It authorises civil lawsuits in US courts by 
foreign persons for torts which violate international or US law (Chesterman 2004). 
Generally speaking, however, efforts to regulate MNCs through legal regimes have 
so far failed.
Like most globalised industries, natural resource and energy companies are 
very vulnerable to public pressure. As a reaction to high profile disasters and the 
deficiencies of international public regulation, MNCs have become increasingly 
subject to high-profile activist campaigns since the 1980s. In most industry sectors, 
NGO activism has contributed to the development of a new regulatory realm outside 
the traditional intergovernmental mechanisms: In the civil regulation, NGOs are not 
only crucial drivers but also play an important role as civil regulators (Zadek 2001). 
Thus, company-NGO relations have evolved rapidly from opponents to partners.4 As 
researchers from International Business emphasise, not only NGO pressure, but 
learning, networking and peer pressure have contributed to the establishment of this 
new regulatory realm (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Spare and La Mure 2003; 
Warhurst 2001).5
While civil regulation has formed mainly around on environmental issues 
since the 1980s (Bendell 2000), opaque business operations considered as conflict- 
promoting economic activities have only recently become the focus of NGOs. Hence 
a new regulatory framework is just about to emerge. According to them, more 
transparent business operations can be a means to contribute to conflict solution and 
prevention. Certification regimes for conflict commodities, revenue transparency 
regimes and codes of conduct for business behaviour in conflict-prone regions have 
embraced the transparency norm by uncovering business operations and their 
revenue flows. Of course, the transparency norm is nothing new for business, but
4 Chapter 3 examines in more detail the social mechansims o f NGOs to engage with MNCs.
5 Examples for this kind of regulation are the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) or the Equator 
Principles which are elaborated on in more detail in the following chapter. While the literature on civil 
regulation is most instructive on internal (business) and external (NGO pressure) reasons o f why 
MNCs adopt corporate social responsibity (CSR), it does not focus on institution building and 
institutional design. The literature is therefore not appropriate for answering the research puzzle and 
does therefore not contribute to the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3.
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after the focus on corruption both within governments and business and the increase 
of financial reporting due to the scandals of Enron and WorldCom (Florini 2007), the 
extractive industries constitute the last frontier in terms of business opacity.
Recently, one policy response, MSI, has become more prominent in diffusing the 
transparency norm into the extractive industries. One example is the United Nations 
(UN) Global Compact which was launched by the UN Secretary General (UNSG) 
Kofi Annan at the 1999 Davos World Economic Forum. Other examples that 
specifically address the extractive industries sector in developing countries are the 
KP to curb trade with conflict diamonds and the EITI to fight bribery and corruption. 
The aim of the initiatives is to fight business opacity and the potential for conflict by 
institutionalising more transparency in industry operations. At the end of the 1990s, 
the NGO Global Witness accused the diamond industry of contributing to the civil 
wars in Africa as conflict diamonds could easily be traded by rebels to fund their 
civil wars (Global Witness 1998). States, the diamond industry and NGOs together 
devised the KPCS to regulate the gemstone trade. Although a trade regime, the KP 
essentially fosters transparency when trading with diamonds by unveiling the 
business operations of producer countries and mining companies. According to the 
KPCS, all rough diamonds that are imported or exported have to be certified. The 
Scheme is accompanied by an industrial self-regulation which monitors domestic 
trade. For the very first time in the history of diamond trade, the goods can now be 
tracked. Given the strong monitoring and enforcement measures, the KP can be 
considered a comparatively rigid regime.6
EITI builds on the research and the experience of the KP. Throughout their 
research on conflict diamonds in Angola, Global Witness and other NGOs also 
explored the Angolan oil industry. They found that although the oil sector 
contributed up to 90 percent of government revenues, a great part of this money was 
not used to develop the country, but contributed to funding the war economy (Global 
Witness 1999). The NGOs advocated for mandatory disclosure of the extractive 
industries’ payments to the host governments. Reliable information about natural 
resource revenues would help civil society and donor agencies to hold governments 
accountable for their use of revenues. The initiative aims at increasing the 
transparency of oil and mining revenues in resource-rich countries. Companies have
6 For a discussion o f the requirements of the KPCS, see Chapter 4.
21
to publish what they pay to governments and governments have to publish what they 
receive from companies. EITI is a purposeful attempt to replicate the KP. Together 
with NGOs, oil companies and producing and importing governments, the 
government of the United Kingdom (UK) wished to design an equally rigid regime 
that would fight the opacity of the oil industry and their host governments. However, 
while the EITI can be considered as a partial success, it is very weak in comparison 
to the KP.7
1.2 Accounting for Institutional Design
Why do states or NSAs agree to design an international institution in a specific way? 
Two theories have been developed to explain the design of institutions: neorealism 
and neo-liberalism (Kahler 2000). However, other IR theories such as neo- 
Gramscian and constructivism could also have the potential to explain variation in 
institutional design. In this sub-chapter, the extent to which the theories are able to 
explain our research puzzle comes under scrutiny.
Although neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism share some basic 
ontological and methodological assumptions, they are quite distinct from the other 
with regard to the causal mechanism they draw on to explain the puzzle. Inherent to 
each of the theories is a methodological individualist ontology and a positivist 
epistemology. Methodological individualism treats the interests and identities of 
actors as exogenously given. Integrated in this ontology is the assumption of rational 
actors with complete information, clear formulated preferences and the cognitive 
ability and time to make the optimal choice. Their logic of action is based on 
cost/benefit calculations. Actors strive to maximise their benefits whilst minimising 
their costs (March and Olson 1998).
Neorealist conceptions of international relations consider international 
institutions and international law as epiphenomenal. The anarchical structure of the 
international system and the starting point of every neorealist informed analysis 
require every state to pursue a policy that secures the state’s survival. International 
institutions are only put in place when powerful actors can impose them (Krasner
7 For a discussion of the requirements of the EITI, see Chapter 6.
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1993: 140). Although main proponents like Waltz say little about international 
institutions, scholars use the school of thought to explain differences of institutional 
design with variance of the power (Kahler 2000; Simmons 2002; Waltz 1979). 
According to this, regime design can be explained in two ways. First, strong 
institutionalisation is due to the behemoth, the altruistically acting hegemonic power 
that wants to supply public goods (Kindleberger 1983). Secondly, powerful states 
acting as a leviathan impose a certain regime design against the will of weaker actors 
(Keohane 1980; Krasner 1976). The two cases discussed in this study demonstrate 
that the power approach is insufficient to explain the outcome. None of the powerful 
states, most notably the US, had an immediate self-interest to create a strongly 
institutionalised KP. Instead, a number of middle and regional powers were pushing 
for strong institutionalisation. With regard to the EITI, the US, along with its oil 
industry, actually had an interest in preventing the creation of the institution. 
However, EITI exists, despite the fact that it has reached only a low degree of
o
institutionalisation.
What about other powerful actors such as the MNCs? Do they dominate the 
design of MSIs? To answer this question, some insights from the Neo-Gramscian 
versions of historical materialism might be useful. The approach claims to overcome 
the reductionism of other structural accounts such as Marxism. Neo-Gramscianism 
concentrates on the formation of a transnational historical bloc and an alliance 
between state, capitalist forces and civil society (Cox 1987). The hegemony of that 
bloc is preserved by “material, organizational, and discursive forms of power (...) to 
project narrow interests as collective concerns and to accommodate challenges to 
those interests” (Newell and Levy 2006: 173). Insights of the approach were recently 
applied to explain international environmental governance (e.g. Levy and Egan 2003; 
Newell and Levy 2005). The aim of this specific approach is to link the macro world 
of international governance structure with the micro level of corporate behaviour 
within environmental governance (ibid.). The dominant alliance of states, business 
and civil society is thought to be contested by social forces in a “war of position”, in 
which MNCs have to reinstate their structural power continuously (Levy and Egan 
2003). Overall, the focus of the approach is to analyse the role of firms in
8 These .aspects are elaborated on in Chapters 5 (KP) and 7 (EITI).
23
environmental policy, rather than the evolution of international institutions. For this 
reason, Neo-Gramscian insights are not applicable to solve our research puzzle.
The most prominent approach to explaining institutional design is neo-liberal 
institutionalism. Like neo-realism, it considers the international system anarchical 
but focuses on the rationalist agent who pursues cooperation with his peers to 
maximise his own benefits. Keohane (1984) pointed out that international institutions 
decrease transaction costs, provide information in times of uncertainty and establish 
stable mutual expectations about others’ patterns of behaviour. Actors gain more 
from cooperation than from defection, but this is hard to achieve given the anarchical 
and uncertain character of the international system. International institutions decrease 
uncertainty by mitigating the fear of cheating or free-riding. Overall, neo-liberal 
institutionalism has been applied to a broad variety of IR questions ranging form 
regime creation and effectiveness to questions of institutional design. Given the high 
range of questions, the assumptions and hypothesis of neo-liberal institutionalism are 
very diverse.9 In the following, I concentrate on neo-liberal approaches that look 
specifically at questions of institutional design. Overall, two explanations have been 
developed. Some neo-liberal institutionalists looking at international regimes argue 
that the institutional design depends on the constellation of the specific policy 
problems the stakeholders wish to solve (e.g. Lipson 1991). Collaboration problems 
suffer from the failure to implement collective action effectively, as actors have more 
incentives to cheat rather than to collaborate. Hence, we can expect collaboration 
regimes to be very formalised, minimising the possibilities for cheating (Hasenclever 
et al. 1997). Derived from this, what would such an approach predict as an outcome 
for the two cases? Considering that we have the same policy problem, a collaboration 
problem in an opaque industry sector, we would not expect the KP and the EITI to 
have different institutional designs but rather that they would be similar. In both 
cases the incentive for cheating is very high as trading conflict diamonds or engaging 
in bribery are both very profitable. The rational and efficiency-seeking actor would 
therefore create two very strong international institutions to minimise the problem of 
defection. Such an approach therefore fails to predict the accurate outcome, so it is 
obviously not apt to account for our research puzzle. Other proponents looking at the
9 A good overview of the theory is given by Hasenclever et al. 1997.
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degree of legalisation10 of international institutions explain institutional design by 
drawing on the benefits and the costs of cooperation (Kahler 2000; Abbott et al. 
2000). Governments choose highly institutionalised agreements “when they provide 
superior net benefits” compared to weaker alternatives (Kahler 2000: 663). One 
crucial additional perspective to this explanation is the question of behavioural and 
environmental uncertainty of the specific problem constellation (Scheiber 2006). 
Governments that know relatively little about a specific policy problem are not 
prepared to bear the high costs of strong institutions. As we see in the empirical 
chapters, policy-makers had very little knowledge on both conflict diamonds and 
revenue opacity. So we cannot explain the variation in the cases by a different 
problem constellation. With regards to expected benefits and costs, the US having 
invested the most in the oil industry in Africa and the Caspian Sea region should be 
interested in a strong EITI as it would gain the most benefits. However, as we see in 
Chapter 7, the US did not contribute to a strong institutionalisation of the EITL 
Overall, neo-liberal institutionalist explanations do not contribute to solving our 
research question.
Being the most elaborated theory to account for variation in institutional 
design, why does it fail only in these cases? First, as with neo-realism and neo- 
Gramscianism, we have to acknowledge that the theory was not devised to explain 
institutionalisation of MSIs. It is therefore not surprising that the theory is not able to 
solve our specific research puzzle. Secondly, and more specifically with regard to 
neo-liberal institutionalism, Hurrell (2005) argues that the theory suffers important 
weaknesses by over-emphasing the actors’ quest for effective solutions to political 
problems. The choice of negotiators is dictated mostly not by a choice between 
creating institutions and not creating institutions, but by which institution offers the 
best trade-off between achieving the common goal and realising self-control (ibid.). 
In international negotiations, questions of asymmetrical power distribution and 
different conceptions of norms and values are crucial:
“[A] great deal o f institutionalist writing has been concerned with the creation of 
institutions within the developed world, there has been a tendency to assume away the 
fundamental differences in religion, social organization, culture, and moral outlook that 
may block or, at least, complicate cooperative action” (Hurrell 2005: 35f).
10 Legalization is looked at in the following chapter in more detail.
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Considering that the cases involve a whole range of countries with very different 
cultural and historic backgrounds, we should be careful not to ignore ideational 
factors constraining or driving strong institutionalisation. Interest- and power-based 
theories treat interests and preferences as exogenously given. The approaches 
therefore fail to explain the formation or a change of interests unless they are seen as 
a function of new incentive structures. Checkel (2001) emphasises that rationalist 
approaches treat the role of language and communication in purely strategic and 
informational terms. Thus, the theories build a black box around the interaction 
context from which decisions emerge, both at the domestic and international level. 
This is not to suggest that rationalist approaches do not focus on interaction. In fact, 
interaction is central, but it is only understood as a strategic exchange among egoistic 
and self-interested actors. In this regard, the impact of material facts is highly 
overestimated while social facts and structural settings are not conceptualised at all. 
Given these constraints, should we not turn to a theory that puts more emphasis on 
ideational factors? Negotiating institutions and deciding on regime design is, after 
all, a creative enterprise whereby actors’ interests are reconstituted, refined, or 
reformulated. Constructivist approaches which treat actors’ interests as endogenous 
could be more apt for analysing the reconstitution of interests and preferences in 
international negotiations. Arguably, constructivism has not as yet been applied to 
accounting for institutional design. Nevertheless, we could use the insights of this 
approach by considering negotiations for designing MSIs as a socialisation process. 
Constructivists would argue that strong institutionalisation occurs in the case of 
successful normative persuasion and social learning. Actors leam about new norms, 
internalise them and consider the creation of a strong institution to regulate these 
issues as the appropriate thing to do. In its most purist sense, socialisation involves 
changing minds and attitudes in the absence of overtly material considerations and 
coercion (Johnston 2001). Actors are supposed to switch from instrumentally 
informed actions to doing what is considered as appropriate by the international 
community, without questioning the validity of the norms (“taking norms for 
granted”). Although constructivists contend that persuasion is not devoid of conflict 
but can involve “pressures, arm-twisting, and sanctions” (Risse and Sikkink 1999:
14) they argue that at the end of the process, socialised actors have internalised the 
new norms and want to behave in the appropriate way.
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In theory, this is a very compelling argument which already had serious 
implications for the practical design of MSIs. The Global Compact, greatly 
influenced by John G. Ruggie, IR scholar and Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations, 
adopted the ‘learning model’ for inducing corporate change instead of a regulatory 
arrangement with strings attached. Ruggie expects that companies internalise 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles and re-shape their conducts 
accordingly (Ruggie 2001, 2004; see also Risse 2004).
Considering my research question it would be highly interesting to put 
Ruggie’s hypothesis to test. In fact, the first years of my research project were very 
much shaped by such constructivist-informed assumptions on MSI. However, this 
research was challenged by some serious methodological difficulties. How do we 
know that actors really internalised new norms and did not cooperate because of 
strategic concerns? (Thies 2003) After all, it is not possible to access the minds of 
actors participating in negotiations. The assumption that actors alter their behaviour 
because of a change of preferences therefore poses a significant challenge to the 
research methods used. The researcher cannot simply deduce a change of preferences 
from a new behaviour as preferences must be researched directly by interviews and 
accurate process tracing. Research on socialisation suggests scrutinising the 
discourses of the concerned actors. If the socialisation process was to be successful, 
the researcher should be able to diagnose that the socialised actors changed their 
perception towards the other stakeholders involved in the negotiations (e.g. 
development of trust) and that a shared understanding of the political issue was 
created. Overall, the re-constitution of identities and roles through the socialisation
process manifests itself in the adoption and reproduction of the discourse and
(
cognitive frameworks of the socialising actors. Yet, as Hooghe (2005: 865) points 
out, this research method is not only time-consuming but may even be inaccurate 
because interviewees “may lie, or they may not be able to express their true 
preferences”. I contend that we lack the psychological methodologies in IR to 
underpin constructivist claims with empirical evidence.
It is therefore not surprising that most studies fail to give evidence for the 
profound change of motivation for action. As Schimmelfenning, Engert et al. (2006: 
258) point out, even the landmark study on socialisation, ‘The Power o f  Human 
Rights’ (Risse et al. 1999) is not convincing in giving such evidence. The study looks
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at a range of country cases in which formerly authoritative governments adopted 
international human rights norms into domestic practices. Risse et al. (1999) argue 
that re-constituted identities triggered by an international network promoting human 
rights norms account for the adoption of norms. It is, however, questionable that this 
is the central explanatory factor. The scholars contend in their concluding chapter 
that in each of the cases “a regime change preceded the dramatic improvements of 
human rights conditions and in many cases brought the domestic human rights 
network into power” (ibid: 258). It seems that instead of triggering socialisation 
processes, the human rights network was able to impact power relations in the 
respective countries and supported the empowerment of key actors sympathetic to 
international human rights norms.
To sum up, none of the mainstream theories is able to account for the research 
puzzle. Constructivism may offer interesting insights but the approach has numerous 
methodological difficulties that cannot easily be resolved. Neo-realism, neo- 
Gramscianism and neo-liberal institutionalism fail to predict the outcome accurately.
1.3 Institutional Design, Political Opportunity Structures and Norm
Diffusion
Given the failure of standard IR theories to account for the variance of institutional 
design in the KP and the EITI, we need a new approach to explain the outcome. This 
sub-chapter provides a brief overview of the different components of my theoretical 
framework. My approach is subject to further elaboration in Chapter 3.
Of all the IR theories mentioned in the above sub-chapter, neo-liberal 
institutionalism is the most developed with regard to explaining institutional design. 
Yet, as we noted, it is not able to account for our research puzzle. Its major weakness 
is its ignorance of the structural settings, conflicts of value and historical dynamics in 
which institutionalisation takes place. I agree with Hurrell (2005), who contends that 
neo-liberal institutionalism, by focussing on questions of effectiveness and 
efficiency, ignores the crucial dimensions of norms and power in international 
relations. So as to overcome these shortcomings, I propose to pay more attention to
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the interaction of norm diffusion as political strategy and the structural settings, 
including the power distribution, in which the institutionalisation of MSIs take place.
My general argument is that norm entrepreneurs can push for strong 
institutionalisation by a social mechanism known as norm diffusion. They diffuse 
their preferred institutional design through political strategies such as framing and 
structural power. Weak institutionalisation, then, occurs as norm opponents succeed 
in obstructing norm diffusion. As with norm entrepreneurs, norm opponents try to 
‘teach’ other actors why a weak institutional design should be preferred over a strong 
one. The most interesting question here is, of course, how can we explain the success 
or failure of norm diffusion by norm entrepreneurs? I argue that material and 
normative structures in business and states can operate as POS which mediate 
between the diffusion of new ideas and policy outcomes (e.g.McAdam et al. 1996; 
Tarrow 1996). Depending on the existence of such opportunities and the ability of 
agents to exploit them, POS can drive or constrain the institutionalisation process. By 
driving, I mean that POS provide entry points thereby facilitating norm diffusion. By 
constraining, I mean that POS empower norm opponents and ultimately block the 
successful diffusion of new ideas. This emphasises a crucial aspect ignored by 
researchers studying POS: they can work in two ways.11
My proposition entails three claims. The first is a structuralist claim used 
mostly by new institutionalists. Such an approach points to the structures, such as 
institutional environment and cultural beliefs, that shape and constrain the actions of 
individuals and groups. Institutional structures encompass “organizational 
characteristics of groups” and the rules and norms which shape actor relations 
(Ikenberry 1988). According to March and Olson (1984: 735), those structures 
should be understood as “a collection of institutions, rules of behaviour, norms, roles, 
physical arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively resilient to the 
idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals”.
The second claim is that structural settings are not immovable. Many 
structuralist explanations treat structures as overly deterministic and thereby risk 
reducing political processes and their outcomes to the expressions of steady 
structures. Falkner (2008:13) criticised structural approaches for not being able to
11 For the research design, see Figure 1 in Section 1.5.
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account for variation. Wendt (1987: 362) observed that a “ ‘structural’ analysis 
explains the possible; ‘historical’ analysis explains the actual”. I argue that agents’ 
preferences are constrained by POS but actors do not passively respond to them. 
Even though structures matter, agents can create or modify some of them at some 
point (Prakash 2000). Historical dynamics provide a good example that structures 
are, indeed, subject to change. Think of historical turning points such as the end of 
the Cold War which dramatically altered the structure of the international system. 
Any structure-based analysis, therefore, has to consider how agents interact with it 
and reproduce it. Therefore, a political analysis has to remain historically grounded 
and pay attention to the variations in structural circumstances.
The third claim is that agents can seize the political opportunities or let them 
pass. In this regard, being able to spot political opportunities and exploit them is a 
form of discursive power. We study this more closely when we discuss norm 
diffusion. To the extent that political opportunities can be exploited both to 
strengthen or weaken institutionalisation, norm diffusion should not be considered as 
a one-way process. Rather, it is an iterative development in which both like-minded 
and not like-minded actors try to push for their preferred institutional design.
From die above we can see that the theoretical framework encompasses both 
agency and structures. One of the most difficult tasks social scientists face is to 
provide an explanation for social phenomena which encompasses both levels of 
analysis. Constructivism with its emphasis on the “mutual construction” has put forth 
that structures create agents and vice versa (Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; Giddens 
1979). Ultimately, however, constructivism has as yet not been able to find a 
satisfactory answer to this issue. Most approaches within constructivism emphasise 
one side over the other. In this regard, Wendt’s conception is structural whereas the 
epistemic community literature is very much focused on agency (Wendt 1987; Haas 
1992).12 Given the specific research question of this thesis, it is beyond its scope to 
find a solution to this issue. Rather, I acknowledge the agency-structure problem as 
one that is inherent to the majority of social science research. The question, then, 
remains where to start with the analysis. The main argument accounting for the
12 A more sophisticated solution to the agency-structure problem is provided by the morphogenetic 
approach which incorporates time to enable the examination of the mutual constitution (Archer 1995; 
for an empirical application see Sell 2003). But even here, ultimately the researcher has to make a 
choice where to start with the analysis.
30
institutional design is that POS provide a setting in which norm diffusion and 
institutionalisation takes place. Hence, the analytical framework starts at that point.
In summary, this section has briefly laid out the three main components of my 
theoretical claim by discussing the link between institutional design, POS and norm 
diffusion. As we have seen, I developed a distinctive approach to accounting for 
institutional design combining elements from different theoretical traditions such as 
thin constructivism, new institutionalism and the social movement literature, whilst 
using a thin rationalist ontology. We turn our attentions to this in the following sub­
chapter.
1.4 Ideas, Norms and Multiple Stakeholders
Considering that part of the overall argument focuses on norm diffusion, norms and 
ideas are the central point of this thesis. We have already noted that NGOs, as norm 
entrepreneurs, attempted to diffuse the transparency norm in both cases. I argue 
throughout the thesis that the institutional design of both MSI differ because the 
norm entrepreneurs were unsuccessful in diffusing the idea to the same extent in the 
two cases.
This section contributes in two ways to the overall argument of the thesis. 
First, it lays the basis for a thin rationalist understanding of ideas in International 
Political Economy (IPE). This is important as we need to understand how norms 
affect actor behaviour. Secondly, to the extent that I also consider MNCs as targets 
of norm diffusion, we must discuss in what way MNC behaviour is affected by 
norms, an aspect widely ignored in IPE (for exceptions see below). 13
Ideas impacting on state behaviour have become more prominent in IR since the 
constructivist turn (Katzenstein et al. 1998). For constructivists, ideas take centre- 
stage. Ideas as intersubjective beliefs are social facts that rest on a collective 
intentionality (Searle 1995; Wendt 1992). Human beings are only able to experience 
reality through ideas that interpret the social world. States develop norms that serve
13 The IPE literature has generated a large research looking at how MNCs generate new standards (e.g. 
Cutler et al. 1999; Haufler 1999; Levy and Newell 2005). To what extent norms can impact MNC 
strategies is a question that has so far mostly been neglected.
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as organisations of meaning and that help to constitute interests and identities by 
creating standards of appropriate behaviour (Ruggie 1998). We have already noted 
that such an understanding of ideas, however, encounters many methodological 
challenges in the empirical research, as constitutive effects are difficult to research.
Given the significant methodological difficulties, I propose not to abandon the 
study of ideas altogether, but to return to the approach Goldstein and Keohane (1993) 
chose when studying the role of ideas and norms in foreign policy. Without doubt, 
their approach is to date the most systematic and thoughtful attempt at studying the 
role of ideas in policy from a rationalist perspective. The approach enables me not 
only to avoid the methodological issues and pitfalls of constructivism, but also to 
broaden the analytical focus. Whereas constructivists emphasise that ideational facts 
define material factors in the first place (e.g. Kratochwil 1989; Wendt 1999), thin 
rationalists do not privilege ideas over interests or vice versa. Interests are informed 
by ideational factors, but behind every idea there is an interest (Hall 1986; Klotz 
1995).14 Using this angle, Goldstein and Keohane (1993) contend that the focus on 
ideas can be complemented by scrutinising the role of interests and power:
“neither that a theory of ideas can stand alone nor that we can understand politics 
without understanding interests and power, we suggest that policy outcomes can be 
explained only when interests and power are combined with a rich understanding of 
human beliefs” (ibid. pg. 13).
Goldstein and Keohane (ibid.) distinguish three ways in which ideas impact in a 
causal way on policy. First, ideas may serve as road maps to define preferences and 
to establish causal relationships of their preferences and different political strategies. 
Second, they may serve as focal points in situations with multiple equilibria in order 
to select the best option. Third, by mediating between institutions and policy 
outcomes, they constrain public policy.
Critics of this approach contend that although it intends to “challenge both 
rationalist and reflectivist approaches” (ibid. 1993: 6), it remains in the rational- 
choice camp, as it is still based on the positive assumption of exogenous interest
14 In some cases the boundaries between rationalists and constructivists are very marginal. Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998: 272), for instance, agree with giving equal weight to both ideas and interests by 
conceding that “arguments about whether behaviour is norm-based or interest-based miss the point 
that norm-conformance can often be self-interested, depending on how one specifies interests and the 
nature of the norm”. While some constructivists recognise a basic comparability with such an 
understanding (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Klotz 1995), others distance themselves from all strands of 
rational choice (e.g. Ruggie 1998).
32
formation based on material concerns (Wiener 2003). This criticism stems from the 
fact that rationalism is commonly misunderstood in one significant way. Rationalism 
does not prefer material motivated preference formation over the ideational one. As 
Wendt and Fearon (2005: 59) stress, the theory “is strictly speaking agnostic on this 
question”. Whereas thick rationalism makes assumptions on the content of interests 
such as self-interest and complete information about preferences (Ferejohn 1991), the 
thin approach does not entail any substantive proposition. Goldstein and Keohane 
(1993: 13) adopt such a thin approach when they argue that
“people’s preferences for particular policy outcomes are not given but acquired. World 
views and principled beliefs structure people’s views about the fundamental nature of 
human life and the morality o f practices and choices. (.. .)To understand the formation 
of preferences, we need to understand what ideas are available and how people choose 
among them” (own emphasis).
Such a preference formation is especially important in cases of uncertainty when
ideas can act as road maps. Constructivists may criticise that ideas are then treated as
auxiliary variables in the unlikely event of uncertainty. This is far from being so.
Modem economic theory has long abandoned the assumptions of rational behaviour.
As early as the 1950s, the concept of bounded rationality was developed, stressing
that
“the capacity o f the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very 
small compared with the size of problems whose solutions is required for objectively 
rational behaviour in the real world” (Simon 1957: 198).
Given time constraints and the vast amount of accessible data, actors are actually not
able to absorb and process all the information available. Bounded rationality, widely
used in modem economics and foreign policy analysis, acknowledges that human
beings cannot assess all the consequences of their actions and they cannot imagine all
possible options available (for insights of psychology in public policy see Gowda
and Fox 2002; for foreign policy see Hill 2003). The issue of uncertainty is much
more common than constructivists assume. In fact, it is a key issue in daily political
life.15 Take for instance the issue area of international environmental politics. The
politics attempting to regulate the production of chlorofluorocarbons were heavily
influenced both by the lack of complete knowledge and the emergence of new
scientific evidence (Litfin 1994). Currently, we are witnessing the same mechanisms
with respect to greenhouse gases and the global climate regime. Bounded rationality
15 The economic sociology literature looks at bounded rationality of firms and their social 
embbededness (see e.g. Smelser and Swedberg 2005). I discuss this literature in 3.2.2.
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enables processes such as emulation, adaptation and learning to influence decision­
making of actors. In light of new evidence or alternative interpretations, actors may 
revise their assessment of policies and strategies.
This brings us to the question of how MNCs are affected by ideational facts. 
Like states, MNCs are boundedly rational. Therefore, providing guidance in times of 
uncertainty is one of the most crucial ways in which ideational facts impact on 
MNCs. However, while the study of norms and ideas has become an important 
component for IPE, MNCs were largely neglected. In IPE, transnational advocacy 
groups have been identified as norm entrepreneurs raising awareness of and fostering 
norms in policy processes (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
O’Brien et al. 2000). The research programme remained largely limited to studying 
their impact on state behaviour (e.g. Risse et al. 1999). Only recently, IPE turned to 
studying the impact of civil society on the behaviour of MNCs (Gereffi et al. 2001; 
Florini 2000; Wapner 1996). MNCs are increasingly targeted by transnational 
advocacy networks, yet social scientists have rarely acknowledged that business is 
receptive to norms or even promotes norms themselves. This neglect stems from the 
fact that companies are often considered to be purely profit-driven. Sell and Prakash
(2004) criticise the distinction between normatively motivated advocacy groups and 
materially oriented corporate actors. They contend that business actors can also be 
motivated by normative considerations by looking at the normative foundations that 
guide the actions of the pharmaceutical industry (see also Rochefort and Cobb 1994; 
Prakash 2000). Not only do MNCs accept and implement new norms, they are also 
actively engaged in the development and setting of norms (Flohr et al. 2007). With 
regard to MSIs, the significance of norms for MNCs is twofold.
First, MNCs are “norm consumers” (ibid.), as they learn about new norms 
using ideational facts as road maps or focal points when they have difficulties 
deciding on a new strategy. MNCs often experience uncertainty regarding what 
behaviour might be the best strategy to pursue their goals. For instance, with regard 
to CSR, companies face particular uncertainties as to what strategies they should 
adopt. The emergence of CSR can be considered as one of the biggest structural 
changes for business since the emergence of globalisation. What CSR entails is not 
as yet set in stone, but is rather a “discursive and material struggle about business 
practice; it represents a politicization of the social content o f the institutions that
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govern private economic activity” (Ougaard 2006: 236). Looking more specifically 
at the extractive industries sector, companies operate in hugely complex political and 
social conditions which they do not fully understand (Litvin 2003). Ibeanu and 
Luckham (2007) analyse how Shell was at first was unable to understand the extend 
of the political and social conflicts in the Niger Delta. It required Shell to become 
embroiled in the political crisis in order for the full extent of that conflict to be 
understood.16 As we see from the case studies later in this thesis, especially in times 
of crisis, ideas can have crucial impacts on the strategies companies adopt.
Secondly, MNCs act as norm entrepreneurs when setting their own norms or further 
developing existing norms. With regard to creating self-regulatory regimes, there are 
numerous examples (e.g. Borzel et al. 2007; Haufler 2001b). However, MNCs also 
invoke norms so as to legitimise their interests and impact public perceptions (Sell 
and Prakash 2004; Fuchs 2005). As I argue later in this thesis, MNCs act as 
normative agents attempting to ‘teach’ other actors about their regime of truth. With 
regard to the institutionalisation of a MSI this can be crucial, as they can either assist 
norm entrepreneurs in spreading the norm or invoke other norms to fight that norm 
diffusion.
In summary, this sub-chapter served to underpin the ontological 
understanding of how norms affect actor behaviour by putting forth a thin rationalist 
understanding. Norms inform actor behaviour by serving as road maps or focal 
points in times of uncertainty. Given that all agents, states and MNCs are boundedly 
rational, ideational facts are crucial for understanding actor behaviour.
1.5 Methodology
The central theoretical puzzle of this study is how to account for the institutional 
variance of MSIs. The prime hypothesis on which the inquiry is based is that 
successful norm diffusion by norm entrepreneurs leads to a strongly institutionalised 
design whereas failed norm diffusion can account for weak institutionalisation. To 
answer the research question therefore, we first have to assess the institutional design 
of MSIs. From a research design perspective, the institutional design of the MSI is
16 We will look more closely at Shell in the Niger Delta in Chapters 6 and 7.
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the dependent variable (DV), with successful or failed norm diffusion being the 
independent variable (IV). POS facilitate or constrain norm diffusion and are 
therefore conceptualised as intervening variables (IntV) (van Evera 1997). Figure 1 
illustrates the research design.
IV IntV DV
<--------------► ----------►
Norm Diffusion POS Institutionalisation
Figure 1 Research Design
By answering the puzzle, the aim of the thesis is to identify causal processes rather 
than to test hypotheses. As McKeown (2004) states, testing a set of hypotheses is an 
appropriate research task in situations where more than one substantive theory exists. 
The analysis of MSI institutionalisation and their institutional design features is still 
at a very early stage of theory building. Therefore, the contribution of this study 
cannot be a definite conclusion on the validity of the hypotheses. In a limited sense, 
the study nonetheless uses qualitative hypothesis testing which is considered as a 
repeating process that enables theory refinement (Munck 2004). Moreover, the thesis 
does not claim to identify all causal processes that can account for the explanation of 
the research question. Rather, it wants to establish one first approach to answer this 
question and, thus, also serve as guidance for future research on governance in MSIs.
The novelty of both the problem and the theory makes the use of quantitative 
methods impossible (Ragin et al. 1998). Hence, the methodological approach of the 
thesis is based on case-studies. More specifically, the study is based on ‘structured, 
focused comparison’ (George 1979). As George and Bennett (2005) explain, the 
comparison is ‘structured’ since the same research questions will be asked in each 
case, enabling the researcher to accumulate standardised data and consequently to 
make a systematic comparison. Furthermore, the comparison is ‘focused’ as it deals 
only with certain empirical aspects of the cases. The KP and the EITI are cases that 
are under-researched and would benefit from analysis from very different 
perspectives. However, for the sake of clarity and feasibility of a doctoral thesis, 
aspects that do not touch upon the research question are excluded from the analysis.
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As to the within-case analysis, the study uses process tracing, which aims at 
setting up causal chains. This offers the possibility of exploring the causal 
mechanisms of independent, interdependent and dependent variables (George and 
Bennett 2005).
One problem that is often associated with ‘small-n’ research is that the case study 
design is not based on random samples. Rather, the cases are chosen intentionally so 
that they match with the research objective. However, this can make research more 
prone to selection bias. The case study selection is based on two deliberations which 
aim at minimising this issue. Firstly, the cases are selected across a range of values of 
the dependent variable (King et al. 1994: 141). In this regard, an MSI with a rigid 
institutional design (KP) is contrasted with a very soft initiative (EITI). Secondly, the 
case studies were selected in the same issue area (regulation of conflict-sensitive 
business practices with policy issue of opacity) in order to achieve a uniform 
character in their background conditions (van Evera 1997).
Although this thesis concentrates on the regulation of the extractive 
industries, the two specific sectors that are compared stand out as being unique 
among any other industry sectors. Sceptics might therefore object that the differences 
in the characteristics of the products, diamonds and oil, explain the research puzzle. 
After all, diamonds are a luxury product and therefore the industry would do 
anything to protect its reputation. In contrast, oil in a very literal sense fuels the 
world economy. Surely, the oil industry is less susceptible to consumer perception? I 
do not object that different product characteristics provide different opportunities for 
norm entrepreneurs to engage in norm diffusion, but as I explain in more detail in 
Chapters 5,7 and 8, the product characteristics provide different windows of 
opportunities.17 Ultimately, however, it was the unique setup of the industry structure 
at the time institutionalisation occurred that increased the importance of the product 
characteristics of oil.
Another question concerns the substantial content of both MSIs. At first sight 
the KP and EITI seem to be very different regarding their objectives and means. The 
KP is a trade regime regulating the import and export of diamonds whereas the EITI 
is a revenue transparency regime. Thus, the question arises of whether it is possible
17 As explained in depth in Chapters 7 and 8, the oil industry is not ‘immune’ to consumer pressure. 
For instance, during the consumer boycott of Shell in Germany as a response to the company’s plan to 
dump Brent Spar into the North Sea, Shell’s sales dropped significantly (Neale 1997).
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to compare these two cases. The selection of these two cases was guided by the 
following considerations. The ultimate goals of both the KP and the EITI are the 
same: both intend to decrease the possibility of conflict and corruption by increasing 
industry transparency. The fact that a commodity tracking regime will be contrasted 
with a transparency revenue regime does not hamper the ‘structured, focused 
comparison’ since it is not the substance of the requirements (e.g. are the certificates 
forgery-proof?) that is subject to scrutiny but the properties of the MSIs (institutional 
design). Most of the indicators elaborated in Chapter 2 are universal, so that the 
analytical framework could as well be the basis of comparison across different policy 
issues such as labour rights or environmental degradation.
Other aspects of the EITI and the KP appear to render a comparative approach more 
difficult. Whereas the KP focuses on one industry sector, the diamond industry, the 
EITI encompasses all extractive industries (oil, gas, and mining). However, the wider 
scope of the EITI does not rule out the initiative as a case study since in the first 
phase of creation and implementation, the EITI was still limited to oil companies 
(Williams 2004). As a recent report concluded, the greater influence of the oil and 
gas industry can be seen as the EITI, more suited to regulate the oil industry, was still 
lacking the institutional features necessary to address the specific challenges of the 
mining sector (EITI 2006a). As the focus on mining was added later, the thesis only 
discusses the EITI with reference to the oil industry.
Despite some differences, the EITI constitutes a very good contrasting case to the KP 
for two reasons. On the one hand, as both initiatives try to regulate an industry which 
is said to be highly opaque as to their business operations in developing countries, we 
can control for the policy issue (Dufresne 2004; GAO 2002). On the other hand, both 
cases are linked, firstly, because the Like-Minded Group (LM-Group) pushing for 
strong institutionalisation was roughly the same.18 Secondly, policymakers, when 
designing the EITI, purposefully set about replicating the success of the KP. The 
interesting question therefore is why this was not successful. Given those important 
similar dimensions and the dissimilar outcome, both cases are ideal for the purposes 
of comparison.
18 In both cases the same NGOs started to campaign for a global solution to the issue and were 
afterwards included in the MSI. Moreover, the UK was in both cases one of the most important of the 
key players pushing for strong institutionalisation. I come back to this aspect later in the thesis.
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The study draws from a wide range of sources. Both cases remain as yet not 
well researched.19 My empirical data also consists of semi-academic writings, 
newspaper reports, and documents produced by governments, staff o f international 
organisations, NGOs, firms and business associations. With regard to the sources, 
two crucial limitations have to be mentioned. First, concerning primary sources from 
the corporate sector, no relevant business documents regarding the developing of an 
industry strategy have been released for academic research. A great number of public 
speeches at the negotiations of both the KP and the EITI exist, helping to shed light 
on corporate preference formation. Secondly, it was possible to interview 
representatives in the two cases from each stakeholder group (governments, industry, 
NGOs). Yet, with one notable exception no interviewee was available from resource- 
rich countries, most notably those countries that opposed strong institutionalisation 
such as India and Russia in the case of the KP or South Africa and Angola in the case 
EITI. In those cases, I had to rely extensively on secondary sources and secondary or 
circumstantial evidence to trace preference formation.
The interviewees were identified and selected based on written sources (list of 
participants of conferences, meetings or hearings), relevant contacts on the websites 
of the KP and EITI as well as on cross-referrals by other interviewees. The 
interviews are semi-structured for two reasons. Firstly, in order to undertake a 
‘focused, structured comparison’ the same data has to be available for both cases. 
Secondly, semi-structured interviews are particularly useful when exploring a new 
issue in detail and constructing a theory (Esterberg 2002). This method also limits 
the possibility of omitting explanatory variables as the interviews allowed for a 
certain extent of flexibility. Interview material remains unattributed in this thesis, but 
Appendix 1 lists the interviewees along with their professional affiliation and the 
date of the interview.
1.6 Overview of the Thesis
19 Most academic accounts of the KP and the EITI focus on why they came into existence but do not 
trace the specific preferences of the stakeholders to explain why the institutions were designed in that 
specific way (Price 2003; Feldman 2003; Grant and Taylor 2004; Schefer 2005; Tamm 2002; 
Schumacher 2004; Williams 2004). The notable exception is Scheiber (2006) who looks at 
institutional design with regard to the KP but does not compare it with the EITI.
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The study consists of three parts. Part one develops the theoretical framework and 
operationalises the dependent and independent variables. Subsequently, the 
theoretical framework is applied to the two cases. Part three provides a summary, the 
conclusions and an outlook.
Chapter 2 addresses the dependent variable, the institutional design of MSIs. 
The review of the literature on MSIs establishes the relevance of this thesis’ research 
question. Furthermore, I discuss why I chose institutional design to operationalise 
policy impact rather than other concepts such as regime effectiveness or compliance. 
Subsequently, the chapter introduces the concept of institutional design in the context 
of MSIs. It critically discusses existing analytical frameworks in light of their 
applicability to soft law mechanisms such as MSIs. I conclude the chapter by 
establishing my own framework for assessing the institutional design of MSIs.
Chapter 3 elaborates the main theoretical argument of the thesis -  how we can 
account for strong or weak institutionalisation of MSI. Since Chapter 1 already 
provided a review of existing institutional design theories, I directly elaborate on the 
link between POS and successful norm diffusion so as to achieve strong 
institutionalisation.
In the second part, the thesis turns to the case studies. I analyse the KP and the EITI, 
each in two chapters. Chapters 4 and 6 begin with an overview of the context o f the 
case, introducing the policy issue, a detailed analysis of the industry structure and a 
narrative of how the initiative evolved. The chapters conclude by defining the 
dependent variable by applying the analytical framework established in Chapter 2 to 
assess the institutional design.
Chapters 5 and 7 account for the variation in institutional design by looking at 
the negotiation dynamics of the KP (5) and the EITI (7). By looking at different 
opportunity structures that empowered either norm entrepreneurs or opponents to 
diffuse or constrain the new norm, the chapters apply the explanatory framework set 
up in the third chapter.
The concluding Chapter 8 summarises the findings of the four empirical 
chapters and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the approach adopted. The 
chapter also broadens the debate by discussing the wider implications that derive 
from this research for MSIs and the study of norms in global governance.
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C h a p t e r  2
The Institutional Design of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives
International institutions are traditionally a central topic in IR, but with globalisation 
and the growing importance of NSAs in global politics the features of international 
institutions begin to change. MSIs are the latest addition to the so-called new forms 
of governance in which NSAs -  with or without the state -  create institutions to find 
solutions to global policy issues.20 As we explore later in this chapter, MSIs are 
hybrid institutions in which states allocate important participation and decision­
making rights to NSAs. Since MSIs become a more popular tool for policy-makers, 
practitioners and academics alike need to know how to design strong MSIs.
This chapter is dedicated to the dependent variable of the thesis, MSIs and 
their institutional design. The overall aim o f this chapter is to develop a framework 
which helps to assess whether MSIs are successful in solving the given policy issue. 
MSIs are a relatively new governance phenomenon, so we introduce these forms of 
governance to the reader in the first sub-chapter. A literature review defines MSIs 
and sums up the main research insights. We conclude that so far, the question of why 
some MSIs develop into strong institutions and others do not, remains highly under­
researched. The first sub-chapter then turns to scrutinising what concept could be 
used to measure whether an MSI is strong or weak. I argue that the concept of 
institutional design is the appropriate one. The second sub-chapter then scrutinises 
more profoundly that concept, in particular in light of its applicability to soft law 
institutions. Finally, the third sub-chapter establishes a framework for assessing the 
institutional design of MSIs on the basis of the concept of legalization and existing 
literature on new forms of governance. I contend that the institutional design of MSIs 
can be assessed by analysing their levels of membership, obligation, monitoring and 
enforcement. The framework hence allows categorising MSIs in strongly or weakly 
institutionalised initiatives.
20 For an overview o f the different new forms of governance, see Haufler (2006) or Hall and 
Biersteker (2002).
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2.1 M easuring the Impact of MSIs in International Relations
The role of international institutions has been a central research topic in IR at least 
since the end of World War II. We have already noted neorealist and neo-liberal 
institutionalist conceptions of international institutions in the previous chapter. Since 
the recent turn of IR towards constructivist and sociological conceptions of world 
politics, the role of international institutions has been emphasised even more 
strongly. Constructivists reject the notion that states are self-interested utility 
maximisers. States shape international institutions as much as they are shaped by 
them (Wendt and Duvall 1989; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986).
With increasing globalisation, international institutions flourish in manifold 
forms, ranging from traditional intergovernmental regimes to private governance. 
That international institutions fulfil crucial roles in global governance is now 
undeniable. Theoretically, the discussion has turned to focussing on the impact of 
international institutions. Why is it that some international institutions yield more 
policy impact than others? As to intergovernmental institutions, regime theory has 
produced a large range of literature (the literature is too vast to cite adequately at this 
point, two good reviews are Young 2002 and Zurn 1998). With regard to new forms 
of governance, this kind of research is still in its infancy (see section 2.3 for a 
discussion of the existing literature). Yet, with the growing importance of 
governance forms such as MSIs, we need to know why some initiatives are more 
successful in producing policy outcome than others.
This sub-chapter addresses the question by scrutinising what approach could 
be useful for measuring success or failure of MSIs. As we see from section 2.1.2, 
regime theory has produced three approaches addressing this question. The sub­
chapter thereby contributes to defining the dependent variable in this thesis. 
However, before we proceed to defining the dependent variable, we first need to 
make sense of MSIs as international institutions. Therefore, to begin with, we turn to 
defining MSIs and reviewing current research on these institutions. It is important to 
analyse the current research on MSI to establish whether our research question is 
practically and theoretically relevant.
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2.1.1 Old Wine in New Bottles?
This section serves as a literature review to define MSIs within IR and to scrutinise 
whether or not our research question is relevant. In Chapter 1, we noted that MSIs 
have only recently gained significance in international relations. So, what do we 
actually know about them and to what extent are MSIs different from other new 
forms of governance? Research on MSIs is still in its infancy, as scholars have only 
recently started to study this form of governance in detail. Overall, we can identify 
three research topics:
• What are MSIs, why are they created and what functions do they fulfil in 
global politics?
• Do MSIs increase the legitimacy and accountability of global governance?
• What are the motivations and objectives for the different stakeholders to be 
engaged in MSIs?
I first turn briefly to each of the three topics and then address the important research 
lacuna concerning the policy impact of MSIs. As we can see from the below, the 
main criticism is that MSI research is still at a very sketchy stage. A small number of 
comparative or theoretical studies exist, but overall, a combination of the two -  
comparative case studies grounded in a robust theoretical framework -  is still 
missing. Research has been very policy-driven (e.g. Nelson 2000; Utting and Zammit 
2006; Reinicke et al. 2000) whilst ignoring IR theory, notably regime theory. 
However, these theories can provide a useful framework for rigorous comparative 
research.
Early research was mainly descriptive. As with all new forms of governance, 
MSIs were created on a global scale due to increasing globalisation and the growing 
authority of NSAs. As a response to the rising significance of NSAs,21 the Global 
Governance literature distinguished three different but interacting governance 
spheres: intergovernmental governance, private governance (e.g. Cutler et al. 1999) 
and world civic politics (Wapner 1995). MSIs transcend the intergovernmental- 
transnational boundaries by including NSAs as equal partners in their decision­
making processes. As Haufler (2006) rightly points out, a common label for this
21 A good overview on NSA scholarship provide Josselin and Wallace (2001a)
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governance phenomenon is still missing. In the literature, one can find the terms 
“global public policy network” (Reinicke et al. 2000), “public-private partnerships” 
(Borzel and Risse 2005) or MSI (Haufler 2006). In addition to this, a common 
definition of these collaborative initiatives has as yet to be found. One group of 
scholars refers to public-private partnerships as institutionalised cooperation that 
involves public actors, business and civil society (Nelson 2002a: 46; Utting and 
Zammit 2006:1; Borzel and Risse 2005: 198). In contrast, the second group of 
scholars has a narrow understanding of public-private partnerships, referring only to 
the institutionalised cooperation of public actors and business (Bull and McNeill 
2007: 6; Broadwater and Kaul 2005). I chose the term MSIs for those modes of 
governance that involve national and intergovernmental bodies, private actors and 
NGOs in order to avoid misunderstanding and because the term best reflects the 
trisectoral nature of the governance arrangement.
For one part, MSIs can be considered as international regimes since they 
generate “norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures around which 
actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 
1983: 2). Thus, they share the properties of intergovernmental soft law agreements 
which are politically but not legally binding. I elaborate on this later in this chapter. 
States or other public actors are crucial in the initiatives since they provide the legal 
and institutional framework, but they differ from traditional intergovernmental 
regimes as NSAs are able to directly influence agenda-setting and the negotiation of 
regulations.22 Corporations are able to shape the norms and standards of behaviour as 
they are given a lot of weight through self-regulatory and co-regulatory 
mechanisms. To some extent, market actors have the right to shape their own 
technical standards and codes of conduct. In other parts, business has to cooperate 
with other actors. MSIs differ from co-regulatory mechanisms as they integrate the 
third dimension of governance, world civic politics. NGOs usually ally in 
transnational advocacy networks so as to campaign against state or corporate 
behaviour (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Increasingly, however, NGOs have striven to 
gain political influence by cooperating with the actors they had once campaigned
22 O f course, NSAs could always exert leverage in intergovernmental regimes to some extent by 
lobbying. But being integrated into the negotiation process as an equal participant dramatically 
transforms the power to set agendas and shape the outcome (Fuchs 2005).
23 Co-regulation involves both public actors and private actors. This tool o f governance combines 
public regulatory aims with private sector efficiency (Haufler 2006).
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against. Thus, they establish norms and standards of behaviour, and monitor and 
enforce compliance in alliance with states and companies. Yet, as I demonstrate in 
Chapter 3, their techniques of exerting political influence have remained the same, as 
their most important assets are still moral authority, the ability to mobilise globally 
and their knowledge.
As MSIs incorporate public actors, private actors and NGOs, they should be 
conceptualised as hybrid institutions at the intersection of intergovernmental 
governance, private governance and world civic politics. In this regard, they are 
unique among the new modes of governance as they are neither public nor private. 
Although MSIs share the characteristics of the three types of governance to some 
extent, they should not be considered as the sum of the three forms. Rather, the 
merging of the different spheres forms a new tool of governance with distinctive 
properties. The cooperation of diplomats, activists and businessmen creates new 
ways of negotiation and governance, a “multistakeholder diplomacy” (Ballentine and 
Nitzschke 2005) which neither of the before-mentioned governance forms can fully 
conceptualise.
How important are MSIs empirically, though? Public-private partnerships and 
MSIs have long played a role in domestic politics (Rosenau 2000). It is only recently 
that MSIs have gained relevance in global public policy. Broadwater and Kaul
(2005) count at least 400 partnerships that address a diverse range of topics such as 
the spread of communicable diseases, climate change or poverty.24 The reasons for 
this increase are manifold. One reason is the changing international political 
environment of the post-Cold War era coupled with increasing globalisation. It 
provides opportunities for new roles for NSAs and multilateral institutions. However, 
one should not go as far as foreseeing the ‘retreat of the state’ (Stange 1996). Borzel 
and Risse (2005) rightly refute the view that conceptualises MSIs and the emerging 
role of other forms of private governance as zero-sum games between states and 
NSAs. Rather, we should adopt the perspective of transformationalists (Held et al. 
1999), who contend that the state perse  is neither dominating the international 
system nor disappearing. It is still the major actor, but globalisation has led to a 
reconfiguration of political power and authority. The policy-making capacity of the
24 In some issue areas partnerships are increasing more than in others. The health sector especially has 
produced a large number o f partnerships (Utting and Zammit 2006: 14). This can be contrasted with 
numbers from the 1980s, where only 50 partnerships were counted (Broadwater and Kaul 2005:6).
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state has become fragmented, permeated by NSAs and transnational networks on 
both the domestic and the international level (Cutler et al. 1999; Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Slaughter 2004). This transformation leads to a new “public global domain” 
which is “a more inclusive arena” for all societal actors (Ruggie 2004: 503).
Another crucial factor for the proliferation of MSIs is seen in the recent turn 
of the UN from anti-business to pro-business which occurred with the appointment 
of Kofi Annan as UNSG (Coleman 2003). Several initiatives were launched: the 
Global Compact in 1999, the Millennium Declaration which dedicated Goal 9 to the 
creation of a global partnership for development; in summer 2000 the UNSG issued 
the UN Guidelines for Cooperation with the Business Community; and in the 
following years the UN General Assembly (UNGA) issued three resolutions 
regarding partnerships with the private sector (A/RES/55/215, A/RES/56/76, 
A/RES/68/129). The trend was not restricted to the UNSG and UNGA, but 
continued at the International Conference of Financing for Development in 
Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002, which stressed the need for more cooperation between 
the public and private sector to overcome the gaps in development finance. The 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in September 
2002 not only launched the EITI (see chapter 6) but also 200 partnerships (most of 
which have not continued to the present day). This trend was followed by launching 
other MSIs outside the UN, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (1997) or the 
broad number of MSIs in the extractive industries.
Next to defining MSIs and observing a new trend, early research also took 
stock of what types of partnership existed. There exist various typologies of 
partnerships that emphasise different aspects (see e.g. Tesner and Kell 2000; UN 
General Assembly 2003, 2005). The following typology draws from Witte et al. 
(2003) and Bull and McNeill (2007). They propose a categorisation into four ideal 
models according to their function. Implementation partnerships are created in the 
aftermath of intergovernmental agreements. The Clean Development Mechanisms 
are an example which are supposed to facilitate the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Coordination Networks such as the Roll Back Malaria Initiative pool actors 
from the different sectors so as to coordinate their action strategies. The networks 
facilitate broad-based knowledge exchange between national and intergovernmental 
bodies, NGOs and the corporate sector (Witte et al. 2003). Financing Networks 
mobilise funds and distribute financial aid in order to realise specific goals. Financial
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resources stem from either direct fundraising at public and private bodies or by 
promoting and facilitating FDI flows to developing countries. Of crucial importance 
is the private sector as it contributes its significant expertise in funding and technical 
expertise (Bull and McNeill 2007). An example is the Global Fund to Fight Aids, 
Malaria, and Tuberculosis which was established in 2001. Finally, negotiation 
networks fulfil the most difficult and contentious tasks by setting norms and 
standards to solve global and complex issues. Examples are the case studies of this 
thesis, the KP and the EITI.
With regard to negotiation networks, a more analytical question came to the 
centre of academic attention focussing on whether these initiatives increase 
legitimacy and accountability in global governance. Approaches focusing on 
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ and ‘transnational civil society’ advocate that through 
NSA involvement the legitimacy of decision-making processes is considerably 
increased (Held 1995; Wapner 1996). In this regard, MSIs are considered as a means 
that contribute to democracy on the global level. However, as pointed out by various 
scholars, the capability of MSIs to increase accountability is also limited (Dingwerth 
2007; Koenig-Archibugi 2004; Ottaway 2001). First, some scholars doubt that NSAs 
can contribute to accountability as these actors are very often unaccountable 
themselves (Nelson 2002b). Second, these initiatives often lack adequate monitoring 
(Ruggie 2002; McIntosh et al. 2004). Some scholars even consider the inclusion of 
private actors as a danger to legitimacy and accountability (Cemy 1999; Paul 2001). 
Especially, it is feared that the inclusion of market actors leads to a “de- 
govemmentalization” and “commercialisation” of international politics (Borzel and 
Risse 2005; Bruhl et al. 2001). In the worst case, partnerships will not promote good 
global governance but deepen the North-South divide. This has led to researching the 
unintended side effects of MSIs, such as the fragmentation of global politics and the 
intergovernmental organisations’ disempowerment (e.g. Richter 2003, Zammit 2003, 
Utting 2003). The WSSD, for instance, is criticised for supporting a “multilateralism 
a la carte in a global multistakeholder bazaar” where business chooses the 
arrangements that suit its interests best whilst public actors are no longer pressured to 
set up binding regulation (Hale and Mauzerall 2004: 223; Pallemaerts 2003: 286). An 
example of this was the “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights” by the 
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Companies
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had lobbied against the adoption arguing that the Norms were unnecessary due to the 
establishment of voluntary initiatives (Utting 2005; Utting and Zammit 2006).
Linked to the question of legitimacy and accountability is the question of why 
the different stakeholders engage in MSIs. As to the national and intergovernmental 
bodies’ motivation to support these cooperative arrangements, functionalist informed 
research puts emphasis on the demand-side perspective (Reinicke et al. 2000). 
According to this view, MSIs arise due to the new needs posed by the new 
challenges of globalisation. In times of economic liberalisation, rapid technological 
change and political ‘regulatory chill’ states realise the need to integrate societal and 
corporate actors in order to provide public goods (Kaul 2003). With states more 
prepared to integrate NSAs into public-policy making, NGOs are also increasingly 
willing to cooperate with other actors. Arguably, a large number of NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International (Al), Greenpeace and Human Rights Watch, still use the 
confrontational strategies of ‘naming and shaming’ companies or states. However, at 
the same time these NGOs also devote a large amount of their financial and human 
resources to cooperative projects with states and MNCs, believing that both 
cooperation and confrontation are different strategies for reaching the same goal. The 
cooperative attitude of these NGOs does not, of course, go unchallenged, as they are 
accused by some of their peers of loosing credibility and helping the culprits’ 
greenwash (Kuper 2004; Winston 2002). With regard to the corporate side of MSIs, 
research in IR and International Business could contribute to a better understanding 
of this question by highlighting corporate incentives in becoming involved. The 
motivations for business to be engaged depend on various factors but a crucial one is 
the aim of the initiative. Some partnerships aim at creating new or deepening existing 
markets. For the companies, this opens the possibility of broadening the sources of 
profit. MNCs are reluctant to engage in these markets alone due to transaction costs, 
or political and commercial risks. By cooperating with public actors and NGOs, 
these risks can be alleviated (Reinicke et al. 2000). Related to this, some companies 
consider cooperation as a competitive advantage over their rivals. MSIs can provide 
new business opportunities by creating new market entry barriers. For instance, 
imposing higher standards of corporate conduct is supported by those companies that 
are able to comply with them. Especially larger companies consider stricter 
regulation as a comparative advantage (Bemauer and Caduff 2004; Martin 2002). 
Moreover, cooperation can be explained by the companies’ public policy strategies.
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Launching regulation together with public bodies and NGOs can prevent stricter 
public regulation. Thus, companies are able to shape the regulation according to their 
needs instead of being on the recipient of regulation. Moreover, participating in MSIs 
can improve relationships with the other stakeholders. This is especially important 
for the extractive industries whose operations are dependent on the ‘license to 
operate’. As the extraction of natural resources is accompanied by negative 
environmental consequences, maintaining good relations with local communities is 
essential. If the extractive industries operate in conflict- or corruption-prone regions, 
cooperation in MSIs can be part of their risk and crisis management. Business 
engagement can also increase brand value and reputation. This can be crucial 
especially when the companies have come under public pressure by public bodies or 
NGOs (Zandvliet 2005; Yakovleva 2005). Using a neo-Gramscian approach, some 
scholars suggest that partnerships provide business with the opportunity to secure a 
capitalist hegemony (Blowfield 2005; Utting 2002). Corporate leaders consider it as 
a political strategy that can reconcile the demands from the anti-globalisation 
movement with their interest to maintain a business-friendly international system. 
Finally, the personal values of individual executives can play a crucial role, too. In 
the context of market failures or changed political and economic circumstances in the 
post-Cold War world, some managers see it as their responsibility not only to 
increase business performance, but also to make a contribution to society (Spar and 
La Mure 2003; Hemingway and Maclagan 2004). In some cases, especially when 
various companies participate, it can be difficult to ascertain one specific motivation, 
as managers might have different reasons for cooperation.
While these research findings are very important for the understanding of 
MSIs in global governance, another question has been raised more recently regarding 
their policy impact. Considering that a great number of MSIs are created across 
different policy fields, scholars and practitioners are left with the question of whether 
and (if so) why they matter in global politics.25 Two questions can be derived from 
this. First, do MSIs have more impact than intergovememental regimes and second, 
what constitutes a successful MSI in contrast to a failed one? The first question is 
difficult to answer as we would have to analyse an intergovernmental regime and an 
MSI regulating the same policy field. Empirically, such a comparison is as yet hard
25 This question is increasingly looked at with regards to private governance as well (Pattberg 2007).
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to find, so it is not surprising that research on this issue remains rare (for exceptions 
see Dingwerth 2004; Reinicke et al. 2000). Nevertheless, the question is discussed in 
a controversial way on a theoretical level. The functional approach emphasises the 
high problem-solving capacity of MSIs due to the comparative advantage to normal 
intergovernmental governance of a variety of stakeholder getting together to solve 
global issues. Constructivist approaches highlight the possibility of higher 
compliance rates in MSIs as they can induce social learning and socialisation 
processes (Dingwerth 2004; Dubash et al. 2001; Ruggie 2001). Moreover, since the 
norm-targets negotiate the norms in the first place, the stakeholders could develop a 
perception of ownership of the standards which might lead to more effective 
regulation and stronger compliance (Brinkerhoff 2002a; Bernstein 2005). In contrast, 
some researchers fear that including a large number of stakeholders will only lead to 
standard setting at the lowest common denominator (Borzel and Risse 2005).
The second question is both empirically manageable and of the utmost 
empirical and theoretical significance. If this form of governance is to remain in 
international relations, policy-makers and scholars alike should know what 
constitutes a successful MSI in contrast to one that is unable to make a significant 
impact. Only a few research outcomes could be generated in this issue so far. The 
most extensive research by Reinicke et al. (2000) looked at a number of MSIs from a 
functional point of view and came to the conclusion that those initiatives have a 
comparative advantage for solving global issues. Borzel and Risse (2005: 208) 
criticise the work of Reinicke et al. for their focus on successful cases rather than 
including failures. Another issue is the question of how to measure the impact of 
MSIs. Dingwerth (2004) rightly points out that specific criteria must be established 
which enable an objective assessment. However, as the research of the effectiveness 
of international regimes demonstrates, this is not an easy exercise. The remainder of 
the chapter will therefore look more closely at what could be the elements of an 
analytical framework for assessing the impact of MSIs.
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2.1.2 Measuring Institutions: Effectiveness, Compliance and Institutional
Design
Before being able to establish such an analytical framework, we have to know how to 
measure ‘political impact’ in the first place. That this is not an easy task can be 
demonstrated by taking a look at regime theory in the past decades. Three 
approaches exist attempting to measure institutional impact in a different way: 
effectiveness, compliance and institutional design. This section will discuss each of 
them in the light of applicability to measuring the impact of our two case studies. I 
conclude that both effectiveness and compliance are not appropriate for assessing the 
impact of MSIs. Institutional design is therefore more suitable, as it focuses more on 
the potential impact.
The most intuitive way of measuring institutions is to enquire about their 
effectiveness. Yet, when researching regime effectiveness, the first challenge is to 
define effectiveness. The literature uses many complementing and competing 
definitions. We can conceptualise effectiveness by measuring political impact. Did 
the regime have the ability to solve the issue? However, research on environmental 
regimes suggests that this conceptualisation raises two difficulties. First, even the 
most effective regime will not be able to immediately eliminate the problem it was 
designed for. Issues may endure even if  all regime regulations are implemented 
because of other social practices that cannot easily be eliminated (Levy 1996). 
Second, there are also other influencing factors that aggravate a political or 
environmental problem, such as biological or social ones, which cannot be 
influenced by the rules of the regimes. Therefore, researchers often refer to regime 
effectiveness as ‘problem-solving capacity’ (Levy 1996). Scholars do not look at 
whether the regime solves the problem for the reasons mentioned above, but analyse 
whether the measures agreed upon are appropriate to effectively address the problem.
With regard to the independent variable {yvhy the regime is effective), the 
most prominent approach is a functional one which points to the nature of the issue 
being regulated (Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Miles et al. 2002). Given that we 
control the policy issue in our case studies, such an approach would predict that the 
KP and the EITI would be equally effective. Yet the empirical analysis contradicts 
such a prediction. Overall, research on regime effectiveness has produced a broad 
range of definitions and explanatory variables, but these different approaches are
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highly inconsistent and come to contradictory conclusions. Using this concept for 
measuring the impact of MSIs is therefore methodologically problematic. As to the 
context of MSIs in the given policy field, measuring regime effectiveness is even 
more difficult. Firstly, this inquiry looks at institutions that were set up only 
recently.26 It is difficult to assess their effectiveness given the short time of their 
operation. In addition to this, another issue arises solely concerning regimes in the 
field of illegal economic activities. It is very difficult to assess the quantity of 
illegally-traded commodities and corruption. Up until now, the data available has 
been extremely poor in terms of availability and quality. Although several datasets 
exist for measuring corruption and the flow of illegal diamonds for individual
oncountries, no research has been undertaken on a global level. Producing the data 
myself would be academically and financially unfeasible given the limited scope of 
the thesis. Due to the manifold difficulties, regime effectiveness offers no theoretical 
framework for assessing the political impact of the KP and the EITI.
Another way to measure the impact is to scrutinise their behavioural effects. 
Compliance is defined as “rule consistent behaviour” (Young 1979; Victor et al. 
1998; Mitchell 1994a).28 There are mainly three approaches to explain compliance. 
Rational approaches conceptualise actors as self-interested utility maximisers who 
have well-defined interests. The actors behave in an instrumental-rational way by 
calculating the costs and benefits of their behaviour (March and Olson 1998). 
Institutions impact the actors by changing their cost-benefit calculations through 
(positive) incentives and (negative) sanctions (Keohane 1984; Victor et al. 1998). 
Given the absence of pre-existing bodies that strengthen the participants’ 
commitments, states must ensure that “illegitimate behaviour” and “procedures to 
discourage cheating” are specified by the institution (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 188). 
Monitoring and sanctions mechanisms are therefore crucial to ensure compliance as 
they increase transparency and limit the possibility of free-riding. Managerial 
approaches put the emphasis on the role of positive incentives that contribute to 
compliance. Overall, states wish to comply with international norms. Cases of non­
26 The KP began in 2000 and the certification scheme was set up in 2003. Discussions about the EITI 
began in 2001 and implementation of the EITI criteria and principles started in 2005. For more details 
about the development o f the two initiatives see Chapters 4 and 6.
27 In the case of goods which can be traded both legally and illegally one can analyse whether the 
amount o f the legal trade has risen since the establishment of the regime.
28 Pattberg (2007) looks at the influence of private governance by measuring behavioural changes.
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compliance are mostly non-intentional and due to the incapacity of states to 
implement and enforce the norms as well as misunderstandings of the norms in 
question (Chayes and Chayes 1993, 1995). Institutions play a significant role in 
assuring compliance not so much because they give positive or negative incentives, 
but because they assist those states which lack the necessary resources for norm 
implementation (e.g. through financial and technical assistance, legal expertise). 
Finally, constructivist approaches have different assumptions about the motivation of 
action. Institutions shape the identities and preferences of their members and induce 
socialisation and learning processes. Over time, actors will internalise the new norms 
and compliance will be taken for granted (Caporaso and Jupille 2001; March and 
Olson 1998). While measuring compliance is a feasible endeavour for a doctoral 
thesis, it is not a reliable indicator of whether or not institutions have a substantial 
impact. The compliance rates of the regime may be high, but the requirements the 
participants have to comply with do not reflect what should be done in order to 
address the issue, but only the lowest common denominator of the different 
bargaining positions when the institution was set up (Downs et al. 1996). In addition, 
measuring compliance rates is difficult given the short time of operation of the KPCS 
and the EITI. We must therefore look for another possibility to measure impact.
The final option is to examine the institutional arrangements. It is assumed 
that specific institutional arrangements shape the impact of the institution. In the last 
two decades, along with the awareness of the proliferation and growing importance 
of international institutions, scholars have begun scrutinising institutional differences 
across international institutions. In addition, a number of approaches have 
crystallised to assess and describe the differences of the institutional design of 
international regimes.29 The underlying rationale of this endeavour is that “specific 
institutional features (...) may account for variation in institutional effect” (Bemauer 
1995: 361; Mitchell 1994b). The hypothesis, derived rather from intuition than from 
rigorous research, is that a strong institution will be more successful in managing 
political issues than a weak one (Bemauer 1995: 362). The important question, 
however, is: what constitutes a strong institution? Proponents of functional regime 
theory took the first steps towards defining strong and weak institutions albeit 
without adding a normative claim. They mainly distinguished between formal and
291 review the literature specific to institutional design in detail in the following sub-chapter.
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informal institutions (Lipson 1991; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Morrow 2000). A more 
recent framework builds on this dichotomy in a more elaborate fashion by integrating 
insights from International Law into functional regime theory (Krasner 2000). The 
concept of legalization has attracted great academic attention in recent times and 
distinguishes international institutions according to their degree of legalization 
assuming that a hard law agreement is a stronger institution than a soft law 
agreement (Abbott et al. 2000). The advantage of this approach to measuring 
institutions is that one can compare relatively new international agreements, as the 
focus is the institution itself and not its effects. It is therefore also appropriate to 
measure the fight against illegal economic activity. One can say that the approach 
measures the potential for success or failure of a given institution. The next sub­
chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the literature of institutional design.
% ♦ ♦ * $
To sum up this sub-chapter, I defined MSI as international institutions incorporating 
states, NGOs and MNCs. MSIs have gained empirical significance since the end of 
the last decade both because of the rise of NSAs in general and because of the 
emergence of a more favourable climate for the establishment of such initiatives. By 
reviewing current research of MSIs in IR, we found a crucial research lacuna, the 
issue of policy impact. Whether MSIs are just a current trend or remain in 
international relations for the long run is difficult to predict. However, if such 
initiatives are more than a trend, it is crucial to know whether or not MSIs have 
policy impact. Therefore, the research question of this thesis, why are some MSIs 
more successful than others, has both practical and theoretical relevance. It is 
practically relevant, as decision-makers should know the success factors of MSIs 
before they continue designing such institutions. It is theoretically relevant as by 
reviewing the literature, no scholar has addressed this question by overcoming the 
selection bias. It is therefore high time that successful and failed MSIs are compared 
and reasons for success and failure established. The sub-chapter then turned to 
identify a possible framework for measuring policy impact. We concluded that both 
regime effectiveness and compliance were inappropriate for measuring the impact of 
the KP and the EITI. While institutional design is only a proxy by not measuring 
actual but potential impact, we found that such an approach would be more suitable
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in the given context. We therefore now proceed by looking at the approach in more 
detail.
2.2 The Institutional Design of International Institutions
After having defined the dependent variable of this thesis as institutional design, we 
now need to establish a methodology by which we can assess the institutional design 
features of the MSI. This sub-chapter serves to discuss two prominent approaches to 
institutional design in light of its applicability to MSIs. I conclude that while both 
approaches offer important insights into how a methodology should look, the 
substantive content of both approaches is not suitable for assessing the design of 
MSIs. The sub-chapter therefore reveals the necessity of establishing an analytical 
framework for new forms of governance when addressing the question of policy 
impact.
2.2.1 Theories of Institutional Design
Two approaches to measuring institutional design have so far been developed. The 
‘Rational Design of International Institutions’ (Koremenos et al. 2001) identifies 
multiple aspects that are significant for assessing institutional design: membership 
rules, scope of issues covered, centralisation of tasks, rules for controlling the 
institution, flexibility of arrangements. The approach follows a neo-liberal 
institutionalist logic whereby the design is explained according to the type of policy 
problem and number of participants, but the approach makes no judgments about the 
degree of institutionalisation.
The more prominent approach however fuses insights of IR with International 
Law. The so-called legalization approach distinguishes between two concepts of law, 
legally binding law -  so-called hard law -  and non-legally binding but politically 
committing law -  soft law. As Kirton and Trebilcock (2004: 8) stress, there are a 
number of different definitions of both concepts in the literature. According to 
Chinkin (1989: 851)
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“Soft law instruments range from treaties, but which include only soft obligations 
(“legal soft law”), to non-binding or voluntary resolutions and codes o f conduct 
formulated and accepted by international and regional organisations (“non-legal soft 
law”), to statements prepared by individuals in a non-governmental capacity, but which 
purport to lay down international principles”
Soft law may prescribe a set of vague or imprecise international minimal standards,
leaving much of its content to the discretion of the participating states (Chinkin
2000; 1989: 862). Soft law arrangements essentially consist of two instruments,
voluntary standards and informal institutions “that depend on the voluntarily
supplied participation, resources and consensual actions of their members” (Kirton
and Trebilcock 2004: 4). Participating states specifically articulate the non-binding
character (‘politically binding’) in soft law agreements. Although they miss strong
surveillance and enforcement mechanisms offered by hard law, soft law can entail
provisions for monitoring and enforcement as well (Chinkin 1989: 862). In contrast
to soft law, hard law is said to have a high credibility due to its possibilities of
adjudication.
How can we operationalise the differences between hard law and soft law? 
The concept of legalization combined the discussion in International Law with 
functional regime theory in IR. Abbott et al. (2000) define the degree of legalization 
of a specific institution along three dimensions. The first one, obligation, describes 
the degree by which states are bound by their commitments. A hard law agreement 
must specify the exact obligations undertaken or rights granted. Non-implementation 
or violation of these obligations by one or more state parties opens the possibility for 
judicial means of reparation by the other state parties. Precision refers to the ability 
to develop a clear-cut and unambiguous set of requirements and action-plans. 
Compliance theory points to the lack of precision as one of the main reasons for 
non-compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1995). Thus, the increasing vagueness of an 
institution’s rules result in an increased loss of its credibility. The last dimension is 
delegation, the extent to which the authority of rule implementation, interpretation, 
application and dispute settlement is referred to third parties. The concept of 
legalization specifically addresses institutions made by states.
The concept enables us to grasp the continuum of different forms of international 
law as indicated in Figure 2.
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Soft Law H ard Law
Obligation Expressly ------------------- ------------------- ► Binding rule
Nonlegal norm (jus cogens)
Precision Vague Precise, highly
Principle -------------------► elaborated rule
Delegation Diplomacy -------------------► International court,
organisation;
domestic application
Figure 2 The Dimensions of legalization (Abbott et al. 2000: 404)
In sum, two approaches for measuring institutional design exist. The 
approach by Koremenos et al. (2001) simply offers a description and an explanation 
of the development of specific institutional designs, whereas the legalization 
approach also makes judgements about the degree of institutionalisation, categorising 
institutions as hard and soft law agreements.
2.2.2 The Variety of Soft Law, MSI and the Extractive Industries
The concept of legalization demonstrates that international institutions exist in many 
forms, but we can not only distinguish between hard law and soft law. In this section 
I argue that soft law itself can be found in a variety of forms, a phenomenon which is 
under-emphasised by the legalisation approach. Soft law differs with regard to its 
form, language, subject matter, participants, addressees, purposes, requirements, 
follow-up and monitoring processes. Whereas the legalization approach focuses on 
the variety of international law along the duality of hard law/soft law, by comparing 
the institutional design of two MSIs, I concentrate on the variety within soft law. Soft 
law is sometimes referred to as “non-law” (Weil 1983) or as second best solution 
(Schachter 1977: 305) by international lawyers, but we see from this section that soft 
law is in some industry sectors a crucial component to their governance.
Before laying out the crucial variances of soft law, we have to link the 
discussion of soft law to MSIs. We have already noted the increase in numbers of 
MSIs and -  more generally -  new forms of governance due to expanding
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globalisation. Most of these initiatives that enable governance on a global scale do 
not fit into the traditional conception of intergovernmental-based, formal 
international hard law. First, we can observe that to a considerable extent these new 
forms of governance are not usually recognised as sources of international law.
Many rules and practices are performed outside the traditional intergovernmental 
structure yet, hybrid public-private or purely private institutions are crucial in 
generating new rules and practices.
Let us examine the extractive industries to demonstrate the importance of soft 
law in governing the sector. As Table 1 shows, the only possibility of holding MNCs 
accountable by hard law is the ATCA. The act authorises civil lawsuits in US courts 
by foreign persons for torts which violate international or US law. International 
lawyers argue that although this is an important measure on a national level, acts like 
this are insufficient to regulate MNCs (Chesterman 2004; Jagers 1999). First of all, 
bringing MNCs to court in the US is a very costly endeavour which plaintiffs from 
developing countries will not be able to afford. Secondly, as the structure of MNCs is 
very complicated, it might be difficult to establish whether the parent company is 
responsible for the activities of other companies in the group. There are a few public 
international legal standards that attempt to govern the regulatory vacuum, such as 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) ‘Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises’ or the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 
‘Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy’ (see e.g. Weissbrodt 2004). However, these guidelines are purely voluntary -  
hence soft law. Most notably, as pointed out by industry officials the standards are 
formulated in very vague terms and only set out criteria for operating in weak zones 
of governance lacking any mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance.30
30 See http://www.unglobalcompact.Org/docs/issues_doc/7.7/7.7.3/sp_oferrall070305.pdf, last 
accessed on 1 December 2006.
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Form of 
Governance
Voluntary 
(Soft Law)
Sanction Binding 
(Hard Law)
Self-regulation
(companies)
Across industries
Industry Level • Anti-Corruption Task Force
• OGP
• The Wolfsberg Principles
• The Global Mining Initiative’s 
Mining Minerals and Sustainable 
Development Project
Company Level • Company Codes of Conduct, e.g. 
Shell’s General Business Principles
MSI
(States, IGOs, 
NGOs, companies)
• UN Global Compact
• Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights
• Chad-Cameroon Development and 
Pipeline Project
• EITI
• KP
Public Regulation 
(States, IGOs)
• OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises
• ILO ‘Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy’
•  UN Security Council 
Sanctions
• USATCA
Table 1 International Regulation of the Extractive Industry in Resource-Rich
Developing Countries (adapted and abridged from Ballentine 2004)
Table 1 also lists the important private and public-private initiatives in the policy 
field. As one can see, the initiatives that have arisen can take several forms. A great 
number of the initiatives are self-regulatory industrial initiatives. Self-regulation is 
mainly exerted in two forms. Almost all companies dealing with natural resources in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America have launched company codes of conduct. These 
codes of conduct are mostly created, implemented and interpreted by the company’s 
own legal staff (Cragg 2004). Although not being the rule, most major MNCs have 
published their Codes of Conduct. The codes vary greatly from company to 
company. They rely mostly on self-reporting while lacking compliance assessment 
by third-parties. Examples include Shell’s General Business Principles (Royal Dutch 
Shell pic 2005). In addition to that, industry-wide codes of conduct exist, which are 
also voluntary in character, and are monitored internally. However, since these codes 
of conduct apply to a wider range of companies, they were adopted after some form 
of public consultation with, for instance, NGOs. Examples are the Anti-Corruption 
Task Force of the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) which
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was created because its members were operating in some of the most corruption- 
prone areas in the world (OGP 2002).
Other initiatives incorporate the private sector, national or intergovernmental 
bodies and NGOs. The most prominent example in this category is the Global 
Compact. It is not limited to MNC operations in developing countries, but sets up a 
wide range of environmental, social, and other good-govemance standards. The 
Chad-Cameroon Development and Pipeline Project addresses this policy issue more 
specifically.31 Chapters 6 and 7 elaborate on this initiative in more detail. The 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (in the following the Voluntary 
Principles) were established in cooperation with the governments of the US and UK, 
a number of large oil and mining companies, and some human rights NGOs such as 
Al. The Voluntary Principles are supposed to provide guidance for companies to 
maintain the safety and security of their operations while respecting the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of the communities affected by company operations.32 
Finally, the KP and the EITI were created so as to fight corruption in resource-rich 
countries and to curb trade in conflict diamonds. I discuss these initiatives in great 
detail in Chapters 4 to 7.
What do we learn from this? We can see that a variety of soft law institutions 
have developed whereas hard law seems to be the exception in this policy field. In 
fact, the significance of soft law as the predominant form of governance is no 
exception in the extractive industries’. Across industry sectors, businesses and civil 
society have long cooperated by agreeing on soft law arrangements which have 
contributed to the creation of ‘privatized soft law’ (Abbott 2005: 24). Kirton and 
Trebilcock (2004) stress, however, that in recent decades business and global civil 
society have begun to devise codes of conduct that extend from their primary 
commercial interests by embracing issues that touch upon environmental and social 
concerns. These private soft law agreements coalesce with the growing hybrid 
public-private regulations and international public law. Thus, we can witness the 
emergence of a
“brave new world o f international law” where ‘transnational actors, sources of law, 
allocation of decision functions and modes of regulation have all mutated into 
fascinating hybrid forms. International law now comprises a complex blend of 
customary, positive, declarative and soft law” (Koh 1995: ix).
31 See www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj, last accessed on 1 December 2006.
32 See http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/, last accessed on 24 April 2007.
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Global governance not only promotes the emergence of soft law but also transforms 
the dichotomy of the two competing law concepts (soft law and hard law) into 
completing and reinforcing mechanisms (Brutsch and Lehmkuhl 2007).
As the above analysis suggests soft law exists in a variety of forms. The 
legalization approach, simply distinguishing between hard law and soft law, 
underestimates this variety. Before laying out the crucial variances of soft law, it is 
imperative to take into account a number of important commonalities. One important 
characteristic across the diverse range of soft law instruments is their voluntary 
nature. As Kirton and Trebilcock (2004: 9) stress, any participant is free to leave at 
any time, without invoking international judicial institutions. Ending participation of 
soft law agreements may, however, deprive the leaving party of certain benefits or 
involve other costs, such as loss of reputation. Soft law therefore plays an 
“informative and educative role” (Chinkin 1989: 862). Due to the lack of dispute 
settlement mechanisms or international adjudication, there is a strong emphasis on 
consensus-based decision-making (Kirton and Trebilcock 2004). Derived from this 
we can identify the third commonality, which is the informality by which governance 
comes about. Since the participants rely on consensus rather than ratified or codified 
charters, soft law agreements rarely involve the creation of intergovernmental 
bureaucracies with their own resources.
As to the differences in soft law, one important aspect concerns its form. As 
we can see from Table 1, soft law instruments range from treaties, which include 
only soft regulations, and non-binding and voluntary resolutions or codes of conduct 
to certification schemes as well as transparency obligations on the part of the 
government.
Soft law agreements can be found in nearly any subject matter of 
international relations. This form of regulation specifically proliferates in the issue 
areas of the environment (e.g. the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Equator 
Principles) and conduct of businesses in host countries (e.g. OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises).
With regard to the participants in and addressees of soft law, government 
actors or intergovernmental organisations can either be included in or excluded in 
soft law agreements as both participants and addressees. In cases where they are 
included in the institutional design and operation, they contribute their authority 
towards regulation but without dominating the regime. In the Voluntary Principles,
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for instance, the governments of the UK and the US, although not being the 
addressees of the agreement, are adding legitimacy to the code of conduct. The 
reputation of the Global Compact relies to a significant extent on the involvement 
and soft power of the UN. In the Wolfsberg Principles, which are relevant to the 
extractive industries as banks regulate their lending activities accordingly, no 
governmental or intergovernmental agencies are involved. The Group is made up of 
12 global banks which came together in 2000 to publish a set of principles and 
guidelines concerning the fight against money laundering and the promotion of 
transparency (Pieth and Aiolfi 2003; Turner 2006).
As to the requirements or obligations, soft law can come in a very general 
form, leaving much of the actual design of implementation to the discretion of the 
participants. Soft law can be described as a set of minimum requirements which the 
participants should implement, thus allowing more progressive participants to move 
ahead. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is one example which 
gives only very general recommendations for business conduct in host countries. For 
instance, Principle II.2 recommends that firms “respect the human rights of those 
affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s obligations and 
commitments” (OECD 2000).
Finally, soft law agreements significantly differ with regard to their follow- 
up, monitoring and enforcement instruments. Since international dispute resolution 
procedures are not applicable to soft law, these agreements have put increasing 
emphasis on this part of the agreement. Third party monitoring and watchdog bodies 
especially can contribute to assuring compliance with soft law agreements.
Overall, this section has argued that by dichotomising hard law and soft law, 
the legalization approach is unable to capture the broad variety within soft law. In 
fact, in many industry sectors such as the extractive industries, soft law in its 
manifold forms is a crucial component of governance. By reviewing some of the soft 
law initiatives, I alluded to different degrees of institutionalisation, concerning for 
instance their degree of membership or monitoring requirements. The next section 
scrutinises to what extent this finding has an impact on the framework we chose to 
measure the impact of MSIs.
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2.2.3 Theories of Institutional Design and MSI
In the previous section we noted that soft law is an important component of 
governance of the extractive industries. By reviewing some of the initiatives, we 
realised that soft law exists in a variety of forms. This conclusion has crucial 
consequences for our analytical framework to the dependent variable, institutional 
design. Only very recently, Beisheim, Liese and Ulbert (2007) measured the degree 
of institutionalisation of MSIs by using the legalization framework. Nevertheless, I 
argue that existing approaches are incapable of capturing the variety within soft law.
As to the first framework, the concept of legalization (Abbott et al. 2000) 
cannot be fully applied since it concentrates on the dichotomy of hard law versus soft 
law. Some aspects of the framework are not applicable as they characterise the 
distinction between soft law and hard law and therefore cannot assess variety within 
soft law. The first aspect is ‘precision’. It scrutinises whether a rule is specified 
“clearly and unambiguously” (Abbott et al. 2000: 412) or leaves scope for 
considerable interpretation. Since soft law mechanisms are all rather imprecise and 
leave specification and interpretation to the discretion of the participants, this aspect 
cannot be used to assess the variety of MSIs.
The second aspect is ‘delegation’, which refers to the right granted to third 
parties, especially courts, arbitrators, and administrative organisations, to 
“implement, interpret, and apply the rules” (Abbott et al. 2000: 401). As mentioned 
above, adjudication is not an instrument of enforcement open to soft law.33 New 
modes of governance, especially MSIs, are based on consensus. Disputes are settled 
informally by political bargaining and not by legal justification. Therefore, to what 
extent dispute settlement mechanisms are set up formally or informally is not a 
question that applies to soft law mechanisms.
‘Obligation’ is the last element of the approach. Although the legalization 
approach argues that soft law is devoid of obligation, I argue in the final sub-chapter 
that obligation can be created in different ways and therefore it should be one 
element according to which MSIs are to be assessed.
33 Finnemore and Toope (2001:747) argue that delegation should not even be conceptualised as an 
important characteristic o f hard law, since many legally binding agreements lack the aspect of 
delegation especially in the context o f human rights commitments.
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With regard to the framework by Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001), most 
of the indicators helping to differentiate the institutional design cannot be used for an 
analysis focussing on soft law either. Scope, centralisation, control and flexibility are 
not applicable to soft law agreements and therefore should be excluded from the 
framework. As explained earlier, flexibility is one of the great advantages of soft law 
in general. As it is not a feature that allows for the analysis of variance within soft 
law, it cannot be part of the framework. The same applies for centralisation and 
control. Soft law in general is characterised by low levels of centralisation and 
control due to its informal nature. Therefore, these aspects cannot be used for 
assessing the variety of soft law. Scope could be used to measure the impact of MSIs. 
Some MSIs, such as the Global Compact are very broad in scope, covering all 
industry sectors and a vast range of policy issues ranging from the environment and 
HIV/Aids to corruption. Others, like the Voluntary Principles, focus on the 
protection of human rights in the extractive industries. How useful is it, though, to 
include scope in our framework given that we maintain the focus on one policy 
issue? I therefore chose not to include scope as an indicator. The last component of 
the framework, membership, is important for assessing differences in institutional 
design. I elaborate on membership in greater detail below.
In summary, while membership and obligation are crucial indicators for 
assessing the institutional design of MSIs, the majority of the components of the two 
frameworks cannot be applied when analysing soft law mechanisms. By using 
existing frameworks as a starting point, I establish my own framework of analysis in 
the following sub-chapter.
This sub-chapter discussed different approaches to measuring institutional design. 
Overall, two approaches exist, both categorising international institutions in hard law 
or soft law. We then conceptualised MSIs as soft law institutions. By reviewing 
existing institutions in the extractive industries, we noted that with the notable 
exception of the ATCA, all other institutions were soft law. We concluded that soft 
law can exist in a broad variety of forms, a fact that the hard law/soft law dichotomy 
ignores. Therefore, the existing frameworks for assessing the institutional design 
cannot be applied for the given case studies. We therefore turn to establishing our
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own analytical framework using Abbott et al.’s (2000) and Koremenos et al.’s (2001) 
approach as a starting point.
2.3 The Institutional Design o f MSIs
Against the background of the previous discussion, I now turn to establishing the 
analytical framework for assessing the institutional design of MSIs. When measuring 
forms of soft law, the institutional setting becomes very crucial, as it is considered to 
be intimately linked to the regime’s impact. As mentioned earlier, research on MSIs 
has largely ignored the insights of IR theory. However, some studies refer to the 
importance of institutional design when scrutinising the impact of partnerships and 
self-regulatory agreements (Rodriguez-Garavito 2005; O'Rourke 2003, 2006; Kolk 
and van Tulder 2006). This sub-chapter identifies the mechanisms and institutional 
settings that contribute to strong or weak MSIs. This is an important precondition for 
proceeding to answer the research question as it ultimately defines the dependent 
variable of our study.
As to the literature on new modes of governance, very little research exists on 
institutional design. Most of the scholars focus on the design of monitoring 
provisions (Rodriguez-Garavito 2005, O’Rourke 2003, O’Rourke 2006). However, 
precise performance criteria and enforcement in cases of non-compliance are also 
mentioned (e.g. Rodriguez-Garavito 2005). The most rigorous model is the one by 
Kolk and van Tulder (2005), who compare the effectiveness of different industrial 
labour codes of conduct. The model includes provisions for monitoring, sanctions 
and financial and management commitments. However, the framework is very issue 
specific (labour codes of conduct). Beisheim, Liese and Ulbert’s (2007) approach 
was already mentioned.
My analytical framework builds on this literature, integrating insights from 
institutional design theory discussed in the previous sub-chapter. Overall, I suggest a 
framework looking at the level of membership, obligation, monitoring and 
enforcement so as to assess the degree of institutionalisation. The remainder of the 
sub-chapter discusses and operationalises each of the indicators.
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2.3.1 Membership
The first aspect concerns the question of participation in the initiative. I have already 
noted that the prime focus of this thesis is not norm adoption but institutional design. 
However, both are linked in one aspect. Endorsing specific institutional design 
features is a precondition for norm adoption. If the strongest institutional design is 
not accepted, it is not worth the paper it is written on. In this regard, we have to 
scrutinise norm adoption as one aspect of institutional design by examining how 
many participants are included in the agreement. Is membership open to any 
interested parties or is it restricted? It is crucial to examine the procedures of 
becoming a member. In some initiatives, such as the Equator Principles, it suffices to 
sign up for the initiative. No implementation measures are tied to being accepted as a 
participant (Wright and Rwabizambuga 2006). In other regulatory systems, 
membership is conditional on the implementation of certain requirements which are 
subject to monitoring. The FSC, for instance, prescribes a detailed procedure which 
must be followed in order to become a member (Meidinger 2006). The candidate 
first has to submit an application explaining his operations and what changes would 
have to be made in order to fulfil the certification requirements. Before the candidate 
is admitted as a participant, an on-ground field assessment is conducted by 
independent specialists in order to ensure that all the necessary requirements are 
fulfilled. The admission of the candidate is subject to this introductory assessment. 
Furthermore, O’Rourke (2003) points to the issue of free-riders. Are all concerned 
countries participating, or is there a significant number of free-riders who refrain 
from cooperation? In order to illustrate this, let us take the example of agreements 
combating climate change. If major greenhouse gas emitters are not members of the 
international regime, this will have negative consequences both on the agreement’s 
credibility and on its capacity to fight climate change.
Ignored by most of the literature that deals with the question of membership 
is a difficult trade off: is it more desirable to have a large number of participants or 
low levels of inclusion? As Steets (2005) discusses, a high level of inclusion makes 
the governance of the agreement unwieldy. The more stakeholders join the more 
difficult it becomes to balance the different interests. The decision-making process is 
negatively impacted, especially when it is an informal and consensus-based 
initiative. Stakeholder consultations can develop into extensive projects which
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demand a high financial and organisational capacity. Yet, despite the costs of a high 
level of inclusion, there are significant advantages linked to the functional argument 
of pooling resources in MSIs, the creation of obligation and to the possibilities of 
enforcement. In the norm creation phase, while a large number of participants might 
make the decision-making process more difficult, including a large number of 
stakeholders enables the involvement the “necessary technical, regional, social, and 
political information” (Brinkerhoff 2002b: 1301) . As to the norm implementation 
phase, the more stakeholders that are participating in the initiative and the more 
countries that sign up for it, the greater the credibility and legitimacy of the initiative 
(O'Rourke 2003). Hence, in general, all countries and NSAs that are involved in the 
policy issue should participate in the MSIs. Figure 3 sums up the important 
indicators for assessing membership.
Membership
•  Open or restricted membership?
• What are the procedures for becoming a member?
• High or low level o f inclusion (exclusion of free-riders)?
Figure 3 Indicators for Assessing ‘Membership’
2.3.2 Obligation
Obligation is an aspect ignored by the literature on new modes of governance, 
mainly for the reason that soft law does not contain any contractual obligation. Yet, 
even if these forms of regulation are not legally-binding, they should not be looked at 
only from their contractual aspect. If soft law does not entail legally binding 
obligations, does this mean that the concept of obligation is completely alien to the 
concept of soft law? The legalization approach assumes that when commitments are 
not legally enforceable, for instance by international courts, states might not feel 
obliged to meet the commitments (Abbott et al. 2000; Abbott and Snidal 2000). As 
Reus-Smit (2004) correctly observes, obligation is the centrepiece in this approach in 
differentiating hard law from soft law, as “legal obligations bring into play the 
established norms, procedures, and forms of discourse of the international legal 
system” (Abbott and Snidal 2000: 409). States feel obliged because obligation alters
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the structure of incentives and constraints that determine actor behaviour. However, 
limiting our understanding of law to constraints only underestimates the effects of 
law in social life (Finnemore and Toope 2001). As Keohane (1997) points out, 
international lawyers have long argued that the legitimacy of norms and their 
persuasive power can be a cause for compliance (see e.g. Trimble 1990). Hence, in a 
more constructivist understanding of law, it not only delimits acceptable behaviour, 
but also “constitutes relationships” (Finnemore and Toope 2001: 745; Slaughter et al. 
1998). Law should be seen as a process rather than a product whereby actors are not 
only constrained but also constituted by defining socially acceptable behaviour. Law 
therefore has an authoritative and transformative character, as it defines authority in 
the first place. Contrary to Finnemore and Toope (2001), however, I do not wish to 
contest the usefulness of the concept of obligation as such, but wish to demonstrate 
that obligation can be created in different ways.34 Obligation understood in a 
constructivist sense does not derive from its sanctioning power but from its 
“normative force through recognition of social expectations” by other actors (UN 
Human Rights Council 2007: 14). In this regard, soft law is not devoid of obligation. 
Like any other law, it creates the expectation that it will be respected (Davidow and 
Chiles 1978; Grachalla-Wesierski 1984). Non-legally binding rules and practices 
should therefore be considered as mechanisms for the creation of new international 
norms. As pointed out by Krisch and Kingsbury (2006), such non-binding rules and 
practices may in many cases be relevant material for decision-making by an 
international legal tribunal. Shelton (2000:4) notes that the fact that soft law 
commitments are increasingly included in hard agreements shows that “both form 
and content are relevant to the sense of legal obligation”. Obligation, thus, should not 
be equalised with the contractual character of an agreement, as “some soft law 
instruments may have a specific normative content that is ‘harder’ than the hard law 
commitment in treaties”. Even if non-binding instruments were never supposed to 
have a normative effect, they might serve as a catalyst for further legal action.
By recognising the authority constituting character of the law, we can 
conclude that obligation can take different forms and that it is also created by soft 
law, even if it is not legally enforceable. The emphasis of the constructivist approach 
on obligation and international law should not be understood as an argument for the
34 On the coexistence of two approaches to the creation of obligation in international law from an IR 
perspective, see also Keohane (1997).
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supremacy of this approach. Rather, the aim is to stress that there exist two optics of 
international law (an instrumental one and a constructivist one) which have different 
assumptions on the creation of obligation. To understand international law both 
optics are needed (Keohane 1997).
To measure the degree of obligation in MSIs, we must consider two issues. 
First of all, it is important to understand how the initiative creates obligation. How is 
the conception of obligation created in the absence of contractual obligation? 
Finnemore and Toope (2001: 748) refer to the notion of the legitimacy of law which 
does not only create obligation in a formal sense but also in a “felt sense”:
“Law is legitimate only to the extent that it produces rules that are generally applicable, 
exhibit clarity or determinacy, are coherent with other rules, are publicized (so that 
people know what they are), seek to avoid retroactivity, are relatively constant over 
time, are possible to perform, and are congruent with official action (...)  Legal 
legitimacy also depends on agents in the system why the rules are necessary”.
According to Finnemore and Toope (ibid.), law that adheres to the abovementioned
values will generate a sense of obligation and behavioural changes. As stated above,
the level of inclusion is linked to the legitimacy of the agreement since a higher level
of inclusion boosts the credibility and legitimacy of the initiative.
MSIs create obligation through their rule-making function. In general, one 
has to distinguish between two kinds of rules generated by MSIs. The constitutive 
rules define and constitute the institution as a whole whereas the regulative rules 
refer to the procedural, structural, and substantive rules, such as certain product 
standards (Giddens 1984). Thus, constitutive rules are prerequisites for public-private 
cooperation whereas regulative rules refer to the governance output of the institution 
(Pattberg 2004a). Social obligation is created by the interaction of the legitimacy of 
both the constitutive and the regulative rules.
As to the regulative rules, MSIs can differ with regard to their standard- 
setting capabilities, which is defined as the making of voluntary, expertise-based 
structural, procedural or substantive regulation (Kerwer 2002: 298). The standards 
can take the form of certification schemes, labelling or general codes of conduct. The 
benchmarks for the standards can be very specific or describe certain minimal 
standards.
Second, the content of the obligation, i.e. the regulatory rules, should be 
subject to scrutiny. What types of requirements must the participants fulfil?
35 On the question of legitimacy of partnerships, see Dingwerth (2007).
69
Figure 4 sums up the important indicators for assessing obligation.
Creation of the sense of obligation How is the sense o f obligation created?
• General applicability?
• Clarity of the established benchmarks?
• Coherence with other rules?
• Public availability?
• Performance possible (technical assistance
available)?
• Notion of necessity?
Content of obligation • What are the participants required to do 
(benchmarks)?
Figure 4 Indicators for Assessing ‘Obligation’
2.3.3 Monitoring
Although MSIs are voluntary in nature, some degree of compliance is necessary in 
order for them to qualify as public-private regulation (for a similar observation 
regarding private governance, see Pattberg 2004a). The regulative rules of the 
initiative define what counts as compliance. As mentioned before, most of the 
institutional design literature on new forms of governance emphasises the 
significance of monitoring.
The techniques and the actors involved in monitoring can vary significantly 
using the whole spectrum of international practices. Ideally, one can distinguish 
between three instances in the conduct of monitoring (Pattberg 2004a; Wolfrum 
1998; O'Rourke 2006). First-party monitoring is a self-assessment exercise where the 
addressees of the rules assess their own compliance and generate reports. Second- 
party monitoring involves other participants of the initiative who work together and 
report compliance. In both cases, the participating NGOs and the secretariat or chair 
of the initiative play a crucial role in ensuring that monitoring is correctly 
undertaken. Finally, third party monitoring involves an independent instance which 
undertakes monitoring and generates the report on behalf of the institution. This can
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be performed by an outside individual, a commission or an international 
organisation.
In addition, the techniques used for monitoring vary. Broadly, one can 
distinguish between two techniques (Wolfrum 1998). The first one is onsite 
inspection, the second one being reporting systems.
Depending on the elaborateness of the monitoring, we can distinguish 
between strong and weak institutions. Soft law institutions vary widely with regard to 
their monitoring requirements. At one end of the scale, the Equator Principles do not 
contain any monitoring requirements at all (Wright and Rwabizambuga 2006). At the 
other extreme, the FSC, as mentioned earlier, elaborated rather strict rules on 
monitoring, as it scrutinised the implementation of the FSC requirements before 
admitting applicants to the scheme. Monitoring, however, is not limited to the 
admission of new members, but undertaken systematically and continuously 
throughout the membership (Rodriguez-Garavito 2005, O’Rourke 2003, O’Rourke 
2006). Annual follow-up audits by third parties ensure that all participants meet the 
standards of the FSC (Meidinger 2006). Between these two extremes, there is much 
leeway for a variety of informal agreements on monitoring. Another important 
element to improve monitoring is transparency (Rodriguez-Garavito 2005). For 
instance, the Global Compact does not formally contain rules on monitoring, yet, it 
relies on enlisted NGOs that gather and disseminate information about the behaviour 
of participating companies (Winston 2002; Hurd 2003). Information is publicised by 
groups as powerful as AL As Hurd (2003) argues, it is expected that the wider public 
is interested in this information and will either punish non-compliant or reward 
compliant participants through the marketplace. Figure 5 sums up the important 
indicators for the assessment of monitoring.
Monitoring
• Is compliance monitored?
• Is monitoring mandatory or voluntary?
• How often is monitoring conducted?
• Who carries out monitoring (self-assessment, second-party or third-party monitoring)?
• Is monitoring systematic and continuous?
• Is monitoring transparent (e.g. are reports published)?
Figure 5 Indicators for Assessing ‘Monitoring’
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2.3.4 Enforcement
Linked to the question of monitoring is the issue of enforcement. Monitoring tells us 
whether participants are compliant or not. Enforcement concerns the political 
consequences of non-compliance. An enforcement problem arises when participants 
prefer defection with short-term benefits over cooperation with long-term benefits 
(Koremenos et al. 2001).
Soft law agreements are voluntary. Therefore, they differ from hard law 
agreements with regard to the mechanisms. However, despite the lack of formal 
enforcement mechanisms, it would be wrong to assume that the notion of 
enforcement cannot be included in soft law agreements. In fact, soft law agreements 
vary significantly with respect to their enforcement mechanisms. Generally, there are 
two approaches to enforcement in the research on MSIs. Constructivists point to soft 
instruments like legitimacy and social learning which ensure compliance of the 
participants (Ruggie 2002). As the case study on the World Commission on Dams 
shows, one can concur with constructivists and proponents of the managerial 
approach to compliance theory who expect high compliance rates when the norm- 
targets participate in the decision-making processes in the norm creation phase 
(Brinkerhoff 2002a; Bernstein 2005). Another example is the Global Compact which 
is designed as a ‘learning network’. The founders of the Compact explicitly rejected 
the inclusion of the possibility for sanctions when it was created.36 It is argued that 
the combination of universal legitimacy and self-interest of the Global Compact 
induces a strong compliance pull (Hurd 2003). Since the participants are convinced 
that the norms promoted by the initiative are legitimate and necessary, they will 
comply with it. One could say that there is a mechanism of ‘self-enforcement’ in 
place.
The other approach criticises the reliance on self-enforcement through 
persuasion and legitimacy by pointing to the necessity of a sanctioning mechanism 
for non-compliant behaviour. Nolan (2005: 459) argues that since the Global 
Compact overemphasises the value of the voluntary approach to the detriment of
36 It has to be noted that the Global Compact does not have the legal capability for a sanctioning 
mechanisms since the UN “has power only over its member states, not firms, and can only apply 
coercive sanctions when there is a threat to ‘international peace and security’” (Hurd 2003: 108).
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clear performance criteria or benchmarks according to which compliance can be 
assessed, it risks losing its credibility.
There are various elements the designer of soft law initiatives can draw on to 
include enforcement in the agreement. Initiatives that make membership subject to 
compliance retain the possibility of sanctioning non-compliance with exclusion or 
membership limitation. Depending on how crucial membership is in order to conduct 
business (both for participating countries and firms), exclusion or the limiting of 
membership benefits can be a very effective means of enforcing compliant 
behaviour. For instance, in well-controlled product chains which require the use of 
certified commodities, such as the forestry sector, exclusion from the initiative is 
accompanied with a loss of business (Meidinger 2006).
Exclusion, or ‘naming and shaming’ non-compliant members in public, in 
plenaries or the initiatives’ website, can be accompanied with loss of reputation. The 
example of forest campaigners demonstrates the power of activists who regularly 
scan forestry products and make non-compliance public. The more dependent the 
participant is on international cooperation, the more powerful this sanction is.
As far as enforcing compliance of countries is concerned, international 
financial institutions (IFIs) can play a crucial role. They can mainstream the 
requirement of participation in and compliance with the initiative by making it a 
condition of their financial support for developing countries.
Figure 6 sums up the important indicators for assessing membership.
Enforcement
• Is compliance enforced?
• Can non-compliant members be excluded or restricted in their membership benefits?
• Is exclusion from the initiative accompanied with exclusion from the product chain?
• Are naming and shaming practices used? How dependent are members on the reputational 
benefits of the initiative?
• Do IFIs make participation in and compliance with the initiative mandatory?
Figure 6 Indicators for Assessing ‘Enforcement’
$  $  $  £  $
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This sub-chapter established an analytical framework for assessing the institutional 
design of MSIs based on both existing approaches and on insights derived from the 
Global Governance literature. To conclude, I focussed on four indicators, looking at 
membership, obligation, monitoring and compliance. Figure 7 sums up the analytical 
framework. It is important to note that it presents the two extremes of a continuum 
(weak MSI -  strong MSI) leaving much leeway for many forms of 
institutionalisation in between.
Membership
States &
Non-state
stakeholders
•  Open membership, no application 
procedures
•  Limited membership (free-riders)
•  Restricted membership, applicants 
have to fulfil certain requirements
•  Global, no free-riders
Obligation •  Purely voluntary: no benchmarks
•  No creation of a conception of 
obligation
•  Performance obligation: participants 
have to fulfil certain requirements
•  Creation of a strong conception of 
obligation (general applicability, 
clarity, coherence with other rules, 
technical assistance, necessity for 
compliance).
Monitoring •  No provisions on monitoring •  Mandatory monitoring on a regular 
basis (systematic & continuous, not 
self-assessment, transparent process)
Enforcement & 
Sanctions
•  No provisions for enforcement & 
sanctions
•  Enforcement measures (membership 
sanctions, exclusion from product 
chain, ‘naming & shaming’, IFI 
mainstreaming)
Figure 7 The Different Nuances of Soft Law: Assessing the Institutional Design of MSIs
74
Derived from this, I define a strongly institutionalised MSI as one that has high 
levels of membership, a high level of obligation and strong monitoring and 
enforcement measures. A very weakly institutionalised MSI is characterised by a low 
membership, no obligation as well as no monitoring or enforcement mechanisms.
2.4 Conclusion
MSIs are the most recent addition to new forms of governance in world politics. 
Although they are a relatively new phenomenon, many MSIs have been created since 
2000, and their attractiveness among policy makers continues to grow. Despite their 
popularity among practitioners, there is still a dearth of theoretical considerations on 
MSIs. From the literature review in this chapter, we see that IR theories of 
international institutions have only rarely been applied to MSI research. This is a 
crucial neglect of current MSI scholarship. In this chapter, I argued that MSIs are 
best conceptualised as international institutions belonging to the realm of soft law. 
The research question of why some MSIs are more successful than others is crucial 
both for IR scholars and practitioners. As the literature review found, we lack 
theoretically informed studies on the conditions of success of MSIs. IR theory, 
especially functional regime theory, has produced a number of approaches to 
establish whether a given institution is successful in dealing with the policy issue or 
not. However, given a number of methodological issues, we concluded that regime 
effectiveness and compliance are not appropriate for assessing the extent of MSIs’ 
success. The theory of institutional design appeared to be a more appropriate 
approach to this issue. Yet, by looking in more detail at the two existing approaches 
to institutional design, we noted that they could not be applied to assessing the 
institutional design of MSIs. As the two approaches concentrated on the hard 
law/soft law dichotomy, we had to adapt the analytical framework so as to be able to 
assess the variety of institutional design within soft law. Although the assessment of 
the institutional design of new forms of governance remains underdeveloped, there 
are some interesting findings incorporated into the framework, mainly on questions 
o f membership, monitoring, and enforcement. I concluded the chapter by suggesting 
four indicators for assessing the institutional design of MSI: membership, the level of 
obligation, degrees of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The discussion now
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turns to the independent variable of the thesis: how we can account for the 
institutional design of MSIs.
C h a p t e r  3
Norm Diffusion and Political Opportunity Structures: An 
Alternative Approach to Institutional Design
The previous chapter introduced MSIs as new forms of governance and located them 
as international institutions in IR. Based on this, we established a framework that 
enables us to capture the differences in the institutional design of these particular 
forms of governance. We now turn to the main question of how we can account for 
these differences.
Institutional design depends on the collective choice over institutions. The 
collective choice consists of the individual strategies of actors during the 
institutionalisation process, but is not just the sum of those individual strategies. 
During the institutionalisation process conflict arises between those favouring strong 
institutionalisation and those that prefer a low degree of institutionalisation. In this 
chapter, I argue that norm entrepreneurs push for strong institutionalisation through a 
social mechanism called norm diffusion. In IR, norm diffusion has been traditionally 
looked at with respect to states as targets, but when looking at norm diffusion during 
the negotiations to an MSI, we also have to study norm diffusion in the private 
sector. Norm diffusion impacts the collective institutional choice by shaping the 
strategies of the stakeholders. I identify two political strategies by which norm 
diffusion can occur: framing and structural power. Succeeding to diffuse the norm 
can account for strong institutionalisation as it galvanises support for it. I explain a 
weak institutional design by the failure of the norm entrepreneurs to diffuse the new 
norm and the resilience of competing norms put forth by not like-minded actors
n n
which I call norm opponents . This brings us to an observation often ignored by 
researchers looking at the impact of ideational facts in IR: new ideas sometimes do 
not make their way through.
What, then, explains the prevention of successful norm diffusion? I argue that 
ideas can have a diverging impact in different structural settings. In this regard, the
37 The term norm opponent does not refer to agents generally refusing the validity of norms but those 
who oppose the new norm put forth by norm entrepreneurs.
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focus of the analysis shifts from agents to structures. Ideas can become constrained 
by existing normative and material structures. When analysing the role of norm 
entrepreneurs in the decision-making process of institutional design we therefore 
have to acknowledge that norm entrepreneurs may not be successful in every 
structural setting. The main argument runs as follows: Material and normative 
structures in business and states can operate as POS which mediate between the 
diffusion of new ideas by norm entrepreneurs and policy outcomes (the institutional 
design). POS therefore have an impact on negotiations in which the design of new 
institutions is decided. In terms of research design, they act as intervening variables 
between dependent and independent variables.
Looking at the material and normative structures in which new ideas are 
diffused does not entail neglecting the agents and their targets of diffusion. Rather, 
the stakeholders and norm entrepreneurs need to be located within the competitive 
dynamics of particular industry structures as well as within the institutions and 
ideologies of the political economy. I argue that being able to spot and exploit 
opportunities to foster norm diffusion is a form of discursive power. This is not a 
new observation. POS have long been scrutinised by social movement theorists. 
However, what has been ignored in the literature is that POS can work in two ways. 
To the same extent that they can provide opportunities for norm entrepreneurs 
pushing for strong institutionalisation, they can also empower norm opponents when 
constraining norm diffusion. They can therefore provide an explanation of why norm 
diffusion in some cases is not successful.
In summary, my approach combines elements from different traditions. It 
adopts an understanding of discursive power and framing from (thin) constructivism 
while using a thin rationalist ontology as previously emphasised.38 The concept of 
norm diffusion derives from new institutionalism. Moreover, by borrowing the 
concept using POS, I make use of insights from social movement theories. However, 
as elaborated later, I depart from the original understanding of POS in a significant 
way.
Such a multi-dimensional framework offers the chance to overcome the 
several shortcomings of existing theories on institutional design. On the one hand, 
we noted in Chapter 1 that the main weakness of neo-liberal institutionalism is to
381 demonstrated the compatibility of thin rationalism and thin constructivism in Chapter 1.
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underestimate the role of power as well as structural differences in such divergence 
in values when setting up international institutions. The inability to account for the 
variance of the institutional design of the KP and the EITI stems from the fact that 
neo-liberal institutionalism focuses on questions of efficiency by assuming complete 
rationality of actors and structural homogeneity. On the other hand, power-based 
theories cannot explain first, why powerful countries became involved in both 
initiatives in the first place and secondly, why the KP was able to produce a strong 
design without US leadership.
Incorporating a structural account into the framework helps us to understand 
structural opportunities or constraints to norm diffusion of norm entrepreneurs. In 
contrast to many structural approaches in IPE, emphasising the significance of 
structures does not mean that they are immovable and thereby over-determine agency 
(Prakash 2000). I am stressing throughout this chapter that structural factors do not 
overshadow but constrain or drive agents. Explaining complex social phenomena 
often requires the use of multiple theories connected within a common framework. 
Given the limitations of mainstream theories such as neorealism, neo-liberal 
institutionalism and constructivism to account for the research puzzle, social science 
has to take into account more the complex and multi-dimensional character of the 
social world. I therefore combine two levels of analysis, agents (political strategy) 
and POS.
The chapter elaborates the theoretical framework in four parts. The following 
two parts discuss POS that account for the variation in norm diffusion by focussing 
first on governments and then on business. Although traditionally, social movements 
theory has looked at POS only with regard to the states (with the notable exception of 
Schurman 2004), we also need to discuss this concept with regards to MNCs when 
analysing the institutionalisation of MSIs. The reason for this is, of course, that both 
states and MNCs are targets of norm diffusion when institutionalising MSIs. In the 
third part, an analysis focussing on the role of norm entrepreneurs and the two 
political strategies to diffuse norms, framing and structural power, is be embedded 
into this structuralist framework. The conclusion summarises the approach and 
discusses its added value in light of existing theories of institutional design.
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3.1 Political Opportunity Structures: The State
The chapter begins by turning to the first level of analysis, POS. We identified 
structural conditions as mediators between norm entrepreneurs and policy outcomes 
during norm diffusion. I chose to start with the structural aspect of the framework as 
it provides the setting in which norm diffusion takes place.
POS are widely used by social movement theorists. The concept was a crucial 
addition to the flourishing research on social movements that had mostly looked at 
internal aspects such as movement structure or financial resources as an explanation 
for their success. POS became prominent in the 1980s when research on social 
movements suggested that their success depends mostly on the external environment 
(this body of research is very extensive, see e.g. Tarrow 1996; Kitschelt 1986; 
McAdam et al. 1996; Tilly 1978; Useem and Zald 1982). POS are defined as “a set 
of formal and informal political conditions that encourage, discourage, channel, and 
otherwise affect movement activity” (Campbell 2005: 44). Overall, movement 
theorists have looked at four aspects providing political opportunities: (1) the relative 
openness/closure of the institutionalised political system, (2) the stability/instability 
of elite alignments that undergird a policy, (3) the presence/absence of elite allies, (4) 
the state’s capacity or propensity for repression. Moreover, POS not only derive from 
inherent properties of the interacting units but also from historic events on the 
international level. In that case, POS resemble what Sell and Prakash (2004: 145) 
termed as “policy crisis”.39 Examples for this could be the outbreak of civil wars, the 
assassination of a politician or any other single, crucial event. So as to take those 
historical dynamics into account, the study must remain historically grounded. In 
both cases, POS do not directly influence the policy outcomes but mediate between 
the agents and the outcome.
I depart from the traditional understanding of POS by using it as an umbrella 
term for structural factors impacting the success of political strategy. I propose two 
key POS that impact on norm diffusion, which have as yet been ignored by the social 
movements literature -  the constructivist-inspired notion of ‘normative match’ and 
the realist-informed power distribution. As we see from the empirical chapters, both 
structures present political opportunities for norm entrepreneurs to impact other
391 focus on this more in Section 3.3.2.
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actors. The added value of framing them as political opportunities is that it enables us 
to stress their case-specific nature. As with POS, these structural factors can change 
throughout history, an aspect that is emphasised by the social movement literature.
In the following, we first study the relationship between the new norms that 
are promoted and domestic established norms. We then look at the extent to which 
international power structures can provide either entry points or constraints for new 
ideas.
3.1.1 Normative Match
I contend that the first POS we need to consider is normative match. The 
compatibility between already-established norms and new ideational facts has been 
stressed by constructivists (e.g. Checkel 1999a; Risse-Kappen 1994; Cortell and 
Davis 2000).
Normative match as a political opportunity structure is crucial as new norms 
are not transmitted in an ideational vacuum (Risse-Kappen 1994), but rather, they 
have to compete with already-established normative frameworks. The adoption of 
new norms is likely to be successful if they resonate with the accepted normative 
frameworks. For instance, resonance with shared ethical traditions (Lumsdaine 1993) 
or accepted democratic processes (Payne 2001a, 2001b) can be a crucial facilitator 
for norm recognition. Constructivists usually contend that the normative match can 
be explained by the agents’ desire to resonate their internalised identities with new 
ideational facts. As Hurrell (2005: 49) argues,
“[m]any international norms (...) are powerful precisely because of the way in which 
they relate to the transnational structures within which all states are embedded and to 
the broad social forces (...).”
I contend that the normative match can also be explained within a thin rationalist
framework. Given the challenge of poor information and uncertainty, the match is
particularly crucial for driving norm diffusion. As we noted before, boundedly
rational actors lack the necessary information to understand all the far-reaching
consequences of their behaviour. Therefore, actors are reluctant to change. Accepting
or learning about new norms that match already-accepted normative frameworks
help us not to completely abandon familiar ground in which actors are more capable
of assessing the consequences of their behaviour.
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Linked to the notion of the normative match is the cultural match. Here, the 
focus shifts from the specific norm that is diffused to a broader set of values to which 
both the target and norm entrepreneurs adhere. Constructivists usually point to 
culture as a factor in politics, mainly in the field of foreign policy analysis (see e.g. 
Barnett 1999). In IPE, although cultural factors are extremely important, they are in 
the most part ignored (Simmons and Elkins 2004). Culture, however, is a political 
opportunity driving or constraining norm diffusion. Being the target of norm 
diffusion drives that process significantly, as does adherence to the same culture as 
the norm entrepreneurs. Research on Chinese financial liberalisation suggests that 
China adopted politics close to the Japanese model because the two countries share a 
similar culture and history (Cargill and Parker 2001).40 As Simmons and Elkins 
(2004) emphasise, such a conjecture is sustained by a large literature on norm 
diffusion which found that agents sharing similar cultural attributes tend to adopt the 
same practices. The phenomenon can be explained by the challenge of uncertainty 
and incomplete information. Targets of norm diffusion find norm entrepreneurs 
adhering to the same culture and values as a more reliable guide for their actions.
Normative match can be an opportunity that is ‘just there’. However, in most 
cases the opportunity needs to be created by norm entrepreneurs. We return to this in 
Section 3.3.2.
3.1.2 Power Relations and Material Changes in the International Political
Economy
If normative match is crucial, how can we account for norm acceptance in instances 
where the new norm did not match the established institutional framework? In global 
trade politics, we can take the example of the adoption of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) by developing countries during the Uruguay Round. Whereas the fast and 
widespread acceptance of IPRs in the developed world can be explained by the long 
established practice of protecting intellectual property domestically, to most of the 
developing countries this was a new concept. The answer to this question points to 
norm diffusion -  not through learning but via adaptation, a mechanism which we
40 As stressed by Simmons and Elkins (2004), the argument about cultural differences or similarities 
as political opportunities in driving norm diffusion refutes the conception that policy-makers absorb 
an expanding world culture (e.g. Boli and Thomas 1999).
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discuss in 3.4. The answer also emphasises the fact that, although ideational facts can 
have powerful effects on agents, they are nevertheless very fragile. Many good ideas 
will never succeed whereas a lot of bad ideas have guided policy-making for 
decades. Successful ideas are the ideas of those in power, as the example of IPRs 
suggests. Hence, political opportunities to diffuse a new norm can also arise from the 
power relations in the international system. We have to scrutinise whether the new 
norm matches the normative frameworks of those in power.
Historical dynamics that involve material changes of power relations can 
either provide opportunities or constraints for new ideas to become accepted. 
Changes to power relations can involve shifts due to growing financial capability, 
technological knowledge or military power. Such changes not only alter significantly 
the constellation of the main players in the international system, they also have an 
impact on which normative framework dominates.
How likely are power shifts in the international political economy? Using a 
structural realist interpretation, in the international political economy we can 
distinguish between unipolar, multipolar and bipolar structures (e.g. Waltz 1979). 
Certainly, since the end of the Cold War, the economic Anglo-American system has 
looked reasonalby stable. Yet, both constructivists and neorealists agree that the 
structure can change.41 In fact, looking at the impact o f the next wave of 
globalisation, we can see that the unipolar economic system is changing into a 
multipolar one. Currently we are witnessing dramatic changes in the structure of 
international political economy. The rise of emerging economies such as Brazil, 
Russia, India and China (so-called BRICs, Wilson and Purushothaman 2003) can be 
compared with major tectonic shifts in the international structure. This is not to 
suggest that Western economies will be dominated by Asian ones in the near future. 
Rather, the shift leads to a multipolar era in the international political economy 
(Drezner 2007b). Hurrell and Narlikar (2006) argue that the post-Cold War era led 
emerging economies from conversion to confrontation of established economic ideas 
and policies. This can lead to normative changes on a global scale. Examples such as 
the current Doha Development Round -  where emancipated emerging economies 
want to actively shape the rules of the global economy -  provide a ‘taster’ of such a
41 According to Waltz (1979), the structure changes with a re-distribution o f the capabilities. 
Constructivists assert that agency and structure are mutually co-constitutive, so structure can change if 
agents allow it to do so (Wendt 1992).
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multipolar economic system (Moon 2004; Hurrell and Narlikar 2006). Overall, the 
impact of the shift on power relations in the international political economy should 
not be underestimated but might have the same effects as the rise of Germany in the 
19th century or the US in the early 20th century.
Deriving from this, I argue that we have to consider the unique historical 
circumstances when institutions are built to understand the way in which they are 
institutionalised. We need to take into account that material changes could 
potentially provide political opportunities or constraints for the acceptance of new 
norms.
In summay, POS have an impact on whether or not norm diffusion is successful. By 
focussing on the governments, we identified two POS whilst departing from the 
traditional understanding in the social movements literature. Normative match fosters 
diffusion as boundedly rational actors are more likely to adopt new norms similar to 
already-accepted ones. However, as we can see from a number of examples, 
successful international norms are always the norms of those in power. Therefore, 
when looking at the match between new and accepted norms, we must always 
include an analysis of the current power relations. More specifically, current shifts in 
power relations may provide either opportunities or constraints to norm diffusion.
3.2 Industry Opportunity Structures: The Companies
We now turn to analysing POS for norm diffusion within the industry. Although POS 
are widely accepted among social movement theorists, this aspect has been mostly 
ignored when looking at the impact of norm entrepreneurs on business behaviour. 
One crucial exception to this is Schurman (2004), who transferred the concept of 
POS to the corporate sector, thereby establishing a first approach to “industry 
opportunity structures”. According to Schurman (2004: 248), ‘“ industry structures’ 
confer particular strategic openings and closures on social movements and render 
firms and industries more or less vulnerable (...)”. Applying the concept to our 
framework, we can say that industry opportunity structures provide entry points or 
constraints for norm diffusion. They, therefore, contribute either to strengthening or
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weakening the institutional design. Using POS in the context of the corporate sector 
is crucial for our theoretical framework, as in MSIs, MNCs are, of course, also 
targets of norm diffusion.
Schurman (2004) proposes four types of industry opportunity structures. The 
first arises from the economic and competitive behaviour of firms in an industry. For 
instance, efforts to maintain the stability of markets as well as brand and reputational 
risk management can provide entry points for norm diffusion. Second, the relations 
and dependencies of companies in the organisational network are crucial. Sectors in 
which companies are dependent on a small number of buyers offer more possibilities 
for norm diffusion than well-diversified industry sectors. The last two industry 
structures concern the institutional and normative frameworks in which individual 
companies as well as the industry sector are embedded.
Building on Schurman, I propose two industry opportunity structures looking 
at the two categories mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. Normative 
structures (3.2.2) concern the established normative frameworks both at an individual 
company level and at sector level. They correspond to what Schurman (2004: 250f) 
labelled as “corporate” and “individual firm cultures” and to the normative match 
discussed in 3.1.2.
Departing from Schurman’s framework, I introduce another, power relations. 
As discussed in the preceding sub-chapter, accepted norms are the norms of those in 
power. Hence we also have to consider power relations or changes thereof as being 
crucial (3.2.3).
This sub-chapter discusses under what circumstances business is vulnerable 
or immune to norm diffusion. Yet, given its financial capability, many scholars 
would consider business as privileged among other interests groups, thereby 
contesting the existence of industry opportunity structures for norm diffusion. 
Therefore, I first have to engage with this wider debate on business in the 
international political economy, setting the theoretical context before establishing the 
industry opportunity structures.
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3.2.1 A Pluralist Conception of Business
There is little doubt that mainstream IPE considers business as an important agent 
shaping global economic and environmental politics (see e.g. May 2006; Levy and 
Newell 2005). However, the questions about the sources of business power as well as 
its relations to other interest groups have been highly debated in the last decades. Are 
companies “privileged” over other NSA (Lindblom 1977)? Two competing 
perspectives have evolved, either emphasising the Gramscian-informed view of 
structural dominance or the more pluralist perspective on companies as privileged, 
but not dominating agents.
We have already noted the Neo-Gramscian approach for studying MNCs. 
Particularly with regard to environmental governance, this approach has become 
prominent (Levy and Newell 2002). With respect to our discussion on industry 
structures and norm diffusion, the Neo-Gramscian approach would hold that given 
their structural power, companies are able to dominate the negotiations on 
institutional design. Yet, in Chapter 1 ,1 have already demonstrated that such a view 
cannot account for the variance in the institutional design of the KP and the EITI, as 
we would expect the diamond industry to be able to block strong institutionalisation. 
Neo-Gamscianism has as yet not established a theoretical account of why in some 
cases MNCs might not be able to dominate negotiations.
Pluralist approaches do not attribute structural power to MNCs but rather 
explain their significance by pointing to expertise and resources. Like other interest 
groups, companies seek to influence policy-making. The fact that companies 
compete with other societal groups ensures that no actor exerts hegemony in the long 
run. The study of MSIs is very illustrative for this point, as business has to negotiate 
both with NGOs and states to reach an agreement. We see from the case studies that 
NGOs and MNCs are equally able to make an impact on institutional design. 
However, in contrast to what pluralist conceptions would predict, we can discern that 
the influence of the stakeholders varies across different stages of the MSIs. While 
NGOs exert discursive power primarily at the beginning of the negotiations, MNCs 
are more successful in shaping the technical details of the institution. This is not an 
expression of structural power but rather stems from the unique expertise companies 
possess in their industry sector. From this we can see that MNCs are actually more
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privileged than other interest groups as their impact increases at the more critical 
stages of institutional design.
The neo-pluralist approach has recently put a corrective to lumping together 
MNCs with other societal groups by maintaining that business is in a privileged yet 
not dominating position (Skidmore 1996; Skidmore-Hess 1996; Falkner 2008). 
Cleavages among different business groups can prevent private actors from dictating 
their policy preferences. Taking the neo-pluralist approach as a model contributes to 
a better understanding of MNCs in MSIs, as it emphasises that the business 
community is not a unitary actor, but can be split over political strategy. Thus, the 
neo-pluralist model disagrees with functional approaches to MSIs which lump 
business actors together, pursuing a unitary material interest (Reinicke et al. 2000). 
Whether or not companies have conflicting interests can stem from structural 
preconditions that determine business interests, such as those preferences formulated 
on the basis of the material structure of gains and losses from international trade 
(Rogowski 1989), their location in the supply chain (Falkner 2005b), or domestic 
normative structures (Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2003).
In this thesis, the neo-pluralist approach serves as an analytical tool for 
conceptualising competition with NGOs over policy impact and for disaggregating 
diverging interests within the business community. Drawing from this insight, we 
have to be aware that different companies or groups of firms pursue divergent 
strategies when it comes to designing MSIs.
3.2.2 Normative Match
The first industry opportunity structure driving or constraining norm diffusion is 
related to preferences within corporations. Opportunities arise from a match between 
those preferences and new norms. Yet, before we can transfer the hypothesis of the 
normative match from state to MNC preference formation, we first have to reflect on 
how companies formulate their preferences.
Preference formation is crucial for analysing the political strategy of MNCs. 
In IPE, we can find two strands theorising business interests. The first conceptualises 
companies as undifferentiated global actors being driven only by the desire to 
maximise profits (e.g. Steger 1993; Reich 1990). So as to account for variation in
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business behaviour this neoclassical, economic framework uses as explanatory 
variables differences in external pressures and structural differences in firm 
operational characteristics (Rogowski 1989; Frieden 1988).
However, a growing number of researchers acknowledge the complex 
rationality of firms. The main thesis of this research agenda is that material returns 
cannot fully account for the firm’s motivations and preferences (e.g. Fort and 
Schipani 2004; Smelser and Swedberg 2005). Firms are complex organisations 
embedded in socio-cultural and domestic political-institutional settings, so they have 
to interact with these structural preconditions (Granovetter 1985; Fligstein 2002). In 
particular, new institutionalism argues that social networks constitute firm interests 
through a process of shared understandings and values (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
Such a conceptualisation offers a deep understanding of company preference 
formation as it can account for differences even if MNCs are exposed to the same 
market incentives and pressures (Pulver 2007).
Domestic normative structures impact MNCs in two ways. First, the domestic 
‘base’ constitutes a major determinant of MNC behaviour as the prevalent attitudes 
and culture in the companies are shaped (Sally 1995; Doremus et al. 1990). Thus, to 
a great extent, domestic political and normative perceptions are reproduced within 
the companies. Therefore, differences in MNC behaviour (including the question of 
why a norm was adopted or not) can be explained by the embeddedness in different 
national or regional political economies. On the individual level, despite the 
multinational character of many of today’s firms, the leading executives are often of 
the home country’s nationality and live in the home country where the company’s 
headquarters are based. On the company level, MNCs, having developed their own 
institutional structures over time, maintain relationships with governmental and non­
governmental domestic institutions that constitute drivers and veto-players for the 
political economic decisions the MNCs take. This insight provides an important 
corrective to simplistic rational choice conceptions of the firm mentioned above, as 
companies do not only learn from competition in the marketplace but also from 
interactions with other agents and their ideas.
Second, domestic normative structures impact on MNCs behaviour in the 
form of social demand (e.g. Kempton and Craig 1993; Skjasrseth and Skodvin 2003). 
Here, the key focus shifts from the normative conceptions of the managers to the 
question of how consumer behaviour affects corporate strategies. Skjaerseth and
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Skodvin (2003) emphasise that social demand provides both business opportunities 
and risk. If consumers favour certain business practices such as fair trade in the 
manufacturing sector or environmentally friendly energy, they are more willing to 
pay higher prices for the goods and services. However, social demand can also lead 
to consumer campaigns and social pressure forcing companies to adopt strategies 
they would not otherwise have chosen. An example for this is the great divide of 
climate change strategies between Anglo-Dutch and US oil firms (Rowlands 2000; 
Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2003; Kempton and Craig 1993).
To what extent are different domestic normative frameworks still relevant for 
preference formation in the era of globalisation? Structuralists argue that with 
increasing economic globalisation, different domestic normative positions lose 
importance as MNC preferences come to be dominated by economic considerations. 
This appears to be especially true in a time where MNCs merge on a global scale. 
With dwindling national identities, the strategies taken by the corporate actors 
converge (Levy and Newell 2000: 16). The increasingly common institutional and 
economic business environments in the European Union (EU) and the US provide 
evidence for such a convergence. I argue that it is the greater convergence of 
normative and political factors in the Western hemisphere that accounts for that 
change rather than the decline of national identity. For instance, we can explain the 
expansion of environmental concerns with more scientific evidence and the 
increasing activity of NGOs in the EU and the US. If we take into account the 
corporate strategies of companies located in other regions such as China, India or 
Russia, where the normative and political-institutional settings profoundly differ 
from those adopted in the West, the hypothesis of domestic normative structures 
regains explanatory value. Therefore, case studies, such as the EITI -  which include 
countries and companies from very different normative and political-institutional 
settings -  are very valuable in revealing processes of normative conversion and 
diversion.
Against this background, I propose accepted domestic normative frameworks 
as entry points or constraints for norm diffusion. The normative structures are 
crucial, “because they affect how firms perceive, interpret, and respond to changes in 
the larger social and political environment” (Schurman 2004: 250). The closer the 
normative framework of the company matches the new norms, the more successful 
the norm is. Nevertheless, the argument about a match between societal normative
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structures in the ‘boardroom and on the barricades’ (Bendell 2004), should not 
conceal the fact that in some cases such an opportunity or constraint is not 
straightforward. We should not conceptualise firm behaviour as a direct function of 
domestic normative structures. I argue that the importance of such a match for 
successful norm diffusion also depends on the openness of the companies towards 
societal demand. For instance, firms that actively engage in managing their brand are 
characterised by a close producer-consumer relationship. Such a relationship can 
offer political opportunities for norm diffusion as the companies that invest in their 
brand management obviously have an interest in protecting it. Societal pressure 
constitutes a risk to those investments. The more companies invest in their brand 
management, the more intense the relationship between consumers and producers 
becomes.
Close producer-consumer relations can arise at individual company level as 
well as at the industry sector level. In the manufacturing sector, for instance, big 
clothing companies such as Gap or Nike have an especially close consumer 
relationship, as the value of their brand (and thus their profits) relies on the 
appreciation by its consumers (Klein 1999). Companies such as Woolworth and 
C&A sell non-branded products and therefore have a less close relationship with 
consumers. Due to the specific producer-consumer relationship, big brands like Gap 
or Nike are very susceptible to consumer and activist pressure. If a whole industry 
sector has very little contact with consumers, it is also much removed from societal 
pressure. One example for this is the highly fragmented logging industry. If anything, 
branding occurs at the very end of the supply chain in the manufacturing sector. 
Societal demand has to be translated upstream on the supply chain.
In conclusion, direct contact with consumers increases the need for the 
producers to protect themselves against business risks by incorporating societal 
values into the production and marketing process.
3.2.3 Power Relations: Material Shifts in the Market
Material shifts in the power relations of an industry sector can also provide political 
opportunities for or constraints on the successful diffusion of ideas. A change of the 
power constellations within the industry accounts for the fluid moments in history
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where structure transforms. I argue that the rise o f new powerful actors in an industry 
sector can change who dominates in the corporate discourse. In this regard, Fligstein 
(2002) distinguishes between market participants as incumbents and as challengers. 
Industry incumbents are large firms that seek to protect or enhance their market 
positions. Challenger firms are usually smaller and are looking for ways to gain a 
bigger market share at the expense of the incumbents.42 Depending on the 
institutional embeddedness of the challengers, a political opportunity can arise for 
norm entrepreneurs to diffuse their new norm. For instance, a change in the power 
relations can empower those companies or parts of the industry sector which are, 
with regard to their accepted normative frameworks, more amenable to norm 
diffusion. Challengers might consider strong MSI as a market niche (Schurman 
2004). However, the rise of challengers might also provide constraints on norm 
diffusion and the strong institutionalisation of an MSI to the extent that their 
accepted normative framework is incompatible with the new norm. In that case, the 
challenged incumbents might also abstain from accepting new norms, fearing it 
would contribute to endangering their market position. The argument about historical 
dynamics in the market therefore provides links to the previously discussed 
normative match.
Just how important, though, are structural shifts in the market? With regard to 
the industry, Fligstein (2002) reminds us that structural changes in markets occur due 
to the power struggles between challengers and incumbents. These are particularly 
important when the changes empower business with different normative frameworks. 
For instance, when devising new industry regulation, an important issue is whether 
European or US firms dominate the discourse, as they come from different regulatory 
traditions. The current rise of MNCs from emerging economies can also trigger a 
change in die power relations, thereby having a crucial impact on which normative 
discourse dominates globally (Goldstein 2007; The Economist 2008a).
Whether changes in the material structure affect institutionalisation has to be 
looked at on a case-by-case basis. I argue that major material shifts in markets can 
have a direct impact on the design of new institutions -  particularly when the
42 With the recent structural changes in the oil industry we can see that industry challengers can 
sometimes be bigger than industry incumbents. Major private oil companies have to stand their 
ground against national oil companies (NOCs), which have recently become global players. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
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industry challengers adhere to very different normative frameworks than do 
incumbents.
$  $  $  $  $
To sum up, industry opportunity structures provide entry points for or constraints to 
norm diffusion. They can thereby explain why norm diffusion is sometimes 
successful and sometimes not. In contrast to POS looking at external factors for the 
success of social movements addressing states, industry opportunity structures have 
long been ignored in the literature with the notable exception of Schurman (2004). In 
this sub-chapter we identified two opportunity structures. Firstly, the match between 
established domestic socio-cultural structures and new norms facilitates norm 
diffusion. Secondly, material power shifts empower companies which either 
sympathise with new norms or whose normative frameworks are very different from 
the new norms.
3.3 The Power o f Norm Diffusion
After having identified the POS, we now turn to examining the political strategies of 
actors who whish to exploit those opportunities so as to foster strong or weak 
institutionalisation.
Although the main argument of the thesis supports a predominantly 
structural-based framework, we must to pay attention to agents, as they are the ones 
that incite norm diffusion processes. Structure may constrain or drive agents but 
structural conditions do not determine agency. This is a subtle but crucial distinction.
Earlier in this chapter, we identified successful norm diffusion as the cause 
for reaching a strong institutional design. Generally speaking, diffusion provides an 
explanation for why states, or other agents on the international level, “choose similar 
institutions” (Simmons and Elkins 2005: 34). To put it differently, this social 
mechanism explains why distinct actors develop the same choices about institutional 
design. Simmons and Elkins (ibid.) stress that diffusion is a very broad concept used 
in very diverse research designs with very different meanings. While the concept is 
mainly used to analyse uncoordinated diffusion, I transfer this approach to the setting 
of international negotiations, hence coordinated diffusion. I consider norm diffusion 
as a social mechanism for norm entrepreneurs by which they can impact other
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agents’ institutional design preferences. However, so as to successfully incite norm 
diffusion, norm entrepreneurs must employ political strategies such as framing and 
structural power.
In IR, norm diffusion has traditionally been looked at with respect to states as 
targets so as to be able to explain the institutional design. We have already discussed 
to what extent MNCs behaviour can also be affected by norm diffusion in Chapter 1.
As previously mentioned, the sub-chapter outlines two political strategies by 
which norm diffusion can occur: framing (3.3.2) and structural power (3.3.3). 
Framing has been referred to at the beginning of this chapter as a strategy by which 
to make new norms match to established frameworks. As boundedly rational actors 
need to find solutions to policy problems under considerable time pressure and great 
uncertainty, framing provides openings for norm entrepreneurs to incite learning 
processes. In contrast to framing and learning, exerting structural power is a political 
strategy that alters behaviour in order to adjust to a changed political environment 
without rethinking existing values or ultimate goals.
Norm diffusion has mainly been looked at within a neo-liberal institutional 
framework (e.g. Simmons and Elkins 2005, 2004), but as with the whole approach, 
norm diffusion lacks an appreciation of power. With regard to the first political 
strategy, framing and inciting learning processes is characterised by an unequal 
distribution of discursive power. Regarding the latter, so as to make an actor adapt to 
a new political environment, other actors have to exert power to change the political 
environment in the first place. Additionally, they can employ structural power to 
reinforce adaptation. From this we see that power is a crucial underpinning of the 
political strategies. Before analysing them in greater detail, we therefore first have to 
make sense of the complex concept of power.
3.3.1 Power in International Relations
Power has always been one of the core concepts in the social sciences. Most 
researchers use as a starting point Max Weber’s understanding of power defined as 
“jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen 
Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf dies Chance beruht” (Weber 1980:
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28).43 In the literature, power is mainly conceptualised as being relational, structural 
and discursive.44 Relational approaches to power are close to Max Weber’s concept 
and focus on instrumental causality where “A has power over B to the extent that he 
can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957: 20If). Such 
approaches are closest to the traditional understanding of power (Morgenthau 1953; 
Waltz 1979). By adopting an outcome-oriented perspective, it analyses power as a 
measurable phenomenon.
Structural approaches to power reveal the “hidden faces of power” (Falkner 
2008: 19). Bachrach and Baratz (1962) focus on the power of non-decisions in cases 
where behavioural options are pre-determined, thus looking at the input-side of 
power. Structural approaches were most prominent in IPE in the 1970s and 1980s 
when scholars turned their focus towards material power structures (e.g. Cox 1987).
With the rise of constructivism, IR theory has begun to emphasise the 
constitutive effect of normative structures for actors’ identities and interests. What 
has been ignored, however, is the fact that these constitutive effects are expressions 
of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 41). Recently, scholars have started to pay more 
attention to constructivist dimensions of power (Guzzini 2005; Holzscheiter 2005). 
Discursive power conceptualises the ability to shape perceptions by framing policy 
problems and solutions. More specifically,
“A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he 
also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.”
(Lukes 1974: 27).
Thus, power is reflected in the norms, ideas and societal institutions that shape 
international social activity. This links to what we noted earlier in this chapter: 
accepted norms are those of the actors in power. By globally institutionalising their 
own norms, powerful actors do not need to directly impose a certain political
43 “The probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own 
will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”(translated by Fuchs and 
Lederer 2007).
44 A different conceptualisation of power is provided by Barnett and Duvall (2005) who distinguish 
between compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. There seems to be an emerging 
consensus that scholars should draw on the various conceptualisations of power rather than sticking to 
one school of thought in order to give a more encompassing analysis than earlier studies did (Barnett 
and Duvall 2005; Fuchs 2005; for applications see Fuchs and Lederer 2007). Studying power with 
such pragmatism means that different actors can draw on the same facets o f power. It is the context in 
which the actors use their power and not the properties of actors that is significant here. As Sell and 
Prakash (2004) note, both NGOs and MNCs can draw on discursive power.
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strategy. Exercising power by dominating the global normative discourse is more 
advantageous as it is less costly than direct imposition (Hurrell 2005).
3.3.2 Framing and Learning
New norms diffuse because actors learn about them and find them useful or 
necessary to reach certain policy goals. The political strategy to diffuse norms by 
inciting learning processes is framing. As Sell and Prakash (2004: 144) contend, such 
a political strategy involves using ideas strategically to graft the “preferred policy 
goals onto debates as solutions to pressing policy problems”. We elaborate framing 
and learning later in this section. At this point, it is important to distinguish such an 
approach from others used to conceptualise international negotiations. On the one 
hand, there is a neo-liberal institutionalist perspective in which self-interested and 
completely informed actors hammer out agreements on a give-and-take basis. The 
aim of such a bargain is to offer tangible incentives such as financial, technical, or 
economic assistance or other benefits in exchange for cooperation or the adoption of 
certain rules (Keohane 2001; Jonsson 2002). On the other hand, constructivists 
emphasise that norm creation in negotiations should not be understood solely as a 
bargaining process. Instead, they draw attention to negotiations as communicative 
forums where persuasion and internalisation are significant (Risse 2000; Ruggie
2002). Actors become entrapped in argumentative discourses over different regimes 
of truth and, ultimately, become persuaded by the better argument. In this reading, 
actors prefer a certain institutional design because they are convinced of its necessity.
Both approaches blur the crucial role power plays in international politics 
(Hurrell 2005). Examples such as the Uruguay Round demonstrate that new ideas, 
such as IPRs, were fostered and adopted by the powerful actors whereas weaker 
states did not have the political and financial resources to challenge this idea (Sell
2003). Another example is the flourishing research on transnational advocacy 
networks under a constructivist banner (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). While the cases are supposed to demonstrate the role of persuasion 
and internalisation, they actually capture the same processes of pressure and 
cost/benefit calculations a standard rationalist model would propose. Transnational
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advocacy networks diffuse norms by socially sanctioning bad behaviour and by 
allocating reputational benefits to norm conforming behaviour (for a similar critique 
see Checkel 1999b). In their ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns they exert 
instrumental power in that they make actors behave in a way they have not chosen 
themselves. However, in order to exercise instrumental power, transnational 
advocacy networks must draw on prestige, moral authority and legitimacy (see 
Josselin and Wallace 2001b).45
Knowledge-based theories of regimes -  of which the concept of epistemic 
communities is the most widely known (Haas 1992; Litfin 1994) -  capture the 
middle ground of constructivism and neo-liberal institutionalism by linking regime 
formation through learning to the notion of knowledge as a disposition of political 
power. The approach emphasises that knowledge is not just a body of objective facts 
that is ‘out there’ (Litfin 1994). New ideas do not float freely in the political space 
but have to be constructed by agents. Whether they can be used to teach other actors 
depends on their persuasiveness 46 To make knowledge policy-relevant it must be 
framed or interpreted in such a way that it can exploit POS. New knowledge or new 
ideas therefore have to be grounded on the structural conditions. Knowledge, then, is 
not an exogenous or value-free factor, but can be used and shaped by actors to 
maximise its impact. I consider the ability to initiate learning processes as a form of 
discursive power. To exert this form of power, agents have to employ normative 
frames. New ideas are framed strategically so that they resonate with already- 
accepted normative frameworks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Framing is a concept 
developed by social movement theorists which describes the creation of meaning. 
Frames are not ideas, but “ways of packaging and presenting ideas” (Khagram et al. 
2002: 12). Overall, framing is a political strategy that increases the likelihood of a 
normative match.
Whether norm entrepreneurs can successfully initiate a learning process by 
framing the preferred institutional design depends ultimately on two factors. They 
have to relate to the underlying power positions as well as to the normative
45 In this respect, Hurrell (2005: 49) is right when he observes that mainstream rational approaches do 
not have the “intellectual tools to comprehend adequately” the sources of power in global governance.
46 Note that I use the concept o f learning rather than persuasion as the latter is a constructivist term 
linked to Habermasian theories of communicative action (e.g. Risse 2000; Deitelhoff and Muller 
2005). Persuasion involves changing what people value and what they think is appropriate (March and 
Olson 1998). As I contended in Chapter 1, IR lacks as yet the psychological methodologies to 
demonstrate the empirical validity of such a theory.
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frameworks that provide the circumstances for shaping global politics. Hence, they 
must exploit the POS described earlier in this chapter. Norm entrepreneurs can 
maximise their impact by intervening in particularly fluid moments of the policy 
processes when decision-makers are searching for new policy solutions. They need 
to capitalise on those policy crises as they constitute turning points in which 
uncertainties concerning behavioural options and unhappiness with past or current 
definitions of preferences provide openings for re-thinking. However, what 
constitutes a policy crisis and what it means for the policy process depends on 
framing (Sell and Prakash 2004). Hence, those turning points can be created 
intentionally by norm entrepreneurs when launching a pressure campaign.47 In those 
circumstances the diffusion of new ideas not only incites instrumental reactions 
(adaptation) but can open pathways for learning:
“(...) learning that is triggered by social movements or interest groups is a form of 
involuntary learning. It takes place because the organisation is confronted with 
problems it has not chosen to deal with and, in order to cope, must develop competences 
it would not have developed without being forced to” (Kadtler 2001: 221).
In order to be successful, framing has to involve a certain amount of pressure, as this
increases the likelihood of being heard.
Norm entrepreneurs can change the minds of their targets, but it is the 
practical value of the ideas at that particular moment of time that gives them the 
force to change. Mapping or constructing political opportunities that have the 
potential to foster the diffusion of a specific idea, and then exploiting them, is a form 
of discursive power. By looking at the emergence of the welfare state in the post war 
era, Ikenberry (1993: 84) stresses this point when he concludes that the welfare state 
did not come about just because the idea simply emerged. In fact, many good ideas 
never find an audience and many bad ideas are around for decades. Ideas matter 
because they provide opportunities for elites to pursue their interests in a more 
effective way and because they are promoted by norm entrepreneurs who know when 
and how to seize the moment. Framing is the political strategy to make new ideas 
look valuable and useful to other actors.
47 As an example, disasters such as the Exxon Valdez spill and the chemical disaster in Bhopal, India 
incited far-reaching environmental regulations which were, o f course, not created. But using a 
perceived loss of US competitiveness as a political crisis to enforce IPRs in developing countries, 
technology firms were able to frame the agenda for the construction of what later became the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). At the time the US 
administration was not as yet aware of the importance o f IPRs to the competitiveness of its companies 
(Sell and Prakash 2004).
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Throughout this chapter we noted that POS can work in two ways. Likewise, 
what we said in the above about framing and learning concerns norm opponents who 
want to prevent the widespread diffusion of a specific norm. My approach therefore 
also speaks to the pluralist-structuralist debate introduced in Section 3.2.1. Is 
business more privileged in being able to frame ideas the way we discussed above 
because of its access to financial resources? I contend that it is not, but to the extent 
that access to appropriate information is vital for successful framing strategies, 
MNCs and NGOs might be privileged in framing different issues. For instance, 
where more technical knowledge about industry operations is needed, MNCs might 
have a competitive advantage as they hold the technological expertise. When it 
comes to designing the technical details of MSIs, MNCs might therefore, indeed, be 
privileged -  yet not, as structuralists would assume, because of their financial power. 
Overall, norm opponents exert discursive power in the same way as norm 
entrepreneurs. They frame their resistance to new norms by exploiting the POS and 
thereby constrain norm diffusion. For negotiations on the design of MSIs this means 
that norm diffusion is not a ‘one-way-street’. It is a contest between norm 
entrepreneurs and opponents over discourse domination.
We can therefore conclude that framing to incite learning processes is a 
powerful social strategy for norm diffusion, but in order to exert such power, the 
relevant ideas must be formulated in conjunction with the specific POS. This 
concerns both norm entrepreneurs and norm opponents.
3.3.3 The Power of the Tipping Point: Structural Power
Norm diffusion is successful when the new norm becomes a globalised norm. 
Although this thesis is not primarily about norm adoption, we have already 
considered norm adoption as a precondition when choosing a specific institutional 
design. The previous section suggests that norm diffusion only occurs in cases where 
norm entrepreneurs match the right strategy (framing) to the right moment (POS). 
Multilateral and multi-stakeholder negotiations are complex to analyse because a 
broad range of actors with different backgrounds participate in them. Therefore, we 
should not expect every actor to support a specific institutional design simply 
because framing strategies were successful and because they had learned to prefer
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the design. Such an understanding of norm diffusion would ignore the unique 
situations actors find themselves in and ultimately would render the structural part of 
this framework obsolete.48 The notion of POS contributes to the explanatory value of 
the framework. For, where those structures are not as favourable, framing and 
inciting learning processes might not be the political strategy that is successful in 
diffusing the new norm. Norm entrepreneurs then have to count on structural power 
to push for their preferred institutional design.
Exerting structural power successfully forces actors to adapt because “the 
decisions taken by others alter the value of the policy for others” (Simmons and 
Elkins 2005: 39). Norm entrepreneurs exercise structural power when they alter the 
political environment of norm opponents. It is important to emphasise that structural 
power does not equal coercion (which, of course, would be instrumental power). 
Norm entrepreneurs do not simply impose certain behaviour on norm opponents. 
Coercion, unless it is a hegemonic imposition, is difficult in global politics -  
especially when it comes to creating voluntary MSIs. Exerting structural power is 
much more subtle than instrumental power. Actors who previously opposed a new 
norm must re-evaluate their political options and goals in light of a changed political 
environment. As a result of this process, they will adapt their behaviour to the new 
political environment. To give some examples, norm entrepreneurs can make the 
material incentives and constraints of cooperation and non-cooperation more visible 
for norm opponents. The strategy could also entail using discursive power by 
‘naming and shaming’ or allocating reputational benefits to persuade other actors to 
endorse specific political goals.49
Borrowing from Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle, I argue that 
the tipping point is crucial to successfully exert structural power. The tipping point is 
reached when a critical mass of actors supports a specific institutional design. 
Constructivists paint a picture of the tipping point in which adapting actors are eager 
and willing followers of new international trends and not ‘victims’ becoming 
marginalised or even isolated in the international community (Finnemore 1996a,
48 It would be obsolete because we would then return to assuming uniform structural preconditions in 
which interaction takes place.
49 An example for this is the way in which IFIs ‘motivate’ developing and emerging countries to 
introduce good governance reforms. The IFIs exert discursive power as Woods (2006) points out. 
However, through the scope and content o f conditionality, IFIs are also able to exert structural power 
by allocating both material and reputational benefits.
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1996b; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). According to this view, actors genuinely 
commit to new standards and norms rather than complying begrudgingly with 
outside demands. They change their goals and not only their approach to problem­
solving. However, when looking more closely at why actors adopt certain strategies 
after a tipping point has been reached, we find that consequentialist-motivated 
adaptation to a new political environment is in most cases a better explanation than 
internalisation of a new norm by political elites (see also Checkel 1999b). 
Particularly, when powerful actors set the standards for new behaviour and 
appropriate action, norm opponents may have little choice but to adapt to the new 
political environment. The political power of the group of like-minded actors does 
not stem from brute force and coercion but from authoritative control. The more 
actors adopt the norm during and after the tipping point, the more not like-minded 
actors become marginalised. Exerting structural power by marginalising norm 
opponents intentionally raises the costs of non-cooperation both in material and 
social terms.
The tipping point is crucial as it creates a political opportunity for successful 
norm diffusion through structural power. The more actors with a crucial reputation 
actively endorse a specific institutional design, the more norm opponents may feel 
marginalised. Hence, it not only matters how many states adopt the norm, but also 
which states are already members, as “some states are critical to a norm’s adoption; 
others are less so” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901).
Finally, we can also discern another adaptation after having reached the 
tipping point. Regime evolution has been identified by many regime theorists as a 
crucial development after an initiative has been created. Participants adapt to the new 
requirements by slowly strengthening the regime. This can be explained by the goal 
of regime participants to exclude any free-riders. Those who bear the costs of 
compliance want to ensure that only those who really comply with the regime enjoy 
the benefits. This is a question of evolution rather than political strategy, and 
therefore should be distinguished analytically from adapting to structural power.
This sub-chapter examined norm diffusion as a social mechanism for pushing a 
certain institutional preference. I argued that norm diffusion could be brought about
100
by two political strategies: framing and structural power. Framing and thereby 
initiating learning processes is the ability to make one’s own institutional preference 
fit to the demand of the crucial decision-makers. Exerting structural power is a 
strategy in which norm opponents are marginalised from the international 
community, both in social and material terms. So as not to suffer reputational or 
financial costs, they must adjust their behaviour to the new political environment.
In summary, the sub-chapter provided the link between institutional design as 
outcome and POS and norm diffusion as causal mechanisms. Successful norm 
diffusion depends on the confluence of the right POS and the ability to spot and seize 
the right moment. Hence, for ideas to matter, timing and circumstances are crucial:
“(...) the role of ideas in politics appears to be both powerful and fragile: powerful in 
shaping the definition o f interests at particular historical junctures -  Max Weber’s 
switchman role -  and fragile in that the conditions that allow for the play o f these ideas 
are so highly dependent on an array of enabling circumstances” (Ikenberry 1993: 85).
3.4 Revisiting Institutional Design: Political Opportunity Structures and 
Norm Diffusion
To conclude, it is helpful to summarise both the main points of my framework and to 
emphasise to what extent my approach differs from existing institutional design 
theories. In this chapter, I proposed a distinctive framework to account for the 
institutional design of MSIs. As we saw from Chapter 1, a reconsideration of 
mainstream institutional design theories was needed since they failed to account for 
the institutional variance of the KP and the EITI. In particular, the assumptions of 
complete rationality, structural homogeneity and the underestimation of power 
contribute to the explanatory weakness of neo-liberal institutionalism. Power-based 
theories could not explain why powerful countries became involved in both 
initiatives in the first place, and why the KP was able to produce a strong design 
without the lead of the US.
I propose to examine the emergence of a specific institutional design by 
looking at norm diffusion and POS as causal mechanisms. The advantage of such an 
approach is twofold. First, it takes into account both power relations and the cultural 
and normative diversity in the social world. MSIs are very complex institutions as 
they involve a broad range of stakeholders from a wide variety of normative,
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institutional and political backgrounds. The assumption that considerations of 
efficiency determine institutional choice glosses over the crucial role that power 
asymmetries and differences in beliefs play in the international political economy. 
Second, its explanatory value is increased by combining two levels of analysis as it 
emphasises the complex link between structure (political opportunities) and agency- 
based political strategy (norm diffusion through framing and structural power).
My framework explains strong institutionalisation by the confluence of 
favourable POS and powerful norm entrepreneurs who are able to map and exploit 
the circumstances to their advantage. In cases where norm opponents are easily 
accessible and the new norm matches their established normative framework, norm 
entrepreneurs can frame new norms accordingly and thereby incite learning 
processes to gain support for strong institutionalisation. However, given the high 
complexity of multi-stakeholder negotiations, we should not expect that norm 
entrepreneurs will always be able to gain support for strong institutionalisation by 
such a strategy. In cases where the opportunity structures are not so favourable, norm 
opponents come to support a strong institution because they have become 
marginalised by their peers and therefore need to adapt to a new political 
environment. Structural power is particularly successful in instances where powerful 
actors have previously endorsed a strong MSI.
Weak institutionalisation is explained by the failed attempt to diffuse the new 
norm and the resilience of competing norms. In such a case, the POS constrain the 
success of the political strategies of norm entrepreneurs. Instead, they can be 
exploited by the norm opponents to water down the new institution as much as 
possible and legitimise their preferred competing norms. By conceptualising norm 
diffusion as a two-way process, I emphasise that even in the event of the downfall of 
new ideas there is no such thing as a norm-free space.
This chapter concludes the theoretical part of the thesis before turning to the 
empirical analysis. I developed a framework emphasising that under some 
circumstances, ideas do not make their way through. Ideational facts are powerful as 
they can shape actor behaviour, but in certain structural settings or if norm 
entrepreneurs are simply unable to use opportunity structures for their own 
advantage, ideas remain simply ideas.
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C h a p t e r  4
Regulating Trade in Diamonds
After establishing the theoretical framework, we now turn to the empirical analysis. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the two case studies are each examined in two chapters, 
first looking at the policy issue and scrutinising the particular institutional design, 
then accounting for the specific outcome and the variance across the cases.
We begin the empirical analysis by examining the KP and the trade of 
diamonds. Precious stones have always inspired mankind. Long before diamonds 
were discovered in Africa, the gems, mainly originating from India, were very scarce 
and treated as a symbol of strength, fortitude and courage. Their geological 
background, however, is less fancy. The stones consist of pure carbon and were 
formed and compressed at 3,600 degrees Celsius at the earth’s core thousands of 
years ago. The stones are carried to the surface by volcanic eruptions along so-called 
kimberlite pipes. Amongst other gemstones, diamonds have unique properties. Being 
very hard and resistant to chemicals, they can serve for important industrial purposes. 
Yet, it is their rarity, purity and durability which have made them so precious, being 
a universal token for love and a symbol for luxury.
Politically and economically speaking, diamonds provide a more diverse 
picture. In countries like Botswana they provide the bedrock for economic 
development and political stability. In recent times, however, diamonds have 
acquired an additional reputation. Since the 1990s, the glittering stones are strongly 
associated with civil conflicts and the atrocities of rebel armies in Angola or Sierra 
Leone.
This chapter introduces the first case study, the KP. The MSI aims at curbing 
trade with conflict diamonds which are said to have fuelled the civil wars in Angola, 
Sierra Leone and the DRC. The KPCS is essentially a trade regime for rough 
diamonds. Participating countries are committed to only sell or purchase gems which 
have been certified by an official authority. By doing this, the negotiating parties 
wanted to ensure that diamonds mined by rebels could no longer enter the legal trade.
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Attached to the KPCS is a self-regulatory scheme of the industry, the System of 
Warranty (SoW). The industry thereby ensures that diamonds, once they are cut and 
polished, come from legal sources. Central to the issue of conflict diamonds is the 
opaque character of the diamond industry. The KPCS is designed to make trade with 
diamonds more transparent.
The chapter provides the empirical and analytical background for the 
consecutive main analytical chapter. We first turn to exploring why the KP was 
created by scrutinising the link between the civil wars in Africa and trade in 
diamonds. So as to make the subsequent analysis more accessible for the reader, I 
then provide a brief narrative about the KP highlighting the most crucial events. As a 
next step, the chapter provides an analysis of the main players and the properties of 
the industry structure. As mentioned before, the opaque structure of the diamond 
industry was said to facilitate trade in conflict diamonds. We therefore analyse 
industry opacity as a structural feature of the sector. Finally, we turn the focus to the 
KP again by assessing its institutional design and thereby defining the dependent 
variable of this case. I argue that the KP is a highly institutionalised MSI with regard 
to its levels of membership, obligation, monitoring and enforcement.
4.1 Beauty and the Beasts: Diamonds, Civil W ar, and Illegal Trade
Before analysing and accounting for the institutional design o f the KPCS, it is 
necessary to understand why policy-makers saw a need for creating such an 
institution in the first place. We have already noted in Chapter 1 that participants of 
the KP wanted to create a diamond trade regime to curb trade with conflict diamonds 
which allegedly financed the civil wars in various parts of Africa. This sub-chapter 
provides a more detailed background to the policy issue of conflict diamonds and 
civil war as well as discussing briefly other intergovernmental initiatives that were 
instigated to deal with the issue.
Diamonds appear to have always been worth fighting for. Centuries ago, 
diamond wars ravaged India. In the 1970s and 1980s, both sides of the Lebanese 
Civil War financed themselves through trading and smuggling diamonds from Sierra 
Leone (Cockbum 2002). However, although diamond wars are not a new 
phenomenon, the link between conflict diamonds and civil wars has been neglected
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for a long time. It is only since the mid-1990s that the issue has gained more 
international attention.
4.1.1 Exploring the Link between Conflict Diamonds and Civil War in Africa
The UN defines conflict diamonds as diamonds “that originate from areas controlled 
by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized 
governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those 
governments”.50 The term was coined for diamonds originating in Angola, Sierra 
Leone, and the DRC. However, the issue was not limited to these countries since the 
diamonds were often smuggled through countries such as Liberia, the Central 
African Republic, and the Republic of Congo (GAO 2002). The illegal diamond 
trade was estimated to account for about US$ 300 million per year, which translates 
to three to fifteen percent of the annual global diamond output.51 Although this 
percentage was relatively low, the diamond trade generated huge revenues for 
purchasing weapons and funding drug deals (Price 2003).
The issue of conflict fuelled by the diamond trade only emerged on the 
international political and academic agenda in the 1990s when the civil wars in 
Angola, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Liberia peaked. The conflicts were characterised 
by a high degree of violence against the civilian population over a very long time. 
Since then, an impressive amount o f research has been produced scrutinising the 
‘political economy of war’ and its link to conflict diamonds (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 
1998; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Berdal and Malone 2000).52 Research has not 
only established the ‘paradox of the plenty’ according to which natural resource-rich 
countries are more likely to suffer from civil conflict, but has also moved on to 
identify the causal mechanisms that link the two. Given that a number of diamond
50 Press Release, UN General Assembly, General Assembly Urges States to Implement Measures to 
Weaken Link between Diamond Trade and Weapons for Rebel Movements, UN Doc. GA/9839 (1 
December 2000), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001201.ga9839.doc.html, 
last accessed on 15 June 2008.
51 This percentage is only an estimate. Due to the clandestine nature of the issue it is very difficult to 
give an exact account o f the actual amount (Smillie et al. 2000).
More recently, international attention has turned to so-called ‘dirty diamonds’ which might provide 
sources for terrorist financing (Farah 2001) and illicit mining where artisanal miners work without the 
protection of any legal framework (see the Diamond Development Initiative at www.ddiglobaI.org, 
last accessed on 16 June 2008).
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producing countries have remained peaceful, such as Botswana or Namibia, research 
suggests that natural resources provide political opportunities for conflict rather than 
being a cause for conflict (Humphreys 2005).
As the case studies below demonstrate, diamonds serve as means of financing 
rebel groups. They therefore provide commercial opportunities to continue already 
existing conflicts. Even in the absence of military victories on either side, 
belligerents are able to continue a protracted war against their governments. 
Particularly with diamonds being so small and highly valuable at the same time, they 
are ideal financial resources as they can easily be smuggled across borders.53 
Lootable natural resources also alter incentives for peace-making (Keen 2000). Rebel 
groups might actually be able to gain more by waging war than they would in times 
of peace. Thus, economic considerations impact the interests and behaviour of the 
opposing parties. The war provides financial opportunities for engaging in illicit but 
highly profitable economic activities, such as smuggling diamonds. Rebels therefore 
might lose interest in negotiating compromises on the political roots of the conflict.
The case of Angola serves as a prototype of the extent to which natural 
resources can change the nature of a civil war. The conflict broke out during the 
period of de-colonialisation (1961-1974) in which the rebel group Uniao Nacional 
para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) struggled for political control 
against the government troops of the Movimento Popular para a Libertagao de 
Angola (MPLA). The conflict then transformed into a Cold War proxy conflict 
(Cater 2003). The two forces were sustained by financial assistance from abroad as 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Cuba supported MPLA whereas 
the US and South Africa funded UNITA (Price 2003). The peace accords of 1992, in 
which the UN supervised democratic elections, led to the victory of MPLA 
supporting Eduardo Dos Santos. Since the end of the Cold War had drained financial 
funding of the superpowers, Dos Santos’ opponent UNITA had to raise alternative 
financial resources. From 1992 to 2002, the conflict therefore transformed into a 
resource-based civil war (Cater 2003). Whereas the government funded the war 
through its oil production, UNITA retreated to the diamond fields of the country. 
Global Witness (1998) estimated that UNITA controlled up to 60 to 70 percent of the 
country’s diamond production, which translated into revenue of US$ 3 to 4 billion
53 Another lootable resource are drugs which serve to prolong the civil war in Colombia (see e.g. 
Guaqueta 2003).
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for the period of 1992 to 2000 (Le Billon 2001). After breaking numerous peace 
talks, Angola could finally be pacified after the death of UNITA leader Jonas 
Savimbi in February 2002.54
Independence was also the origin of the civil conflict in the DRC. The US 
supported the highly oppressive regime of Joseph Mobutu, which was challenged by 
a series of rebellions between 1967 and 1978. Mobutu was able to survive those 
rebellions, but the end of the Cold War coupled with widespread human rights 
abuses and the economic collapse of the country precipitated his downfall. The rebel 
leader, Laurent Kabila, and the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la 
Liberation du Congo (AFDL) benefited from the power vacuum following Mobutu’s 
downfall and seized the capital Kinshasa in May 1997. The group was mainly 
supported by Uganda and Rwanda as well as the mining company American Mineral 
Fields, which wanted to protect its concessions (Cater 2003). In the DRC, diamonds 
were only one natural resource among coltan, gold and timber which fuelled the civil 
conflict (Montague 2002). The conflict was finally ended militarily by Zimbabwean, 
Angolan and Namibian troops which led to the Lusaka Peace accord in July 1999.
In contrast to the preceding cases, Sierra Leone’s civil war is not rooted in the 
country’s independence from the UK in 1961 (Cater 2003). Although the regimes 
following independence were highly unpopular, being very corrupt and coercive, the 
conflict was instigated by the outbreak of civil war in neighbouring Liberia. In 
March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by the Liberian 
warlord Charles Taylor, initiated an invasion Sierra Leone. The UN Panel of 
Experts’ Report (S/2000/1195) found that since 1995, RUF had conquered the 
diamond rich fields of Kono and Tongo. The UN estimated that RUF generated an 
annual income of between US$ 25 million and US$ 125 million. The civil war in 
Sierra Leone gained international attention as RUF became widely known for 
horrific atrocities. Overall, the war had caused 75,000 deaths and resulted in 500,000 
people becoming refugees (Cater 2003: 24).
From the three cases we see that diamonds can prolong civil conflicts. 
International initiatives cutting off rebels from their financial resources can therefore 
be very helpful but have to be complemented by more traditional means of 
pacification, as it happened in Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC.
54 For a short summary of the phases of war in Angola, see Global Witness (1998).
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4.1.2 Overview of International Initiatives Dealing with Conflict Diamonds
Against the background of the atrocities committed in the African civil wars, the 
international community repeatedly tried to intervene in order to bring the conflicts 
to an end. As the attention of policy-makers and scholars had moved from political to 
the economic motives for the civil wars, so the strategy was adjusted for dealing with 
the atrocities. Instead of just sending troops into the complex conflicts, the UN 
adopted economic sanctions in order to cut off rebel groups from their revenue 
source. With a view to protecting the legal diamond trade in the countries concerned, 
national certification schemes were set up.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) issued the first embargo for Angola in 
June 1998. Resolution 1173 embargoed, among others, all imports of diamonds 
which were not certified by the Angolan government (S/RES/1173). Subsequently, 
the same was applied to Sierra Leone (S/RES/1306). Nevertheless, the sanctions 
proved ineffective in keeping illicitly mined diamonds out of the global diamond 
pipeline (Cortright and Lopez 2000; Global Witness 1998). In fact, military 
intervention was responsible for the pacification of the civil wars rather than the UN 
sanctions (Le Billon 2003). As the UN Panel of Experts’ Report (‘Fowler Report’) 
pointed out, the effectiveness of the national certification schemes was very limited 
due to widespread corruption (S/2000/203). Moreover, most of the governments 
concerned were incapable of preventing diamonds being smuggled into neighbouring 
countries where the diamonds could be laundered. Some governments in 
neighbouring countries, such as Liberia or Burkina Faso, were not only willing to 
tolerate these practices but also supported them since they provided additional 
revenue. However, major powers and the UNSC were also unwilling to monitor and 
enforce the sanctions more rigorously.
In light of the inefficiencies of the UN sanctions for conflict diamonds, the 
international community was looking for ways to more effectively prevent conflict 
diamonds entering the legal trade. Prior to the KPCS, there were only a few 
certification regimes in place regulating trade in, for instance, endangered species 
(CITES) or hazardous waste (Basel Convention) (Reeve 2002; Krueger 1999). 
Certainly, regarding the regulating of trade in conflict commodities, the KPCS was 
the first of its kind.
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Overall, having understood the link between trade in diamonds and civil wars in 
Africa, the international community saw a need to find an international solution that 
would cut off warlords from their revenue sources. However, given that all existing 
sanctions had proven to be inefficient, uncertainty as to how to design such a global 
regime was very high. Against this background, the KP evolved, and it is this to 
which we now turn.
4.2 Negotiating and Implementing the Global Diamond Trade Regime
In this sub-chapter, I provide a brief description of how the KP evolved. I first revise 
how the issues reached the international agenda in 2000. Subsequently, I explain how 
the Process evolved and what issues were contested during the negotiations. In the 
final section I study the implementation of the KPCS and the SoW as well as the 
Three Year Review in November 2006.
4.2.1 From the Campaign against Conflict Diamonds to the KP
Having studied the link between the opaque diamonds trade and the civil conflicts in 
Africa, the London-based NGO Global Witness brought the issue of conflict 
diamonds to public attention at the end of the nineties. It published a report about the 
inefficiencies of the economic and political sanctions by the UNSC on UNITA in 
Angola (see Global Witness 1998).55 At the same time, the UNSC Sanctions 
Committee on Angola, chaired by Robert Fowler, commissioned an Expert Panel to 
assess the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. In March 2000, the Fowler Report 
concluded that the trafficking of conflict diamonds was facilitated by certain actors 
in the diamond industry as well as weapon dealers and certain heads of state.
By the year 2000, other NGOs had already joined Global Witness in their 
Conflict Diamonds Campaign. In 2000, a Canadian NGO, Partnership Africa Canada 
(PAC), published a report on conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone concluding that RUF
55 This section only briefly reviews the NGO campaign. I analyse NGO action in detail in Chapter 5.1.
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was financing its rebellion largely by smuggling diamonds into Liberia (Smillie et al. 
2000).
Between 1999 and 2000, the Conflict Diamonds Campaign exerted immense 
pressure on both governments and the industry. With regard to the latter, NGOs 
accused the industry of facilitating trade in conflict diamonds by virtue of their 
opaque trading traditions.56 As a reaction to the mounting pressure, an international 
policy response to the issue began to evolve. South Africa invited all the stakeholders 
to a ‘technical forum’ in Kimberley, South Africa, in May 2000. A follow-up 
working group meeting was organised only a month later in Luanda, Angola. The 
outcome of this meeting was the recommendation of a new global system that would 
prohibit the importation of rough diamonds without a certificate of origin. The 
industry discussed the issue at the meeting of the World Diamond Congress in July 
2000, which created the World Diamond Council (WDC) to take part in the KP 
meetings.
In the following thirteen KP meetings, the stakeholders designed the 
certification scheme and supported the creation of an industrial self-regulatory 
system. As we shall see in Chapter 5, members of the LM-Group, such as the UK, 
Canada and the NGOs pushed for strong institutionalisation from the beginning on. 
Although UK diplomats were crucial to the negotiations until the KPCS launch, the 
European Commission (EC) took a lead as soon as the focus on trade regulation was 
determined. The working group meetings and interministerial meetings were 
accompanied by several conferences hosted by academic institutions where 
stakeholders were invited to express their opinions on the ongoing process. Despite 
the multi-stakeholder character of the negotiations, the KP was also backed by 
several multilateral institutions. Two G8 summits, at Okinawa, Japan, in 2000 and 
Kananaskis, Canada, in 2002, supported the creation of a commodity tracking system 
to curb trade in conflict diamonds (Smillie 2005c). Moreover, the UN endorsed the 
KP in its resolution 55/56. The subsequent meetings of the process with an 
increasing number of participants were labelled the ‘enlarged KP’ (Beffert and 
Benner 2005).
56 The opaque trading traditions are analysed in the subsequent sub-chapter.
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A meeting in Botswana in November 2001 failed to result in a final 
agreement. The KPCS was adopted by consensus by both governments and NSAs at 
November 2002 in Interlaken, Switzerland.
4.2.2 Issues of Contention
The second meeting after the technical forum in Kimberley, a working group 
meeting in Luanda, Angola in 2000, had already produced final recommendations 
which essentially outlined all the elements of the final agreement ratified in 
November 2002. It was estimated that an international certification scheme could be 
set up within a few months. However, during the negotiations, a number of issues of 
contention arose so that it took 40 months to finalise the agreement. The main issues 
of contention were the following:
• Identification of origin and certification of diamonds
• NGOs’ participation in the negotiations
• The role of the diamond industry in the conflicts
• Compatibility of the KPCS with WTO obligations
• Compliance requirements
• Industrial self-regulation
• Disclosure of statistics
• Taiwan
Most of the contested issues were directly linked with the design of the certification 
scheme and the regulation of the diamond trade. One of the most contested issues 
was how to differentiate between illegally and legally mined diamonds. As the 
subsequent chapter explains in more detail, NGOs aimed for a technological solution 
by marking diamonds with lasers, whereas diamond-producing countries and the 
industry preferred the more cost-effective alternative, forgery-proof certificates.
Another keenly contested issue was the role of the industry in the civil 
conflicts. For a long time, the industry did not want to bear a share of responsibility 
in the atrocities of Angola, Sierra Leone, and the DRC. I elaborate further on this 
issue in Chapter 5.
As to the governments, some countries, such as Russia, China, and Japan, 
blocked the negotiations as they questioned the attendance and participation of
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NGOs. However, over time, these countries began to see the advantages that arose 
from civil society participation.
Another issue was the question of whether the KPCS would be compatible 
with the obligations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As explained in more 
detail in the following sub-chapter, the KPCS prohibits trading diamonds with non- 
participants. The inclusion of this provision created considerable controversy among 
the participating states. Some states, notably the US, Canada, and Japan, had 
expressed their concerns that the KPCS might violate WTO obligations. This group 
of states refused to endorse any international agreement which would infringe the 
global trade regime. The issue could not be resolved by a KP working group which 
issued a report in advance of the Ottawa meeting in March 2002, concluding that 
import and export bans on rough diamonds would not interfere with WTO 
requirements provided that the bans were necessary for credible reasons (Kimberley 
Process 2002; Partnership Africa Canada 2002). The US, Canada, Japan, Sierra 
Leone and several other countries sought for a WTO waiver which was granted 
based on human security considerations in May 2003 (Partnership Africa Canada 
2003; WTO 2003).
The thorniest issues of contention were monitoring and the disclosure of 
statistics. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, the final agreement of 
November 2002 was endorsed without significant monitoring requirements. Notably, 
Israel and China rejected extensive provisions. Both countries gave up their 
reservations during the first year of operation. Subsequently, the compliance 
mechanism was significantly strengthened. As to industrial self-regulation, the 
diamond industry agreed to set up the SoW at the Luanda meeting in the summer 
2000. However, it took more than two years to agree on the details of industrial self­
regulation. The two contested issues were whether the SoW would be voluntary or 
mandatory and whether it should be subject to independent auditing. As with the 
compliance mechanisms, this issue could be resolved soon after the implementation 
of the scheme.
As with the issue of monitoring, the disclosure of statistics could only be 
agreed upon after the KPCS was launched. In order to regulate illicit trade in 
diamonds effectively, it is important that a central authority knows who exports what 
amounts of commodities to whom. However, most diamond-producing countries 
consider the commodity as a strategic mineral, hence for reasons of trade security
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and commercial confidentiality, states and the industry alike were reluctant to agree 
to lay open their trade and stockpiling statistics.
Other issues that delayed the launch of the Scheme were only indirectly 
linked to the issue of conflict diamonds. For instance, the issue of Taiwan 
considerably delayed the adoption of the KPCS. The stakeholders had intended to 
launch the KPCS on 1 January 2002. At the last meeting in December 2001, the 
Chinese delegation stalled the negotiations as the KPCS had identified Taiwan as a 
participant. In the end, Taiwan was removed from the list of participants by including 
a note that “the rough diamond-trading entity of Chinese Taipei has also met the 
minimum requirements of the KPCS”.57
4.2.3 Implementing the KP (2003-2006)
The KPCS sets up a minimum of international standards for national certification 
schemes. Since January 2003, all KP participating states have passed national laws to 
establish export and import controls. One problem in this context is that national 
legislation differs across countries. Several countries, including some African 
countries and Brazil, have extremely weak internal controls. Others, like the 
countries of the EC, have taken a tough approach (Wexler 2006). The disclosure of 
statistics remains an important issue as a significant number of countries are either 
tardy with their submittal of data or submit incomplete data. The implementation of 
the SoW is still a work in progress. Whereas large mining companies such as De 
Beers are fully compliant with the SoW, the retail sector especially falls short of 
implementing the requirements of self-regulation (Interview 16).
Very recently, the KP gained new momentum. A Three Year Review of the 
KPCS and the SoW took place at a meeting in Gaborone, Botswana on 6 and 7 
November 2006. Based on the views58 of the KP participants, Global Witness, PAC, 
the WDC, as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 43 
recommendations were formulated which addressed issues ranging from the current 
conflict diamond situation in Cote d’Ivoire to the non-compliance of Venezuela and
57 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/structure/participants_world_map_en.html, last accessed on 
16 June 2008.
58 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/third_year_view_en.html, last accessed on 16 
June 2008.
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the disclosure of statistics. The review coincided with the making of a Warner Bros. 
Pictures movie ‘Blood Diamond’ which again catapulted the issue of conflict 
diamonds into the sphere of public awareness.59 The diamond industry in particular 
was very concerned about the public image the movie could create and wanted to use 
the Three Year Review as an opportunity to strengthen the diamond trade regime 
(Interviews 6 and 7).
Overall, the Three Year Review was so successful that even PAC, the most 
critical NGO involved, commended the KP for its efforts (Partnership Africa Canada 
2006). The Review had formulated 43 recommendations to further strengthen the 
regime, all of which of them were accepted at the Plenary.
* * * * *
This sub-chapter provided a brief narrative o f how the KP evolved. This facilitates 
the in-depth analysis of the negotiation dynamics in the subsequent chapter. Overall, 
the stakeholders could create an international certification regime in a comparatively 
swift time. As already mentioned, the diamond industry’s opacity was seen as 
facilitating trade in conflict diamonds. Given the crucial role of the diamond industry 
in designing the KPCS, the chapter therefore now turns to analysing the sector by 
introducing the key players and scrutinising trade opacity.
4.3 The Key Players in the Global Diamond Market
Diamonds are unique among the world’s minerals. Contrary to other extractive 
sectors, such as oil or gas, diamonds have no strategic importance in the global 
economy. Diamonds are usually classified into two groups, gem quality diamonds 
and industrial diamonds, which include brown and black diamonds. As the latter are 
used for the manufacture of instruments, these stones might have some significance 
for the global economy. Diamond mining and distribution companies trade both
59 The movie tells the story of a South African mercenary smuggling diamonds from Sierra Leone in 
the 1990s. As a response to the blockbuster movie in which the KP is only mentioned briefly at the 
beginning and at the end, the diamond industry launched a website explaining conflict diamonds in 
great detail while also highlighting the significant role diamonds play in the economies o f African 
countries (see www.Diamondfacts.org, last accessed on 16 June 2008).
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categories of diamonds, but in contrast to industrial diamonds, gem quality diamonds 
are very rare and account for only about 17 percent of the total production. However, 
the gems yield more than 80 percent of the value of global diamond output 
(Yakovleva 2005). Thus, economically speaking, industrial diamonds have always 
been insignificant for the industry. Moreover, industrial diamonds are becoming even 
less significant as they are now being replaced by artificial diamonds.
Managed by a powerful cartel, the industry was, for a long time, as unique 
as its product. This sub-chapter introduces the main players and their power relations 
in the industry which were crucial for setting up new regulations. It also draws 
attention to important structural changes in the industry which became crucial 
political opportunities when negotiating the KP. Thus, this sub-chapter contributes to 
the overall argument of the thesis by deepening the understanding of the industry, an 
important precondition for being able to understand the negotiation dynamics during 
the KP. Relevant for analysing the KP are the producing countries and the mining 
companies, the manufacturing centres with their cutters and polishers, as well as the 
retail sector and consumer countries. In contrast to other extractive industries where 
vertically integrated companies cover the whole production process, this industry is 
very fragmented with very little contact between mining, manufacturing and retail. 
Finally, the sub-chapter elaborates on why opacity as a structural feature enabled 
conflict diamonds to enter the legal trade.
4.3.1 Upstream: The Producing Countries and the Mining Companies
Diamonds are carbon atoms which where formed by heat and pressure 120 miles 
below the earth’s surface in kimberlite pipes (Campbell 2004). With the exception of 
Antarctica, kimberlite pipes are found all over the world. However, not all of them 
contain diamonds. The top diamond-producing countries are: Botswana, South 
Africa and Namibia, which mine an estimated 41 percent of world production.
Russia, Australia and Canada produce another 33 percent (Goreux 2001). Table 2 
depicts the productions in 1999 and 2003.
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Country 1999 2003
Angola 3,360 4,770
Australia 13,403 14,900
Botswana 17,200 22,800
Canada8 2,429 11,200
DRC 4,120 5,400
Liberia 120 36
Namibia 1,630 1,650
Russia15 11,500 12,000
Sierra Leone 7 214
South Africa 4,000 5,070
Other 2,883 2,910
Total 60,600 80,900
8 Total production. Several figures for industrial diamonds not available. 
b The data o f 1999 is based on estimates, with output believed to be 50% gem 
and 50% industrial
Table 2 W orld Rough Gem and Near-gem Diamond Production by Country for 1999
and 2003 (in Thousands of Carats)60 (adapted from Shor 2005b: 204)
Sub-Saharan countries are especially dependent on the diamonds trade. The 
economies of Botswana and Namibia rely almost exclusively on the trade in 
diamonds. Namdeb, Namibia’s half state-owned mining company, is the country’s 
largest taxpayer and foreign exchange generator. In Botswana, approximately 85 
percent of government revenue is derived from diamonds (Hazleton 2002). In South 
Africa, the role of diamonds in the economy is significantly smaller,61 but the 
industry is important for international exports as South African diamonds are of high 
value. For other African countries too, diamonds play a vital part in generating 
economic growth and development. In most of these countries, the industry 
represents one of very few sustained and profitable export sectors (Ng and Yeats 
2002). While the sector has been very stable in the past, most of the African diamond 
producers would be very vulnerable to a collapse of the global diamond market. The
60 Generally, the diamond trade is recorded in carats per year (1 carat equals 200 milligrams). The 
value o f a rough diamond does not only depend on its weight but also on its quality. For instance, the 
DRC produced 22 million carats o f diamonds with a value of only US$725 million (Goreux 2001).
61 The industry contributes 0.88 percent o f the South African GDP (Hazleton 2002).
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sector creates enormous wealth in some countries, yet diamonds play only a very 
limited role in the global economy. In contrast to other natural resource markets, the 
diamond industry is comparatively small. Upstream, the overall annual world 
production accounts for more than 250 million carats (US$ 7 billion per year) 
(Schefer 2005).62
Mining companies play a crucial, but not always a key role in the industry. 
Approximately 25 percent of the global annual diamond output stems from Western 
and Central Africa as well as Latin America. Diamonds coming from these regions 
are mostly found in riverbeds. Mining techniques, so-called alluvial mining, are very 
simple and require only rudimentary technological skills. The diamonds are collected 
by small-sized companies and artisans. The mining sites are mostly not secured and 
controls were formerly loose and mostly ineffective (Goreux 2001). The stones are 
mostly sold through middlemen on the open market. In Botswana, Namibia, South 
Africa, Russia, Canada and Australia, diamonds are extracted from kimberlite 
formations (Partnership Africa Canada 2006). So-called kimberlite mining requires 
very technological and mechanised extraction techniques. Big mining firms are 
dominating in this field.
Up until the end of the last millennium, one mining company, De Beers, was 
of central importance in the industry. The company has regulated the market since 
the late 1800s when Cecil Rhodes arrived in South Africa in the midst of the African 
Diamond rush.63 Today, the corporate structure of De Beers is very complex. Since 
June 2001 the Group has been privately owned by Anglo American pic (45 percent), 
the Central Holdings Group (40 percent), and the government of Botswana (15 
percent) (see Figure 8). De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. manages the 
arrangements with major diamond exporting countries, namely South Africa, 
Namibia and Botswana. The Diamond Trading Company (DTC, former Central
62 To put the annual diamond production into perspective, let us take a brief look into other natural 
commodity sectors. For instance, in the timber industry, the gross production accounted for US$ 160 
billion world-wide in 1998, representing 0.4 percent o f value-added in the global economy (Brack et 
al. 2002; OECD 2001).
63 Rhodes had found the first diamond mine near Kimberley on an area purchased from the farmers 
Johannes and Diedrich De Beers. In 1888, De Beers Consolidated Mines was founded by merging two 
of the biggest mines in South Africa, De Beers and Kimberley. This marked the beginning o f the De 
Beers cartel (Hart 2003).
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Selling Organization, CSO) sells and markets the diamonds. The subsequent section 
will look more closely at the DTC.64
Governm ent of Botswana
15%
Anglo American Group 
45%
Central Holdings Group 
40%
Williamson
(Tanzania)
75%
Debsw ana
(B otsw ana)
50%
De Beers 
Consolidated 
Hines* 
(South Africa) 
74%
Diamond
Trading
Company
(United
Kingdom)
100%
Namdeb
(Namibia)
50%
DB In v estm en ts (Lux) 100%
De Beers sa (L u x )
*Ponahalo In vestm en ts acquired a 2 6 %  indirect in terest in DBCM on  18 April 2006
Figure 8 The Structure of the De Beers Group (taken from www.debeersgroup.com)
De Beers established a very powerful position in Southern Africa, as it largely 
controls the industries o f Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (Hazleton 2002; Spar 
1994: 77). The group formerly mined 70 percent o f the world’s diamonds itself in 
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (Bream 2005). It still manages 18 mines in 
Africa that cover the whole range o f  mining processes -  everything from huge open 
pits to underground operations and from beach mining to underwater mining (Voss 
1998). In Botswana, De Beers mines all diamonds in partnership with the 
government (Debswana). In Namibia, again, in partnership with the government 
(Namdeb), De Beers is responsible for 80 percent o f the diamond mining and market. 
In South Africa, De Beers produces through its sister corporation Anglo-American 
nearly 95 percent o f  the diamonds.65
Since the end o f the 1990s, just shortly before the start o f  the Conflict 
Diamonds Campaign, however, the industry sector has gone through significant
64 For more details see www.debeersgroup.com, last accessed on 15 June 2008.
65 Historically, another crucial diamond supplier was the USSR. In the USSR, government agencies 
had controlled the diamond operations. Through intermediaries, USSR diamonds were sold to the 
CSO (see Spar 1994; Bergenstock 2004).
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structural changes. New discoveries in Canada led to a diversification in the market 
and generated major diamond supplies. De Beers did not develop into a major player 
in Canada because the company historically had never been present in North 
America (Hart 2003). With the new discoveries, new players gained significance 
upstream. For BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, the discoveries constituted a crucial 
window of opportunity to become involved in the diamond mining business. The 
Canadian mines are now the first major operations that are producing and marketing 
outside the De Beers Group. Canada is now the third largest diamond producer by 
value (Even-Zohar 2005; Shor 2005b).
De Beers is also challenged by one of its former clients, the diamond dealer 
Lev Leviev. By using windows of opportunities he could take away significant 
business from De Beers in Russia and Angola. In Russia, his company LLD formed a 
joint-venture with Alrosa for diamond manufacturing operations which allowed 
Leviev to gain access to rough diamond resources (Shor 2005b). Due to the Conflict 
Diamonds Campaign, De Beers was forced to withdraw its operations in Angola.66 
Subsequently, Leviev took this window of opportunity to also gain access to the 
Angolan diamond production.
In summary, the upstream diamond industry is dominated by the producing 
countries and De Beers. However, just when the Conflict Diamonds Campaign hit 
the industry, the sector underwent significant changes which decreased the structural 
power of De Beers by empowering new players such as traditional mining companies 
and diamond dealer Leviev. The structural changes upstream also had significant 
consequences for the downstream sector to which the sub-chapter now turns.
4.3.2 Downstream: From a Cartel to the ‘Supplier of Choice9
We have already noted the crucial role of De Beers upstream. However, before the 
structural changes in the industry, it was through the downstream sector that the 
company exerted its strong relational and discursive power. The downstream sector 
consists of sorting and selling the rough diamonds. The gems are then cut, polished 
and manufactured in one of the world’s diamond centres. Looking at this stage in the
66 For De Beers withdrawing from Angola, see Chapter 5.1.
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diamond industry, we can understand the sector’s truly global character. Cutting and 
polishing centres are mainly located in South Africa, Botswana, Russia, China, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam and Mauritius, whereas manufacturing centres are located 
in Israel, Belgium, India and New York (Even-Zohar 2002).
More than any other industry, the diamond sector is very fragmented. In 
particular, the retail sector is very removed from mining. Given that diamonds are re­
sold numerous times through middlemen, the manufacturing sector also has few links 
to the upstream part of the industry.
The fragmentation is reinforced by the fact that there are no fully integrated 
companies as with other resource sectors. Even De Beers, until very recently, did not 
cover the whole supply chain. Apart from mining the stones, the Group also covered 
transporting, sorting and selling. However, in the diamond business the biggest 
returns are made further downstream in the retail sector. Therefore, in early 2001, the 
Group announced the launch of its own jewellery brand, the Forevermark™ in a joint 
venture with Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton.
De Beers has been able to acquire strong power in the industry mainly for two 
reasons. Firstly, in comparison to other cartels, De Beers has been exceptionally 
successful in controlling prices and the market, thus maintaining a high price level 
over the decades. De Beers was able to control prices by regulating and manipulating 
the supply of the gems, stockpiling its mined goods. Thus, the company could 
maintain the rarity of diamonds artificially even in times of abundance.68 The DTC, 
formerly CSO, is the Group’s marketing arm which sells De Beers’ own diamonds 
and those mined in joint ventures. Moreover, De Beers has set up sales agreements 
with major competitors for securing the distribution of their production and sold 
those diamonds. Due to these agreements, the DTC formerly marketed the 
USSR/Russian diamond production, Zaire’s (present-day DRC’) official production, 
the Miniere de Bakwanga (a parastatal Congolese mine), as well as Angola’s state-
67 Since then, a number of De Beers retail stores have opened, see http://www.debeers.com/en/, last 
accessed 15 June 2008.
68 The need to control both arose at the very beginning of De Beers as a company. Already Cecil 
Rhodes had observed that diamonds were a pure luxury commodity serving neither as a material use 
to man nor as a financial investment (Voss 1998). They are only bought because they are a symbol of 
love. Hence they would only be sold at high prices when they were perceived as being scarce by the 
consumer. In the late 1880s, however, with the new discoveries in South Africa and great advances in 
diamond production, the prices were under pressure. As Bergenstock (2004:19) points out, within a 
few years, prices were halved and nearly one-third of South African diamond companies had to end 
their business. Cecil Rhodes understood very quickly that the diamond market needed to be controlled 
otherwise the industry would mine too many diamonds and flood the market.
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owned diamond-mining company Endiama (Shor 2005b: 204). Finally, the DTC sold 
diamonds that were bought on the open market (so-called outside buying).69 Overall, 
De Beers controlled over 80 percent of the supply of rough diamonds globally 
(European Commission 2002). The 20 percent marketed outside De Beers came from 
the Rio Tinto mine in Australia, smaller mining productions in South Africa and 
South America as well as informal alluvial mining in West Africa (Shor 2005b: 
204).70 Selling the diamonds through the DTC follows traditional rules. The 
diamonds are sold to pre-selected diamond dealers, so-called sightholders, who are 
mostly owners of diamond-cutting factories in Antwerp, Bombay, New York and Tel 
Aviv.71 In CSO times, around 160 sightholders had the privilege of buying their 
diamonds directly from the CSO.
Secondly, the Group was key to the industry as it created a new market for 
diamonds. De Beers started to drive demand for diamonds from the 1930s onwards 
by constructing diamonds as a symbol of love. Although diamonds have always been 
perceived as precious stones by monarchs, historically they had never been a 
metaphor for ever-lasting love. In the late 1930s, De Beers, together with their 
former public relations agency undertook a campaign to persuade the American 
public to purchase diamonds.72 Today, De Beers spends an estimated US$ 200 
million per year on advertising (Bergenstock and Maskulka 2001).
Overall, De Beers was the most powerful actor for over 70 years. Due to its 
enormous financial capability and its firm grip on the diamonds supply, the Group 
had immense relational power. Dealers feared being cut from the supply chain if they 
did not comply with the De Beers regime. However, De Beers only rarely needed to 
exert (or threaten) with its relational power as the Group also has extensive 
discursive power. The discursive power stems from the fact that the diamond dealers
69 The company ended all open market acquisitions in 2000.
70 Due to changes within the group and diversification o f the industry, these numbers have 
dramatically decreased since 2001.
71 The diamonds are stored in CSO/DTC offices in London until the company decides how many and 
which diamonds should be sold. The diamonds are sorted into over 15,000 categories and mixed into 
‘assortments’ (European Commission 2002). The stones of one assortment, different in size and 
quality, are put into ‘boxes’. As only whole boxes are sold, De Beers is able to sell all its stones and 
not only those that are profitable. Diamond sales, so-called ‘sights’, are held every five weeks in 
London (Bergenstock and Maskulka 2001). Sightholders usually communicate their preference 
regarding quantity or quality to the CSO/DTC. Whether the CSO/DTC meets these requests is 
dependent on its own needs and the standing of the sightholder.
72 The agency invented the historical background for giving diamonds as engagement rings and 
established the origin of the tradition several centuries prior to its actual beginnings in the late 
nineteenth century (Bergenstock 2004: 58f).
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know that no other actor has put so much effort and money into preserving the 
industry and constructing the value of diamonds as De Beers (Even-Zohar 2002). 
Apart from De Beers, Antwerp and the Belgian diamond industry’s representative, 
the High Diamond Council (HRD), are historically powerful actors within the 
industry. In contrast to the De Beers emporium, the diamond industry in Antwerp has 
always been very fragmented, consisting of a large number of families and small- 
scale businesses.
However, with the huge structural changes upstream, De Beers has lost its 
firm grip on the industry since the late 1990s. Within a few years, De Beers had lost 
its dominating role, as its market share had plummeted from 80 percent in the early 
1980s to 65 percent by value in 2000.73 After the end of the cold war the Russians 
could adopt a more competitive approach in the industry. As Shor (2005b) describes 
a new diamond company, Alrosa, was created after the collapse of the USSR. Today, 
the DTC markets about half of the overall Russian diamond production. The other 
half goes to domestic diamond-polishing factories including those that are owned by 
Alrosa (Even-Zohar 2005). Alrosa has now developed into the second largest 
diamond mining company by diamond production (Even-Zohar 2005). With the 
emergence of other new players, like BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, De Beers’ single­
channel sales have come to be challenged. An even more significant competitor is 
Leviev. After De Beers left Angola in reaction to public pressure, he created the 
Angolan Selling Corporation together with the Angolan government which markets 
Angolan rough diamonds. Since 2000, Leviev is also active in offshore mining in 
Namibia and markets rough diamonds for the DRC. Overall, LLD Diamonds sold 
diamonds worth US$1 billion in 2002, making him the most serious competitor of 
De Beers (Even-Zohar 2002).
Another issue was having an impact on the diamond industry. The East Asian 
Financial Crisis has hit the sector hard as demand in these emerging markets has 
plummeted, contributing to a rising supply of diamonds. With new competition 
looming and De Beers’ rough diamond stockpile growing, yet suffering from a 
declining market share, the Group realised it had to change the way it operated. The 
rather dramatic changes in the diamond industry prompted De Beers to take unusual 
actions. For the first time, the Group employed a management consulting firm to
73 As of 2008, De Beers mines 40 percent o f the global diamond output and sells 45 percent 
(Skapinker 2008).
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review their corporate strategies (Bergenstock 2004). It was concluded that De Beers 
needed to adapt to a new business environment. The growing stockpile of diamonds 
was no longer considered to be an asset but a liability. The consultancy 
recommended that De Beers should give up its role as industry custodian (‘buyer of 
last resort’). Rather, De Beers should develop into a ‘supplier of choice’ (SOC). This 
strategy was supposed to introduce a multitude of competing brands where the Group 
would establish itself as a leader rather than a custodian of the industry (Shor 2005b). 
The SOC strategy includes a series of different policies. Among other things, it 
includes a reduction in sightholders from an original 120 to 85 (Shor 2004). The 
SOC was implemented in January 2003 after the EC approved the new business 
strategy.
However, the change of the business strategy had serious ramifications on the 
power relations within the industry by introducing new sources for business conflict. 
Previously, De Beers held a custodial role within the industry by regulating supply 
and demand. Cutting down its number of sightholders significantly and launching its 
own brand alienated the manufacturing sector from the Group. With regard to the 
Forevermark™, many diamond dealers suspected De Beers deliberately ceded trade 
relations with those dealers handling larger diamonds so as to manipulate supplies, 
furthering its own retails (Shor 2005b). De Beers had lost control over the industry 
due to the constant suspicion that De Beers was only pursuing its own interests.
From this sub-chapter we can conclude that the diamond industry sector has 
gone through very significant changes, just as the Conflict Diamonds Campaign hit 
the sector. Due to the rise of new players the sector diversified, curtailing the power 
of De Beers. Chapter 5 scrutinises to what extent these structural changes had an 
impact on the negotiations for the KPCS.
4.3.3 Industry Opacity as a Structural Feature
We could see from the preceding sections that the diamond industry differs to a great 
extent from other extractive industries. As noted before, NGOs and policy-makers 
considered the diamond industry central to facilitating conflict diamonds entering the 
legal diamond trade. Therefore, I now turn to exploring the issue of industry opacity 
in connection with conflict diamonds.
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The diamond industry’s peculiar role is reinforced by their secretive conduct 
of business in both developing and developed countries. In fact, secrecy has for a 
long time been a structural feature of the industry. Like no other industry sector, the 
diamond industry is still based on traditions and customs. Until the launch of the 
KPCS, most of the deals were made trough extralegal contracts, such as handshakes, 
without providing written records. Reputation and reliability are the biggest assets 
among diamond dealers and whoever makes public the workings of the industry risks 
both as secrecy is highly valued throughout the whole business (Bernstein 1992). 
Apart from missing paperwork, there are virtually no consistent trade patterns as the 
traders often change the trade routes. These secretive traditions have evolved for 
several reasons. Firstly, as mentioned before, the diamond trade is conducted mostly 
by family-run businesses. Since the industry is a very small one, most of the people 
have known each other for a long time. Regulating close-knit family enterprises 
effectively is a very challenging task. Secondly, although diamonds do not play a 
significant economic role globally, for a lot of producer countries, the stones are vital 
and therefore considered as a strategic commodity. The industry and the producer 
countries point out that the trade with diamonds necessitates special security 
measures. Especially in remote zones of Africa, it can be difficult to assure security 
when transporting the high-value goods. Finally, traders also change their trade 
patterns frequently so as to benefit from lower taxes and fewer regulations (GAO
2002). The conduct of business also has repercussions on the effectiveness of 
national legislation and international regulation as it makes the industry less tangible.
In addition to the peculiarities of the industry, the circumstances in the 
countries of origin make effective regulation even more difficult. Angola, Sierra 
Leone and the DRC were zones of weak governance. Since the diamonds were 
scattered over vast territories it was nearly impossible for the governments to control 
the diamond mines (Tamm 2002).
$  3fC $  $  $
In this sub-chapter, we analysed the diamond industry by introducing the key players 
both in the corporate sector as well as the producer and consumer countries. The 
sector is a very peculiar industry. Not only does it deal with a unique product, it was 
also formerly characterised by an exceptional power distribution, having been
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dominated by the cartel of De Beers for decades. Yet with new discoveries the 
industry began to diversify, empowering new corporate players and producer 
countries to the detriment of De Beers. In other aspects the industry had remained 
very traditional, until the KP began benefiting from its opaque business operations. 
We therefore now turn to analysing the institutional design of the KPCS, which is 
supposed to render diamond trade more transparent.
4.4 The KP as an International Institution
Regulating illegal trade with diamonds effectively is a very challenging task. African 
diamonds are mined in remote regions where governance structures are weak or even 
missing altogether. Moreover, since diamonds are the most concentrated form of 
wealth, they are also very easy to smuggle. As to the actors involved, adding to the 
challenge are the secrecy of the diamond industry as well as diamond-producing 
governments’ reluctance to provide accurate documentation about their businesses by 
labelling this information as commercially sensitive. The KPCS tries to take into 
account these unique characteristics of the diamond trade.
The participants knew from the beginning that a total elimination of trade 
with conflict diamonds would not be possible. Essentially, the KPCS aims at creating 
a clear distinction between legal and illegal diamond markets. By rendering it more 
difficult for illegally mined diamonds to access the legal global markets, the market 
price of conflict diamonds and smuggled gems should fall relative to that of the legal 
commodities. As the risks of trading conflict diamonds increase with the introduction 
of the KPCS (increased costs with respect to laundering and increased risk of 
prosecution), the scheme is supposed to cut rebels off from their important income 
source (Scheiber 2006).
4.4.1 Overview of the KPCS
The KPCS was designed to address the specific needs of the regulation of trade in 
diamonds by taking into account both the distinct position of the diamond industry 
and the peculiarity of the diamond trade. The KPCS was not only negotiated by
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multiple stakeholders, it also combined two approaches to regulation: the 
intergovernmental regime being complemented by industrial self-regulation.74
The intergovernmental regime consists of a set of politically-binding common 
standards, enacted by each state through its own national legislation (Wright 2004). 
The standards determine how member states handle the import and export of rough 
diamonds (section II. and III. KPCS), set out a system of internal controls to track 
illicit diamonds (section IV. KPCS), and -  to a certain extent -  establish cooperation, 
transparency and monitoring among members (section V. KPCS).75 The diamond 
industry is represented through the WDC, an international body specifically created 
for this purpose. The civil society is represented by Global Witness and PAC.
The regime also explicitly refers to a second form of diamonds trade 
regulation, the SoW, which is a self-regulatory system established and adopted by 
the diamond industry (section IV. KPCS). SoW is a complementary set of practices, 
yet, it is officially acknowledged by the UNSC resolution76 (World Diamond Council
2003). The SoW addresses one significant loophole of the KPCS, so it has to be 
considered an important part of the regulation of trade with diamonds. The KPCS 
only concerns the trade with rough diamonds. The industrial self-regulation 
addresses the issue by going beyond the regulation of rough gems. Moreover, it 
contributes to more transparency in the industry. It requires (1) warranties on all 
invoices for the sale of cut and polished diamonds and jewellery containing 
diamonds which guarantees that the goods have been purchased from legitimate 
sources,77 (2) a code of conduct, (3) the maintenance of detailed records of purchases 
and sales of rough diamonds, and (4) monitoring via independent auditors.
74 For the following, see Appendix 2 on the Interlaken Declaration of 5 November 2002 on the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) for Rough Diamonds, taken from 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/basic_core_documents_en.html; last accessed 16 June 
2008.
75 The main requirements are the following: No participant is allowed to trade diamonds without a 
certificate-of-origin (section III. KPCS); and participants are not allowed to trade diamonds with non­
participants (section III.c KPCS). Member-states also have to ensure that exports and imports o f rough 
diamonds are in tamper-resistant containers (section XX. KPCS) and that a KP certificate-of-origin is 
attached (section XXX. KPCS). Finally, members have to collect, maintain and exchange official 
statistical data on the production and trade of rough diamonds so that illicit commodities can be 
tracked (section XX. KPCS).
76 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1459 (2003), 28 January 2003.
77 In this system of warranties, all buyers and sellers o f rough and polished diamonds are obliged to 
make the following statement on all invoices: “The diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased 
from legitimate sources not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with UN resolutions. The 
seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are conflict free, based on personal knowledge and/or 
written guarantees provided by the supplier o f these diamonds” (World Diamond Council 2003: 2).
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Companies that do not comply with these principles are expelled from the industry 
organisations, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses (WFDB) and the 
International Diamond Manufacturers’ Association (IDMA) (World Diamond 
Council 2003). Moreover, the code of conduct requires that participants publicise
78names of non-compliant companies or individuals. The SoW is crucial to the 
effectiveness of KPCS. It hampers the possibility that conflict diamonds can be 
laundered by cutting and polishing them on the black market so they can enter the 
trade pipeline. Hence, the effectiveness of the whole scheme depends to a large 
extent on the actions taken by the diamond industry.
The sub-chapter now turns to assessing the institutional design of the KPCS 
by applying the framework which was elaborated in Chapter 2.
4.4.2 Assessing the Institutional Design of the Kimberley Process
Despite the fact that initially only a few diamond producing and importing countries 
initiated the Process, a large number of countries were attracted to join the 
negotiations in the later stages. As of November 2006, 46 countries and the European 
Community participate in the Scheme. The KPCS includes the diamond-producing 
countries (e.g. South Africa, Namibia, Canada), countries engaging in sorting and 
transhipment (e.g. Belgium and Switzerland), and countries with special interests in 
retail (e.g. the US and Japan).79 The Scheme has a high level of inclusion as no 
country critical to the diamond trade deals outside the KPCS. We can therefore 
conclude that the Scheme has developed into a truly global trade regime. With regard 
to the NSAs, Global Witness, PAC, and the WDC were participants with rights equal 
to states in the KP negotiations. In the KPCS, they have observer status, but fulfil 
various crucial functions and therefore remain indispensable stakeholders. The KP 
now has an application process in place to ensure that all new participants are 
compliant with the scheme. A participation committee screens new participants with 
respect to KPCS conformity.
The KPCS does not define whether it is a legally or politically binding 
international agreement. The Scheme operates as a system of common minimum
78 Joint WFDB/IDMA Resolution supporting the Kimberley Process (29 October 2002), available at 
http://www.worldfed.com/summary-september2005.pdf, last accessed 16 June 2008.
79 Taiwan is not considered officially as a participant but does conform to the minimal requirements.
127
international standards for national certification schemes in participating countries.80 
Furthermore, the official website of the KP refers to the Scheme as “an innovative, 
voluntary system that imposes extensive requirements on participants to certify that
0 1
shipments of rough diamonds are free from conflict diamonds”. Price (2003) 
therefore concludes that the KPCS can be classified as a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) or political agreement. However, the KPCS is able to create a 
strong obligation towards its participants due to the high level of peer pressure, strict 
monitoring and enforcement measures which are discussed below. The Scheme 
benefits from a high degree of clarity, although ways of implementation are left to 
the discretion of the participants. As Scheiber (2006) concludes, the provisions are 
overall very determinate. The sense of obligation is further strengthened by the fact 
that the KPCS is applicable to all its participants. Those that are technically not able 
to apply the minimal standards are assisted by other governments and industry 
representatives (Interview 12). Moreover, the KPCS is coherent with other 
international conventions, such as UN resolutions 1173 and 1306 prohibiting trade 
with conflict diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone.
As mentioned earlier, the KPCS disposes of very strict compliance mechanisms. 
The high level of monitoring, enforcement, and sanction mechanisms is very unusual 
for a soft law agreement. Although the original agreement of the KPCS in January 
2003 did not entail any detailed provisions on compliance, the requirements were 
significantly strengthened throughout the 18 months of operation. Therefore, it is 
important to look beyond the actual KPCS agreement of January 2003 when 
assessing the compliance mechanisms.
Monitoring is based on a peer review mechanism. So far, participants have 
decided to make one review visit per member. Moreover, the participants have to 
submit annual reports on their implementation of the certification scheme 
(Kimberley Process Chair 2004). Finally, review missions are deployed in cases of 
credible indications of non-compliance. Apart from government officials, 
representatives from the industry and the NGOs participate in these review missions.
80 Annex to the Letter from the Permanent Representative o f South Africa to the UN addressed to the 
General Assembly, submitted in Pursuance of Assembly Resolution 55/56 o f 1 December 2000, UN 
Doc A/56/502, App. B, at pg. 7
81 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/background/index_en.html, last accessed 15 June 2008.
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Although the review visits are officially not mandatory, in practice no 
participant can avoid them (Wexler 2006). There exists considerable peer pressure 
among KPCS participants to allow for review visits in the country as any participant 
that hesitates to allow a review visits is suspected of being non-compliant. 
Furthermore, the monitoring capacity of the scheme is significantly strengthened by 
the inclusion of NGOs and the industry as ‘watchdogs’. Their role as permanent 
observers is acknowledged in section VI para. 10 KPCS. Officially, they have no 
right to vote, yet, both the industry and the NGOs are de facto equal to states since all 
decisions are taken unanimously. The civil society is represented by Global Witness 
and PAC. The diamond industry is represented by the WDC. The scheme relies on 
Global Witness and PAC to a great extent since both organisations have field offices 
in the countries of concern and regularly issue reports. We can therefore consider the 
monitoring provisions as being comparatively high.
The KPCS also disposes of a strong enforcement and sanction mechanism of 
which Section III para, c is the basis. It requires that participants should “ensure that 
no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a non-Participant”. 
Since the KP Participants account for approximately 99.8 percent of the global 
production of rough diamonds,82 this creates a very strong incentive to become and 
remain a participant. Being expelled from the KP means being cut off from the legal 
global diamond market. Exclusion from the KP is not an idle threat. Already several 
countries such as the Republic of Congo have been excluded from the KP as they 
have been found to be non-compliant with the minimal requirements (Kimberley 
Process 2004).83 Therefore we can conclude that, despite the KPCS being voluntary 
from a legal point of view, in effect it is mandatory. In addition, non-compliant 
participants are named and shamed both by the KP (on the website) and the NGOs. 
Currently, KPCS compliance is not mainstreamed into IFI lending practices. Only in 
the case of the Republic of Congo has non-compliance affected the country’s 
relations with IMF and the World Bank (Interview 11).
82 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/background/index_en.html, last accessed 15 June 2008.
83 Among other cases of concern were Cote d ’Ivoire and Ghana. In the first case, KP participants 
estimated that the country smuggled diamonds from rebel-held areas into neighbouring countries. 
Since 2005, trade in Ivorian diamonds is prohibited. In the latter case, a KP meeting following a peer 
review took a tough stance requiring the country to strengthen its internal control within three months 
or else face exclusion (Partnership Africa Canada 2006).
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The KPCS only applies to rough diamonds that are imported or exported. The 
important question throughout the KP was, first, how to assure that diamonds are 
tracked and clean when moving from one dealer to another within countries. 
According to the experts, diamonds are traded numerous times among individual 
dealers by being sold back and forth, mixed and re-mixed (GAO 2002). In these 
instances, the danger of conflict diamonds entering the commodity chain and being 
laundered is very high. Secondly, the KPCS does not apply to cut and polished 
stones, which can be considered as a significant loophole. In order to address these 
problems, the WDC had proposed the introduction of the SoW for the sale of rough 
diamonds. The stones should be tracked by value and weight when they are moved 
from dealer to dealer (World Diamond Council 2003). This was supposed to give the 
exporting authority the assurance that no diamonds were laundered even if the stones 
came from very remote areas. The SoW is audited differently across the participating 
countries. The EC decided to adopt the most rigorous requirements for self- 
regulation. Regular audits by independent auditors of members of each self­
regulating body were authorised by the EC (Kimberley Process 2006a). In countries 
lacking rigorous guidelines, the NGOs now fulfil a major watchdog role for the 
industry’s self-regulation.
To conclude, one can say that the specific set-up of the KPCS is based on 
performance obligation, which renders the regime de facto mandatory (though not 
legally binding) trade regime.
3 |C  &  $  $  $
The KP started as an informal consultation process and the participants’ expectations 
were at the beginning very low. Throughout time, however, the mix of 
intergovernmental regime and a self-regulatory MSI produced a very light, flexible 
and issue-oriented agreement that has the potential to adapt to future needs. A 
member of the UK Government Diamond Office notes that due to the mix of 
intergovernmental and self-regulatory standards, a bureaucratically light regime 
evolved. It ensures the effectiveness of the regime as the diamond industry does not 
have to bear administrative or procedural delays when applying for certificates 
(Wright 2004: 701). The KPCS has developed into a scheme with a comparatively 
strong institutional design. Among other certification schemes it has the strongest
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monitoring and enforcement measures (Crossin et al. 2003). Given that the KPCS is 
not a hard law instrument but a soft law agreement based on performance obligation, 
the enforcement mechanisms are quite advanced since both non-compliant states and 
companies can be removed from the scheme. The incentives for states and the 
industry to remain participants of the scheme are very high. Although the KP does 
not have an independent secretariat, its internal organisation is well established due 
to its annual plenary meetings, working groups and committees. The KPCS together 
with the SoW covers both upstream and downstream operations, yet, it would be 
preferable that all countries adopt consistent standards for auditing the SoW. In 
conclusion, the institutional design of the KPCS can be considered as being very 
strong. Figure 9 provides a summary of the assessment of institutional design.
Membership High - Membership
- Application procedures
- Level o f inclusion
- Global
- Yes
- High
Obligation High - Type of obligation
- Creation of obligation
- Clarity
- Coherence with other rules
- Technical assistance
- General applicability
- Notion of necessity
- Performance based
- Peer pressure
- Yes
- Yes
- Yes
- Yes
- Yes
M onitoring High - Monitoring included
- Mandatory or voluntary
- Who monitors
- Systematic & continuous
- Publication of reports
- Yes
- Voluntary, but de-facto 
mandatory (peer pressure)
- second-party monitoring
- Yes
- Yes
Enforcement High - Type of enforcement
- Consequences of 
enforcement
- Naming & shaming 
practices
- IFI mainstreaming
- Exclusion from the scheme
- Exclusion from the legal 
trade
- Yes, on website; NGOs
- Not mainstreamed
Figure 9 Assessing the Institutional Design of the KPCS
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter served to provide the empirical and analytical background for the 
subsequent chapter. As we could see, diamonds are rather peculiar goods produced 
by a very unusual industry. Although the stones are a symbol for both luxury and 
love, in recent times they have acquired a more grim reputation, financing civil wars 
in Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC. The opaque diamond trading traditions have 
especially facilitated the concealment of the stones’ origins and made it easier to deal 
with conflict diamonds. The KP was created to make diamond trade more transparent 
and to ensure that only conflict-free goods are dealt with internationally. From the 
analysis of the diamond industry we concluded that the KP coincided with a 
historically important phase in the diamond industry. Having been dominated by the 
De Beers cartel for decades, at the end of the 1990s the group’s power was 
challenged by new players in the industry. Since then, De Beers has dramatically 
changed the way it operates by ending its function as ‘buyer of last resort’. Most 
importantly, we defined the dependent variable for our first case at the end of this 
chapter. Using the analytical framework from Chapter 2, we assessed the institutional 
design as being comparatively strong -  particularly if we consider that it is a soft law 
agreement. Not only is the KPCS a truly global regime, it also boasts strong 
monitoring and enforcement requirements. We considered the obligation to comply 
with these requirements as being very high. Given this outcome, the question arises 
as to why the KP was able to produce such a strong institution. This is the question to 
which we now turn.
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C h a p t e r  5
The Institutional Design of the Kimberley Process: 
Structural Opportunities for Norm Entrepreneurs
After having established the peculiarly strong institutional design of the KP, we now 
turn to the main analysis so as to account for this outcome. By tracing the negotiation 
dynamics, we can see that norm diffusion by norm entrepreneurs can explain the way 
the KP was institutionalised.
In this chapter I demonstrate the significance of four turning points that 
determined the degree of institutionalisation of the KP. The NGOs dominated in the 
campaign and agenda-setting phase and identified the opaque industry as enablers of 
the conflicts. While the diamond industry was rather defensive and reactive in this 
phase, the LM-Group -  favouring a strong institutionalised regime -  was formed in 
this early phase. The match of the new norm with established normative frameworks 
can explain why key countries like the UK and Canada joined the LM-Group. In the 
second phase the diamond industry formulated its strategy. By abandoning a reactive 
approach and taking the lead, the industry was able to shape the start of the 
negotiations in a crucial way, particularly by leading it to an MSI. In the third phase, 
the technical details of the certification scheme were discussed. While the NGOs 
were able to dominate the agenda, particularly in the earlier phases, with a more 
technical debate about how the Scheme should be designed, the industry was able to 
increase its discursive power by exploiting its technological expertise. A few 
governments, including that of the US, tried to water down the requirements at that 
stage. In the end, the Scheme was launched without an agreement on requirements 
regarding monitoring or disclosure of trade statistics. However, during this phase the 
industry changed its attitude on the issue a second time. While commercial 
considerations had a crucial part to play in the industry becoming involved in the 
first place, the industry then went through a learning process accepting that 
normative considerations were crucial for selling the product. Ultimately, the 
diamond industry acknowledged it had to bear a share of responsibility by facilitating 
the trade of conflict diamonds. The industry’s change of attitude has a crucial impact
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for the most recent phase of institutionalisation in which the KPCS was significantly 
strengthened. The phase reveals that normative and cultural differences both played a 
role, as the norm opponents did not want to submit to monitoring and disclosure of 
trade statistics. However, as the diamond industry backed the demands of the LM- 
Group, they could successfully marginalise norm opponents thereby initiating 
adaptation processes.
Overall, I argue that the strong institutionalisation is not only due to the 
successful political strategy of the LM-Group. They were also able to exploit POS 
favourable to strong institutionalisation. Two crucial historical events served as a 
catalyst for bringing the issue onto the international agenda. Early on, the escalating 
crisis in Angola catapulted the issue into the headlines. The attacks of 11 September 
2001 and the question of whether diamonds would finance terrorism served as a 
catalyst for the negotiations. Most crucially, however, a normative match and 
favourable power relations were very important for the success of the LM-Group in 
determining the institutional design. This becomes clearest when looking at the most 
recent phase of institutionalisation. The LM-Group was powerful enough to be able 
to marginalise crucial norm opponents and thus trigger adaptation processes.
In summary, the chapter demonstrates how case-specific opportunity 
structures empowered the LM-Group to determine institutional design. By initiating 
learning and adaptation processes, the LM-Group gradually decreased the power of 
the norm opponents.
5.1 Creating a Global Agenda for Conflict Diamonds
I begin scrutinising the KP by looking in-depth at how a global agenda for conflict 
diamonds was created at the end of the 1990s. The analysis is important to our 
argument as we see how the NGO campaign was able to impact the institutional 
design of the KP from the very beginning. Calling for a global certification scheme 
gave an important direction to the international efforts curbing trade with conflict 
diamonds. What is striking when scrutinising the Conflict Diamonds Campaign is 
that the NGOs were able to obtain international attention and to dominate the public 
discourse within less than two years. The great success of NGOs in shaping the 
public discourse becomes even more visible in the final section of this sub-chapter
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when looking at the very defensive reactions of the diamond industry towards the 
campaign.
We can see from the analysis that NGOs were effective in pushing their 
campaign by capitalising on a policy crisis and exploiting it as a political 
opportunity. Without the escalating civil conflicts in Africa, NGOs would have 
probably campaigned more to receive international attention, but political strategy 
such as framing was also crucial. Being able to build an epistemic community with 
researchers and UN representatives, the Conflict Diamonds Campaign, boosted their 
legitimacy in the public eye. Finally, directly turning to the industry was unusual for 
a NGO campaign addressing human security issues, yet proved to be highly effective 
in getting all the stakeholders involved. Although the industry was very defensive in 
this first phase, it provided a setting for future cooperation. The success of the 
Conflict Diamonds Campaign in raising global attention differentiates the NGO 
campaign from others dealing with natural resources, such as timber, which needed 
much more time and energy in order to reach public agendas.
5.1.1 The Epistemic Community on Conflict Diamonds
The conflict diamonds issue is a product of the post-Cold War security debate on the 
so-called ‘economies of war’ conducted by scholars, representatives of international 
organisations and NGOs since the mid-1990s. As we already noted earlier, the 
‘economies of war hypothesis’ states that most conflicts in Africa and Asia are 
fuelled and sustained by illicit exploitation of natural resources including, but not 
limited to, diamonds, timber, oil or coltan.
The epistemic community which formed throughout the 1990s consisted of 
three groups of agents, namely scholars, representatives of international 
organisations and NGOs. Cooperation within the community was based on a 
common understanding of the policy issue, industry opacity, and advocating for the 
same solution, increasing transparency. Each of the groups was crucial in leading the 
campaign to success.
The actors that discovered the conflict diamonds issue were international 
NGOs such as Global Witness, PAC and others. From the early 1990s, they had been 
producing reports on the role of conflict commodities like timber and diamonds in
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sustaining conflict. From the early days Global Witness had been the most successful 
in attracting the world’s attention to these issues. When the NGO began to conduct 
research on the role of natural resources in conflicts, only few other people were 
examining the issue. After first looking at the role of timber in Cambodia’s conflict, 
corruption and human rights abuses, Global Witness turned their attention to the civil 
war in Angola. In December 1998, shortly after the UNSC had decided to impose 
comprehensive economic and political sanctions on UNITA by activating Resolution 
1173, Global Witness accused the diamond industry, in particular De Beers, of 
undermining the sanctions due to its opaque business operations (Global Witness 
1998: 659). In 2000, PAC released its own report looking at the role of diamonds in 
the civil war in Sierra Leone, again specifically identifying the diamond industry as 
enabling trade with conflict diamonds. For the diamond industry, the link between 
diamonds and conflict was not new. The UNSC sanctions of July 1998 had put the 
issue on the agenda for De Beers and the HRD as they had to find ways of filtering 
Angolan stones from the supply chain. Yet, the NGO campaign changed the political 
environment for the corporate actors dramatically. Instead of blaming the corrupt 
Angolan government or UNITA, the Western diamond industry was now put under 
the spotlight. The fact that the NGOs identified the private sector as the principal 
driver for change corresponded to the more general trend towards more CSR since 
the early 1990s. By the time Global Witness classified the diamond industry as the 
main agent for change several other NGO-campaigns in issue areas as diverse as the 
environment, health, development and labour standards had already been launched 
by various transnational advocacy groups (see e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998). From 
1998, when the first NGO report was published, until the Three Year Review in 
October 2006, the activist network was the main agent in the epistemic community in 
raising public attention and putting both the industry and governments under 
pressure. However, the two other groups in the epistemic community were crucial in 
increasing the campaign’s credibility and legitimacy.
At the end of the 1990s, the research community followed the activists by 
turning their attention to the economic factors of the conflicts in Africa and Asia. A 
new research programme began to flourish concentrating on the ‘resource curse’ and 
‘paradox of the plenty’ (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Berdal and Malone 2000; 
Keen 1998). The research programme received institutional backing from the World 
Bank and the International Peace Academy. At the Bank, Paul Collier set up a
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research programme which subsequently published influential work establishing the 
causal link between natural resource endowment and poverty and corruption (Collier 
2000,2003). The International Peace Academy launched the Economic Agendas in 
Civil Wars Program looking at the causal relationship between civil war and conflict 
commodities (e.g. Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Ballentine 2005). The NGO 
approach of focussing on the industry as the principal driver for change was 
supported by a growing number of think tanks specialising in CSR. In particular the 
Council on Economic Priorities and the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum 
conducted initial research on the potential role of business in conflict prevention 
(Nelson 2000; see also Haufler 2001a; Wenger and Mockli 2003).84 The researchers 
underpinned the NGOs’ demands with sound social science research and, thus, 
enhanced their credibility.
The UNSC Sanctions Committee on Angola added further legitimacy to the 
epistemic community. The task of the expert panel was to examine the connection 
between diamonds and the ability of Angola’s UNITA to purchase weapons.
In summary, the combination of NGOs, researchers and the UN 
representatives produced an epistemic community that was considered as highly 
legitimate by the public. However, understanding the Conflict Diamonds Campaign 
as a unitary agent using the same methods to achieve the common goal is misleading. 
The epistemic community was always very loosely connected, not being organised 
by a clearing house. It is therefore unsurprising that especially within the NGO 
community different, even conflicting, ways of campaigning emerged as more 
activists joined the network. Some, like Global Witness, emphasised research.
Others, like Fatal Transactions mainly organised public pressure. Nevertheless, the 
peculiar combination of activists, research and UN representatives increased both the 
credibility and the outreach of the Campaign. With the growing number of research 
reports from institutions, such as the World Bank and the UN, national decision­
makers became more alert to the issue.
84 According to Haufler (2001a: 659), the conflict diamonds issue re-invigorated an old debate on the 
role of business in conflict. This link first became apparent in the 18th and 19th century when colonial 
investors “disrupted existing patterns of political relationships -  more often than not with force”. The 
second wave of interest followed after the Holocaust when its victims re-claimed compensation for 
forced labour from (mostly German) companies (see on this issue Bindenagel 2006).
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5.1.2 Setting the Agenda: Political Strategy and Structural Opportunities
We have already noted the epistemic community’s main focus on the industry. In 
their view, any attempt to pacify the wars in Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC had 
to start there since the opaque business procedures of the diamond industry enabled 
conflict diamonds to enter the legal supply chain. Although the NGOs’ prime focus 
was on the industry, they also knew that without governmental support it would be 
difficult to realise their proposals. The challenge was therefore to frame the issue in a 
way that would draw in both kinds of actors. This section examines in detail three 
factors, related both to political strategy and structural opportunities, which helped 
the network set the agenda both for the industry and the governments.
The first factor was one of political strategy. The network re-interpreted the 
conflicts in a way that emphasised both the human security dimension and private 
sector responsibility. As to engaging the private sector, the NGOs were able to 
exploit the product characteristics of diamonds. Considering that conflict diamonds 
were a security and an international trade issue, the focus on the industry was very 
unusual, but most pragmatic as the industry was the weakest link in the chain. The 
previous chapter has already pointed out the unique characteristics of diamonds. 
Their value and their reputation as tokens for love and purity had been constructed 
by the diamond industry decades ago. It was here the network started by re­
constructing the meaning of diamonds. Labelling the gems as conflict diamonds or 
even ‘blood diamonds’ to counter the established reputation of diamonds and putting 
emphasis on the suffering of civilians in the countries concerned, proved to be a very 
successful frame to raise public attention. As we can see later in this section, the 
emphasis on human security helped the NGOs to draw in two key governments, 
those of the UK and Canada.
Secondly, the campaign could benefit from the emerging norm of CSR. Being 
able to frame the issue in terms of this emerging trend enabled the topic to fit into the 
other debates on business ethics. To be successful, the NGOs had to have a ‘causal 
story’ as to why they considered the diamond industry as the linchpin to finding a 
solution to the issue rather than the governments. After all, the industry would never 
have been able to stop the wars. To this end the activists argued that cutting off 
rebels from their revenue source -  the diamonds trade -  could potentially contribute 
not only to ending the civil wars in Africa but could also play a part in sustaining
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peace. For this to be achieved, the origin of the stones had to be much better 
monitored by an international certification scheme. In order to emphasise the role of 
the industry, it was important that the NGOs could link the diamonds issue with the 
emerging norm of CSR. The public had already been sensitised to corporate 
misbehaviour by a number of activist campaigns. Also, as the private sector in 
general became more aware of the notion of CSR, it began to develop initiatives to 
pre-empt outside pressures and the threat of potential public regulation (Haufler 
2001b). Among other issues, the role and responsibilities of MNCs in developing 
countries was increasingly debated both in the public and private sector. The Conflict 
Diamonds Campaign was therefore able to benefit from the increasingly accepted 
CSR norm. The activists’ interpretation was supported by the UN officials. Under the 
leadership of Ambassador Fowler, the UNSC expert panel on Angola publicly 
criticised the business operations of the diamond industry. Moving away from 
normal UN procedure, the report bluntly named and shamed companies, weapon 
dealers and heads of state that were involved in the trafficking of weapons and 
diamonds. As to the diamond industry, Antwerp was singled out for not sufficiently 
complying with the UNSC sanctions. The Antwerp diamond industry and the 
Belgian authorities alike were accused of being unwilling or unable to enforce 
stronger controls (United Nations Security Council 2000: 30). Moreover, the Panel 
criticised De Beers for only reporting the provenance of the goods but not their 
origin. Since two thirds of all goods imported by De Beers’ CSO transited through 
Switzerland, it was impossible to establish their origin. Yet, overall, the Fowler 
Report was more favourable towards De Beers’ compliance with the sanctions 
(United Nations Security Council 2000: 3 If). Being at the centre of the accusations, 
Antwerp received the report badly and accused Fowler of trying to boost the 
emerging Canadian diamond industry (Interviews 18 and 20; Duncan 2000). 
However, in most other policy circles and in the broader public, the report added 
legitimacy to the NGO campaign.
Thirdly and most importantly, the network was able to exploit one crucial 
window of opportunity that catapulted conflict diamonds onto the international 
agenda. We noted in Chapter 3 that political opportunities can also arise from policy 
crisis. In this regard, the network could benefit from the increasing publicity of the 
civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone (Shaxson 2001; Williams 2005). From 1994 to 
1998, UNITA had gained strength by re-arming itself. In December 1998, the same
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month Global Witness published its first report, the civil war erupted again. In Sierra 
Leone, RUF was also re-gaining force, which ultimately led to a UK military 
operation in early 2000. The escalating conflicts provided an ideal setting for the 
more confrontational-minded NGOs in the network. They organised protests outside 
major diamond retailers in the US. Posters with images of mutilated children in 
Sierra Leone were common (Tamm 2004). Global Witness and PAC also engaged in 
‘naming and shaming’ strategies but first and foremost tried to engage the diamond 
industry in a dialogue so as to find a solution together. While Global Witness and 
PAC concentrated on De Beers and the diamond industry in Antwerp, other NGOs 
targeted the retail sector.
The international campaign very soon gained extraordinary publicity. 
Magazines such as Vanity Affairs and BBC television reports provided immense 
coverage of the issue. The diamond industry was thus confronted with a new 
business risk to which it had to adapt. Framing diamonds as ‘conflict diamonds’ 
instantly addressed the industry’s fear of decreasing profits, but as we can see in the 
following section, it was far from easy for the corporate actors to adapt to the 
mounting international pressure.
5.1.3 Confronting the Structural Power of the Diamond Industry
In contrast to the governments and the wider public, the industry was not as receptive 
to the Campaign. In fact, the industry’s initial reaction can be compared with nearly 
all NGO campaigns against corporate behaviour, whereby the companies denied 
having any responsibility in the issue. Particularly, the older generation of 
diamantaires and traders, who still belonged to the ‘old school’, took a very 
adversarial stance towards the NGOs. Most of them felt they were being attacked 
unjustifiably by NGOs, the UN and the governments that pushed for a solution. They 
saw themselves as scapegoats being an easy target for ideological civil society actors 
because they sold a high profile product that could easily be damaged by negative 
publicity (Interview 3; Rapaport 1999).
“The diamond industry cannot accept the responsibility of functioning as a surrogate 
multilateral responsible for African problems of state. Diamonds must not become a 
convenient scapegoat ( ...)” (Antwerp Diamond Bourse 2000).
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The more confrontational the NGOs became, the more the industry despised them. In 
contrast to other industry sectors, it was very difficult for the diamond industry to 
devise a strategy against the campaign since they had never previously been attacked 
by international NGOs (Interview 5). We have already noted in Chapter 4 the 
traditionally very insular character of the diamond industry -  not maintaining many 
contacts with other sectors which have been frequently targeted by civil society, such 
as the oil or pharmaceutical industries. Hence, in the boardroom the feeling of 
uncertainty as to how to react properly dominated. Although De Beers had always 
had contact with local communities and grassroots organisations through its active 
work in philanthropy in Africa, blueprints or experiences of how to deal with civil 
society activism were completely missing. Moreover, the industry did not consider it 
as their job to solve the issue. For the industry this was predominantly a trade issue. 
Pacifying the civil wars in Africa and ensuring that no illegal diamonds reached the 
legal market was a task for governments, custom agencies and the UN, not the 
industry:
“(...)  Frankly, I [Martin Rapaport] don’t buy the idea that war in Africa is the fault of 
the diamond industry. Simply put, since the problems in Africa were created by foreign 
governments, it is their guilt trip not ours. (...) No one has the right to dictate morality 
to the diamond industry ( ...)”(Rapaport 1999).
The NGO campaign strategically identified De Beers as the central target of their 
campaign. As mentioned in the previous chapter, when the conflict diamonds 
campaign had started, De Beers was still the largest supplier of diamonds world-wide 
and had, in contrast to the many family-sized businesses, a public image. Especially 
at De Beers the senior executives took an arrogant stance. In their view, they were 
attacked because they were a big company that had controlled the diamond industry 
for more than a century. Their first reaction was to shield themselves against the 
allegations without admitting any problems and solutions (see e.g. Lear 1998). 
Overall, the De Beers executives hoped that the campaign would “go away” 
(Interview 6). Yet, very quickly the industry realised that the campaign was to stay 
for the longer run and concerns about a potential loss of profits outbalanced industry 
ignorance (De Beers 2000a; Antwerp Diamond Bourse 2000).
Hence, De Beers finally realised that the NGO framing of diamonds as 
conflict goods constituted a serious business risk which could have a devastating 
effect on their market. This realisation marked the turning point in their behaviour.
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So as to restore the reputation of their product, the industry launched a 
counter-campaign framing the gems as Diamonds for Development. According to 
this, diamonds, of which allegedly 96 percent were conflict-free, contributed 
substantially to the economic development of African producer and Asian 
manufacturing countries (African Confidential 2002). In the view of the industry, 
tainting diamonds with blood, as the NGO campaign did, was very irresponsible, 
putting at risk the economic development of a number of African countries.
The launch of the counter-campaign marked the industry’s beginning in 
engaging in the public discourse on conflict diamonds. However, until early 2000, 
the industry including De Beers was only reactive. In June 1998, De Beers 
emphasised adherence to the UN embargo by only buying certified Angolan stones. 
After the Global Witness report made it public that Angolan certificates could be 
forged, the company announced in October 1999 that it would cease to buy Angolan 
diamonds on the open market altogether (Bone 2004). On top of this, just a few 
months later, De Beers decided to close all buying offices in West and Central 
Africa.
Although the company started to engage in the fight over who was shaping 
the public discourse, the Diamond for Development Campaign did not much to 
restore the image of the product. As the public discourse was dominated by the 
NGOs, the defensive attitude of the industry demonstrated its inept crisis 
management. The sources are inconclusive as to whether the Conflict Diamonds 
Campaign slowed down jewellery sales,85 but at the time, industry representatives 
feared that the diamonds could develop like fur (O'Ferrall 2002; Smillie 2005b).86 In 
summary, the conflict diamonds campaign constituted a new business risk the 
diamond industry had not yet developed the competence to cope with.
5.1.4 Engaging the Key Countries: Normative Match and Material Interests
Rather than involving the industry, the NGOs were more successful in engaging the 
key governments: the UK, Canada and African producer countries. In this section I 
discuss why the key KP countries that had a significant impact on institutional design
85 Whereas in 2000 newspapers reported a sharp drop in diamond sales in the run-up to Christmas, two 
years later, another report came to the conclusion that consumers had been largely unaffected by the 
NGO campaign (Africa Mining Intelligence 2000; Kletter and Conti 2002).
86 Fur is another luxury commodity which became ostracised in the mid-1990s.
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became involved early on. The African producer countries’ interest in the process 
was motivated by the need to respond to an increasing business risk. With regard to 
the UK and Canada, although both countries are home to the diamond industry, 
business interest cannot explain why they became involved in the first place. As 
Chapter 4 elaborated, the industry is economically crucial, especially in countries 
like Botswana. Although London is a large diamond centre, its exports account for 
only a small fraction of the annual gross domestic product (GDP) (Even-Zohar 
2002). Canada, with its emerging diamond industry, would have benefited from a 
comparative advantage in the conflict diamonds issue, being able to market Canadian 
diamonds as conflict free. I argue that in contrast to the African countries, it is not 
material interest that can account for the UK’s and Canada’s lead in the KP but the 
success of the NGOs to make the KP fit into their domestic normative frameworks.
Let us first scrutinise Canada, which soon developed into a key driver for 
strong institutionalisation of the KP. It had taken an interest in the initiative first due 
to the strong involvement of the Canadian Ambassador Fowler. Its interest was 
reinforced as the goals of the NGO campaign matched with Canada’s recent foreign 
policy strategy of supporting -  even leading -  several international human security 
initiatives.87 In fact, the way the NGOs framed the issue of conflict diamonds fitted 
very well into Canada’s foreign policy strategy of promoting human security. Canada 
had embraced human security as a foreign policy principle since Lloyd Axworthy 
was appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs (Behringer 2005). Moreover, Canada 
was very familiar with working closely with NGOs from the Ottawa Process.
With regard to the UK, the newly elected Labour Government and its turn 
towards an “ethical foreign policy” focussing on human rights, democracy promotion 
and securing peace (Williams 2005) provided an important political opportunity for 
the NGOs to diffuse their norm. As they successfully framed an international trade- 
related issue into a human security one, their government’s new foreign policy focus 
matched perfectly the aims of the Campaign. Moreover, the Labour government was 
very sympathetic to liberal and bureaucratically light policy solutions distributing 
more responsibilities to the private sector. This created a political environment
87 The Ottawa Process is another example in which Canada developed into a leading country 
promoting the human security agenda. The notion of human security was first elaborated by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (UNDP 1994). It called for a re-conceptualisation 
of security with a focus on protecting the human security o f individuals rather than securing nation­
states from the nuclear threat.
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sympathetic to the NGOs’ call for more industry responsibility in the issue. Finally, 
with the escalating conflicts in Africa, the continent rose considerably as a priority 
during Labour’s first term (Kampfner 2004). Most importantly, the UK began its 
military intervention in Sierra Leone just when South Africa convened its first 
meeting of the KP in May 2000, contemplating policy options on how to make its 
military operations sustainable. Hence, the NGOs met a need for new policy ideas. 
Like Canada, the UK was very familiar with working with NGOs on international 
issues.
For African countries such as Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, 
commercial interest in the Process was the dominant factor in becoming involved. 
First, as with the industry, the governments had to face a new business risk, fearing a 
global consumer boycott. Although the NGOs did not call for a boycott, the 
campaign on conflict diamonds was potentially negative publicity for the diamonds 
market (Smillie 2005a). Diamonds mined in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa 
had always been conflict-free. Yet, the countries were involved in the issue as they 
served as transits for illicitly mined stones from Angola and the DRC (African 
Confidential 2002; Hazleton 2002).88 Hence, being part of the problem coupled with 
vital economist interest can account for their engagement. The African countries 
feared that a new international regime could have repercussions on their trade by 
rendering international trade more difficult (Taylor and Mokhawa 2003). In 
particular, they feared that a costly and inefficient regime would slow down trade. 
Hence they were in general very wary of the KP but knew a political solution needed 
to be found to combat trade in conflict diamonds.
* * * * *
The sub-chapter explored the formation of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign and 
examined how the network was able to shape the future direction of the KP in a 
significant way in a very short time. A peculiar combination of NGOs, researchers 
and UN representatives could boost the legitimacy of the campaign and increased the 
outreach to governmental decision-makers as in the case o f Canada. Nevertheless,
88 Tracing the flow o f smuggled diamonds is nearly impossible. However, there is evidence that 
Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa were used to launder the illegal goods. For instance, in South 
Africa the volume o f diamonds going through the diamond bourse had doubled from 1997 to 2002 
although the local production had remained stable (African Confidential 2002).
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more crucial to the success of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign than the network 
composition was their ability to spot and exploit significant opportunities. The 
product characteristics of diamonds enabled the NGOs to re-interpret the meaning of 
the stones by framing them as conflict diamonds. Being able to draw on the emerging 
CSR norm facilitated the NGO’s causal story of the industry as bearing a share of 
responsibility in the issue. This frame was very persuasive for the UK government, 
which favoured a private sector taking on more responsibility. Most importantly, 
however, the escalating civil wars catapulted both the conflict and the diamonds into 
the headlines and the agendas of governments. Without this opportunity, it would 
have been much more difficult to attract widespread international attention within 
less than two years.
As we can see from this sub-chapter, the NGOs clearly dominated the public 
discourse in this agenda-setting phase. The governments were very receptive to the 
NGOs’ demand to search for a political solution. With regard to corporate actors, the 
impact of the campaign caught them by surprise and constituted a serious business 
risk. At that early stage the industry still had to formulate an appropriate reaction.
5.2 From Laggard to Leader: The Diamond Industry Confronts Conflict 
Diamonds
The second phase is characterised by the change in the De Beers’ attitude from a 
laggard to a leader in confronting conflict diamonds from the year 2000. It represents 
a key turning point as it opened the way for the KP. Without it the formation of an 
MSI would have been highly unlikely and the KP would have, if  it had existed at all, 
turned into a traditional intergovernmental regime. So as to impact on the KP’s 
institutional design in such an important way, however, the diamond industry first 
had to increase its structural power by becoming united on an unprecedented scale. 
However, this was not an easy task. When De Beers suddenly and proactively started 
to engage with the issue in the first half of 2000, a rift between De Beers and the 
remainder of the industry emerged.
What can explain the fundamental shift of the De Beers position? The 
subsequent analysis reveals that the pressure campaign by the NGOs only in part 
accounts for the change in strategy. More important was the confluence of the
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outside pressure with the historical changes in the industry structure which we 
analysed in Chapter 4. It provided the NGOs with the unique opportunity of a more 
accessible De Beers, a company which had been closed for decades to outsiders. 
While we noted the ability of NGOs to spot opportunities and frame the policy issue 
accordingly when setting up their campaign in the previous sub-chapter, this time, 
being able to exploit the structural changes to their advantage was rather a 
coincidence than a demonstration of discursive power. In particular, the main motive 
of De Beers for adopting the proactive stance was more linked to its internal 
operations review than to the outside pressure campaign. Most crucially, De Beers 
then started to exert structural power so as to shape the future direction of the KP.
5.2.1 From Business Opportunities to Business Conflict?
We have already discussed De Beers’ change of its overall business strategy in detail 
in Chapter 4. This unprecedented revision also led to a change in attitude of the 
company towards conflict diamonds in 1999 and 2000. We noted earlier that De 
Beers was confronted with a further fragmentation and disintegration of the sector 
due to the emergence of new players both in Africa and in Canada. Coupled with 
conflict diamonds, this pushed De Beers onto a steep learning curve. As this section 
shows, De Beers’ change in attitude provided entry points for the NGOs to engage 
seriously with senior executives. Nevertheless, it also led to a growing divergence 
between the political strategies of the main industry players.
Faster than most in the industry, De Beers realised the potential danger, but 
also the opportunities, which emanated from the conflict diamonds campaign. In 
order to be able to transform the risk into an opportunity, De Beers needed to 
abandon its ‘laggard strategy’ of trying to ignore the campaign and rejecting any of 
the NGOs’ accusations. As we see later in this sub-chapter, the change of perception 
within De Beers was crucial for the KP to develop into an MSI.
In order to transform into a leader in the conflict diamonds issue, an internal 
debate within De Beers had to be fought regarding the giving up of its defensive role. 
In the early days of the NGO campaign, De Beers’ senior and younger executives 
had an intense discussion about how to deal with the conflict diamonds issue. The 
younger executives realised that the Diamonds for Development Campaign could not
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avoid real engagement with NGO criticism. The older executives, however, insisted 
on continuing to ignore the issue (Interview 6).
A window of opportunity opened up for active engagement and solved the 
company dispute. De Beers’ review phase at the end of the nineties provided an entry 
point for serious debate with Global Witness. After having been closed to outsiders 
for nearly a century, De Beers finally became more accessible as the company had 
hired a management consultancy to give advice on the future market strategy for the 
first time in its history. Together with the consultancy firm, De Beers came also to 
understand how the conflict diamonds issue could be exploited as an opportunity, 
thereby supporting its overall change in business strategy (for the following see 
Beffert and Benner 2005). From Chapter 4, we recall that one of the challenges was 
the growing stockpile. Introducing tougher international controls for certified gems 
would contribute to De Beers’ goal of decreasing its stockpile by reducing the 
supplies of rough diamonds. A certification scheme would entail comparative 
advantages, as De Beers would be able to certify the origin of its gems more easily 
compared with others. De Beers’ diamonds came from conflict-free mines in South 
Africa, Namibia and Botswana. As De Beers was about to launch its own brand, the 
Forevermark™, presenting itself as a leader in CSR would yield reputational 
benefits. This was supposed to facilitate the marketing of the new brand. A more 
cooperative stance on the conflict diamonds issue could ease the tension with US 
authorities with regard to anti-trust laws. Settling the issue was crucial, as the US 
was the biggest market for the company and US shareholders controlled more than 
30 percent of its shares. Moreover, it was a precondition for opening its own branded 
diamond stores in the US. Finally, another important objective besides brand 
management was the desire to have as much influence in shaping the future trade 
mechanism as possible.
With this analysis in mind, there seemed to be no policy strategy other than 
being responsive to the NGOs. Hence, in March 2000, De Beers altered its reactive 
stance into a proactive approach. The first step was to announce that written 
guarantees were to be given on De Beers invoices declaring that the diamonds had 
not been purchased from areas where rebels were challenging the legitimate 
government (Bone 2004). Furthermore, the company wanted to establish its 
credibility and manifest itself as part of the international efforts to curb trade in 
conflict diamonds when it was invited to provide written testimony to the US House
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Committee on International Relations. The testimony contained proposals for an 
international solution and expert evaluation of the value of the trade in conflict 
diamonds (De Beers 2000b). With De Beers’ proactive stance, the international 
cooperation gathered steam. Global Witness was now able to talk directly to De 
Beers about possible solutions rather than concentrating only on campaigning. For 
political decision-makers, De Beers’ evidence was crucial for finding a position.
However, De Beers’ proactive stance also had serious repercussions for the 
unity of the industry. It put the company into conflict with the remaining corporate 
players. As long as De Beers had considered the Conflict Diamonds Campaign as a 
threat, the company was in line with the rest of the industry, but as soon as De Beers 
realised its own opportunities and changed strategy, a potential business conflict 
emerged between De Beers and the other firms in the sector. Most of the diamond 
dealers opposed a certification scheme for several reasons. They lacked a long-term 
perspective on the issue as they had to focus on the transaction of the moment, 
turning over large volumes of diamonds, very often at narrow margins (Hart 2003: 
200). On the one hand, they realised the immediate threat of the campaign to their 
businesses, but on the other hand, they did not want to invest in longer-term solutions 
to the issue. Being small-sized businesses, they feared they would not be able to cope 
with the increased costs imposed by a certification scheme. Furthermore, since most 
of the traders were not as publicly exposed as De Beers, they felt they did not suffer 
as much under the campaign. Hence, engaging in a political strategy towards 
developing an international certification scheme was not in their interest.
From this section we can see how significant the historical structural changes 
within the diamond industry were at the end of the 1990s and how they influenced 
the political strategy of De Beers towards conflict diamonds. The further 
fragmentation and disintegration o f the industry coupled with a loss of financial 
power forced De Beers to fundamentally review its business operations. This 
transition phase not only rendered the company more accessible to outsiders but also 
revealed that the conflict diamonds offered important opportunities for a revised 
business strategy. For the remainder o f the industry, however, De Beers’ shift was 
not welcomed. As the other companies could not derive much benefit from an 
international certification scheme, a rift within the diamond industry emerged.
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5.2.2 Taking the Lead to Kimberley
Being the first in the industry to recognise both the risks and opportunities stemming 
from the conflict diamonds issue, De Beers transformed into a leader in the search 
for a political solution to the conflict diamonds issue by using its structural power. 
One of the most important objects besides containing the public relations damage 
was to be able to have as much influence in shaping the certification scheme as 
possible. De Beers needed a two-pronged strategy to spark change.
First, the executives quickly realised that the industry would not be able to 
curb trade in conflict diamonds without the governments. Only governments would 
have the capacity and the responsibility for this. De Beers worked closely with the 
South African government, which invited all the stakeholders to Kimberley in order 
to discuss the issue in the ‘Diamond Experts’ Technical Forum’ in May 2000 
(Smillie 2005c).
More importantly, however, De Beers realised very quickly that its proactive 
stance would put the company into conflict with the rest of the diamond industry.
Yet, so as to be able to find a solution to the issue and protect the industry from 
material and reputational risks, a concerted effort of the industry was necessary. 
Although De Beers would have had a comparative advantage by becoming a first 
mover in certified diamonds, the company realised that in order to protect the 
reputation of the product, all diamonds should be certified.
At first glance, we might expect it to be easy for De Beers to unite the 
diamond industry. After all, the industry is very small in comparison to other 
industry sectors. Moreover, De Beers had controlled supply and demand of diamonds 
for a very long time. It possessed enormous financial capacity and instrumental 
power having the ability to cut off dealers from the supply chain. In addition, De 
Beers’ discursive power stemmed from the fact that every diamond dealer knew that 
no other actor had put so much effort and money into preserving the industry and 
constructing the value of diamonds as had De Beers (Even-Zohar 2002). Yet, De 
Beers’ ability to act as the behemoth of the diamond industry was constrained by 
several significant aspects. First, there was a structural aspect. Chapter 4 already 
referred to the fragmentation of the industry where the retail sector had no contact 
with the upstream part of the industry. De Beers’ reach was therefore limited to one 
part of the industry. Second, throughout the transition phase, cutting the number of
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its sightholders had sparked conflict and mistrust between De Beers and the rest of 
the industry. Coupled with the rise of other independent diamond dealers such as 
Leviev in Angola, giving dealers new options, the company had lost significant 
power in initiating change just when the KP was supposed to kick off. The difficult 
situation for De Beers was that it could no longer force the diamond industry to act 
according to their wishes as there was a constant suspicion that De Beers was only 
pursuing its own interests. In fact, there was a double-edged dynamic at play 
(Interview 14). As the company pursued its own interests both by transforming its 
business strategy and by becoming proactive with regard to conflict diamonds, small 
traders and manufactures felt threatened. This decreased chances for collective 
action. Nonetheless, the only way to protect the industry from material and 
reputational risks was to persuade its peers that they needed to act in unison. To that 
end, a lot depended on the discursive power of De Beers to persuade the industry.
De Beers began to lead the events in the private sector shortly after the first 
technical meeting in May 2000. A month later, the company sent letters, signed by 
Nicky Oppenheimer and Gary Ralfe, Managing Director, to the Presidents of the 
WFDB, IDMA, other industry associations and diamond bourses worldwide. In these 
letters, they not only called for a collective response to the issue of conflict 
diamonds, but also urged the diamond bourses to expel any member caught trading 
in the conflict commodities (De Beers 2000a; Hart 2003). These letters demonstrated 
that De Beers was taking the situation very seriously and, thus, served as a ‘wake up 
call’ within the industry. Some weeks later, the Antwerp Diamond Bourse addressed 
the issue of conflict diamonds and called for the united efforts of the industry 
(Antwerp Diamond Bourse 2000). De Beers diffused its strategy not only by public 
speeches but also by directly approaching corporate actors and confronting them with 
the issue. The company used this influence in order to arrange several meetings with 
diamond dealers to discuss the issue, always making sure to emphasise the benefit 
for the whole sector and not just for itself. Sometimes, they also invited 
representatives of NGOs (Interview 3). In these cases, De Beers also acted as a 
facilitator for NGOs by helping them to get into contact with diamond dealers who 
would otherwise never have talked to representatives of civil society.
With other parts of the industry no longer belonging to the De Beers system -  
the retail, manufacturers and small diamond dealers -  the Group was less successful 
in creating change. The manufacturing sector, for instance, the most remote from
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consumer pressure and the actual conflicts, was profoundly resistant to change 
(Interview 14). They, along with small diamond dealers which had lost their 
sightholder status, suffered very much from the De Beers’ revised overall business 
strategy and were therefore highly suspicious of the company’s leadership.
De Beers had to realise that their leadership would not be sufficient to unite 
the industry. An independent industry body with more credibility across all sectors 
would be more suitable to deal with this issue. This would also ensure that industry 
action would be seen as a sector-wide contribution rather than a De Beers initiative 
(Interview 14). The most significant contribution of De Beers in leading the industry 
to Kimberley was its engagement in building a new institution that is now in charge 
of dealing with KP related issues, the WDC. The aim of building this institution was 
to create a place where the entire industry, from mining to retail, could come together 
discussing among themselves and with civil society the various approaches to 
solving the issue. The HRD especially had not trusted De Beers to represent the 
interests of the entire industry and, by being present, wanted to protect its Antwerp 
dealers. Therefore, in the first two meetings of the KP in Kimberley, South Africa 
(May 2000), and Luanda, Angola (June 2000), the industry was represented by two 
bodies, the HRD and De Beers. For several reasons, the industry realised that being 
represented by two different bodies would be a disadvantage. Initially, the diamond 
industry was only supposed to provide technical consultation. However, when the 
Process began, negotiations were very politicised. Therefore, the industry saw a need 
to adapt to this situation and delegate representatives that were not only technically 
knowledgeable but also politically sensitive. Moreover, the industry feared that either 
governments or civil society could exploit the rift in the industry by playing the two 
business players off each other (Interview 5).
By creating the WDC, De Beers intended to overcome these issues, but the 
company had to be careful not to give the impression of pursuing their only own 
interests, but those of the whole industry. Considering how disparate and competitive 
the industry was, the creation of the WDC was a very innovative and bold move. 
Together with the industry bodies WDFB and IDMA, De Beers worked towards the 
creation of the WDC and ensured that the industry would be properly represented.
On 17 July 2000, at the 29th World Diamond Congress, the WDC was created. Eli 
Izhakoff, the president of WFDB, was elected as chairman of WDC. De Beers had 
pushed for Izhakoff behind the scenes (Interview 5). He was considered to be the
151
ideal candidate since he was both very highly esteemed in the diamond trade and also 
had political experience. Hence, he was able to lead the diamond industry in the 
politicised atmosphere of the KP. For De Beers, the creation of the WDC meant that 
it was giving away its leadership to the new body. However, at this very specific 
moment in time for the industry, De Beers considered it more as an advantage than a 
loss of power.
This section examined the efforts taken by De Beers to act as a leader within 
the diamond industry. The historical changes within the industry structure had a 
profound impact on De Beers’ behaviour. However, the changes did not provide the 
company with an opportunity but rather limited its behavioural options. With its 
decreasing instrumental and structural power, De Beers’ ability to guide the industry 
diminished. As a large number of players in the industry began to distrust the 
company, it had to find a new way of initiating collective action. In order to be able 
to lead, De Beers had to take the exceptional step of transferring its power to the 
newly created industry body. Thus, De Beers ensured that diverging perceptions and 
interests in the industry did not develop into a business conflict which would have 
weakened the industry’s impact.
5.2.3 Setting the Scene for an MSI
The creation of the WDC was an important milestone not only for fostering 
collective action within the industry but also for directing the KP into an MSI.
In the early days of the Process, leading governments, in particular that of the 
UK, were in search of a political format for the evolving process. For several 
reasons, the UN was not considered to be the appropriate place (Interview 11). The 
UK would have preferred to push the certification scheme through the UNSC as a 
Chapter 7 resolution since conflict diamonds had an obvious link to peace and 
security aspects.89 Since the UK delegation also preferred a legally-binding 
agreement, working within the UNSC framework seemed most advantageous. Other 
UNSC members, however, had a different opinion and did not consider the UNSC as 
the appropriate institution to deal with conflict diamonds. For the Russians and the
89 UNSC Chapter 7 deals with threats to peace.
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Chinese the conflict diamonds seemed to differ too much from the usual UNSC 
Chapter 7 issues and neither government was eager to set new precedents for the use 
of that Chapter. Moreover, the US hesitated to call on the UNSC since they preferred 
a lighter and swifter solution (Interview 11).
The way the KP had evolved until the end of 2000 forced governments to 
realise that it would be impossible to achieve and implement an international 
agreement without the strong support of the industry.90 Any effective political 
solution would therefore need to take into account the industry’s position. The first 
reason for this could be found in the opacity of the diamond industry. As explained 
in Chapter 4, the diamond trade is very difficult to track. Yet, in order to set up an 
effective commodity tracking system, policy makers need to have a profound 
understanding of the supply chain (Interview 20). Moreover, due to the secretive 
trade traditions, consistent and accurate data on global diamond production was not 
available (GAO 2002). Hence, it was impossible even to estimate the amount of 
conflict diamonds traded per year. This is not unusual when trying to regulate an 
illegal market. However, governments also had very little knowledge of how the 
diamond industry worked. Most importantly they did not understand how supply 
chains functioned. Globally, there were only a small number of diamond experts, 
most of them working as consultants in the industry. Apart from the industry, only 
Global Witness and PAC had acquired an advanced and reliable knowledge of these 
issues through their campaign activities.
The governments realised that the only way for them to acquire that 
understanding was to cooperate intensely with the experts. Nevertheless, why did the 
diplomats see a need to allocate equal rights to the NSAs by designing the KP as an 
MSI? Looking at other international negotiations, we can distinguish a number of 
ways by which governments can allocate participating rights to industry 
representatives and civil society. In global environmental politics for instance, 
governments need technological and scientific advice from the industry to the same 
extent. Therefore, the governments included industry representatives in their national 
delegations during the negotiations for the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto 
Protocol.
90 This paragraph draws heavily on Kantz (2007).
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However, the way the KP had evolved from the beginning had directed the 
Process away from such traditional methods of inclusion towards a more novel 
approach. First, in several African countries, the industry itself was a private-public 
partnership. Therefore a natural distinction in countries such as Botswana, Namibia 
and Angola between the public and private sector did not seem appropriate. Even 
more importantly, the industry itself was able to steer the Process into the direction 
of an MSI by launching the WDC. Governments found it very easy to engage with 
the industry and to exchange their knowledge through the WDC. Hence they did not 
see the necessity to change that status quo by including industry representatives in 
their national delegations. With the formation of this new industry body, the diamond 
industry paved the way for the MSI. Only by unifying the industry and speaking with 
a single voice could corporate actors transform their technological and industrial 
expertise into structural power, shaping the nature of the KP in a significant way. We 
should therefore consider the creation of the WDC as pivotal for the industry’s 
acquisition of equal participation rights in the KP.
With the inclusion of the industry, policy-makers also had to assign 
participation rights to the NGOs so as to balance the negotiations. As mentioned 
before, most of the diplomats, especially those from the UK and Canada, had good 
experience cooperating with NGOs from the landmines campaign. Hence, they 
treated Global Witness and PAC with respect from the very beginning. Moreover, 
especially smaller delegations from African countries, such as the one from Sierra 
Leone, benefited from the alliance with NGOs as they could rely on their policy 
consulting and experience in international politics (Interview 1). However, it should 
not be surprising that NGO participation to that extent was not uncontested. In the 
early phase of the KP, only Zimbabwe and Angola opposed the presence of civil 
society. Not sufficiently valuing their domestic civil society, it was difficult for those 
diplomats to adapt to this very open and inclusive negotiation style (ibid.), but the 
more countries that joined, the more the specific approach of the KP to diplomacy 
had to be justified. As noted by Smillie (2005: 59), in particular Russia, China and 
Japan repeatedly “stalled and blocked” the negotiations trying to restrict NGO 
participation. It is only due to the persistence of the UK (later the EC) and Canada 
that NGOs were allowed to participate to such a high degree.
4c s)c &  £  j)c
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Overall, in this phase structural opportunities were more important than the NGOs’ 
political strategy. De Beers’ change from being defensive to a leading industry was 
crucial for being able to devise a common industry position on the issue, but rather 
than NGO pressure and framing, opportunities arising from structural changes in the 
industry sector are what account for De Beers’ change of attitude. Political strategy 
became more important when it came to unifying the industry’s approach to the KP. 
It was rather difficult for De Beers at that specific moment in time to be a leader as 
the rest of the industry was highly suspicious about its motivation. Even more 
importantly, however, the leadership of De Beers and the creation of a new industrial 
body directed the KP towards an MSI. Being able to talk with a single voice, the 
industry was finally able to exercise structural power on the evolving KP agenda. As 
such, this phase is very crucial for explaining business’ impact on the KP and 
ultimately being able to explain certain institutional design features of the KP.
In summary, this sub-chapter gives evidence for the overall argument of the 
thesis that the specific structural setting of a case is crucial when analysing the 
design of international institutions.
5.3 M ulti-stakeholder Diplomacy: From Luanda (2000) to Interlaken 
(2002)
The third phase is characterised by an increase of the norm opponents’ impact on the 
KP institutionalisation. Most notably, the more the diamond industry could increase 
its influence, the more technical the negotiations would become. With the growing 
number of participants in the KP, opponents of strong institutionalisation soon 
outnumbered the LM-Group. This change in the power distribution during the 
negotiations ultimately had a significant impact on the institutionalisation as a 
number of requirements -  such as disclosure of statistics, monitoring and 
requirements of KP governance (the secretariat) -  were watered down. Yet, despite 
this crucial set-back, in this phase the foundation was laid out to push 
institutionalisation after the launch of the KP as the NGOs could successfully initiate 
a learning process within the industry. At the end of this phase, the industry had 
profoundly changed its stance on opacity and its responsibility with regard to conflict
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diamonds. The effects of this change in attitude can be seen in the final phase of the 
KP (see 5.4).
Overall, this accounts for key institutional design features such as the issue of 
diamond identification (5.3.1), the rotating chair, and weak monitoring and statistic 
disclosure requirements (5.3.3). Moreover, it explains why the diamond industry 
began to be interested in stronger institutionalisation (5.3.2).
5.3.1 Establishing Corporate Power: The Role of Scientific Expertise
Following a stakeholder meeting in Luanda in June 2000, the industry concentrated 
on increasing its impact on shaping the institutional design of the certification 
scheme. In this regard, we have already noted the significance of the formation of the 
WDC, as it concentrated corporate voices. In addition, one crucial issue for the 
industry was to increase its discursive power. The corporate actors had to understand 
the negotiation dynamics, spot windows of opportunities and swiftly learn how to use 
their technological and scientific expertise in those instances. To some extent, the 
NGOs had a competitive advantage, especially at the beginning of the negotiations, 
as they already had experience of this kind of policy impact. Yet, the ability of the 
industry to make an impact on the institutional design was limited by one further 
aspect. The governments, especially the UK (later the EC) and Canada, distrusted the 
industry, as they had been persuaded by the NGOs that the way the industry dealt 
with the diamonds was an essential component of the policy problem (Interview 11). 
Hence, in the beginning, it was clear to the industry representatives that some 
governments and the NGOs did not expect them to be honest partners. If they wanted 
to make an impact on the scheme, therefore, they knew that they had to establish 
their trustworthiness. In order to achieve this, they pursued the strategy of providing 
reliable, relevant and timely information. Accordingly, their discursive power grew 
increasingly. Throughout the process, the industry also learned to steer the 
negotiations by giving out the appropriate kind of information at a given time 
(Interview 5). The endeavour of the industry to increase its impact was facilitated as 
the discussion began to focus on how to design a certification scheme. The 
stakeholders concentrated on discussing more technical issues rather than the
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humanitarian situation on the ground. This was an opportunity for the industry to 
have more impact on the scheme than the NGOs.
Among the members of the WDC were representatives of De Beers and 
HRD. They had already gained some experience in setting up a certification scheme, 
albeit limited in scope (Bone 2004). De Beers had introduced issuing guarantees with 
its diamonds assuring that none of the goods would derive from regions of conflict. 
The HRD had cooperated with the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone to 
devise a national forgery-proof certificate of origin documentation system (Cook
2001). The representatives of both organisations drew on these experiences to 
consult governments. Although governments had a rough idea o f how they wanted to 
design the certification scheme, they did not know whether this would do justice to 
how the supply chain worked in reality. Therefore they cooperated closely with the 
WDC and the HRD in order to see whether their idea of a certification scheme would 
be feasible and effective.
The technological and scientific recommendations from industry 
representatives were contested by the NGOs. Policy impact by the industry can 
therefore be best characterised as fights over different regimes of truth where both 
the NGOs and the industry tried to exploit the governments’ uncertainty on the issue, 
framing for them what was considered to be the best policy solution. Norm diffusion 
in this respect had not one direction, but instead the different stakeholders tried to 
push their specific regime of truth. Among the numerous contributions of the 
industry and relating discussions with NGOs, two stand out as giving crucial further 
direction to the certification scheme. They also serve as a good illustration of the 
competition between industry and NGOs to make an impact on institutional design.
The first issue concerned the evaluation of the value of trade in conflict 
diamonds. For the governments, before starting to discuss the details of the 
certification scheme, it was important to analyse the extent of the policy issue. The 
NGOs insisted that conflict diamonds represented at least 20 percent of the entire 
diamond trade. In contrast, De Beers contended in its testimony that they represented 
no more than four percent in 1999 (De Beers 2000b). The governments knew that the 
exact amount of illegal diamonds could not be estimated, but as De Beers was the 
only organisation that had quantified the amount of rough diamonds available to 
RUF and UNITA, governments accepted the industry’s estimate. The figure of four
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percent was subsequently used in official documents by the UN, governments and 
even some NGOs.
The second, more important issue was that of diamond identification. At the 
centre o f the discussion was how to differentiate between illegally and legally mined 
diamonds. In order to obtain a more profound insight into the issue, the UK funded a 
working report produced by Global Witness that compiled and compared different 
means for identification and assessing existing national control systems (Global 
Witness 2000). The report dismissed the industry’s assertion that experts could not 
assess the origin of diamonds by quoting De Beers’ Jim Cluskie. He had admitted 
that De Beers was able to identify “Angolan production with 90 percent accuracy and 
50 percent of certainty [to] Unita production” (quoted in Global Witness 2000).
Later, the diamond industry argued that it might be possible to identify the origin of 
diamonds when having a sample of diamonds stemming from the same area, as 
geologists could examine small dirt particles attached to the diamond. However, the 
industry maintained that it would be totally unfeasible to establish the origin once the 
gems were mixed (Schefer 2005). In order to solve this issue, Global Witness argued 
for a technological solution using laser beams for the identification (Global Witness 
2000). From a technical point of view this was, indeed, an option. Already in March 
1998, De Beers had announced the development of a new branding technique. 
According to the new strategy, the CSO planned to brand high-quality diamonds 
bigger than one carat with a De Beers mark and serial number for their 
Forevermark™ (Bergenstock 2004). At a conference hosted by the White House 
Office of Science and Technology in January 2001, the stakeholders looked more 
profoundly into technological solutions for identification (Cook 2001). The diamond 
industry strongly opposed Global Witness’ suggestion arguing that it would be 
technically and economically unfeasible to mark the world diamond output. For the 
Forevermark™, only a very small amount of diamonds was branded. However, each 
year around 100 million carats are mined, which translates to millions and millions 
of individual stones, each often weighing a fraction of one carat (Interview 3). The 
diamond industry therefore argued against such an “ill-conceived” quick fix and 
proposed to design an international certification scheme accordingly to the models of 
already existing national certification of origin schemes (Izhakoff 2001). The 
industry’s proposal was not only technically persuasive but also more cost-efficient
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than that of the NGOs. Hence, the industry’s proposal was accepted by the 
governments.
The decision as to how identify diamonds was important for the impact of the 
industry on the institutional design of the Scheme. Having delivered essential 
technical expertise the WDC could establish itself as a trustworthy body. 
Subsequently, it became profoundly involved in designing the actual certification 
scheme. The HRD’s Director of International Affairs, Mark van Bockstael became 
the chair of the Working Group Diamond Experts and Technical Issues. In retrospect 
a number of stakeholders confirmed that he could be singled out as one of the biggest 
contributors to the scheme (Interviews 2,20). Van Bockstael drew from his 
experience in Angola and Sierra Leone where he had headed the design of national 
certification schemes just before the KP had started (Cook 2001). On behalf of the 
participants of the KP, Global Witness was mandated to assess the certification in 
Sierra Leone established at the end of 1999. Global Witness concluded that the 
scheme was broadly working and made a number of recommendations with regards 
to the global scheme (DFID 2002; Global Witness 2001b).
The governments relied heavily on van Bockstael’s expertise when devising 
the global scheme. Although delegates had a rough idea of how they wanted to 
design the scheme they did not know whether this would do justice to how the supply 
chain functioned in reality. Therefore, they cooperated closely with the WDC and 
van Bockstael in order to see whether their ideas would be feasible and effective 
(Interview 2). The WDC issued a draft of “A system for International Rough 
Diamond Export and Import Controls” (World Diamond Council Technical 
Committee 2000), in which they outlined regulations for the certification schemes 
and proposed a three-part export and import verification document consisting of the 
certificate of export origin, a detachable import confirmation certificate, and a 
security slip. Furthermore they made suggestions regarding an audit trail and 
electronic data transmission. This system was adapted from the certification scheme 
of Sierra Leone.
However, the impact of the industry was not unlimited. One example for this 
is the industry’s fear of bureaucratic measures that would be a burden for their trade. 
This is a normal reaction of an industry which faces more regulation. Together with 
the Belgian government they called for any bureaucratic burden, like setting up 
databases, to be placed onto the African governments (Interview 20; Bryant Banat
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2002: 950). Thus, the importing countries would not have to bear this bureaucratic 
burden. The EC was particularly opposed to such a proposal arguing the Africans 
needed to be supported by the industrialised countries (Interview 20). Moreover, the 
industry was very opposed to any compliance measures and the publication of 
statistical data, referring to the right of protecting proprietary data (Bryant Banat
2002). Regarding monitoring, the industry argued that such measures would at best 
be ineffective and at worst interfere with the trade. As the subsequent section shows, 
the industry needed to go through a learning process in order to support stronger 
institutionalisation of the KP in the importing countries.
To conclude, this section demonstrated how crucial discursive power is to be 
able to impact the institutional design. At the beginning of the KP, the industry’s 
influence was rather limited as it first had to build up its discursive power. But the 
more technical the discussions became and the more the industry could present itself 
as trustworthy, the more it could increase its impact on institutional design features. 
However, from the beginning the industry tried to block certain requirements 
regarding monitoring and statistics disclosure. It took another change in attitude 
before the industry began to support stronger institutionalisation.
5.3.2 Framing and Learning: New Industry Responsibilities
At first glance, we might be tempted to explain the strong institutionalisation of the 
KP by the overlapping interests of the main stakeholders. The NGOs were interested 
in establishing trade regulation whereas the governments’ and the industry’s interest 
was to get rid of the NGOs. Yet, a close look at the negotiation dynamics reveals that 
the overlapping interests first had to be discovered. This section concentrates on a 
learning process within the industry sector triggered by the NGO framing.
At the beginning the stakeholders were far from realising common interest. In 
fact, the KP kicked off in a difficult atmosphere as the stakeholders seemed to have 
significantly divergent interests. We have already noted that the governments, 
especially the UK (later the EC) and Canada were wary of the industry and wanted 
them to deal more responsibly with their product. But although they wanted to solve 
the issue, they were not prepared to push for strong public regulation. Industry 
representatives mistrusted the diplomats as they did not know what the motivations
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of governments were. Their greatest fear was that strict public regulation would be 
set up which could inhibit the diamond trade. In particular, they feared that more 
sanctions would be imposed on non-compliant exporting countries. Those were 
considered as ineffective and trade intrusive. Finally, NGOs were very suspicious of 
the industry. But they were also unsure as to whether to trust the governments to 
produce a strong international institution. Hence, the first meetings of the Process did 
not bring any ground-breaking results and were marked by some strong disputes, 
particularly between NGOs and corporate actors.
However, during these negotiations the stakeholders began to realise that they 
had converging interests. What stands out most in this analysis is the profound 
change of attitude of the diamond industry which opened the way to strict rules on 
monitoring, enforcement and the disclosure of statistics. Eventually, as we see from 
the next sub-chapter, the industry began to contribute significantly to the stronger 
institutionalisation of the KP by pushing opposing governments to accept monitoring 
and compliance.
What motivated the industry to change its attitude on these issues and to 
discover common interests with the other stakeholders, most notably those of the 
LM-Group? We can see from the subsequent analysis that the NGOs were able to 
initiate a learning process by using framing as a political strategy. This was 
facilitated both by the profound uncertainty of the industry about corporate behaviour 
and responsibility as well as close consumer relations.
Let us first turn to the issue of uncertainty which played a crucial role in the 
institutionalisation of the KP. We already noted that it was the governments’ 
uncertainty as to how to technically devise the certification scheme which ultimately 
paved the way to a MSI. With regard to the industry, they were uncertain about their 
responsibility in the issue and their role in keeping conflict diamonds out of the legal 
trade. We noted in 5.1.3 that the industry would not accept bearing a share of 
responsibility considering this was an international trade issue. In their view, it was 
the governments, particularly the African ones, which were in charge and, therefore, 
had to bear most of the bureaucratic responsibility. However, as we see below, the 
high level of uncertainty offered huge potential for diffusing the new transparency 
norm and more corporate responsibility. Uncertainty was created by two issues. First, 
as mentioned before, the industry had never been subject to an activist campaign. 
Secondly, although especially De Beers was involved in philanthropy in Africa,
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when producing the diamonds CSR had never been an issue before. As we can see 
from Section 5.4.4 the KP was actually the starting point of CSR in the sector. The 
campaign as a business risk created an uncertainty about how the value of the 
product was created and led the industry to re-assess how the value of their product 
was constructed. Most importantly, the NGOs not only created a new business risk 
but also gave guidelines on how the industry could manage this new risk by re­
defining business responsibility. Managing the diamond business responsibly 
previously meant that the industry needed to focus on preserving the scarcity of the 
product so as to maintain the stones’ high prices. With the framing of conflict 
diamonds, however, the way the industry operated suddenly had repercussions on the 
value of the product. Such a question had never before been an issue. Slowly, 
normative considerations began to have an impact on the material value of the 
product.
“ (...)  The leaders of the industry saw that there was a clear moral imperative that we 
could not allow our beautiful and unique product to be associated in any way with the 
horrors of war. We could not stand aside and say this was an African problem, let 
Africa solve it. A very large proportion of our rough diamonds -  the diamonds you buy 
here at the Sights, and are traded and polished downstream and made into jewellery -  
come from Africa. Whether we like it or not, we were involved, we are involved.
Equally, the commercial imperative was clear -  do nothing and our entire industry was 
at risk. The leaders of the industry chose, wisely, to act. (OTerrall 2002)
As soon as the industry understood that normative concerns were crucial for creating 
value, the interests of NGOs and industry started to converge as rigid international 
certification essentially preserved the diamond’s value. Hence, while no-one in the 
industry denied that there was a vital commercial interests, business representatives 
also started to consider cooperating in the Process as a moral imperative. Material 
interest and normative concerns became inseparable from one another. Moreover, 
many in the industry began to understand that although the way their business 
traditionally operated did not cause the conflicts, but it enabled their continuation.
“(...)  Taking responsibility: The diamond industry must address the fact that illegal 
diamonds from Sierra Leone and other war zones are in fact finding their way into the 
diamond marketplace. While the industry in general cannot solve Sierra Leone’s 
problems it can, and must, take realistic measures to assure that illegal diamonds are 
excluded from the marketplace. The argument that it is impossible to ascertain the 
origin o f specific diamonds is very interesting, but it does not negate the responsibility 
o f  our industry (...). (Rapaport 2000, emphasis added).
Several individuals in the diamond industry soon turned to be the most committed 
members of the Process, disclosing the opaque world o f the diamond industry to 
governments and NGOs. Some of them later on mentioned that it was due to NGO
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research that they changed their attitude (Ratner 2007; Smillie 2005c). Eventually, 
this led to a more balanced design where importing and exporting countries as well 
as the industry were responsible for keeping the trade clean.
But not only was the political strategy of creating a demand for new business 
conduct important for the industry’s change of attitude. It was also a question of 
normative match. The upstream and retail sector reacted to a consumer demand 
which fit that of NGOs. Having close contacts with the consumer the retail sector had 
to meet the new societal values (Interview 14). In contrast to this, the manufacturing 
sector, being the most removed from the consumers, did not undergo this change of 
attitude. As we see in the following section, the governments representing this part of 
the industry contributed to weakening the institutionalisation. Overall, it was the 
confluence of good strategy and structural normative opportunity that can account for 
the change of attitude.
The framing and learning process about new industry responsibilities created 
a shared understanding on the issue and ultimately the industry also altered its 
perception towards the NGOs. During the negotiations, they discovered common 
interests, such as ending trade in conflict diamonds, and common frustrations out of 
their interaction with governments. Especially, when more governments joined 
thereby delaying the process, the NGO-industry relationship evolved. They were 
newcomers on the international diplomatic parquet and clung together because they 
were increasingly frustrated by governments’ intransigence and procrastination 
(Smillie 2005). From meeting to meeting, interactions among the NSAs intensified; 
all were on a first-name basis and had regular personal, phone and e-mail contacts 
between meetings. NGO representatives were invited to meetings of the World 
Diamond Congress in Antwerp where they were allowed to attend most of the 
meetings and treated “cordially” (Smillie 2004). Both sides wanted an agreement on 
an international certification scheme as fast as possible. Hence, both put pressure on 
governments and thereby pushed the Process forward.
In summary, the realisation that normative issues would have an impact on 
the value of their product changed the industry’s stance on the KP. Essentially, the 
diamond industry learned what other industries had realised before, that there was a 
business case to be made about responsible behaviour. Whilst before, the industry 
tried to water down requirements on monitoring, enforcement and statistics, it started 
to acknowledge that the way it operated had enabled a continuation of the conflicts.
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The NGO-industry discussions on the situation in Africa were critical for this 
learning process. We can see that the diffusion of ideas by framing and learning is 
most effective when there is a demand for new ideas. Most importantly, the NGOs 
themselves created that demand by launching the pressure campaign. The confluence 
of that political strategy and the normative match of consumer expectations 
accounted for the successful diffusion of the transparency norm.
5.3.3 Doomed to be Weakly Institutionalised?
The learning dynamics, especially between the NGOs and the industry, should not 
conceal the fact that as the agreement drew closer in late 2002, some of the NGOs’ 
maximum demands were not met (Partnership Africa Canada et al. 2002). Not like- 
minded actors were able to exploit political opportunities to slow down the Process 
and water down the requirements. Many critical issues such as monitoring, 
enforcement and the issue of statistics’ disclosure were not agreed upon when the 
KPCS was launched in 2003.
The main issue for not being able to agree was that more and more countries 
had joined the Process between 2001 and 2002. This dynamic was triggered by an 
internal KP debate on whether to set up a closed diamond trade where only 
participants were allowed to trade with each other. Being less interested in the issue 
of conflict diamonds, other producers feared being marginalised and cut off by the 
supply chain lest they join the Process. Hence the rush to join the KP resembles what 
we discussed in Chapter 3 as the tipping point. As most of the countries were to some 
extent involved in the manufacturing process, such as India and Brazil, the group of 
latecomers had two commonalities. They were the most removed from consumer 
pressures and NGO activism as they concentrated on manufacturing rather than 
mining or retail. Therefore, they were not willing to disrupt their diamond industry 
with new trade laws. Those countries therefore shifted the power balance from the 
coalition calling for strong institutionalisation towards those preferring a low degree.
The debate about a ‘closed diamonds buyers’ club’ was highly successful in 
increasing the number of countries wishing to participate in the KP. As discussed 
later in this section the proposal was contested mostly by the US, fearing 
incompatibility with the international trade regime. The US position on the KP was
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actually very mixed throughout the Process.91 The US had been in the Process from 
the beginning, with the Clinton administration backing international cooperation to 
find a solution to the issue (Cook 2001).92 This was in line with the increased focus 
of the Clinton administration on Africa (Wright 2004). Interest in the Process 
decreased considerably when George W. Bush became US President, mainly because 
of the administration’s dislike for multilateral agreements. The US remained in the 
Process to protect its jewellery industry. In the immediate aftermath of 11 September 
2001, the US administration became more interested in a stronger KP as, not long 
after that day, journalists and activists drew a causal connection between conflict 
diamonds and Islamic terrorism. A Washington Post journalist revealed that 
members of Al Qaeda benefited from the sales of millions of dollars of conflict 
diamonds mined by the RUF in Sierra Leone (Farah 2001; see also Global Witness 
2003b). Moreover, the diamond industry, especially in the US, was severely hit by 
that claim. While conflict diamonds and civil war in remote parts of Africa had had 
some effects on American consumers, the ‘terrorist’ diamonds had an even bigger 
impact, as it had brought the terror home to US consumers. Even when in 2002, most 
analysts -  including officials from the US administration -  were more cautious about 
‘terrorist diamonds’, the topic still haunted the US diamond industry (Bates 2002). 
Islamic terrorism had an effect on the US position but not because of the US 
administration’s security concerns. In fact, the NGOs were concerned that the fight 
against terrorism would distract the US from conflict diamonds (Global Witness 
2001a). Rather, the diamond industry increased its pressure on the US administration 
to negotiate a strongly institutionalised KP.
With more countries joining the KP negotiations, the peculiar nature of multi­
stakeholder diplomacy was replaced by day-to-day intergovernmental diplomacy.
91 As mentioned before, domestic politics is only covered in this thesis if it contributes to shedding 
light on preference formation at the international level. Suffice it therefore to say that the NGO 
network in the US was backed by Congressman Tony Hall who lobbied for more US support. As early 
as 1999, Congressman Hall proposed a bill in Congress, the Consumer Access to Responsible 
Accounting of Trade (CARAT Act) which required that every diamond worth more than US$ 100 
would be certified. However, Congress did not adopt the bill (Feldman 2003). Hall attempted to re­
introduce the bill several times at a later stage but was never successful. In the end a similar bill called 
the Clean Diamond Trade Act was adopted in 2003. The bill was successful mainly because at the 
time o f its adoption, the US diamond industry had begun to favour stronger regulation and had started 
to lobby Congress. The bill mainly provides mechanisms for the US to implement the KPCS as well 
as some additional penalties in cases o f non-compliance (ibid.).
92 One of the last acts o f the Clinton administration was to convene a White House Diamond 
Conference looking into the issue of technologies for identification and certification (Cook 2001).
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NGOs and the industry alike complained in the latter stages of the KP that a large 
amount of time was lost with lengthy diplomatic statements. In particular, four issues 
have to be highlighted which not only slowed down the Process significantly but also 
had crucial effects on the institutional design. Due to the persuasiveness of the moral 
cause of the KP, not-like minded countries could not argue in principle against a 
certification scheme but had to exploit certain opportunities to either slow down the 
negotiations or prevent strong institutionalisation.
The first was the question of costs and the complexity of putting the system 
into place. So as to implement the Scheme properly, every country, except Belgium 
and Israel, which already had special expertise on diamonds in their customs 
departments, would have to train their customs officers. Most countries feared the 
enormous costs the Scheme would entail (Smillie 2001). Up until now, the US in 
particular is resisting any requirements that could potentially be costly (US 
Delegation n.d.).
The second issue was monitoring of the Scheme. NGOs demanded the 
establishment of an independent secretariat with third-party monitoring power in 
charge of statistical reporting. The proposal to create a secretariat was backed by 
South Africa and Namibia. However, most of the norm opponents, most notably the 
US, Israel, China and Russia -  albeit for different reasons -  fiercely opposed it. The 
US was worried about funding whereas Russia considered the creation of a 
secretariat as a first step towards monitoring. Most of the countries -  in particular 
Israel, Russia and China -  rejected the idea drawing on the principle of state 
sovereignty. In many countries, such as Russia, diamonds were considered as a 
strategic mineral and therefore international regulation on reporting and monitoring 
would touch upon state sovereignty. Even a lighter version respecting state 
sovereignty, by not making review visits mandatory and by not insisting that NGOs 
had to be in the review teams, was not accepted. Most African countries were 
particularly “nervous” about monitoring (Feldman 2003b). Russia and Israel, having 
the biggest political clout among these countries, opposed openly the idea of an 
independent secretariat with far-reaching rights. Both countries blocked the proposal 
on commercial confidentiality grounds. Specifically, Russia exploited the 
opportunity to water down the Scheme by referring to its domestic laws on “trade 
secrets” (Feldman 2003b; Smillie 2005c). Since all other issues had been solved by 
consensus, the participants were required to find a compromise rather than pushing
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strict regulation on statistics. In the Ottawa meeting in March 2002, an agreement 
was reached that participating countries would produce quarterly trade statistics and 
semi-annual production statistics. Although this was a major boost for transparency 
in a traditionally opaque industry, the agreement was full of loopholes. The 
participants could not concur on a harmonised standard but agreed to use their own 
statistical arrangements. Moreover, although Russia agreed on the compromise, it did 
not disclose any trade statistics in the first two years after the certification scheme 
was launched.
For the NGOs, self-regulation in particular was untenable, and until the end 
of 2002, they threatened to leave the Process. As the coalition of not-like minded 
governments prevailed, the NGOs had to make a choice about their future role in the 
Process. They agreed to stay on and compromise in order to push further for eventual 
institutionalisation.
The third issue concerned the coherence with other multilateral agreements 
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). So as to be effective, 
the KP had to prohibit trade between participants and non-participants. However, as 
a ‘Closed Clean Diamonds Buyers Club’, the KPCS was potentially relevant to the 
WTO. For some countries which had only reluctantly joined the Process, such as 
India, this served as a window of opportunity for trying to stop the Process 
altogether. To this end, India announced it would file a complaint against the KP at 
the WTO if the negotiators adopted trade prohibition between participants and non­
participants. Since India was thus threatening the effectiveness of the whole scheme, 
the question about the KP’s compatibility with GATT was the most serious issue 
during the negotiations. It delayed the negotiations for a significant time, not least 
because the LM-Group including the industry was not able to decide on a common 
strategy to counteract India. The US, Canada and Japan wanted to ask for a waiver at 
the WTO, whereas the Europeans (mostly due to UK influence) wanted to push the 
negotiations further arguing that given the implications to human security in Africa, 
no waiver would be needed anyway (Interview 11; Smillie 2005c) After long 
discussions, the issue was solved when a coalition of countries applied for a waiver 
at the end of 2002, which the WTO granted in February 2003.
Literally at the last minute, the Process was stalled by the question of which 
actor should be considered as a participant. The issue was led by China, which called 
for a wording to exclude Taiwan. The issue was very serious for Taiwan as it would
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have legally excluded the country from the diamond trade which was important to its 
economy. So as to find a quick solution to the issue, Western diplomats simply 
advised Taiwan to ignore the wording (Feldman 2003b).93 The incident was less 
about the institutional design of the KP than about China’s relations with Taiwan, 
yet, it demonstrates the pragmatic approach of the LM-Group to swiftly finding a 
solution and getting the certification scheme started.
In summary, the KP risked falling short of its proposition to create a strong 
international trade regulation as crucial requirements were watered down by a 
growing number of norm opponents. Given the consensual character of the KP 
negotiations and the fact that the KPCS had as yet not been launched, norm 
opponents could easily block stronger institutionalisation. Their strategy was to 
exploit opportunities by framing diamonds as strategic commodities and capitalising 
on global trade rules. The LM-Group feared that the KPCS could ultimately fail if 
pushed too hard towards strong institutionalisation. The group therefore decided to 
first launch the Scheme and then engage in regime evolution.
* * * * *
This sub-chapter explained the main decisions taken on institutional design features 
between 2000 and 2003.1 particularly highlighted the ability of the industry to shape 
the technical issues of the certification scheme. With a greater significance of 
technical issues, we can see the rise of the industry’s discursive power and a decrease 
of NGOs’ impact. The NGOs were defeated with respect to questions about diamond 
identification, monitoring, statistics and the international secretariat.
What stands out from the analysis is that both sides, NGOs and the industry, 
used their technological knowledge to exploit the governments’ uncertainty on the 
issue and frame the best policy solution. This confirms what has been said in Chapter 
3: that norm diffusion is multi-dimensional where norm entrepreneurs and opponents 
try to diffuse their interpretation of reality. By the end of 2002, the certification 
scheme was drafted, albeit without the very elements for which it is now applauded 
as a strong institution. Requirements on monitoring and enforcement as well as on 
the disclosure of statistics were still missing. Disappointed by the progress, several 
NGOs called the KP “a watchdog without teeth” (cited in Price 2003: 35). We see
93 Until now, Taiwan participates in the KP without being formerly recognised as a participant.
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from the following sub-chapter how the stakeholders eventually agreed upon these 
institutional design features. This sub-chapter, however, discussed a crucial 
developement which paved the way for regime evolution. Triggered both by 
uncertainty about the issue and a normative match, the industry underwent a learning 
process, starting to acknowledge its share of responsibility in the issue. More 
specifically, it adopted the transparency norm, conceding that the opaque business 
operations enabled the flow of conflict diamonds. Ultimately, the industry therefore 
changed its attitude on issues such as monitoring, enforcement and the disclosure of 
statistics by joining forces with the LM-Group. The next sub-chapter elaborates on 
the significance o f this altered attitude for the evolution of institutional design.
5.4 Beyond Kimberley: Regime Evolution
The KPCS, as of Interlaken 2003, is not the most ambitious regime. In particular, 
basic requirements on monitoring, enforcement and statistics were still missing. Yet, 
the years subsequent to the launch of the scheme demonstrated the real strength of 
the Process. The soft law approach enabled a ‘learning by doing’ approach and the 
ability to make incremental enhancements whenever participants could achieve a 
new consensus on an issue.
We have already concentrated on learning processes specifically within the 
industry as a turning point for achieving a strong institution. This sub-chapter 
elaborates to what extent the industry was important in achieving a stronger 
institutional design. We see that in the most recent phase of the KP 
institutionalisation process, exerting structural power gains importance as a political 
strategy. With the diamond industry now on board regarding the contested issues, the 
LM-Group was big and powerful enough to marginalise norm opponents and to 
trigger adaptation.
After the official launch of the KPCS, two groups emerged within the 
Process. First, the group which focused on preliminary implementation hoping that in 
a few years time the Process would be obsolete. This group consisted of those 
countries which had only reluctantly joined the KP in the first place. Countries such 
as China and Russia belonged to this group, which does not value strict international 
regulation or transparency in other policy issues. Their aim therefore was to preserve
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the status-quo of the KPCS by not appending tougher regulation. The second group, 
the LM-Group, considered the launch of the KPCS as only an intermediate step. 
These participants, among them the EC, Canada and the NGOs, knew that the KPCS 
agreement had significant loopholes which would hamper the effectiveness of the 
scheme. For the LM-Group, the year after the launch of the KPCS was crucial in 
achieving a consensus on pushing the Process forward so as to boost its credibility. 
As this sub-chapter demonstrates, the LM-Group could strengthen the regime design 
by engaging with specific norm opponents individually. Thus, they could broaden the 
coalition favouring strong institutionalisation issue by issue and marginalise other 
not-like minded actors. Marginalisation of not-like minded actors was specifically 
successful, as the KP had acquired a very good reputation. Every participant who 
opposed advancements of the scheme was suspected of supporting diamond 
smuggling. Obviously, most of the countries were careful not to acquire such a 
dubious reputation. Ultimately, a good reputation created the strong sense of 
obligation noted in Chapter 4. As the participants recognise that the reputation of the 
KPCS can only be preserved if it delivers good results, peer pressure has since been 
very high.
This sub-chapter highlights the political strategy of structural power and 
marginalisation by looking at how the procedures for restricting membership (5.4.1), 
monitoring, enforcement and obligation (5.4.2), and further institutionalisation of 
transparency by requirements on disclosure statistics (5.4.3) were included in the 
KPCS. The sub-chapter concludes with an assessment on the overall impact of the 
KP on the diamond industry. I demonstrate that the diamond industry did not only 
adapt to a new political environment but, indeed, went through a learning process re- 
conceptualising its role in the sector. This adds to our argument as we can 
contextualise what was said previously about the learning process.
5.4.1 The First Challenge: Setting up a Participation Committee
The two prime issues, the questions of participation and monitoring, were linked 
together (Interview 18). Participation concerned the question of what requirements 
countries had to fulfil so as to become members of the KP. Before launching the 
KPCS, the negotiating parties had turned a blind eye to this issue partially so as to
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engage with as many countries as possible in the first place. Essentially, any country 
that endorsed the KPCS at the meeting in Interlaken was an official participant in the 
Scheme (Smillie 2005). However, this had led to a situation where countries with a 
reputation for smuggling or laundering conflict diamonds were allowed to trade with 
the gems. Burkina Faso, for instance, a KP participant, had been named and shamed 
before for trading in conflict diamonds. The Republic of Congo was able to trade 
diamonds under the Scheme although it had no domestic production at all (JCK 
2003). At the Plenary in Johannesburg in 2003, the first one after the KPCS launch 
earlier that year, the participants had to face the fact that there was no control over 
whether the participants were really implementing the Scheme. Apart from the 
NGOs, the EC, Canada and South Africa were most concerned about this issue 
(Interview 18). Nevertheless, within this group, disagreements emerged on which 
issue, participation or monitoring, needed to be pushed first. The NGOs favoured the 
latter. The EC was sympathetic to strengthening the monitoring but considered the 
control of participation to be the more pressing issue and prevailed. The Working 
Group on Monitoring (WGM) with the EC as Chair proposed to set up a new 
committee, the Participation Committee, which would screen all the participants so 
as to decide which ones could stay and which ones would need to develop an 
appropriate system to implement the KP before re-applying as a participant. 
According to the proposal, 31 July 2003 was set as the deadline. Before that date, 
non-implementation was tolerated, but those participants that had failed to implement 
the KPCS by the deadline would be excluded and be forced to re-apply.
The success of the proposal was astonishing. No-one had expected that within 
very little time, the advocates of the committee could gain the support from the other 
participants given that its implementation could have very serious repercussions for a 
number of participants.
What is it, then, that explains the swift success o f the Participation 
Committee? First, a number of participants that joined the KP for reptuational 
benefits but which had little interest in a tough Scheme, had altered their preferences 
within the first months of the existence of the KP. So as to enjoy the reputational 
benefits, it was no longer sufficient to support a weak KP. Instead, the KP had to be a 
credible instrument in the fight against conflict diamonds, which included taking a 
tough stance on non-implementing participants. Moreover, those participants that 
implemented the KPCS, and changed their legislations and customs procedures
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wanted to ensure that free-riders would be excluded from the system. Second, those 
participants that wanted to free-ride the system could not openly oppose the 
Participation Committee. Any participant opposing stronger participation rules was 
suspected of seeking to benefit from trade with conflict diamonds. Norm opponents 
had no possibility for framing that would legitimise their opposition. A number of 
those countries may have hoped that the KP would not exclude participants after all, 
given its soft law character. Their hopes remained unfulfilled. When the deadline 
passed, the KP lived up to its requirements for the very first time and expelled 23 
countries, among others Burkina Faso, Ghana and the Czech Republic (Gomelsky
2003).
Overall, the new rules on participation were very successful as they ensured 
that only implementing countries remained part of the Process. What we could see 
from the analysis is the importance of group dynamics after having reached the 
tipping point whereby the launch of a new regime creates new interests. Moreover, 
norm opponents who wanted to free-ride the weak KPCS were unable to openly 
oppose tougher regulations as they would have suffered damage to their reputation.
5.4.2 Short Distance, Much Progress: From Johannesburg (2003) to Sun City
(2003)
While the question of participation could be settled in a quick fix, the Johannesburg 
Plenary had still left open the thornier issue of monitoring. In most general terms, the 
KP participants were bifurcated into two groups, both stressing two different 
principles to make their case (Interview 11; Beffert and Benner 2005). On the one 
hand, the LM-Group wished to enhance the key principle of the KP, transparency, by 
introducing third-party monitoring. Among the most committed actors were the 
NGOs, the EC and South Africa. However, essential to the success was also the 
industry, which sided with the LM-Group on the issue of monitoring. The NGOs 
pushed very strongly on the issue of monitoring by publicly pressuring norm 
opponents. Shortly after the launch of the Scheme they seized a window of 
opportunity for raising public awareness. Following a coup in early 2003, the KP 
participants suspected that the Central African Republic was laundering conflict 
diamonds and that their controls were insufficient (Dietrich 2003). On the other 
hand, the group of norm opponents rejected independent monitoring by not desiring
172
to go beyond the original KPCS document. Those participants, among them Israel, 
Russia, China and some African diamond-trading countries, feared that monitoring 
would infringe on their state sovereignty (Wallis 2003). Also, a few of countries 
feared that commercial secrets could be revealed during the reviews (Interview 11).
As Beffert and Benner (2005) emphasise, the biggest difficulty in the 
discussion about monitoring was that the UNGA only provided scarce guidance on 
how to design it. The UNGA had made quite detailed recommendation regarding the 
design of the certification scheme. Yet, in this case, the UNGA drew on both the 
principle of state sovereignty and transparency leaving it to the discretion of the 
participants to bring together those apparently irreconcilable principles. The LM- 
Group pursued a two-fold strategy. First, the NGOs maintained the momentum by 
publicly criticising the KP. Second, the group tried to engage with norm opponents in 
small and informal groups thus splitting and marginalising not like-minded actors. 
The bulk of the discussions were conducted in the WGM in which only a small 
fraction of the KP members were participating, but the advocates also attempted to 
meet with norm opponents individually to persuade them of the necessity of 
monitoring. One of the most important opponents of monitoring was Israel. At an 
informal meeting in Tel Aviv in the run-up to the Sun City Plenary in 2003, the 
NGOs, representatives of the WDC and the Israeli government met to discuss the 
issue. At that meeting, the WDC was particularly instrumental in finding a workable 
compromise as it produced a preliminary compromise, based on the EC proposal.
The fact that the proposal was supported by the WDC contributed in two ways to 
achieving a compromise with Israel. First, Israel was concerned about trade 
efficiency and trusted that the industry would not support an overburdening 
compromise. Second, the WDC was able to convince Israel that strong monitoring 
requirements would be a commercial benefit as it would manage reputational risks.
In addition, the way the EC framed the compromise was crucial to getting Israel on 
board. The compromise attempted to reconcile the requirement of transparency with 
the principle of state sovereignty by conducting monitoring through voluntary peer 
reviews. The EC’s strategy was to seize the middle ground between the two extreme 
positions on monitoring.
This strategy, with the input from the WDC, yielded success. Nevertheless, 
with the Israelis now on board, the LM-Group still had to convince a number of 
countries. Since, in the run-up to the Sun City Plenary, all the discussions were
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conducted in informal meetings among only a small number of participants, most of 
the participants were actually not aware of the details of the proposals. For a number 
of participants it came as a surprise that monitoring was on the agenda at Sun City.
At the Plenary, prospects for the LM-Group to obtain an agreement on 
monitoring looked rather gloomy due to initially very divergent positions. However, 
the compromise brokered in Tel Aviv proved to be very convincing. How could the 
LM-Group convince the norm opponents? First, the fact that the proposal was 
already backed by representatives of the three stakeholder groups marginalised other 
opponents and made it rather difficult for them to maintain their resistance. 
Particularly, the backing of Israel, a formerly powerful norm opponent, having used 
the same arguments, weakened the resisting states. Also, the industry made very 
clear that they were in favour of monitoring requirements (Interview 18). Second, the 
LM-Group specifically addressed the norm opponents’ framing by avoiding any 
language which might have sounded too intrusive so as to make clear that monitoring 
was not at odds with state sovereignty. Instead of monitoring, the WGM used the 
term ‘peer review’ and avoided terms such as ‘inspection’ thus emphasising its 
voluntary character (Interview 11). The strategy was successful as it made arguments 
against monitoring futile. In particular China could be convinced that monitoring 
would not affect its sovereignty. The Chinese government was careful not to set any 
precedent about compulsory monitoring for sovereign states. After their support 
could be secured, the participants endorsed the new procedures on monitoring, 
stressing that
“these visits will take place on a voluntary basis,... [but] it would be ‘desirable for the
largest number o f Participants possible to volunteer to receive a review visit’ by 2006”
(Kimberley Process 2003).
The first test case for the credibility of the new monitoring procedures followed 
about a year later. According to the statistics and the diamond experts, the Republic 
of Congo having only a very small diamond production, still managed to export more 
than US$ 200 million worth per year (Innocenti 2004). The KP participants had a 
strong suspicion that conflict diamonds from the neighboring DRC and Angola were 
being laundered in the Republic of Congo. The review mission sent to Brazzaville in 
June 2004 confirmed the suspicion and only a month later the country was expelled 
from the Process (Kimberley Process 2006a).94 The Review Mission to Brazzaville
94 The Republic o f Congo was re-admitted in November 2007 (Kimberley Process 2007)
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was as yet the only one that was not voluntary. Instead, the Canadian KP Chair had 
to press for it (Smillie 2005b). It was clear that this was a serious test case for the KP 
and unless drastic consequences were taken, the credibility of the Process would be 
undermined.
The recent Three Year Review demonstrated that the KP participants, 
including the NGOs and the industry, were very satisfied with the new monitoring 
requirements. Despite its voluntary nature, 30 countries had invited review visits by 
the end of 2006 (Partnership Africa Canada 2006). Those countries that try to evade 
monitoring raise suspicions of concealing non-compliance. Therefore, the high 
participation in the review visits can be explained by the reputational gains to be 
made when offering to be subject to monitoring.
Why is voluntary monitoring so successful? As already mentioned, the 
majority of the stakeholders wished to preserve the good reputation of the KP. The 
obligation to commit voluntarily to review visits stems from the high degree of peer 
pressure. Overall, this section could show that despite the voluntary character of the 
KP, monitoring and enforcement requirements could be set up which are de facto 
mandatory given the high degree of a sense of obligation.
5.4.3 The Trouble with Numbers: Making Statistics More Transparent
With the participation committee and monitoring requirements in place, the KP then 
turned to its “greatest challenge” (Smillie 2005b), the creation of a reliable and 
comparable statistical database.
As already mentioned, the KP is fundamentally a transparency exercise. 
Without the knowledge of each member’s production statistics it is impossible to 
detect conflict diamond smuggling and laundering. However, the creation and 
management of a KPCS statistical database, as well as establishing a coherent 
methodology for analysing the data, proved to be highly difficult.
The first difficulty was the creation and management of the statistical 
database. Although the disclosure of trade statistics is one of the key requirements of 
the KPCS, a number of participants, among others the US, passively opposed the 
creation of a database up until the end of 2004 (Interview 18; The Washington Post
2004). In particular Russia, referring to its domestic legislation on diamond trade
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statistics as a state secret, was not willing to agree on any further disclosure 
requirements. With regard to the minimal requirements agreed upon in the original 
KPCS, a large number of countries provided the data either too late or inconsistent 
with the agreed formula (Smillie 2005b; The Washington Post 2004). Was this just 
an issue of non-compliance or also one of weak institutional design? The answer to 
this question is both, but a weak design of the disclosure requirements caused non- 
compliance. Given that the disclosure of trade statistics was so hotly contested, the 
original KPCS had left open the question of what format the data that had to be 
submitted must take. Moreover, the KP did not have an enforcement system in place 
for situations of non-compliance. The LM-Group realised that so as to achieve higher 
compliance rates, the institutional design features on statistics had to be strengthened. 
In particular, the group proposed setting up naming and shaming practices for those 
who would not comply with disclosure requirements, as well as agreeing on clear 
guidelines on what data should be disclosed and when (Kimberley Process 2006b). 
The Ottawa Plenary in 2004 provided a window of opportunity for the NGOs to 
bring the issue of statistics to attention. At this plenary, the Russians had applied and 
been designated as vice chair and therefore would automatically become chair of the 
KP in 2005. As the NGOs increased their pressure on Russia, a number of KP 
participants doubted whether a country that was non-compliant with key 
requirements should become chair. Just before the deadline in December 2004, the 
Russians changed their legislation and disclosed their data to the KP Working Group 
on statistics. The joint pressure by KP-participants, both NGOs and governments in 
connection with the embarrassment Russia faced if  excluded as a chair, served as a 
push factor for the Russian government to adopt the new legislation. Russia’s new 
commitment coupled with ongoing NGO pressure enabled the KP to adopt new 
requirements regarding the disclosure. At the plenary in Gaborone in 2006, the KP 
participants agreed to publish the names of members that habitually failed to disclose 
their statistics. By 2006, every KP member was compliant with the statistics 
requirement. Moreover, as a last step, KP participants agreed on the publication of 
the statistics in 2006 (Kimberley Process 2006b). For the first time, statistics on the 
diamond trade were published on the KP website in 2007.95 For 2008, the 
participants envisage publishing even more detailed data.
95 Currently, data is published on a country-by country basis with all rough diamond production (semi
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As to the second issue, the question on methodology, the launch of the KP in 
2003 had left open the question of how to create and manage the KP database as well 
as how to analyse the data (Kimberley Process 2006a: 44). Since March 2003, 
Canada had chaired the Working Group on Statistics at considerable cost to itself. 
The working group tried to conduct a first-ever full scale analysis of the statistics. 
The NGOs argued for employing a professional financial services firm such as 
KPMG or Deloitte to carry out the analysis. Yet, in the run-up to the Three Year 
Review 2006, the government rejected this proposal after considering the costs for 
hiring such a company (Partnership Africa Canada 2006). Instead, the participants 
endorsed the analysis of the statistics at the plenary in Gaborone in 2006 (Kimberley 
Process 2006b).
In conclusion, both Russia’s new legislation and the publication of statistical 
data on the diamond trade have constituted tremendous progress in making the 
diamond industry more transparent and in curbing trade with conflict diamonds. As 
in other issues before, peer pressure and reputational risks were crucial in achieving 
greater transparency (Federal News Service 2006). Specifically, the strategy to speak 
to participants individually and the threat to withdraw chairmanship from Russia 
enabled a re-negotiation of disclosure requirements.
5.4.4 The ‘Kimberley Effect’ within the Diamond Industry
There can be no doubt that the diamond industry was crucial in setting up the KPCS. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the diamond industry very much exploited its 
discursive and structural power so as to design the Scheme as much as possible to its 
own needs. However, the KP also had an enormous impact on the diamond industry. 
For centuries, it was one of the most secretive industries. Within a few years, the 
industry had transformed itself from a situation where only unreliable and 
contradictory data was available from customs to one where a global regulatory body 
requires all governments to provide detailed statistics on a regular basis. Even more 
so, this information is now publicly available. The diamond industry must comply 
with the KPCS requirements. It has to register for the acquisition of certificates and
annually) and trade (by quarters) including carat weights and values (see 
https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/default.asp, last accessed on 28 June 2008).
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trade within that framework. As to the self-regulation, the system of warranties 
creates a paper-trail through which bureaucracies can trace all legal rough diamond 
transactions.
The culture of the diamond industry has also changed significantly. The 
Campaign against Conflict Diamonds opened up the sector. Whereas the industry 
was formerly very insular, companies now hire CSR officials coming from other 
sectors such as pharmaceuticals (Interview 14). In the long term, this will have a 
profound impact on their business culture. Moreover, the sector exhibited more 
togetherness. The crisis served to create a greater understanding of the 
interdependencies along the supply chain. What happens at the mining end affects 
the retail and vice versa.
Finally, the crisis introduced the CSR notion into the sector. Since the KP, a 
number of other initiatives have been initiated in cooperation with the NGOs, such as 
the Diamond Development Initiative (DDI) and the Council for Responsible 
Jewellery Practices. The DDI, created in 2005, is a logical consequence of the KP.
As soon as De Beers began to cooperate with Global Witness and PAC on a regular 
basis, both the industry and the NGOs became aware that controlling the trade in 
rough diamonds by means of the KPCS and the SoW only partially covers the 
problems associated with diamonds. The NGOs and the industry concluded that only 
the downstream activities had been addressed throughout the KP. The certification 
scheme covers aspects regarding the export and import of diamonds, the SoW 
regulates downstream operations, that is to say polishing, manufacturing, and retail. 
The upstream operations remain unregulated and there is an immense issue with the 
considerable proportion of illicit alluvial mining. Contrary to kimberlite mining, 
artisanal mining is carried out by individuals who are mostly not registered. The 
conditions in which miners operate make these operations especially prone to 
predatory actions. In addition to this, the working conditions are very hard, as 
remuneration is very poor and health and safety measures are virtually absent (DDI
2005).
The DDI was initiated by Global Witness, PAC, De Beers and Rapaport in 
order to address these issues. The initiative is now supported by the World Bank’s 
Communities and Small-Scale Mining Initiative. Although the DDI is in a very early 
phase of existence, the initiative is supposed to become a major contributor to 
sustainable development and CSR in African artisanal mining. In November 2004,
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the so-called Early Adopters’ Initiative which subsequently developed into the 
London-based Council for Responsible Jewellery Practices was launched (Shor 
2005a, 2005b). The initiative aims at promoting “responsible business practices in a 
transparent and accountable manner throughout the industry from mining to retail”.96 
In particular, the Council seeks to facilitate compliance with the practices of the SoW 
provisions and fair labour practices.
3 |C  $  $  $  l | (
In summary, the recent phase of institutionalisation is the most important one for the 
KP as it strengthened the Scheme significantly in a number of ways. The LM-Group 
was successful in pushing for application procedures, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, as well as tougher disclosure requirements for statistics. Especially for 
the NGOs, this constitutes a great success as their demands were met by both the 
industry and the governments.
The sub-chapter revealed how important it was for the LM-Group to draw on 
different political strategies depending on which stakeholder was addressed in order 
to succeed in determining the specific institutional design. While initiating a learning 
process was successful with the industry, such a strategy did not yield much success 
with other norm opponents. With the diamond industry on board in most of the 
issues, it became easier to put not like-minded actors under pressure. Norm 
opponents did not concede to strengthening the scheme because they became 
convinced of its necessity. In fact, most countries such as Russia, China or India 
draw on very different normative frameworks regarding issues of transparency and 
monitoring. As for transparency, we could see that Russia was one of the fiercest 
opponents of disclosing trade statistics having considered this as a state secret for 
decades. China and Israel did not want to be subject to by monitoring requirements 
fearing that they would interfere with their sovereignty. The success of the LM- 
Group can be explained by several aspects. First, the KP is an excellent example to 
demonstrate to what extent regimes impact the interests of their members. Those 
stakeholders that wanted to join the KP for reputational benefits (‘fighting conflict 
diamonds is good’) started to realise that they needed to strengthen the Scheme once 
it was launched to preserve the reputation of the KP. Hence, by agreeing to
96 See http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/, last accessed on 27 September 2006.
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application procedures, monitoring and enforcement requirements, they wished to 
preserve the status as a ‘good guys’ club’. Second, political strategy was crucial. It 
was important that the diamond industry supported strong institutionalisation as it 
shifted the power balance in favour of the LM-Group. Being able to present 
suggestions that were already endorsed by the three stakeholder groups enhanced the 
legitimacy of the proposals significantly, but most crucially, being able to 
marginalise not like-minded states by getting key norm opponents on board yielded 
success. Both with monitoring and disclosure of statistics, the LM-Group engaged 
with Russia and Israel separately before presenting a compromise to the plenary.
This put the not like-minded group under pressure and forced them to adapt to a new 
political environment.
To conclude, this sub-chapter demonstrates that norm diffusion can be 
successful in cases where there is no normative match. However, so as to be able to 
achieve norm diffusion under those circumstances, it was crucial that the LM-Group 
was powerful enough to incite such adaptation processes. In fact, the group had to 
depend on its ability to marginalise the norm opponents so that they would give their 
consent for strengthening the scheme.
5.5 Conclusion
The KP is certainly a great success for the NGOs. In less than five years they were 
not only able to convince key decision-makers that curbing trade in conflict 
diamonds would be an appropriate measure to contribute to pacifying the civil wars 
in Africa. They were also instrumental in strengthening the Scheme significantly 
after it was launched.
Early on, we can explain support for the KP by favourable POS. Especially, a 
normative match explains why a few crucial governments, such as those of the UK 
and Canada, became involved in the first place. As for the industry, the historical 
changes of the industry structures made De Beers push for industry involvement 
early on.
Yet, overall, the KP is an example in which strong institutionalisation could 
be achieved by capitalising on policy crisis with sound political strategy. It accounts 
for the agenda-setting phase up until regime evolution after 2003. Norm diffusion is
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important to explain the case. It gives a reason for the crucial role of the diamond 
industry. Although very defensive at the beginning, the diamond industry became 
increasingly important for determining the institutional design. I identified two 
dynamics that kept the diamond industry committed during the negotiations. First, 
the initial interest of the corporate sector in taking lead action and commit to the KP 
was based on commercial considerations. The creation of the WDC served to 
increase the industry’s structural power and maximised the corporate impact on the 
negotiations. Second, the diamond industry changed its attitude on the question of 
responsibility and to what extent the industry should become transparent during the 
negotiations. The LM-Group, particularly the NGOs, was able to incite a learning 
process within the industry on the value of business ethics. This explains the long 
road the industry travelled from denying the link of the diamond industry to conflict 
diamonds altogether and being very hostile to any regulations, to eventually 
admitting a share of responsibility. Ultimately, the diamond industry endorsed a 
scheme that was far more ambitious than corporate actors had initially wanted it to 
be, and even supported the LM-Group in further strengthening the Scheme. The LM- 
Group was able to incite such a learning process as uncertainty of the industry about 
both the issue, the link between conflict and diamonds, and uncertainty about how to 
react to the activist campaign made the industry more accessible to re-evaluating its 
own behaviour. It adopted a new understanding of what responsibility meant in the 
industry. Previously, diamonds were considered as valuable because they were 
scarce, hence De Beers’ role as custodian of the industry. With the Conflict 
Diamonds Campaign, however, the diamond industry realised that normative 
considerations were crucial for maintaining the high price level.
Norm diffusion simply by framing and learning, however, would not have 
produced such a strong institutional design. By 2002, too many norm opponents had 
joined the KP, all interested in keeping the institutional design as weak as possible. 
Exerting power on norm opponents by marginalising them and structural power was 
crucial in pushing for strict monitoring, enforcement and statistics disclosure rules. 
Framing and learning proved to be ineffective as increasing transparency did not 
match with the norm opponents’ stance on diamonds as a strategic and therefore 
secretive commodity. Given that the US was not interested in investing many 
resources into a strong KPCS, the LM-Group had to push for stronger 
institutionalisation in another way. Being able to break up the group of norm
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opponents by engaging with some of them on an individual basis served to 
marginalise others and ultimately forced adaptation. This strategy was effective both 
for increasing monitoring and for the disclosure requirements.
Looking at the industry sector now it is fair to say that the KP had a 
significant impact. As we could see the idea of CSR had spill-over effects by 
initiating other certification initiatives in the sector. Both the private and the public 
sector are less opaque than they were previously. In fact, for the first time in history, 
diamond trade statistics are published on a regular basis.
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C h a p t e r  6
Regulating Revenue Flows in the Oil Industry
Oil and gas fuel our everyday life. Whether it is petrol for cars, synthetic fibres or 
plastics, petroleum and petrochemical products can be found in nearly every part of 
private use and industrial processes. Gas plays an equally essential role in economic 
development as a major generator for electricity. Where the resources are found in 
abundance, many stakeholders have hopes and expectations. Governments count on 
large and regular revenues, citizens hope for an increase in their living standards, 
local communities wish for it to be a panacea for poverty and multinational oil firms 
expect high returns on their large-scale investments.
However, the highly valued resources can also be used by rebels, insurgents 
or secessionists to further their goals. In many oil- and gas-rich countries, the high 
hopes for sustained economic growth were dashed by the gradual destruction of the 
livelihoods of local communities, social unrest, a corrupt political elite and increased 
poverty.
This chapter introduces the second case study of the thesis, the EITI. The 
initiative aims at increasing the transparency of oil and mining revenues in resource- 
rich countries. Basically, it is a very simple international institution. Companies have 
to publish what they pay to governments and the governments have to publish what 
they receive from the companies. A national multi-stakeholder group reconciles the 
two figures. The citizens of the implementing country can be confident that all 
resource revenues reach government accounts. As already discussed in Chapter 1, 
unlike the KP, the EITI is not limited to one sector of the extractive industries. In 
fact, it addresses the oil, gas and mining sectors. The case study concentrates on all 
aspects of the oil and gas sectors since in the first phase of creation and 
implementation, the EITI was still limited to oil companies. As a report recently 
concluded, the EITI is more suited to regulating the oil industry as it still lacks 
institutional features to address the specific challenges of the mining sector (EITI 
2006a).
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The chapter first explores the emergence of transparency regimes in the oil and 
gas sectors and explains their need by clarifying the link between oil, gas and 
conflict. I then provide a brief narrative of the creation of the EITI so as to make the 
subsequent analysis more intelligible for the readers. The chapter then provides a 
detailed analysis of the key players in the oil industry and its structural pressures. 
Finally, I define the dependent variable of the case by assessing the institutional 
design of the MSI. Given the low level of membership, low enforcement, a moderate 
degree of obligation and a high degree of monitoring, I conclude that the EITI is 
weakly institutionalised.
6.1 The Trouble with Black Gold: Oil and Conflict
The aim of EITI is to “strengthen governance by improving transparency and
Q7accountability in the extractives sector”. The increased interest in launching 
transparency regimes regulating both the private and the public sectors has already 
been mentioned throughout this thesis. In this sub-chapter, I specifically examine the 
flourishing of initiatives regulating the oil and gas sectors. As mentioned before, I 
concentrate on the oil and gas sectors rather than mining as those industries were
Q Q
instrumental in the design of the EITI. I argue that the increased interest stems from 
the international effort to cut the link between hydrocarbon abundance and civil 
conflict in resource-rich developing countries. Oil and war have been bedfellows 
since the beginning of the twentieth century. Oil has a vital economic and strategic 
significance for all countries of the world. Access to oil can therefore be considered 
as a geopolitical interest and constitutes both a foreign policy issue and a matter of 
national security. The ongoing war in Iraq has revived the debate about oil as a 
motivation for engaging in war in political and academic circles (e.g. Bromley 2005; 
Klare 2004a). However, oil and war are linked beyond this traditional geopolitical 
understanding as the sub-chapter later demonstrates.
I first turn to a brief discussion of different existing initiatives that were 
launched to increase transparency in the oil sector. Then I turn to explain why the
97 See www.eitransparency.org, last accessed on 13 May 2008.
98 However, unaccounted mining royalties also facilitate corruption to the same extent as unpublished 
oil and gas revenues facilitate corruption (The Economist 2007b).
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international community saw a need to create those initiatives by exploring the link 
between oil abundance, bad governance and conflict.
6.1.1 Overview of International Initiatives Dealing with the Policy Issue
Up to now, the EITI is the most significant international initiative to promote 
revenue transparency. Launched in 2002, the EITI is part of the anti-corruption 
movement which has emerged since the end of the Cold W ar." With increasing 
globalisation, fighting against corruption and promoting transparent public financial 
management and accountability have gained more significance. A number of 
international initiatives have arisen since then, such as the OECD’s Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (1997), the UN Convention against Corruption (2003) or the Global 
Compact (1999). These international norms promote, amongst other things, the 
principle of transparency. Yet, apart from a very general recommendation there are 
no specific guidelines, monitoring or enforcement procedures attached to the 
principle (DFID 2003).
There is an existing consensus amongst diplomats, policy-makers and 
academics about the causal relationship of the mismanagement of oil revenues and 
internal conflict in resource-rich countries. This is looked at below. Until the creation 
of the EITI, only a few international initiatives existed specifically to promote the 
transparency of payments and revenues. IFIs recently began to pay more attention to 
transparency-related issues in the extractive industries sector by reassessing the 
performance of their own operations’ performance. They are one of the most 
influential agents in shaping the operations of the extractive industries and the host 
governments. Due to their lending activities they reach far into the sector, especially 
in key moments such as the period prior to exploration and later when petrodollars 
become insufficient (Gary and Karl 2003).
This new engagement of IFIs stems from growing pressure from civil society, 
who questioned lender support for oil exploitation projects in conflict-ridden regions 
(Gary and Karl 2003; Pegg 2006a). The World Bank started to focus more closely on
99 The NGO network, PWYP actually very closely connected its campaign to the global fight against 
corruption. The campaign and its framing are analysed in detail in Chapter 7.
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the issue of transparency in their programmes on the extractive industries. In 2000, 
the Bank announced it would conduct an independent stakeholder consultation, the 
Extractives Industries Review (World Bank Group 2004). The aim was first to 
analyse the extent to which the extractive industries could contribute to sustainable 
development. Furthermore, it scrutinised whether and how the Bank’s lending 
practices could be reconciled with the principles of sustainable development and 
poverty alleviation. One of the major outcomes of this report was that pro-poor 
governance required transparency in the resource revenue management (World Bank 
Group 2004: iv-vi).
As part of the new focus on promoting transparent revenue management the 
Bank announced its participation in the Chad-Cameroon Development and Pipeline 
Project.100 It is very regional in scope as it only involves ExxonMobil, Chevron, the 
Malaysian state oil company Petronas, the World Bank, the governments of Chad 
and Cameroon, as well as NGO representatives. The aim of the project is to stimulate 
responsible and socially beneficial management by the government of Chad. Central 
to the initiative is the Revenue Management Program whereby the Chadian 
government is obliged to establish a system of safeguards assuring that the revenues 
contribute to poverty alleviation.101
Having a slightly different mandate, the IMF has recently followed suit by 
promoting revenue transparency as part of its overall fiscal transparency agenda 
(Gary and Karl 2003; IMF 2005a, 2005b). Moreover, it advises the establishment of 
oil funds taking Norway as a role model.
In looking at other initiatives that exist in the field we can understand why the 
EITI fills a crucial gap. It is the only initiative that tries to involve a larger number of 
resource-rich countries by elaborating a common global revenue transparency 
standard. The EITI as an international institution is presented and assessed later in 
this chapter.
6.1.2 Exploring the Link between Oil, Corruption and Conflict
As with diamonds fuelling civil war, there exists a strong academic consensus about 
the connection between oil and conflict. There are, however, strong disagreements
100 See www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj, last accessed on 6 July 2007.
101 See http://go.worldbank.org/RQSFYMZPEO, last accessed on 6 July 2007.
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about how oil is related to conflict and the causal mechanism of this claim. As to the 
first disagreement, scholars have advanced competing hypotheses on whether oil 
increases the incidence, duration or intensity of war or whether the commodity 
renders conflict resolution more difficult (Kaldor et al. 2007). This section explores 
the two main competing explanations, the ‘greed and grievance’ approach and the 
petro-state argument, by concurring with Kaldor et al. (2007: 24) that the two 
explanations are valid in combination with each other “at different levels and at 
different times”.102 The analysis is illustrated by looking at two cases, those of 
Nigeria and Angola.
The petro-state argument explores the paradox of weak petro-states. One 
might expect that oil and gas resources contribute to the development of a strong 
state, but actually natural resources weaken state institutions (Karl 1997; Moore 
1998; Ross 2004). The argument starts from the Weberian assumption that the 
economic foundation of a state matters as the sources of income shape the structure 
and the dynamics of state power (Kaldor et al. 2007). The state’s income normally 
derives from its citizens’ taxes. In these societies, the government is not in control of 
income but has to negotiate with the citizens. The citizens, in turn, ask for 
participation rights in determining how their money is spent. A state whose income is 
based on taxes will therefore most likely develop into a democratic one. Petro-states, 
however, are rentier states. Their governments generate income by exploiting their 
oil and gas resources and by selling them to foreign consumers. It is not the citizens 
who are in control of the state’s income but the government itself. This leads to a 
weakening of the citizen-state linkage. On the one hand, the citizens are less 
informed about state expenditure and activities, while on the other, the state is not 
dependent on involving its citizens in the decision-making processes on how the 
money is spent. In addition to the alienation of the state and its citizens, the elites are 
inclined to adopt a so-called rent-seeking behaviour. Rents differ from other industry 
sector’s profits and wages in that they are not dependent on the productive efficiency 
but simply on the quality of land. Individuals, whether they work for the government 
or the private sector, have an incentive to build political mechanisms which allow
102 Note that Kaldor et al. (2007) include a third approach as well. The introduction of this sub-chapter 
has already referred to the geopolitical significance of oil. This explanation is excluded from the 
subsequent analysis as it focuses on the oil-consuming countries as triggers o f regional or global 
conflicts.
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them to capture these rents. The rent-seeking behaviour is supported by a system of 
financing patronage, repression and corruption. In contrast to the previous case, 
where diamonds were easily accessible to rebel groups in remote regions of the 
country, oil is a fixed asset whose exploration is capital-intensive and demands a lot 
of technological know-how. Thus, the executive, the state oil company and the 
ministries of energy and finance are privileged in their rent-seeking behaviour (Ross 
2003). However, as the example of Nigeria shows below, NSAs are able to capture 
some rents by engaging in illegal activities related to oil exploration and production 
(E&P).
The competing explanation looks at ‘greed and grievance’ processes in the 
societies of resource-rich countries. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the literature on the 
political economy of conflicts point to the economic motivations as a driving force 
for conflict in resource-rich countries. Especially in petro-states, the rule of law and 
taxation systems have collapsed, so individuals are forced to look for other sources 
of income. Being highly capital-intensive, the oil sector is mostly an enclave industry 
with very few linkages to other industrial sectors of the country. The geographical 
location of the resource has an impact on what kind of conflict will develop. If the 
oilfields are in close reach of the government, a coup d ’etat is more likely in which a 
certain political group aspires to gain control over government (and thus the income 
form the natural resource). Where the oilfield is distant, as was the case with Nigeria, 
the conflict is most likely to be secessionist.
The Nigerian case stands out from others since the conflict provoked 
vigorous grassroots protests (Abah and Okwori 2006). Oil has been central to the 
Nigerian conflict since the outbreak of the civil war in 1967 and is linked to human 
rights abuses, environmental degradation and state corruption. Although Nigeria is 
the largest oil producer in Africa and the world’s eighth largest producer (Herskovits
2007), oil revenues have not contributed at all to the welfare of its citizens. Nigeria 
developed into a petro-state soon after the civil war (1967-70), which had its roots in 
the legacy of the colonial rule.103 Oil did not serve as a trigger for the civil war, but 
the conflict in turn served as a catalyst for Nigeria’s development into a petro-state 
fostering corruption and misappropriation (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007). In contrast to 
other oil-rich countries, Nigeria never established full control over its oil industry but
103 For a detailed analysis o f the Nigerian civil war see Luckham (1971).
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cooperated intensely with the multinationals. Thus, Western oil companies, 
especially Nigeria’s largest oil producer Shell, became quickly entangled in the 
policies of the military dictatorships that ruled the country until 1998 (Said 2005). 
Their complicity with the ruling elite became specifically apparent when local 
communities began attacking oil installations and kidnapping workers. As a 
consequence of the attacks, the companies requested security assistance, whose 
involvement often led to human rights violations (see e.g. Human Rights Watch 
1999). Western oil firms became the focal point for grassroots violence as they 
constituted a surrogate for the neglectful government (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007). 
Bad governance, inequalities in the distribution of oil rents and environmental 
degradation alienated local communities from the central government. In the Niger 
Delta the conflict around oil has been most severe and has received global attention. 
The conflict led to the establishment of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People in 1993, which demanded compensation for lost oil revenues and 
environmental damage (Human Rights Watch 1999). Moreover, they sought control 
of the petroleum resources, corporate responsibility for the oil firms, and more 
federalist political rights (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007). The campaign was met with 
brutal repression by the military regime, which culminated in the execution of the 
leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other leading members of the group in early 1995. 
While the oil companies, especially Shell, adopted a neutral stance on the issue in 
public, senior officials are said to have worked behind closed doors so as to contain 
the government excesses.
As the Angolan case demonstrates, oil conflicts do not only have domestic 
roots. Rather ‘greed and grievance’ mechanisms can also exacerbate existing 
conflicts. Chapter 4 has already referred to Angola’s wealth in natural resources. 
While diamonds constitute an important commodity, the oil sector can be considered 
as the key resource. After Nigeria, Angola is Africa’s largest oil producer, but it only 
contributes one percent of the global production. Nevertheless, the commodity is 
domestically of great significance, since it provided 80 percent of government 
revenue during the 1990s (Le Billon 2001). 95 percent of Angola’s total oil 
production is offshore and therefore was unaffected by the civil war. With the 
development of new technology in the late 1990s enabling companies to drill in 
ultra-deep waters, international oil companies (IOCs) engaged in highly competitive 
bids so as to ensure the exploration rights for blocks on offer. The oil industry is
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controlled by the national oil company (NOC) Sonangol, which enlists IOCs in 
production-sharing agreements (PSAs). In total, ten IOCs are operating in the 
country (Le Billon 2007). Like in Nigeria, oil was not the trigger for the conflict. 
Nonetheless, Le Billon (ibid.) suggests that if the oil fields were onshore and 
therefore closer to the conflict-ridden regions, this would have provided an incentive 
for the government to become more engaged in the peace process. The availability of 
oil revenues prolonged the conflict in two ways. First, a large portion of the oil 
revenues were used by the Angolan government after the end of the Cold War to 
fund the war against UNIT A. So as to be able to acquire more weapons, the Angolan 
government also signed oil-backed loans (ibid.). Second, apart from the 
redistribution of oil revenues through official government channels, a vast amount of 
money also enriched the Angolan political and military elite. The prospects of 
benefiting from the military supplies offered an incentive for individuals from the 
military elite to push forward the privatisation of the war (Global Witness 1999). 
Western oil companies and governments also became entangled in the arms-for-oil 
deals (Global Witness 1999; Le Billon 2007).
While oil is rarely the only reason for the emergence of internal or 
international conflict, we can see from the above country cases that oil has been a 
crucial factor in sustaining or fuelling existing conflicts. From the example of 
Angola, we can see that governments were able to finance their wars against rebel 
groups by using the oil revenues. Moreover, using the petrodollars for personal 
enrichment fostered widespread impoverishment in those countries. In Nigeria, the 
negative environmental consequences of oil exploitation and its unequal distribution 
fuelled existing post-colonial ethnic conflict. Here, NSAs were able to capture a 
fraction of the oil revenues by illegal means such as kidnapping or siphoning. At the 
heart of the problem are mismanagement and misappropriation of the oil revenues by 
governments, the military or NSAs, all of which revenue transparency initiatives try 
to address. It has been suggested that IOCs were able to benefit from the instability 
in the countries and even fostered this instability (Frynas 1998; Manby 1999). 
Whether this allegation is correct has as yet not been established (Detheridge and 
Pepple 1998). However, since the late 1990s, the conflicts have had a very negative 
impact on the companies’ public relations and prompted a review of their operations.
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Against this background of conflict and corruption, the international community saw 
a need to find a solution to the policy issue. Given that a number of anti-corruption 
conventions already existed and had no impact, there was a high uncertainty as to 
how to design a global revenue transparency initiative. The following section briefly 
revises the creation of the EITI to make the subsequent analysis more intelligible to 
the reader.
6.2 Negotiating and Implementing the EITI
At the beginning of this millennium, it has become increasingly clear to 
policymakers that the causal relationship between resource wealth and civil conflicts 
had to be terminated. As previously mentioned, the EITI touches new ground 
concerning the regulation of resource revenue flows. This sub-chapter briefly gives 
an overview of how the issue reached the international agenda in 2003.
Subsequently, I explain the evolution of the EITI and issues of contention that arose 
during the negotiation. The final section looks at the implementation of the EITI.
6.2.1 Publish What You Pay and the Emergence of EITI
The NGO campaign, PWYP, is driven by the same players as the Conflict Diamonds 
Campaign. The issue of revenue management was brought to the international 
agenda by the NGO Global Witness. Whilst investigating UNITA’s diamonds funds 
in Angola, the activists recognised the huge revenue stream flowing to the 
government from companies that were completely unaccounted for in the public 
budgets (Hayman and Crossin 2005). After investigating the issue more thoroughly 
in Angola, Global Witness published its first report on the issue in December 1999 
(Global Witness 1999). The report called for full transparency in the oil sector so as 
to enable the African civil society to monitor the government’s oil revenues. In 2002, 
Global Witness won over a powerful ally, the financial speculator George Soros, 
founder of the Open Society Institute (OSI). Together with Soros, the advocacy work 
gained steam by launching PWYP in June 2002. Since then, more than 200 NGOs 
and individual academics worldwide have joined the campaign (Hayman and Crossin 
2005: 265). The objective of the NGO campaign is to push for mandatory disclosure
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by oil companies through stock market requirements. We come back to analysing in 
more detail the NGO campaign, their objectives and methods in Section 7.1.1.
With the political clout of Soros, PWYP was able to lobby the UK 
government in little time. Tony Blair launched the EITI at the WSSD in September 
2002 (ibid.).The UK Department for International Development (DFID) was 
mandated to lead the creation of die initiative.
In the first year, DFID mainly engaged bilaterally with the IMF and the World 
Bank, which were working on similar issues at the time. The first multi-stakeholder 
meeting was convened in February 2003 in London. At the workshop, the 
stakeholders discussed possible formats for the initiative as well as principles, 
definitions and objectives. In June 2003, the stakeholders convened for the First 
Plenary Conference at Lancaster House, London and agreed on a Statement of EITI 
Principles to increase transparency over payments and revenues in the extractive 
industry sector.104 Among other things, the stakeholders agreed on setting up a 
voluntary disclosure initiative. After a stagnation period of two years, another 
workshop followed by the Second Plenary Conference convened in London 2005. 
The NGOs, being disappointed that their call for mandatory disclosure remained 
unheard, pushed for tougher accountability rules for both implementing countries and 
companies. Thus, the plenary of 2005 endorsed the EITI Criteria, which were 
supposed to translate the principles into action. Essentially, the Criteria are a set of 
guidelines for those countries wishing to implement the EITI (International EITI 
Secretariat 2005).105 In 2005, the initiative had attracted interest from a number of 
countries and the stakeholders saw the need to develop a more stable governance 
structure for EITI. The 2005 Plenary therefore mandated an International Advisory 
Group (IAG) to decide on the governance and future direction of the initiative. The 
IAG was constituted by representatives of companies, countries, NGOs and 
investors. Peter Eigen, the founder of Transparency International (TI), chaired the 
group. From June 2005 to August 2006, the IAG met six times, discussing a broad 
range of issues such as
• Monitoring of both the implementing countries and companies (the
‘Validation Process’)
104 See http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/eitireportconferencel7june03.asp, last accessed 7 
December 2007 and Appendix 3 for EITI Principles.
105 See Appendix 3 on EITI Criteria
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• The future governance of EITI
• Proposals for dispute resolution mechanisms
• The role of emerging economies
• The extension of the EITI to the sub-national level
• Incentives for implementation.
At the final IAG meeting in June 2006, the group was transformed into the Board. 
The IAG final report was presented at the third Plenary Conference in Oslo, October 
2006 (EITI 2006a). The objectives of the Oslo conference were threefold: (1) expand 
the number of countries participating in the process; (2) improve the record of 
implementation, (3) endorse the recommendations of the IAG on the future policy 
arrangements for EITI. Most importantly, the Oslo conference launched the 
Validation Process, which was supposed to monitor the progress of 
implementation.106
6.2.2 Issues of Contention
Since its conception, the EITI has had a very narrow focus by only engaging with 
stakeholders and governments that were directly relevant to the process. Thus, the 
initiative could maintain a highly technical focus, avoiding politicised discussions. 
Unlike the KP where more global issues such as the question of Taiwan stalled the 
negotiations for a while, the issues of contention in EITI negotiations where 
exclusively related to the topic and mostly technical by nature. The main issues of 
contention are listed below. Chapter 7 analyses these issues in great detail.
•  The design of the overall scheme: mandatory vs. voluntary scheme
• Role of civil society in implementing countries
• Ways of reporting
• Engaging the US and US companies
•  Engaging emerging economies
• Monitoring
106 See http://www.eitioslo.no/, last accessed 6 August 2007.
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•  Funding o f the Secretariat
One of the thorniest issues at the beginning of the initiative was the question of 
whether EITI should be mandatory or voluntary. As discussed at length in the 
following chapter, a mandatory agreement would have meant placing the burden of 
responsibility with the companies rather than with the producer governments.
Related to this was the problem of winning the commitment of the US to the 
initiative. The administration was adamant in opposing anything that would place its 
oil industry at a competitive disadvantage. In the end, like-minded actors chose to 
integrate the US at the expense of a mandatory regime.
Once the overall design of the scheme was agreed, the discussion turned to 
implementation issues. Two aspects dominated the negotiations for a long time. 
While some oil companies opposed certain ways of reporting, producer countries 
tried to water down the role of civil society at the national level. After giving up a 
mandatory regime, reporting methodology was another lost battleground for the 
NGOs as their preferred methodology was not adopted. So as to appease the NGOs 
and keep them engaged, the UK subsequently bolstered their role at the national 
level, even risking alienating several producer countries such as Angola from the 
initiative.
When EITI was revised in October 2006, the discussions turned to questions 
about monitoring and funding of the secretariat. Most of the northern stakeholders 
had realised that the initiative had to be strengthened by a compliance mechanism. 
Consequently, in October 2006, the so-called Validation Process was put into place. 
With the transfer of the secretariat from London to Oslo, funding also came onto the 
agenda. Previously, EITI was substantially funded by the UK government. Up until 
the present day, funding remains a big issue, as the initiative becomes more 
cumbersome and expensive. Very recently, emerging economies have reached the 
top of E m ’s agenda. As discussed at length later, they do not participate in EITI and 
enjoy substantial benefits as free-riders. While no-one contests that emerging 
economies challenge EITI, there is substantial disagreement about how significant 
the issue is. Several countries and the Board consider the involvement of emerging 
economies as key to the success of EITI, whereas some NGOs regard the discussion 
as a red herring. They fear that the discussion distracts from what they think is the 
main issue, implementation on the national level (Interview 24).
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6.2.3 Implementing the EITI
As with the KP, the EITI sets minimal international standards its implementing 
participants are required to fulfil. Furthermore, the initiative is based on a ‘learning 
by doing’ approach. In June 2003, the pilot phase was launched, in which Nigeria, 
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Ghana volunteered to implement the initiative as first 
movers. Since then, the participants have been meeting on a regular basis and have 
strengthened the standards significantly. The EITI is implemented nationally and its 
implementation is divided into four phases: sign up, preparation, disclosure and 
dissemination. The EITI distinguishes between candidate countries and compliant 
countries. Compliant countries have fully implemented the EITI requirements in all 
four phases. Candidate countries have met the four Sign Up criteria107. Once a 
country has obtained that Candidate status, it has two years in which to be validated 
as a Compliant country.108
Implementation of EITI is obviously crucial for the ultimate success of the 
initiative. At the time of writing, however, the picture looks rather grim. So far, no 
country has been able to reach the Compliant status.
$  $  :|c)|e £
As we have been able to see from this brief narrative, the stakeholders could create 
an international initiative within very little time. Given that the oil industry (both 
national and private) was considered as the main culprit for the misappropriation of 
oil revenues, we now turn to analysing the key players in this industry sector.
6.3 The Key Players in the Global Oil and Gas Market
The global oil regime is a highly complex regime and, not surprisingly, has been 
described in a variety of ways (for different approaches see Yergin 2003; Falola and 
Genova 2005; Bridge 2008; Awad 1999). This sub-chapter breaks the structure of the
107 The four criteria are (1) committing to implement EITI, (2) committing to work with civil society 
and the private sector, (3) appointing an individual to lead implementation, and (4) producing a Work 
Plan that has been agreed with stakeholders (EITI 2006b: 3).
108 See http://eitransparency.org/implementingcountries, last accessed on 28 June 2008.
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oil regime into two main entities: public agents -  that is producer and importing 
countries -  and IOCs and NOCs which will be discussed with regard to the high level 
of competition. As Grant (2006) correctly points out, there are many other parties 
involved in the regime that guarantee its functioning, such as smaller oil firms, spin­
off industries and energy traders. Yet, it is the states and the large oil companies 
which have a profound impact as far as our case study is concerned. One crucial 
player in the oil regime is, of course, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). The organisation is not included in the analysis since it is not 
relevant to our case study.
Currently, the industry structure is subject to dramatic changes which will 
probably have as much impact as the first nationalisation wave in the 1970s. 
Therefore, I focus specifically on the extent to which the changes affect the relations 
among the players and the degree of competition.
The most crucial ordering principle of the oil regime is competition among oil 
consuming nations, NOCs and IOCs. Oil is, and will remain, the main source of 
energy in the near future. Despite the debates about climate change, energy security 
and renewables, the International Energy Agency’s world energy outlook predicts a 
growing demand of 1.9 percent per annum (EEA 2005). The growing demand is 
fuelled by sustained economic growth in Asia’s emerging economies (in particular 
China), but also by the industrialised world and an increase in global transportation. 
Against the rising demand stands a fast growing supply gap of roughly 62 million 
barrels per day by 2020 (Boscheck 2007: 5).
6.3.1 Agency and Structure in the Oil Regime (1): The Producing and
Consuming Countries
Since oil is the most important source of energy, every nation in the world is a 
consumer country. The top importers are the US, Japan, China and Europe (BP
2008). With regard to the producing countries, most of the oil is found in developing 
countries and economies in transition. Together, they hold 94 percent of the world’s 
oil reserves and account for 88 percent of the world’s oil exports (McPherson 2005: 
461). The top net exporters are Saudi Arabia and Russia, followed at some distance 
by Norway, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Table 3 gives an overview of
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oil imports and exports in 2007. Despite the fact that the main oil producers are 
found either in the Middle East, Russia or Latin America, new regions continue to 
gain importance in the global market. As easily accessible crude oil resources are 
becoming depleted or are located in countries which are essentially closed for major 
IOCs because of a nationalised oil industry, the companies have been forced to turn 
to more remote and unstable regions in search for their resources. Two regions 
highly relevant to our case study have become special ‘hotspots’ for energy supplies: 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caspian Sea Region.
Crude Imports* Crude Exports*
US 10.073 123
Canada 979 1.879
Mexico 10 1.828
South & Central America 847 2.313
Europe 10.890 585
Former USSR 2 6.360
Middle East 117 17.262
North Africa 179 2.721
West Africa 68 4.706
East & Southern Africa 514 385
Australasia 548 310
China 3.277 73
Japan 4.118 t
Singapore 1.028 16
Other Asia Pacific 7.187 885
Unidentified^: - 392
* In thousand barrels daily 
t  Less than 0.05
% Includes changes in the quantity o f oil in transit, movements not
otherwise shown, unidentified military use etc.
Table 3 Oil Im ports and Exports in 2007 (BP 2008)
Up to this point, the significance of Sub-Saharan Africa in the global oil market has 
been only of minor significance, with the notable exception of Nigeria. Because of 
widespread political instability, civil wars and geographic remoteness, much of 
Southern Africa remains unexplored. Only recently, IOCs have become increasingly
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interested in the region. Experts suggest that Africa’s role as a major supplier will 
grow immensely in the decades to come (for the following see Hueper 2005: 24If). It 
is estimated that the region’s potential corresponds to one fifth of the Middle East’s 
undiscovered resources. The discovery rates in ultra-deep waters offshore from 
Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea are unmatched elsewhere in the world. For 
instance, as of today, Angola is only the 25th largest oil producer in the world. 
However, given the unknown reserves offshore Angola could potentially overtake 
Nigeria and become the largest producer in Sub-Saharan Africa (Le Billon 2007). 
This immense potential explains the rush of the IOCs into the country. Together with 
the exploration in the mature oil provinces in Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and the 
Republic of Congo it is suggested that the region could account for up to 20 percent 
of oil production by 2020. However, whether West Africa will develop into an 
important oil supplier depends not only on its geology, but also on foreign 
investment for E&P. Since the region competes with other newly developing oil and 
gas regions around the world, it is crucial that the political and economic 
environment in the West African countries becomes more stable.
The most important competitor to Sub-Saharan Africa is the Caspian Sea 
region. The discoveries in this region have been favourable to the countries 
concerned, in particular with regard to their size and timing. The region is home to a 
number of mega-projects, such as the Kazakh fields of Kashagan and Karachaganak 
(Davis 2006). While the Caspian Sea region does not suffer from the political 
instabilities related to civil war, with the notable exception of Chechnya, the region is 
nonetheless volatile. On top of the political issues there are also transportation 
problems. The transport routes from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to Western and 
Eastern markets are blocked by territories involved in civil wars (Chechnya and 
Afghanistan), great power politics (Russia, Iran, China) or by geographical obstacles. 
Thus, the pipeline routes have great political importance. With the exception of the 
Baku-Supsa pipeline and the Khashuri-Batumi pipeline, ending in Georgia, and the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, ending in Turkey, all other existing pipelines to the 
West run through Russia (Davis 2006). New pipeline projects are planned but depend 
on the geopolitics of the countries concerned.
Given the vast resources of the Middle East, the new oil provinces can 
diversify yet not substitute for the Middle East. Nonetheless, what makes Western 
Africa and the Caspian Sea region so attractive to the West is their openness to IOCs.
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In contrast to many other oil producers such as Russia and the OPEC member 
countries, the new regions constitute business opportunities for Western IOCs. This 
becomes even more important with the recent wave of resource nationalism in Latin 
America. In the cases of Nigeria, Angola, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the NOCs are 
the dominant actors but rely extensively on partnerships with IOCs. The relationship 
between the NOCs and the IOCs is analysed in more detail below.
6.3.2 Agency and Structure in the Oil Regime (2): The Industry Structure
As with any other industry, the petroleum industry has undergone significant changes 
since its origins in the late 1860s (for a historic overview see Bromley 2005; Yergin 
2003; Sampson 1988). Today, the players in the oil industry are typically grouped as 
integrated, independent companies (IOCs), NOCs, as well as contract and service 
firms such as refineries, transport firms, and the petrochemical industry. After a 
number of re-structurations and the wave of nationalisation in the 1970s, the most 
successful majors are the ‘Big Five’: ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, ChevronTexaco and 
Total.109
The development of the oil industry has always been dominated by political 
and technological barriers. As mentioned previously, the political barriers imposed 
by most OPEC countries and former communist countries ruled out investment and 
operations in these countries. Only small companies were able to enter politically 
sensitive areas, but they did not have the financial resources to conduct the major 
projects. Moreover, up until ten years ago, technological barriers also prevented 
companies from exploiting reserves in deepwater reservoirs. The change of political 
constellations, most notably the end of the Cold War, resulted in many regions of the 
world becoming accessible to IOCs. An example of this is the Caspian Sea Region.
In addition, tremendous technological improvements opened up multiple investment 
opportunities, which the majors are most apt to exploit (Antill and Amott 2002).
109 Minor oil companies, also known as independents, are non-integrated companies that concentrate 
on the upstream exploration and production segment. They originate from the North American and 
North Sea markets. The size of the companies varies considerably, from one-or-two person companies 
to large publicly traded multinational companies. Examples are ConocoPhillips and Talisman Energy. 
Some of the independents, like Talisman Energy and Apache, seem to join the majors in terms of 
geographical scope, technological complexity and scope. In contrast to the majors, they do not have 
direct contacts with consumers as they do not operate downstream.
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Since only recently, IOCs have acquired the technology to produce oil in the ultra- 
deep waters offshore from Angola. Overall, these developments explain the rise of 
operations in conflict-ridden countries such as Angola, Burma and Sudan.
The oil industry is a highly influential player in domestic politics both in host 
and home countries. The industry derives its structural power from the central role 
oil plays in the world economy (Goel 2004). However, the countries are not only 
dependent on the industries’ delivery but also on their technological expertise. In the 
context of resource scarcity, the technological ability to produce oil profitably in 
geographically difficult regions, such as areas of West Africa, the Caspian Sea and 
Russia, gains increasing importance. Although NOCs from emerging economies are 
catching up, IOCs are the only enterprises that have the technological expertise to 
produce oil efficiently. We also have to consider the companies’ commercial weight 
as a source of power. In Western countries, both the majors and the independents are 
among the most successful companies.110
The giant multinational companies notwithstanding, the oil and gas industry 
is dominated by NOCs, as 90 percent of the world’s oil reserves are state-owned 
(Marcel 2006). The five biggest NOCs of Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria and Abu 
Dhabi in the UAE produce one quarter of the global oil and hold half of the world’s 
oil and gas reserves. In comparison to these NOCs, the most successful majors, 
ExxonMobil, BP and Shell, are but mere dwarves (Petroleum Review 2005).
Until recently, NOCs were mostly important for IOCs as they regulated the 
access to resources in the host countries. Hence, in countries where oil was not 
completely nationalised, such as Nigeria, NOCs constituted the local join venture 
partners for IOCs. Given the predominance of NOCs in oil-rich countries, one 
dominating structural aspect of the oil industry is the relation between the host 
government, the NOC and the investing IOC. Whereas the government and the NOC 
control the bulk of the available oil and gas reserves, the IOC meets much of the 
financial, technical, organisational, and marketing needs. There are several 
contractual forms at their disposal, the most frequently used since the nationalisation 
wave in the 1970s being PSAs. Here the government retains sovereignty over the raw 
material with its NOC as its agent (Barnes 1995: 42f; Johnston 2007). The IOC has
110 According to Forbes, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and BP belong to the 10 biggest companies 
in the world. See http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/18/biz_2000global08_The-Global- 
2000_Rank.html, last accessed 19 September 2008.
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the right to produce oil or gas but does not own the equipment. The physical 
production is divided between the private company and the host, who retains a 
portion for the recovery of pre-production and production costs.
Increasingly, however, NOCs from emerging consuming countries compete 
with IOCs for access to resources in producer countries. Asian NOCs especially have 
begun to acquire oil and gas E&P assets around the world. The growing demand and 
increased concerns about energy security pushes Asian NOCs to both improve their 
national domestic oil recovery and diversify sources of imports (Mitchell and Lahn 
2007; Yi-Chong 2007). China’s energy consumption has increased considerably over 
the last 25 years. In 2003, China became the second largest oil consumer in the 
world, following the US and overtaking Japan (Energy Information Administration 
2005; Grant 2006). To fill the supply gap, China significantly increased its relations 
with the oil boom countries in Africa (The Economist 2004). For instance, the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) bought a 45 percent stake in an 
offshore Nigerian oilfield for US$ 2.27 billion in 2005 (Alden 2007). By 2004, 28.7 
percent of Chinese crude oil imports already came from African producer countries 
(Zweig and Jianhai 2005).111
The emergence of new global players has significant repercussions on the 
potential for business conflict. To be fair, regardless of their great structural power, 
the IOCs have never been completely successful in impacting politics. Like any other 
industry sector, the oil industry does not consist of a monolithic bloc. Characteristics 
such as company size, market of operation, ownership structure or the culture of the 
home country may account for different interests or strategies. However, in times of 
growing concerns about resource scarcity and energy security, the additional 
competition between IOCs and NOCs has crucial consequences for the structure of 
the oil industry and its regulation. Due to their growing commercial and technical 
capabilities, coupled with strong home government support, NOCs increasingly 
compete with IOCs on the global oil market. As the technological gap between IOCs 
and NOCs decreases, the picture is mixed concerning technological competition. The
111 NOCs from emerging economies not only extend their global reach but also diversify within the 
value chain. Until recently, NOCs concentrated predominantly on the upstream side (Antill and Amott 
2002: 10). However, NOCs now also integrate vertically downstream so as to secure outlets for crude 
oil production and not by increasing profits in downstream operations. However, in contrast to the 
diamond mining industry, where the big profits are made downstream, the greatest returns in the oil 
business are gained from developing new oil fields and not from investing in refining.
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gap seems to still be quite significant, especially concerning deep offshore oil and 
gas extraction. For instance, Chinese companies were able to acquire Angolan oil 
blocks, yet the blocks will actually be operated by Total (Global Witness 2007). 
However, others, like Petrobras, are catching up. The Brazilian NOC is involved in 
operations in the deep and ultra-deep acreage with technology traditionally used by 
IOCs. Two incidents in particular alerted IOCs as well as Western governments in 
recent times. In 2005, CNOOC attempted to procure the ninth largest US oil 
company, Unocal, and only withdrew its bid after massive intervention by the US 
Congress (Kahn 2005). In the same period, the Iranian National Petrochemical 
Company tried to acquire a Shell-BASF petrochemical venture. Again, the bid was 
unsuccessful because of political intervention from Washington and pressure on 
Shell not to accept the bid (Marcel 2006: 228f). Due to their home government 
support, NOCs are able to make better offers to oil-producing countries than 
international private companies. First, they seem to be willing to pay more for oil and 
gas assets than the markets justify.112 Second, the governments of China, Venezuela 
and Saudi Arabia have become increasingly engaged in refining and infrastructure 
programmes in Africa and South-East Asia, where vast amounts of money are put 
into oil-backed loans. Thus, they gain comparative advantages, as IOCs consider 
investment in downstream activities in oil-producing countries as risky and 
unprofitable. This form of development assistance in exchange for access to raw 
materials was recently labelled as “rogue aid” due to its non-democratic and non­
transparent characteristics (Naim 2007). Most African countries are attracted by 
China’s ‘pragmatic’ approach to investment.
The rise of NOCs from emerging economies also has repercussions on CSR 
practices in the industry. There has always been a drift between CSR leaders and 
laggards in the field. At the end of the nineties, a number of high-profile crises, such 
as the crisis in Nigeria, pointed to the complicity of the oil companies in human and 
labour rights abuses (Frynas and Pegg 2003). Several of the largest oil companies 
responded very quickly to the NGOs’ accusations not only through advertising but 
also by adopting codes of conduct, fostering their environmental management 
systems, engaging in dialogue and partnerships with NGOs and increasing their 
support for local communities (Bendell 2000). Shell became the first MNC that
112 Mitchell and Lahn (2007: 8) refer to the example of CNOOC’s bid for Unocal, where the Chinese 
offer accounted for US$ 18.5 billion. Chevron only offered US$ 16.6 billion.
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referred to human rights in public and published its “Statement of General Business 
Principles” (Said 2005). Those companies which are now at the forefront of CSR 
argue for its strong business case (see Utting and Ives 2006). In contrast to that, small 
companies and NOCs not only fall behind by being indifferent to CSR, but also by 
increasingly operating in regions where the more responsible companies choose not 
to go. Pegg (2006b) emphasises two groups of companies in particular which fall 
into this category of CSR laggards. The first group constitutes small Western 
corporations such as Lundin Petroleum and Unocal.113 Although all of these 
companies have accepted CSR, for instance, by supporting the Voluntary Principles 
(e.g. Unocal 2004), they continue to operate in very difficult regions of the world. 
Lundin Petroleum maintained its investments in Sudan, ignoring the role of oil in the 
country’s civil war (Gagnon and Ryle 2001). Unocal continued to operate in Burma 
despite the country’s concerning record of human rights abuses and accusations of 
using forced labour when constructing oil pipelines (Larsen 1998). The other group 
pointed out by Pegg (2006b: 256) is that of Asian NOCs. Where more responsible 
companies abandoned their operations, the NOCs took over, as in the case of 
Talisman, who sold its Sudanese holdings to an Indian NOC.
The analysis of CSR leaders and laggards shows that the success of CSR 
activists has only been partially successful, namely in cases where oil companies can 
be held accountable directly by Western consumers. Given the high structural power 
of the oil industry, the fact that the oil industry is sensitive to consumer pressure 
might be counter-intuitive. Oil is, after all, a crucial commodity. As we discuss in the 
following chapter in more detail, examples of activist pressure against Shell show 
that international vertically integrated oil companies are indeed vulnerable. Their 
company-consumer relations are close due to the contacts fostered through their 
branded service stations. The more independent oil companies focus on operations 
upstream, the more remote they become from consumer pressure and the less 
influential the civil society campaign is. Globalising NOCs seem to be even less 
vulnerable to Western activist pressure whether vertically integrated or not. The 
discourse of CSR has not as yet become accepted in the BRIC countries, due to their 
primary concern with economic growth and the political weakness of civil society. 
For instance, Chinese officials cannot be compelled by public pressure to meet with
113 Unocal is now part o f ChevronTexaco.
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Western NGOs (Alden 2007; Financial Times 2007).114 Therefore, NOCs benefit 
from comparative advantages when behaving irresponsibly or investing in politically 
unstable regions. In the long term, however, NOCs from emerging economies might 
be affected by activism and the politically unstable conditions of oil-producing 
countries as well. In Nigeria, for instance, Chinese oil workers have already become 
targets for kidnapping by militant groups (Agence France Presse 2007).
6.3.3 Opacity as a Structural Feature
We have already noted the high level of competition as a major structural feature in 
the industry. In addition, opacity is another feature that structures the international 
petroleum sector. I discuss this separately as this is the fundamental policy issue 
which established the need for the creation of EITI.
Karl (2007: 265) considers opacity to be the “glue” that holds together the 
various agents in the industry. According to the principle of contract confidentiality, 
governments and companies do not disclose the most basic information about the 
revenue flows. Moreover, citizens of producer countries are not provided with 
information about the amount of resources available, their rate of exploitation, the 
revenues governments receive and how they are used (ibid.). Such secrecy reinforces 
the characteristics of rentier states in which governments are more and more 
alienated from their citizens.
Secrecy in the oil business could become a structural feature as it serves the 
interests of both producer governments and IOCs in the short run. For government 
elites, opacity offers windows of opportunity for personal enrichment as the actual 
amount of revenues they receive is unknown and revenue flows are untraceable 
(Global Witness 2004). For IOCs, even though corruption is considered as 
economically unbeneficial, opacity offers opportunities to decide how to account for 
their costs, what profits to report and also the chance to evade taxes. It also improves 
the companies’ competitive stance when negotiating access to the resources. By 
offering large signature bonuses or side payments, IOCs can improve their bid vis-a-
1,4 Alden cites the desperate remark by one US activist who admitted: “We don’t have leverage here 
like we do elsewhere, we can’t put pressure directly on the Chinese government and neither can 
Chinese NGOs” (Financial Times, 2007, quoted in Alden 2007: 11 If).
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vis their competitors (Karl 2007). Ultimately, opacity is also a means for producer 
governments to strengthen their bargaining power vis-a-vis IOCs. We already noted 
the difficult power relations in the oil and gas market in which national governments 
and NOCs controlling the bulk of the hydrocarbon reserves face IOCs meeting the 
majority of the financial, technical, organisational and marketing needs to produce 
the oil. Under certain circumstances -  high oil prices and low financial and technical 
investment needs -  governments and NOCs have more bargaining power than IOCs. 
However, these power relations are very fragile. Governments face considerable 
challenges when dealing with international corporations as they are dependent on the 
companies’ technological expertise and financial capability. This dependency leads 
to the awkward situation in which the buyer (the company) actually knows more 
about the value of the goods than the seller (Humphreys et al. 2007: 4). Companies 
then have more bargaining power than the governments.115 One way of restricting 
this bargaining power to include confidentiality clauses in PSAs with companies. By 
limiting the information flow to companies during the bidding process and thereby 
increasing the competition, governments can increase their own power and play 
companies off each other. Contract confidentiality therefore fosters state sovereignty 
over natural resources when government power is fragile.116
In the long run, opacity is obviously not beneficial for both parties. The lack 
of transparency exemplified in OPEC’s refusal to publish field-by-field production 
data and the extraordinary secrecy of the swing producer Saudi Arabia foster 
speculation and price volatility (Karl 2007). Within producer countries, corruption is 
a direct cause of opacity ultimately exacerbating internal conflict and grievances. For 
companies, corruption increases the transaction costs of conducting business and 
internal conflict increases the political risks of operating in the countries.117
In this sub-chapter, we analysed the oil and gas industry by introducing the key 
players in the corporate sector as well as in the producer and consumer countries. We
115 In a few cases, like in Russia’s Sakhalin-II, IOCs were able to strike beneficial deals due to their 
higher bargaining power. See also Fn. 151.
1 From an international law perspective, state sovereignty over natural resources has its roots in the 
principle of self-determination. The issue mainly arose throughout the process o f decolonialisation 
and found its main expression in UNGA resolution 1803 (14 December 1962) (Dufresne 2004)
117 For a more detailed account of the long term negative effects o f opacity, see Karl (2007).
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can note several commonalities with the previous case. Like the diamond industry, 
the oil sector is a very peculiar industry -  but for different reasons. The fact that the 
product is of strategic importance to the global economy empowers those actors that 
have access to oil. As with the diamond industry, structural changes gained 
importance in the oil industry just shortly before the campaign for more transparency 
began. We scrutinise in Chapter 7 whether these changes had the same effects on the 
institutionalisation process of EITI as they had on the KP. Finally, another similarity 
stands out: Industry opacity is a structural feature in the oil industry. As the EITI was 
designed to increase transparency, we now turn to an in-depth analysis of the 
institution.
6.4 The EITI as an International Institution
The EITI is an international initiative that operates exclusively on the global level 
but which supports country-driven reform towards good governance. Like the KP, 
the EITI establishes a set of minimal requirements on the international level which 
participants, implementing countries and companies alike, must comply with. 
Contrary to the KP, where consumer countries also have to implement the standards, 
in the EITI, consumer countries are supporters and sponsors of the initiative but do 
not need to implement standards.
Corruption is an internal and sovereign affair in the economic process of a 
country. As an international initiative cannot intrude in such a process, EITI is only 
designed to lay open the revenue flows of resource-rich countries. In cases where 
corruption has occurred, the initiative may give recommendations on how to deal 
with it but there are no political consequences prescribed. This is for the political 
elite together with civil society in the respective country to decide.
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6.4.1 Overview of the EITI
The EITI is a highly managed regime whose secretariat has been based in Oslo since 
September 2007.118 The initiative is based on a set of Principles119 and Criteria120 
which call for greater revenue transparency in the extractive industries (Principle 5) 
without compromising confidentiality clauses enacted in existing oil and mining 
contracts (Principle 6). EITI is an MSI, but it addresses producer governments at the 
first instance as implementing parties (Principle 2). EITI consists of two 
components. At the national level, once the government has decided to implement 
EITI, payments by companies to governments and revenues of governments from 
companies have to be published (Criteria 1). The payments and revenues are then 
reconciled by an independent auditor to ensure that no corruption is taking place 
(Criteria 3). The national civil society accompanies all the phases of this process, 
fulfilling a watchdog function (Principle 12, Criteria 5). Moreover, with the reports 
by the international auditor, the civil society is equipped with a tool to monitor 
public spending.121
Once participants are committed to implementing the standards for revenue 
transparency enacted in the EITI Sourcebook, monitoring is implemented according 
to the Validation Guide (International EITI Secretariat 2005, 2006).
On the international and sponsoring level, EITI participants developed 
incentives and technical assistance programmes to induce producer countries to fully 
implement the initiative.
Its participants exert control by collective and consensual decisions. Up to 
now there is no formal dispute settlement mechanism. The main legitimising 
authority of the initiative stems from the international conferences where participants 
agreed upon the Principles, the Criteria and the Validation Process. In between these 
conferences, an independent board (the ‘Board’) is responsible for the overall 
direction of EITI and the policy issues as they arrive. The Board is made up of 
representatives from three supporting countries, five implementing countries, five
118 Before September 2007, the secretariat was housed by DFID in London.
1,9 See http://www.eitransparency.org/eiti/principles, last accessed on 28 June 2008.
120 See http://www.eitransparency.org/eiti/criteria, last accessed on 28 June 2008.
121 An important precondition for the civil society’s monitoring function is that it is literate and is able 
to understand public budgets as well as extractive industries’ revenue flows. Therefore, the Revenue 
Watch Institute, an EITI participating NGO, organises workshops and publishes guides for civil 
society on how to monitor the process (e.g. Shultz 2005; Tsalik and Schiffrin 2005).
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NGOs, five companies and one investor. Its chairman, Peter Eigen, stands as an 
independent. The initiative is also supported by a group of investors (Insight 
Investment 2005).
As Chapter 7 demonstrates, the EITI is a work in progress and its 
institutional design has changed several times, often in a very short period of time. 
The subsequent section analyses the institutional design as of November 2007.
6.4.2 Assessing the Institutional Design of EITI
In the following, the degree of institutionalisation will be analysed by using the 
analytical framework introduced in Chapter 2 -  membership, obligation, monitoring 
and enforcement.
Concerning its membership, the EITI does not have to be a regime with truly 
global scope like the KP. It addresses first and foremost resource-rich countries and 
the extractive industries, and hence, those developing countries that are neither 
resource-rich nor home to companies from the extractive industry sector are not 
addressees of the initiative. However, Northern countries that are neither resource- 
rich nor home country to oil and gas or mining companies can act as supporters of 
the initiative and are therefore potentially addressees of EITI. There are no formal 
application procedures to become a member. Between 2003 and 2005, 24 resource- 
rich countries publicly committed to EITI. Since the Oslo Plenary in October 2006, 
the EITI distinguishes between Candidate countries and Compliant countries. As of 
autumn 2007, no country has been formally monitored (‘validated’). Of the 53 
countries that the IMF lists as resource-rich countries, 15 are now listed as EITI 
candidate countries (IMF 2005b; World Bank 2008). The EITI is officially 
multilaterally or bilaterally supported by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway the UK, and the US. The institutions 
international legitimacy was enhanced by consecutive endorsements by the G-8 at 
Evian, France (2003), Sea Island, US (2004), Gleneagles, UK (2005), and 
Heiligendamm, Germany (2007) (see e.g. G8 Summit Heiligendamm 2007). Out of 
the 22 top international oil and gas companies, 14 IOCs are EITI participants. 
Membership is also limited with regard to emerging economies. Apart from Brazil 
and Mexico, emerging economies are not supporters of the initiative. In particular,
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emerging economies which are mostly home to NOCs do not support the initiative. 
The lack of support is crucial as it leads to collective action problems. If not all 
resource extraction companies cooperate, host governments will have little incentive 
to reform their governance practices. This chapter has already discussed the 
increasing globalising operation of Asian NOCs. Especially when national or 
privately owned companies from the emerging economies compete with EITI 
participating companies, it is feared that resource-rich countries would cooperate 
with those that do not require good governance practices. That this is a real threat is 
demonstrated by the case of Angola, a country that has decided to remain outside 
EITI with the help of Chinese oil-backed loans (see Chapter 7.4). Overall, due to 
E m ’s limited membership, the collective action problem has as yet not been 
reduced. Therefore, the limited membership of the EITI significantly weakens the 
initiative.122
As with all soft law mechanisms, the EITI is devoid of contractual obligation. 
However, as the previous case demonstrated soft law mechanisms can create a high 
degree of obligation in a “felt sense” (Finnemore and Toope 2001). Only recently, 
the EITI has become a performance based initiative. Those stakeholders that do not 
implement or comply with the regime requirements will be expelled (see below). 
Unlike the KP, the EITI has not as yet been able to create peer pressure to comply 
with the requirements or to undertake validation. The EITI disposes of clear 
benchmarks. The Sourcebook and the Validation Guide clearly state what is 
expected from the countries and how compliance with these requirements can be 
achieved (EITI 2005b, 2006b). Moreover, the initiative has now developed clear 
guidelines on how to implement EITI on the domestic level (see World Bank 2008). 
Being an initiative promoting transparency, the EITI is coherent with other 
international standards such as the OECD Convention against Bribery, the Global 
Compact, the IMF Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency and the IMF Good 
Fiscal Transparency Practices for Resource Revenue Management (e.g. IMF 2005a, 
2005b). The coherence with those established international conventions and 
guidelines significantly raises EITI’s legitimacy. However, the sense of obligation is 
hampered by the fact that the EITI distinguishes between developing resource-rich 
countries and developed resource-rich countries. In Chapter 7 ,1 show that the
122 The same assessment would be true, if  the mining sector was included into the analysis.
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missing general applicability not only decreases the notion of legitimacy and social 
pressure among member countries but also severely decreases EITI’s discursive 
power to attract new member countries. Overall, this decreases the sense of 
obligation which is mirrored in patchy implementation.
The Third Plenary Conference has significantly strengthened the monitoring 
mechanism (International EITI Secretariat 2006). Prior to that, the initiative had no 
monitoring mechanism in place. Stakeholders feared that the opportunities for 
whitewash were very high. The Validation Process is now in place, and EITI 
countries must undergo this process at least every two years (World Bank 2008).123 
The national multi-stakeholder group managing implementation at the country level 
has to appoint an independent Validator. The Validator reports on whether the 
county’s progress is according to the Country Work Plan and to what extent the 
country has implemented EITI. The Validator will also monitor company 
implementation. At the end of the process, the Validator has to assess whether the 
country receives the candidate or compliant status. The report of the Validator will 
be published after the multi-stakeholder group, the government and the EITI Board 
have been given an opportunity to comment on it. However, in case of 
disagreements, the stakeholders will deal with it locally in the first instance. Since 
there is no dispute settlement mechanism, the EITI Board will be called to help in 
cases of serious disputes.
The initiative does not dispose of any enforcement mechanisms but operates 
on a ‘carrot’ basis. It is argued that implementing countries will gain material 
advantages from improved governance of the oil sector.124 The only ‘stick’ the 
initiative has is to remove members who do not comply from the participation list. 
Before September 2007, the EITI had listed 24 countries as implementing 
participants. In autumn 2007, nine countries which had not implemented the initial 
requirements were removed from the list of candidate countries. For some months, 
the countries were still listed on the website in the category of ‘indeterminate 
countries’.125
123 For the following see also www.eitransparency.org/eiti/implementation/validation, last accessed on 
11 January 2008.
124 On the techniques used to persuade countries and companies to become members, see Chapter 7.
125 See Fn. 152.
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Thus, enforcement is very weak and could potentially be strengthened by two 
aspects. First, NGOs both at the national and international level could increase their 
naming and shaming activities. Public naming and shaming activities are especially 
missing at the national level. NGO pressure is hampered by the fact that the initiative 
is not widely known to the public. Even in countries like Azerbaijan, which are in 
advanced stages of implementation, the initiative is not well-known to the wider 
public. Another way is to increase EITI’s attractiveness. Most of the countries 
addressed by the EITI are dependent on foreign aid and investment. Although the 
EITI is supported by the World Bank and the IMF, EITI implementation is not as yet 
mainstreamed into their lending requirements. Making loans and grants contingent 
upon EITI implementation could provide a bigger incentive for countries to become 
members. Yet, the greater the influx of revenues from the exploitation of natural 
resources, the less the country is dependent on foreign aid. The most promising way 
to increase EITI benefits is to strengthen EITFs effect on a country’s risk rating 
(Leipprand and Rusch 2007). Better risk ratings lower the costs associated 
with raising sovereign debt in international capital markets. Risk rating is also a 
crucial indicator for private investors who take it into account when making project 
appraisals. A country can become more attractive for private investors by improving 
its rating. That EITI has an impact on the risk ratings is shown in the case of Nigeria 
(Leipprand and Rusch 2007; see also Melville 2004).126 Leipprand and Rusch (2007: 
21) therefore propose that rating agencies should create a mechanism using EITI 
implementation as a proxy for good governance in their risk assessments. In 
summary, the enforcement measures are low in comparison to the numerous options 
available to the EITI.
The EITI has progressed significantly since October 2006. By then, its 
institutionalisation was very low. With the introduction of the Validation Process, the 
EITI was significantly strengthened. Nevertheless, as Figure 10 summarises, low 
membership, low enforcement mechanisms and selected applicability weaken the 
institutional design considerably. In contrast to the KP, which is highly 
institutionalised in all four aspects, the level of institutionalisation of the EITI is still 
considerably low. The following chapter accounts for this outcome.
126 On Nigeria, see also Chapter 7.
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Membership Low - Membership
- Application procedures
- Level o f inclusion
- Restricted
- No
- Low
Obligation Moderate - Type of obligation
- Creation of obligation
- Clarity
- Coherence with other rules
- Technical assistance
- General applicability
- Notion of necessity
- Performance based
- Peer pressure
- Yes
- Yes
- Yes
- No
- No
M onitoring High - Monitoring included
- Mandatory or voluntary
- Who monitors
- Systematic & continuous
- Publication of reports
- Yes (since October 2006)
- Mandatory
- second-party monitoring
- Yes
- Transparent process
Enforcement Low - Type of enforcement
- Consequences of 
enforcement
- Naming & shaming 
practices
- IFI mainstreaming
- Exclusion
- None
- Not on website; NGOs
- Not mainstreamed
Figure 10 Assessing the Institutional Design of EITI
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the empirical and analytical background of the second case 
study. Oil and gas resources can provide enormous wealth to one’s citizens, as the 
examples of Norway and Saudi Arabia demonstrate. However, as we saw from the 
examples of Angola and Nigeria, many resource-rich countries suffer from the 
‘paradox of the plenty’: although being theoretically very affluent, the oil wealth 
translates into widespread poverty and civil conflict. The undisclosed and unaudited 
revenue flows from oil companies to host governments have provided opportunities 
for the personal enrichment of the ruling elites.
The EITI was created to increase transparency in the oil and gas markets of 
resource-rich developing countries. Like the KP, the EITI was institutionalised at a 
time when the industry structure had begun to change. Since the wave of 
nationalisation in the 1970s, IOCs were gradually able to recover and regain their 
commercial strength just after the end of the Cold War. However, globalising Asian
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NOCs coupled with a rising demand for hydrocarbons and a revival of resource 
nationalism opened up a new ‘scramble for resources’.
Most crucially, this chapter assessed the institutional design of the initiative, 
thereby defining the dependent variable of the second case. In comparison to the KP, 
we concluded that the institutional design of the EITI was rather weak. We identified 
a low degree of membership, low enforcement, a moderate degree of obligation and a 
high degree of monitoring (albeit only very recently) as indicators for weak 
institutionalisation overall. Given a number of similarities with the KP, most notably 
with respect to the policy issue and similar important norm entrepreneurs (Global 
Witness and the UK), the question arises of why the EITI failed to produce a strong 
institution.
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C h a p t e r  7
The Institutional Design of the EITI: Structural 
Opportunities for Norm Opponents
Building on the background of the previous chapter the analysis now turns to 
accounting for the regime design of EITL The analysis emphasises four crucial 
turning points that determined the institutional design of the initiative. In the agenda- 
setting phase, the NGOs were able to quickly dominate the public discourse by 
launching the PWYP campaign. Within less than a year they built an effective 
coalition with sympathisers of the transparency norm, DFID and the Anglo-Dutch oil 
companies. In the second phase, negotiations on the EITI were launched. The LM- 
Group very early lost its discursive power to have a profound influence on key 
features of the EITI. In particular, the debate on whether EITI should be government- 
driven or company-driven set the direction towards a voluntary initiative. American 
IOCs backed by the US government could draw on the changes in the industry 
structure as a window of opportunity for blocking stronger institutionalisation. In the 
third phase, stakeholders were more concerned about details, such as how to design 
reporting templates and what role civil society at the national level should have. It 
neither strengthened nor weakened institutionalisation of EITI but revealed a 
stalemate between the two groups favouring different degrees of institutionalisation. 
The most recent stage significantly strengthened the regime design by introducing 
the monitoring mechanism (‘Validation’). Despite the recent boost, however, the 
analysis concludes that the EITI is a very fragile process.
A close analysis of the negotiations dynamics of EITI reveals important 
differences between this case and the KP. Although both industries were subject to 
dramatic structural changes, in the EITI, those changes served as a window of 
opportunity for not like-minded actors to oppose strong institutionalisation by using 
framing strategies. In addition, we can also see how differences in the normative 
structures rendered it more difficult to exercise discursive power effectively to get a 
set of producer countries to join the initiative. Normative and cultural differences 
also challenged the institutionalisation of the KP, but in this case, the LM-Group
214
could successfully marginalise norm opponents thereby initiating adaptation 
processes. In contrast, the structural changes in the oil industry were most crucial in 
the recent stage of EITI as they prevented norm entrepreneurs from marginalising 
not-like minded actors and pushing for stronger institutionalisation. The altered 
power relations due to changes within the industry structures constrained the LM- 
Group, and prevented it from using this strategy effectively. In Chapter 6, we 
identified low membership, low enforcement and moderate obligation as indicators 
for low institutionalisation and we should not expect the EITI to overcome these any 
time soon.
In summary, the chapter demonstrates how the case-specific opportunity 
structures constrained the LM-Group, and prevented it from replicating the success 
of the KP. Rather than initiating learning and adaptation processes, norm opponents 
gradually increased their power and blocked several institutional design proposals.
7.1 Creating a Global Agenda for Revenue Transparency
Revenue transparency first reached the international agenda in the early 2000s. In 
this phase, the NGOs, supported by academics, formed an epistemic community to 
lobby for an international institution. Beginning the analysis with the agenda-setting 
phase of EITI is important as we can see how the PWYP campaign was able to bring 
transparency onto the international agenda. By looking at the responses from the 
corporate sector, we can conclude that in this phase, the NGOs were able to exercise 
discursive power by shaping the discourse on revenue transparency. Their success in 
dominating the agenda is mainly due to the fact that business was split over political 
strategy. The NGOs were able to exploit BP’s and Shell’s sympathy for broadening 
transparency whereas CSR laggards tried mainly to passively oppose the creation of 
EITI.
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7.1.1 The Formation of an Epistemic Community against Revenue Opacity
In 6.2.1 we only briefly looked at the role of NGOs in raising awareness of the issue. 
In this section we return to the activist network by providing an in-depth analysis of 
their campaigning methods.
The campaign for revenue transparency in the extractive industries is 
essentially a continuation of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign. The fact that PWYP 
involved mostly the same players and campaigning methods as the Conflict 
Diamonds Campaign -  albeit with a dissimilar outcome regarding the degree of 
institutionalisation -  makes both cases interesting for comparison. As with the 
diamonds case, the norm entrepreneurs tied PWYP closely to the evolving agenda on 
the role of business and conflict. PWYP received support from the same academics 
who had already researched the link between resources and conflict resources.
During the Conflict Diamonds Campaign, these academics had increasingly turned to 
the question of to what extent companies could play a responsible role in mitigating 
conflicts in the regions in which they operate (Wenger and Mockli 2003; Nelson 
2000; Haufler 2001a). The KP and new CSR approaches by oil companies in Nigeria 
and Colombia demonstrated that business could, indeed, be used to break the link 
between conflict and resources. The Council on Economic Priorities and the Prince 
of Wales Business Leaders Forum published a report making a moral and business 
case for corporate conflict prevention (Nelson 2000). NGOs like International Alert 
produced a range of reports focussing on the same issue (Banfield et al. 2003). Since 
the same actors who had formerly worked on conflict diamonds had now moved on 
to the issue of revenue transparency, it was not necessary for a new epistemic 
community to be created. The old epistemic community simply took another topic on 
board whilst already having in place the communication channels to governments, 
MNCs and international organisations.
The epistemic community did not only have the main agents in common, it 
also repeated its main campaigning strategy by turning to MNCs. The NGOs’ turn to 
corporations was a strategic move as the norm entrepreneurs had difficulties in 
opening the debate with resource-rich countries. As with the conflict diamonds case, 
MNCs were considered to be more potent drivers for change; being sensitive to 
Western consumer attitudes. Sceptics might object that in contrast to the diamond 
industry, the oil industry is less susceptible to consumer perception. The unique
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product characteristics did play a role in that the Conflict Diamonds Campaign had 
more leeway in teaching the industry that the value of diamonds did not only depend 
on their scarcity but also on the way the industry operated (see 5.3.2). However, as 
we see in the subsequent section this does not suggest that integrated oil companies 
are insensitive to consumer pressure. The other reason for turning to the companies 
was the campaigns’ link to the global anti-corruption movement which had kicked 
off at the end of the Cold War. Anti-corruption had become an established norm in 
Western companies, which had by now launched many regulatory schemes to fight 
corruption. As Chapter 3 discussed, the normative match of new ideas to established 
normative frameworks increases the likelihood that the idea will be adopted. Overall, 
PWYP benefited greatly from this established norm. The movement against 
corruption provided the NGOs with a window of opportunity to bring the issue onto 
the global agenda and to obtain both company and country support in a 
comparatively short time. Hence, the campaign should not be seen in isolation from 
the global anti-corruption campaign.
A thorough description of the rise of the anti-corruption norm is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It is sufficient to point out some major developments to illustrate 
how anti-corruption has become an established global norm. Overall, since the 
1990s, a large number of international and regional organisations have formulated 
policies against corruption.127 With the deregulation and privatisation of former 
USSR markets and the acceleration of information technologies after the end of the 
Cold War, corruption began to be a concern for Western governments. The new 
economic environment created conditions in which corruption could flourish 
(Galtung 2000). Throughout 1992 and 1993, significant corruption scandals raised 
public awareness in Western countries and in Russia. Yet, while the end of the Cold 
War spurred corruption, the subsequent wave of democratisation also provided an 
ideal environment to fight it. Since the 1970s, academic research on the negative 
economic consequences of corruption had grown gradually. Nevertheless, until very 
recently the US was the only country that legally prohibited bribery with its 1977 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Galtung 2000).128 An important norm entrepreneur
127 Examples are the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and International Chamber of Commerce’s updated Rules of 
Conduct.
128 As Galtung (2000: 20) points out, in the 1990s most of the European countries still did not take 
bribery seriously as they allowed for tax deductibility of bribes as business expenses.
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promoting the anti-corruption norm was TI. Its director, Peter Eigen, had previously 
worked for the World Bank and had experienced bribery and corruption first-hand. 
From very early on, TI was supported by key business players and government 
representatives including the Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. The fight 
against corruption was also boosted by international organisations, especially the 
World Bank. James Wolfensohn made the fight against corruption a priority of the 
Bank. Within a short space of time, the Bank became a leading platform in the fight 
against corruption (McCoy and Heckel 2001). From the very beginning, TI and the 
Bank framed the fight against corruption in political development terms, arguing that 
poor countries could least afford the negative consequences of corruption. As part of 
its good governance policies, the Bank integrated anti-corruption policies into its 
programmes. TI was highly successful in launching ‘naming and shaming’ 
campaigns by publishing its annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Since its 
inception, the CPI has had serious implications for the reputation of developing 
countries (Wang and Rosenau 2001).
The anti-corruption norm was also extended to the corporate actors in 
developing countries. Since the turn of the millennium, major business scandals 
pushed the anti-corruption agenda in industrialised countries. The collapse of Enron 
and WorldCom hit business and governments alike in 2001, and led to a drastic 
increase of disclosure requirements by the accounting sector. The US designed the 
most far-reaching legislation for transparency, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which aimed 
at restoring public confidence in American business (The Economist 2007a; Calland 
2007).
PWYP is a product of the anti-corruption norm, but the publicity of the fight 
against corruption on a global scale also presented a window of opportunity to 
promote the idea of revenue transparency. Right from the start, activists like Global 
Witness, International Alert and Pax Christi established a clear connection between 
revenue transparency and corruption, arguing that opaque revenue streams were one 
aspect of corrupt oil economies (Global Witness 1999). Due to revenue opacity, 
resource-rich countries such as Angola, which could potentially be among the 
wealthiest in Africa, were, in fact, among the poorest. As with the Conflict Diamonds 
Campaign, NGOs turned to MNCs considering this to be the most effective move to 
promote change. In light of the anti-corruption movement, NGOs considered 
Western oil companies as a better target given the costs and benefits to MNCs of
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reputation and risk management (Bendell 2004). Moreover, most of them had already 
endorsed the anti-corruption norm following the push by the US government. PWYP 
expected that it would be relatively easy to extend the anti-corruption norm to the 
extractive industries.
In conclusion, the peculiar mixture of experienced players who had already 
campaigned on issues linked to extractive industries and security as well as the 
ability to connect PWYP to an already established anti-corruption norm produced a 
cross-linked network which was able to put the issue onto the international agenda 
within very little time. In particular, linking revenue transparency to the broader 
issue of anti-corruption proved to be a very persuasive framing as the chapter later 
demonstrates, making it more difficult for not like-minded actors to oppose the norm.
7.1.2 Diverging Conceptions about Company Responsibility
We have already noted that the NGOs first turned to the oil companies expecting a 
quicker reaction than with producer countries. However, while it was relatively easy 
for the NGOs to put the diamond industry under pressure, as one would expect due to 
the strategic and economic significance of the product, the oil industry was more 
difficult to campaign against. However, as I discuss later in this section, oil and gas 
companies have often been targets of civil societal criticism in the past and -  in 
response -  changed the way they operated. In fact, it is not only product 
characteristics, such as oil as a vital fuel for the global economy or diamonds as 
symbol for love and luxury, that determine whether shaming campaigns yield 
success. Another crucial issue that has an impact on the level of vulnerability, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, is company-consumer relations, which might provide 
opportunity structures for norm entrepreneurs. Due to their direct outreach to 
consumers, integrated oil companies are relatively sensitive to consumer pressure.
For instance, throughout a consumer boycott in reaction to Shell’s plan to dump 
Brent Spar into the North Sea, sales had dropped in Germany by 30 percent (Neale 
1997). The companies therefore were already sensitive to commercial risk stemming 
from activism.
The more crucial differences between the diamond and oil industries were 
that the latter was already experienced in being attacked by NGOs. Hence, activists
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could not create an environment of uncertainty as they did prior to the KP. In fact, 
most of the oil companies had already formulated their own CSR policies according 
to which they devised their strategies in response to NGO pressure. The low degree 
of uncertainty had two consequences. On the one hand, the campaign did not 
constitute a policy crisis as the Conflict Diamonds Campaign was for the diamond 
industry. It was therefore more difficult to diffuse the new idea with not like-minded 
actors. On the other hand, however, the NGOs could build a coalition with those 
companies whose own CSR policies were very close to the idea of revenue 
disclosure.
An analysis of the CSR policies prior to PWYP reveals that some companies 
already focused on revenue transparency in their CSR policies whereas others 
completely ignored the issue. The split within the corporate community may be 
surprising considering the strong business case for oil companies to fight corruption 
in resource-rich countries. Regardless of the short term benefits discussed in 6.3.3, 
bribery increases the costs of operations and makes the business environment less 
stable. Oil companies have to invest major sums for E&P and usually have to stay in 
the country for a long time. Fighting corruption and poor governance could therefore 
be considered as an essential part of their risk management and as a way to secure 
their assets in the host country (see e.g. Poroznuk 2006). We can see the divergence 
in company attitudes on these issues by assessing company literature published 
before 2003 (for the following see Skjaerseth et al. 2004). While the majority of the 
major companies recognise the broader social concerns in the countries in which they 
operate in, only BP and Shell emphasised their commitment to key social issues as 
part of their business agenda. According to Skjaerseth et al. (2004: 9), ExxonMobil 
had responded to growing CSR pressures by 2002, but the “relevant sections on 
governments and societies are (...) amazingly sparse in clear commitments on the 
macro level, compared to BP and Shell”. Looking more specifically at the issue of 
revenue transparency, an assessment of company literature provides an even clearer 
picture. Both BP and Shell considered non-transparent financial flows in host 
countries as problematic and emphasised the need for more transparent governance 
in the countries in which they operated. Furthermore, as early as 1999 (Shell) and 
2001 (BP) the companies had the ambition to become leaders in developing 
standards for transparent reporting (BP 2001 and Royal Dutch Shell pic 1999 cited in 
Skjaerseth et al. 2004). Yet, ExxonMobil rarely mentioned the issue in their company
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literature (e.g. ExxonMobil 2002 cited in Skjaerseth et al. 2004). When looking at 
how theory is translated into action, we find more evidence for this divergence. In its 
recent report, TI concluded that Shell was among the best for revenue and payments 
transparency. BP, although only scoring averagely in the overall rating, received a 
‘first’ for the disclosure of payments. ExxonMobil was ranked very lowly alongside 
China’s CNOCC and Lukoil (Transparency International 2008).129
At the heart of the differences between the Anglo-Dutch and the US IOCs 
was a different conception of who should bear a share of responsibility in the 
‘paradox of plenty’. Whereas the Anglo-Dutch companies recognised that they had a 
part to play in helping their host countries deal with the influx of revenues, US 
companies did not accept any responsibility for the issue. ExxonMobil preferred to 
call the issue a “governance curse” (The Economist 2005), where private investors 
had no role to play.130
The divide between the companies is less surprising if we link revenue 
transparency to the broader CSR attitudes of Western IOCs. We can discern a 
normative match between favourable attitudes towards revenue transparency and 
other CSR issues. Looking at the ways European- and US-based IOCs have 
responded to climate change confirms the thesis of diverging CSR strategies. For a 
long time, the European IOCs, specifically the Anglo-Dutch ones, have adopted 
proactive strategies embracing climate change policies while US-based firms have 
been reactive ( Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2001, 2002). As with climate change 
strategies, one factor explaining the different CSR approaches is the difference of 
societal demands in the companies’ home countries. BP and Shell already 
experienced significant consumer pressure over human rights violations and 
strategies for tackling civil conflict in countries such as Nigeria (Shell) and Colombia 
(BP). Each company suffered a major public scandal. BP had to fire its chief security 
officer in Colombia after evidence suggested that the company had bought military 
equipment linked to paramilitary death squads (Pegg 1999, 2006b). In Nigeria, Shell
129 Overall, TI assessed three areas of revenue transparency: payments to host governments, public 
reporting on a country-by-country basis and anti-corruption programmes. Companies were ranked in 
each of the areas and received an overall mark (Transparency International 2008).
130 As mentioned later in this chapter, ExxonMobil actually takes part in the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline 
Project. Here, the company leaves crucial political roles such as institutional design to the World Bank 
(Buchan and Mcnulty 2002). I elaborate later on why ExxonMobil agreed to join that initiative.
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was entangled in the execution of eight Ogoni leaders, including Ken Saro-Wiwa. In 
the aftermath, the company drastically changed the way it operated in Nigeria.
The incidents in Colombia and Nigeria served as crises to which both BP and 
Shell were required to find an appropriate strategy. The high level of uncertainty of 
the companies’ officials as to how best to respond to the crisis served as an entry 
point for the diffusion of new domestic norms on CSR (Pulver 2007; Skjaerseth and 
Skodvin 2003). By acquiring a greater understanding of the roles companies play in 
conflict prone regions and countries, BP and Shell learned further about the benefits 
when adopting more responsible practices in the field.131 Shell, for instance, formerly 
supported state suppression in Nigeria, but after the incidents in the Niger Delta,
Shell fundamentally revised its political approach in conflict-prone regions (Ibeanu 
and Luckham 2007). It now organises stakeholder meetings and has expanded its 
community development programmes to mitigate political risk for its employees and 
assets. Shell was also active in lobbying the Nigerian government for an
139improvement of the social conditions in the oil-producing regions of Nigeria. The
Delta is still a very difficult region for Shell to operate in, but the company now 
assumes more responsibility in managing social risk. US-based companies had not 
experienced similar public relations disasters until early 2003. Therefore, there was 
no need for these companies to internalise new business practices that exceeded 
vague verbal commitments.
We can see from this section that a rift on revenue transparency between the 
US and Anglo-Dutch firms had partially arisen because o f the firms’ diverging 
positions on appropriate behaviour in host countries. Due to the specific social 
demands in the home countries of BP and Shell, the IOCs had revised their CSR 
strategies in host countries long before PWYP was launched. Revenue disclosure 
was an issue that BP and Shell themselves had already pondered on when advocating 
for a more active role in preventing or mitigating conflicts. In contrast, the strategy 
of US firms was to retreat from a political role so as to prevent any public criticism 
in the first place.
131 With regard to environmental risk, Shell’s Brent Spar crisis also incited a learning process. Public 
pressure not only motivated Shell to re-assess the necessity of dumping the platform into the North 
Sea but also incited a re-think o f the cultural assumptions the decision had been based on (Neale 
1997).
132 Following the lobbying activities, the Nigerian government began to return 13 percent o f the oil 
revenues to the oil-producing regions (as opposed to the prior policy of returning 3 percent) (Litvin 
2003).
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7.1.3 Corporate Responses to PWYP: Towards A Divided Business Front?
Given the diverging conceptions of a company’s role in host countries, the firms 
reacted very differently when Global Witness started lobbying for stricter disclosure 
regulations in resource-rich countries. The split between the companies first became 
visible as early as 2000, when the issue of revenue transparency gathered steam. 
Global Witness had begun to invite the companies operating in Angola as well as 
concerned NGOs to discuss ways of disclosing company payments. Since the 
companies had all started to operate in the country very recently, the NGOs had 
hoped they could change their business practices from the start. Already in 2000, the 
FCO took up the issue by discussing ways of disclosure with IOCs operating in 
Angola. However, in contrast to the European oil companies, ChevronTexaco, 
ExxonMobil and other IOCs did not seem to be interested in the topic and were 
absent from the meetings (Shaxson 2007). Globally operating NOCs were not 
integrated into the dialogue either. Since the Asian NOCs did not have a reputation 
for being interested in advancing anti-corruption policies, neither the officials of the 
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) nor the NGOs addressed those 
companies in the first place. The perception of a normative and cultural rift between 
Western private and Asian national companies was therefore crucial for deciding 
which actors should be involved in the new initiative.
As far as BP was concerned, because of its position on the issue, the UK 
government’s and Global Witness’ lobbying efforts seemed to yield success quite 
quickly. After all, Global Witness advocated a norm which fitted perfectly into the 
company’s approach to transparency. In early 2001, BP took leadership in promoting 
transparency in Angola. The company announced that it would publish payments to 
the Angolan government for oil concessions (for the following see Gary and Karl 
2003; Global Witness 2004). BP’s disclosure included net production, aggregate 
payments, total taxes and levies paid as well as a recent signature bonus to Angola.133 
BP decided to disclose this information under the impression that under their contract 
with the Angolan government this would be legal (Interview 17). Its stance aimed at 
creating a new benchmark for public and shareholder expectations towards the
133 Subsequently to this announcement, BP revealed that it had paid the Angolan government a US$
111 million signature bonus for a 26.7 percent operating share in the Angolan Block 31 (Gary and 
Karl 2003: 53).
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private sector. On behalf of the Angolan government, Sonangol reacted furiously, 
citing a confidentiality clause and threatening to dissolve the contract with BP. Since 
BP had high stakes in Angola, the company distanced itself from Global Witness 
(Shaxson 2007: 216).134
In contrast to the Anglo-Dutch companies, the other IOCs remained largely 
hostile to the NGOs demands on revenue transparency. The US companies still 
rejected having a responsibility on the issue. On BP’s move in Angola, ExxonMobil 
commented that such a move to disclosure was not a “proper role for private 
companies” (Buchan and Mcnulty 2002). ChevronTexaco agreed by saying:
“We recognize that we have a responsibility to the people o f Angola, but when it comes
to government policy we feel very strongly that it's not our role to suggest or influence
national economic policy” (Volman 2003).
As the strategy to involve US IOCs by discursive power had failed, the NGOs had to 
look for another way to get them involved. In early 2003, a window of opportunity 
presented itself to PWYP when the so-called Riggs Bank scandal unravelled in 
Washington, D.C. Journalists and Global Witness had discovered unaccounted 
payments by American IOCs to Equatorial Guinea. More specifically, ExxonMobil, 
ChevronTexaco, Amerada Hess and Marathon Oil were accused of paying Equatorial 
Guinea’s oil revenue into accounts controlled by President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, 
at Riggs Bank (Silverstein 2003; Peel 2004; Shaxson 2007). Journalists and NGOs 
exploited the scandal with public pressure and bad press reports (e.g. Global Witness 
2003a). It also had political implications, as the permanent Sub-committee of the 
Senate launched an investigation into the unaccounted payments. Although there was 
no evidence of corruption in early 2003, the scandal was a very serious issue for the 
companies as managers were put on witness stands in congressional hearings. PWYP 
exploited the scandal by publicly naming and shaming the US IOCs. In the face of 
mounting public pressure, US companies saw the need to become more engaged in 
transparency initiatives. Suddenly, the EITI was not considered as a nuisance 
anymore but as an opportunity to improve their image. According to interviews with 
NGO representatives, after the Riggs Bank scandal, the US oil companies began to
134 Nevertheless, the company remained committed to its principles. Despite the serious blowback 
with Sonangol, BP banned not only outright bribery, but also all facilitation of payments in 2003 
(Skjasrseth et al. 2004).
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come regularly to the EITI meetings bringing with them officials of the US State 
Department (Interview 4 and 17, see also Energy Compass 2004).135
In contrast to the diamond industry, which ultimately coordinated its 
response, the IOCs could not overcome the collective action problem. Although the 
diamond industry is very competitive and fragmented, De Beers could incite 
collective action even at a time when its power was decreasing. As we noted in 
Chapter 6, unlike the diamond industry, the oil industry consists of a larger number 
of big companies. The Big Five not only competed with each other, but also with 
local companies and increasingly with NOCs. Most importantly, however, the oil 
industry structure at the time differed dramatically from that of the diamond industry, 
which had to recover from the Asian financial crisis and had to struggle with an 
increasing supply from new discoveries in Canada. For IOCs, business was 
dominated by decreasing access to the resources and increasing global demand, 
which ultimately drove the level of competition to a peak and rendered collective 
action unfeasible. In fact, the question of whether IOCs should address the issue 
together was never really discussed in the early stages. For BP and Shell, the 
situation constituted an opportunity to try to achieve competitive advantages by 
being first movers in corporate citizenship. Some of the US oil companies calculated 
that adopting a bottom line would give them a competitive edge when dealing with 
the producer countries (Buchan and Mcnulty 2002).
To conclude, this sub-chapter demonstrated the importance of the normative match 
to diffusing a new norm. The NGOs could quickly bring revenue transparency onto 
the international agenda, benefiting not only from the continuation of the epistemic 
community but also from their ability to link the new norm to the accepted anti- 
corruption norm. In contrast to the Conflict Diamonds Campaign, PWYP did not 
create a ‘crisis situation’ for the companies. Most companies were already aware of 
the issue and had positioned themselves in the debate. The activists were therefore 
unable to exploit the companies’ uncertainty as to how to react to mounting public 
pressure, as in the case of the KP. However, they could benefit from the normative
135 American IOCs, like Exxon Mobil, deny that there is a causal link between the Riggs Bank scandal 
and their increasing interest in EITI.
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match. Already being sympathetic to revenue transparency, it was easy to get the 
support of BP and Shell. In cases where there was no normative match between the 
new and the established normative framework, it needed the political opportunity of 
a corruption scandal to get the US oil companies involved. Overall, this shows how 
important both political strategy (NGO framing to create a normative match) and 
circumstantial opportunities are for launching an effective lobbying campaign.
7.2 Setting the Scene for EITI: Conflicting Ideas, Common Goals
Despite the fact that some IOCs had already thought about the issue prior to the 
campaign, creating an international institution that promoted revenue transparency in 
resource-rich countries was a new task for all stakeholders. Although a small scale 
role model already existed -  the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project -  uncertainty as to 
how to design such a regime on a global level was immense. The beginning of EITI 
was marked by the debate between the proponents of two conflicting ideas. The 
difference between both ideas centred on where to put responsibility for ensuring 
revenue transparency. On the one hand, the not like-minded group consisting of 
producer countries, US companies and the US government wanted to allocate the 
responsibility to oil-producing countries. Their stance is analysed in the following 
sections. On the other hand, PWYP considered the Western companies as the 
enabling force of corruption in host countries. However, the BP-Sonangol incident 
had convinced the activists that pushing IOCs to unilaterally disclose their payments 
to host governments was not a feasible option given that host governments could 
punish the companies quite harshly. The activists’ focus therefore turned to Western 
regulators and mandatory disclosure for Western IOCs. PWYP called for a 
“regulatory requirement” for resource companies “to disclose their net payments (...) 
through stock market rules and international accounting standards” arguing that this 
would be one way to “override individual confidentiality agreements without 
bringing companies into conflict with host governments” (PWYP 2003). The NGOs 
thought this approach would protect the companies from the individual 
confidentiality agreements of host countries since it would be a requirement by 
western law. Confidentiality agreements had always been required to enable IOCs to
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comply with their domestic law. Moreover, this mandatory initiative would establish 
a level playing field for all companies, and governments would not be able to 
penalise resource companies for illegal disclosure (Schumacher 2003). More 
specifically, PWYP proposed as a condition for stock market listing, the requirement 
for companies to disclose their information about tax payments, royalty fees, 
revenue-sharing payments, and commercial transactions with governments to market 
regulators (Hayman and Crossin 2005).
In the UK, DFID was generally sympathetic to the NGOs’ proposal. The aims 
of PWYP corresponded very much to what the government tried to achieve 
throughout the KP, decreasing the potential for conflict by increasing business 
transparency. However, while at the beginning of the KP, UK officials had wondered 
about the appropriate format for the negotiations, the EITI was set to become an MSI 
from the beginning. Although the KP could not be copied, its success should be 
replicated with EITI (Interviews 8 and 11). Together with the NGOs, the UK formed 
the LM-Group, but although the UK was interested in the issue, the government did 
not want to spend too many resources on this. The suggestion of mandatory new 
stock market requirements seemed to be a feasible and fast option as demonstrated 
by the example of Canada. Up to now, Canada is the only country where listed 
companies are required to disclose their payments (Save the Children UK 2005b).136 
The UK government would not need to engage with developing countries in a 
lengthy process but would nonetheless send out a strong signal to resource-rich 
countries to address the issue. The mandatory requirement also corresponded to the 
concern of the UK to establish a level playing field.
We see below how not like-minded actors slowly began to dominate the 
discourse despite not being able to completely prevent the institutionalisation of 
EITI. That the LM-Group was able to sustain the process even with such resistance 
was mainly due to the fact that no norm opponent wanted to appear as a corruption 
sympathiser. EITI’s normative match to the anti-corruption norm was therefore 
highly significant.
136 The Canadian legislation corresponds to what NGOs were calling for as it also overrides all 
confidentiality clauses in Canadian companies’ contracts with host governments (Insight Investment 
2005; Save the Children UK 2005b)
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7.2.1 Re-asserting Sovereignty over Natural Resources
As already mentioned, norm opponents were able to gradually increase their 
influence on the institutional design during this phase. However, not like-minded 
actors such as resource-rich countries had to constrain outright resistance. PWYP’s 
strategy of very closely connecting revenue transparency to the established anti­
corruption norm proved to be very successful. No government dared to openly 
oppose revenue transparency. However, the outcome of this was not that producer 
countries would not try to fight this NGO framing. In order to fight it though, they 
had to find a legitimate reason to dispute the NGO proposals without losing their 
credibility and reputation. Framing, therefore, was a crucial strategy to impact the 
future design.
The way the norm entrepreneurs argued offered a window of opportunity to 
fight their suggestions. As PWYP framed the solution to the issue by placing the 
burden of responsibility on IOCs, governments framed their rejection of mandatory 
stock market requirements by addressing the question of national sovereignty. 
Producer countries argued that putting corporate responsibility at the centre of an 
international response to oil-related corruption would infringe on their sovereignty 
over their national resources and their right to determine the conditions of 
exploitation thereof. Very instructive in this regard is a statement by the 
representative of Botswana who argued that despite the fact that transparency “has 
become one of the universal virtues of our time (...) its application in specific 
situations needs to be tempered by commercial and political prudence” (Mokgothu 
2003).
Launching international regulation usually involves reducing national 
sovereignty. Therefore, under normal circumstances, we should not expect this 
argument to be persuasive enough to challenge the NGO’s proposal. However, as 
noted in 6.2.3, the question of sovereignty over natural resources, mostly considered 
as strategic commodities, is a more specific issue than regulating other economic 
processes. Being legally able to determine the terms of resource company-host 
country relations is crucial for producer countries in dealing with the power dilemma. 
We noted in Chapter 6 that under certain circumstances, resource companies actually 
have more bargaining power than their host countries. Being able to negotiate access 
and its terms under the principle of contract confidentiality is one way to increase the
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bargaining power of producer countries in the bidding process by allowing the 
producer country to play companies off against each other. Moreover, state 
sovereignty over exploitation of natural resources is a principle of international law, 
so the argument turned out to be a very powerful one in challenging the NGOs’ call 
for companies to be proactive in the fight for transparency. As soon as this counter­
argument appeared on the agenda, the fight for a mandatory initiative turned into a 
lost cause for NGOs. For the LM-Group, the defeat meant that a ‘quick fix’ on the 
issue was no longer possible.
7.2.2 Bandwaggoning Resource-Rich Countries: Corporate Framing 
Strategies Against a Mandatory Scheme
Apart from the producer countries, US IOCs were particularly hostile to the 
suggestion of devising mandatory disclosure. They disliked the fact of being held 
responsible for corruption and bad governance in resource-rich countries. The IOCs 
continued to consider corruption as a governmental problem and not as an issue for 
private companies, since only the countries could determine the rules of disclosure 
and decide on their expenditure (American Petroleum Institute 2003; Buchan and 
Mcnulty 2002; Interview 21, Palley 2003; Robertson 2004). However, like their host 
governments, they had difficulties in outwardly opposing the PWYP’s call for more 
transparency. After the range of corporate corruption scandals at the beginning of the 
new millennium, no major western company could afford to publicly oppose anti­
corruption policies. It was therefore crucial for the companies to find another 
legitimising cause for their resistance so as to subtly undermine the campaign. The 
companies very swiftly realised that the debate about corporate responsibility and 
state ownership constituted a window of opportunity for them and should be 
exploited for their own benefit. To this end, the US companies joined forces with the 
host governments by legitimising their resistance to mandatory disclosure, referring 
to the principle of state sovereignty. They emphasised that any initiative would have 
to respect the sovereign right of the resource-rich countries to decide on setting up 
licence agreements and revenue expenditure. The firms warned the LM-Group that 
such a mandatory initiative would alienate producer countries (Robertson 2004).
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Yet, more importantly, the recent changes in the industry structure provided an even 
better window of opportunity to legitimise their opposition to the NGO suggestions. 
In contrast to the NGOs, they had a much deeper understanding of the industry and 
were concerned about their position vis-a-vis globalising Asian NOCs. They argued 
that mandatory disclosure required by stock market listing would counteract DFID’s 
objective to establish a level playing field for all companies in the extractive 
industries, since securities and exchange requirements would only affect publicly 
listed companies. As such, the initiative would develop into a regulatory mechanism 
aimed at western global resource companies and ignoring non-listed companies, 
including state-owned and parastatal companies. It would put the IOCs at a 
considerable competitive disadvantage relative to non-listed companies from 
emerging economies. The opposing oil companies were backed by the World Bank, 
which considered the producer countries rather than the industry as the main culprits 
of corruption (Interview 13). As mentioned before, given the profound normative and 
cultural differences with respect to valuing transparency, DFID did not see any 
possibility in engaging with countries such as Russia or China and their NOCs.
On the European front, BP and Shell remained sympathetic to the proposal of 
mandatory disclosure. Throughout the entirety of the negotiations they held a middle 
position, mediating between the LM-Group and norm opponents. The heated debate 
between the NGOs on one side and US IOCs and resource-rich countries on the other 
gave them an opportunity to distance themselves in the public eye from their 
competitors (Shaxson 2007). However, given the broad consensus between US IOCs 
and the host governments blocking the way toward mandatory regulation, BP and 
Shell did not have much political leeway to make the first move.
7.2.3 Sending out Mixed Signals: the US
In the KP, the NGOs had been able to obtain the support of a number of major and 
middle powers. In the EITI, the initiative was backed by only a few countries from 
the beginning. In addition to UK involvement, Norway joined the LM-Group early
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on. Canada, crucial to the KP, only recently expressed support for EITI.137 France138 
and Germany139 backed EITI financially without playing a big role in most of the 
institutionalisation process. Apart from the UK, the US had the biggest impact on the 
institutional design. Since the beginning of PWYP, the US had been very cautious 
towards revenue transparency as the administration faces a dilemma between several 
important policy objectives.
The first policy objective concerned its changing energy policy. The scramble 
for resources, especially oil and gas, coupled with terrorist threats from the Middle 
East, has transformed Central and West Africa as well as the Caspian Sea region into 
new hotspots for US energy supplies. As early as 2000, the US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) forecast that by 2015, West Africa alone would supply 25 percent of 
US imported oil (The Economist 2002; Volman 2003). The US policy toward 
procurement of African oil was formulated prior to the attacks of 11 September 
2001. The key document is the National Energy Policy of 17 May 2001, widely 
known as the ‘Cheney Report’, as it was written under the auspices of Vice President 
Dick Cheney (Klare and Volman 2006). It advocated increasing reliance on foreign 
oil sources so as to meet the US’s growing oil demand. The attacks of 11 September 
2001 and increased volatility of supplies from the Middle East underscored the need 
for the US to diversify its energy supplies by expanding trade relations with African 
countries. The current administration is specifically interested in West African oil 
due to its fast transport routes to US markets, the high quality of sweet oil, and the 
prospect of Africa’s considerable proven and probable reserves. Moreover, apart 
from Nigeria which is a member of OPEC, African countries provide easy access for 
IOCs (Klare 2004b). However, civil wars, corruption and sabotage against 
international oil companies are undermining the stability of US oil supplies (see e.g. 
Kansteiner HI and Morrison 2004). A key priority for US foreign policy was 
therefore to contribute to the stabilisation of energy producing countries. Civil war 
and poor governance are not only a concern of humanitarianism but considered in the 
context of economic and strategic US interests in the region. One should therefore
137 Having already launched mandatory disclosure rules, Canada did not consider it necessary to join 
EITI early on (Haworth 2003; Department of Finance Canada 2007).
138 France was more active during the I AG.
139 Germany very recently became more engaged, making an effort to involve the emerging 
economies at the G8 meeting in Heiligendamm (G8 Summit Heiligendamm 2007). Moreover, 
Germany pledged to host the EITI Secretariat after September 2007 (BMZ 2006).
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assume that promoting revenue transparency in resource-rich countries was in US 
foreign policy interests.
However, despite the fact that the EITI could meet its foreign policy goals, 
the US government was very hesitant to endorse the initiative at the beginning. As 
with other issues in foreign policy such as environmental politics, domestic and 
societal forces play a crucial role in determining US politics (see e.g. Falkner 2005a). 
We have already noted that US IOCs have been investing heavily in West Africa and 
the Caspian Sea region.140 US oil companies usually have full governmental support 
for their contribution to the US economy (Obi 2006; Gary and Karl 2003). So with 
EITI, the US government did not intend to threaten their companies’ interests in the 
producer countries. In addition to the dilemma of balancing the interests of its IOCs 
operating in prospective EITI member states and its interests in stabilising oil 
producing countries, the US administration had a particular dislike for cooperating in 
multilateral institutions (Mingst 2006). Under the presidency of George W. Bush, the 
US rejected cooperation in both the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
Kyoto Protocol. Whilst maintaining an interest in stabilising both West Africa and 
the Caspian Sea region, the US took on a different approach from the UK 
government. Rather than being enthusiastic about EITI, the US aims to stabilise the 
political and economic environment through the use of military assistance, such as 
the provision of arms and military assistance, the establishment of military bases and, 
ultimately, the deployment of US combat forces. As Klare and Volman (2006) stress, 
the Clinton administration commenced this policy by establishing military ties with 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The strategy was 
further re-emphasised after 11 September 2001 and introduced in Africa. The greater 
part of assistance to African oil-producing countries intends to enhance the internal 
security capability, including better control of the diverse communities within the 
countries.
Further to internal security risks, the US administration identified another risk 
to energy procurement in Africa and the Caspian Sea region. US officials are 
increasingly concerned about competition with China. In light of this new challenge,
140 To give two examples, ChevronTexaco announced in 2002 that it had invested US$ 5 billion in the 
past five years in African oil and would spend US$ 20 billion more over the next five years. In the 
same year, ExxonMobil intended to invest US$ 15 billion in Angola in the next four years and US$ 20 
billion across Africa during the next decade (Gary and Karl 2003: 12).
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the US is concerned that China might pre-empt US firms in winning contract bids 
(Klare and Volman 2006). Competition with China and increased concerns about 
energy security are crucial reasons preventing further strengthening of the scheme. 
We return to this in section 7.4.4.
In light of the vested interests of the US administration and its strong ties to 
the oil industry, Global Witness was concerned that the UK government’s efforts to 
design a tough EITI would be undermined by the US government so as to protect the 
interests of the oil industry (Global Witness 2003c). While in the KP, a strong regime 
could be created and although the US did not take a lead in the E ITI, it seemed to be 
a much more pronounced opponent to strong institutionalisation. Since the US is also 
home to a number of important IOCs, it was obvious for both the NGOs and the UK 
government that EITI could not be successful without having the US on board. 
Marginalising the US, as the LM-Group did in the KP with opponents to strong 
institutionalisation, was not an option in this case given the power of the US in the 
industry. Eventually, the US came to be much more inclined towards a tougher EITI 
once Steven Krasner joined the US State Department as Director for Policy and 
Planning (Interview 17). He argued that opacity in the oil business would prevent 
democratisation in producer countries as it provides producer states with resources to 
oppress opposition. EITI would not only increase energy security and contribute to a 
more stable international environment but also contribute to promoting democracy 
(Krasner 2006). By linking EITI to democracy promotion, the initiative fitted more 
into the normative framework which informed US foreign policy. However, far from 
changing its stance completely, the US remained committed to a voluntary approach 
whilst further pursuing military assistance to guarantee stability in the countries 
concerned.
>|c *  *  $  s|e
The sub-chapter focussed on the different framing of revenue transparency and the 
different policy proposals by the various stakeholders before main decisions as to 
how the EITI should look were taken. It demonstrated that, although dominating the 
discourse at the beginning, the NGOs gradually lost their grip in shaping the policy 
options. Overall, while the NGO framing (the link to the global fight against 
corruption) was very difficult to oppose, not like-minded actors succeeded in
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legitimising their policy solutions. Most importantly, the changing industry structure 
provided an ideal window of opportunity to constrain more ambitious institutional 
design ideas. Moreover, important allies of PWYP such as Soros and the UK could 
be convinced that mandatory stock market requirements were not an appropriate 
policy option. Both the argument by the host governments on state sovereignty and 
that by the IOCs on the level playing field persuaded DFID to stop backing PWYP’s 
suggestion. Soros, having his ties to the US political elite, quickly realised that such 
legislation was not feasible in the US given the Congress’ Republican majority 
(Soros 2006: 179). There was also a pragmatic consideration at play. The UK 
government wanted to exploit the political climate and launch an initiative as soon as 
possible fearing that the momentum could pass. Knowing that a mandatory initiative 
could not be realised at that moment, DFID abandoned the idea. At the London 
Conference in 2003, state ownership and voluntary, state-driven disclosure were 
endorsed as part of the EITI founding principles (Principle 2). The US, after having 
worked closely with its IOCs, declared its support for EITI only after these 
concessions had been made.
7.3 Successes and Setbacks: From an Idea to a new International 
Initiative
Only a year after launching the initiative, the LM-Group once more had to 
experience serious backlashes. As discussed below, the voluntary design of EITI was 
considered as a serious defeat within the NGO community. The phase that followed 
was characterised by a stalemate between supporters of strong institutionalisation 
and not like-minded actors. The companies could draw from their discursive power 
and dominated the discussion on the reporting templates. The NGOs resorted to the 
tactic of pushing the initiative by giving in to compromises. In exchange they were 
able to strengthen civil society involvement at the national level. The biggest success 
in this phase was receiving support from producer countries. Despite serious 
setbacks, the initiative could nevertheless move on.
This sub-chapter examines more closely the evolution of some of the key 
institutional design issues of the EITI, such as the creation of the Principles and 
Criteria as well as the reporting guidelines (7.3.1), the role of civil society at the
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national level (7.3.2), and the process of obtaining support from producer countries 
(7.3.3). The sub-chapter also assesses to what extent the industry served as a norm 
entrepreneur in the institutionalisation process (7.3.4).
Overall, this phase is characterised by a stalemate between the LM-Group and 
their opponents. Although not like-minded actors could not prevent further 
institutionalisation, they shaped the design significantly according to their benefits.
7.3.1 Moving from Principles to Criteria (London 2003 -  2005)
This section analyses how the EITI Principles and Criteria were developed.
Moreover, it examines how the US IOCs could push for their preferred option of 
disclosure.
In early 2003, when the aim of the initiative was clear but not its means,
DFID elaborated the Principles to underpin the objective of the initiative.
Specifically, Global Witness and Shell were involved in making suggestions for the 
Principles. The US companies set the top line by demanding that the Principles 
should not entail any legal obligation and threatening that they would stop 
cooperation otherwise. Moreover, they required the principles to fulfil three criteria: 
universality, protection of proprietary information and no violation of existing 
contracts or legislation in host governments (Interview 26). Although the US 
companies wanted to circumvent strong institutionalisation of the EITI from the start 
by emphasising the principle of universality, they significantly strengthened the 
initiative (Principle 11 and Criteria 4). They were sincerely concerned about the 
growing competition in the sector and wanted to introduce a level playing field 
between IOCs and host country NOCs. Therefore, EITI implementation should apply 
universally to all extractive industries operating in the respective country regardless 
of whether the companies were state-owned, private or publicly listed.
Universality was one of the very few issues the NGOs and the companies 
were united on. For the NGOs, this objective represented an opportunity to partially 
compensate for the lost fight for mandatory requirements on the international level. 
Despite this small achievement accomplished by the companies rather than the 
NGOs, the outcome of the conference in 2003 was not very satisfying for PWYP. 
Neither countries nor companies could be held to account if they did not comply with 
the Principles, as they were not legally binding. After the Principles were agreed
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upon, the process stalemated. The NGOs especially were very disappointed with the 
results of the conference and had to ponder on their strategy.
In contrast to the Principles, the Criteria were very much debated. They were 
formulated in the run-up to the second Plenary Conference in London in 2005 and 
reinvigorated the stalemated process. The Criteria served to translate the Principles 
into action and therefore had to have more substance than the Principles (Davis
2005). Again, NGOs and companies advised DFID through the EITI core group.
From very early on, a deep divide emerged between the stakeholders. It 
concerned the question of how to design the reporting templates. The issue turned 
out to be very complicated, since policy-makers and NGOs did not have a profound 
understanding of how to design the templates. Their uncertainty on the issue 
dramatically increased the discursive power of the IOCs which drew from their legal 
and technological expertise. Two types of reporting were discussed prior to the 
conference. The NGOs favoured the approach of disaggregated reporting. In this case 
company data should be published separately, so that one could account for the 
payments from each company individually. The companies, again, were split on this 
issue. BP, Shell, Statoil and Nordsk-Hydro favoured disaggregated reporting, arguing 
that it corresponded to their company policy on transparency.141 ChevronTexaco and 
ExxonMobil were extremely opposed to disaggregated reporting (Energy Compass 
2004; PWYP and Revenue Watch Institute 2006). Together with a majority of 
resource-rich countries they argued for aggregated reporting that added up the 
information of a similar type before publication. The companies would only have to 
disclose the basic annual country figures whereas the PSA arrangements and 
revenues from crude sales would remain secret. So as to legitimise this form of 
reporting, proponents of aggregated reporting contended that this would be the only 
way to uphold the protection of proprietary data. Their disclosure would put the 
companies at a competitive disadvantage (Interview 26). In their opinion, the purpose 
of transparency was to provide data for civil society which in turn would be able to 
hold their governments to account. Disaggregated reporting, in their view, did not
141 Shell for instance stated that “Our view is that it is for host governments to decide whether 
individual or aggregated company payments should be disclosed. But, having said that, we start from 
the premise that individual company payments should be disclosed in each country that is 
implementing EITI -  unless there are good and defensible reasons not to do so.” See 
http://www.shell.com/home/content/envirosoc-
en/society/using_influence_responsibly/payments_to_govemments/our_approach/our_approach_ptg.h 
tml, last accessed on 9 May 2008.
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serve this purpose, as it was considered to be “company-specific information” which 
was “not central to achieving the aims of EITI” (American Petroleum Institute 2003). 
The companies argued that the aggregated figure was fully sufficient for civil society 
to contribute to government accountability.
NGOs argued that although aggregated reporting was better than no reporting 
at all, it still entailed a number of problems. They argued that citizens had a right to 
know which companies paid what kind of revenue. Moreover, aggregate data would 
not allow the identification of leakage sources or poorly performed reporting by 
scrutinising citizens. There was a need to check the total figure against individual 
company payments so as to assure proper reporting. According to the NGOs, 
aggregated reporting could have an impact on the reputation of those companies that 
performed well in reporting, as it left options for free-riders (PWYP and Revenue 
Watch Institute 2006; Global Witness 2005a, 2005b). Several investors partially 
supported the NGOs, arguing that as long as reporting was disaggregated company- 
by-company and not further broken down by payment type142 or field-by-field, the 
commercial interests of the companies were not compromised (Insight Investment 
2005: 16).
Companies remain divided on the issue of reporting to this day. Among 
others, BP, Shell, Statoil and Talisman are willing to publish data on a disaggregated 
basis (Interviews 13, 21, 22 and 26). The US companies were supported by the 
World Bank, which considered it to be more important to account for the revenues of 
the governments rather than control the financial flows of the companies. Whereas 
NGOs had always considered the companies as enablers for corruption, the IFIs from 
the beginning had argued that the issue could only be solved by addressing the 
corrupt governments.
DFID was committed to finding a workable compromise between the two 
positions, balancing the opposing stakeholders by leaving the decision of aggregated 
or disaggregated reporting at the discretion of implementing countries. In the process 
of doing this, they re-emphasised the principle of state ownership. The issue of 
reporting templates constituted an additional crucial defeat for the NGOs. As with 
mandatory disclosure, the NGOs had to give in to a compromise so as to keep the 
process alive.
142 For instance, breaking payments down into signature bonus, royalty payments, fees and taxes.
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When analysing the negotiations during the years 2003 to 2005, distinctive 
negotiation dynamics stand out as they differed profoundly from those in the KP. 
First, contact between individuals was significantly less than in the KP since many 
delegations kept changing their composition. Second, throughout the process, the 
alliances remained roughly as they had been at the beginning. The NGO-industry 
relationship remained stable overall throughout the negotiations. Only in a very few 
cases, the NGOs and resisting oil companies fought for the same issues, one of them 
being the question of universality mentioned earlier. In most other issues, the LM- 
Group, BP and Shell on the one hand and producer countries, the rest of the oil 
industry and the US on the other were very opposed. Only the IFIs, World Bank and 
IMF, sided with the different groups depending on the issue. The creation of a shared 
understanding and the constitution of similar interests therefore remained very 
limited throughout the negotiations.
7.3.2 Negotiating Compromises: the NGOs
In 2003, the EITI had decided on the overall design of the initiative by endorsing the 
Principles. During 2004 and at the beginning of 2005, it became clear that many 
contested details had to be discussed so that the EITI could move forward. Since the 
Principles did not entail any legal commitment, the NGOs especially wanted to make 
sure that the EITI would gain more substance. For them, the beginning of the EITI 
had been difficult since they felt defeated right from the start. One possibility to 
increase their bargaining power was to threaten to leave the Process if  their demands 
were not met by the other stakeholders. Thus, the EITI Conferences in 2003 and 
2005 were critical moments for them in deciding whether they should continue to 
lend their support to the EITI or walk out of the process. The NGOs had to be very 
careful, though, and it was imperative they remain balanced with their threat to 
abandon EITI. The initiative was still very fragile as not like-minded actors only 
reluctantly backed the idea. Threatening to abandon the EITI during stalemates was a 
rhetorical device but not a realistic option. The NGOs knew that as soon as they left 
EITI, the initiative would fade away (Interview 4 and 22). This decreased their 
bargaining power significantly, so the NGOs went along strategically with the 
voluntary design both to keep the initiative alive and in order to able to ask others to 
make compromises in return later on. Not being able to push for their preferred
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design reminded some NGOs, especially Global Witness, of the dynamics of the KP. 
Prior to the launch of the Scheme, the NGOs had called, without success, for the 
integration of some strict requirements such as the peer review or rules for the 
disclosure of statistics. In the end, those requirements were included in the Scheme 
subsequent to its launch. This experience motivated the NGOs to remain in the EITI 
and to consider it as an incremental process towards stricter institutionalisation.
The greatest victory for the NGOs was the strong emphasis on the role of 
civil society both at the international and national level (Principle 12, Criteria 5). One 
of the crucial questions when designing the EITI was how to deal with reported data. 
An international initiative could provide the framework for how to account for 
payments and how to report data. An independent auditor (‘Validator’) could ensure 
that the figures produced by both the companies and government institutions 
matched and could publish a report on the data. Yet, as mentioned before, monitoring 
revenue flows and ensuring that oil money is not flowing into secret funds of the 
political elite is part of a democratic domestic process that cannot be determined by 
international agents. The heart of EITI therefore is the strengthening of civil society 
in member countries which should enable them to hold their government to account. 
The EITI made civil society representation mandatory for national EITI committees 
(EITI 2005b). These representatives have to participate in every implementation 
phase of the initiative. So that domestic civil society can deliver its role, the EITI 
engages in capacity building together with its international NGO members (e.g. 
Shultz 2005; Tsalik and Schiffrin 2005). When pushing for a strong role for civil 
society the NGOs did not experience any outright opposition from the other 
stakeholders. The Western governments and the companies were especially aware 
that the issue had been driven by the NGOs, so they had a right to demand 
appropriate participation rights. As discussed in more detail below, many producer 
countries, however, had difficulties in accepting the civil society role -  especially on 
the national level. However, instead of lobbying against the NGOs’ role, 
governments attempted to circumvent the requirement by bringing in government- 
influenced NGOs (PWYP and Revenue Watch Institute 2006).
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7.3.3 Talking Producer Countries into EITI: The Case of Nigeria
Resource-rich countries play an important role in the EITI. In contrast to the KP, 
which compensates for the weak capacity of resource-rich countries by placing the 
burden of regulation on importing countries, resource-rich countries are the main 
drivers of regulation in the EITI. Although companies play an important role in the 
disclosure of payments, it is resource-rich countries that have to lead disclosure, not 
Western resource-importing governments.
Given the significance of resource-rich developing countries, it was crucial 
for EITI to find supporters amongst the countries that would assist in designing and 
implementing the initiative. As mentioned previously, the EITI is the first revenue 
transparency initiative of its kind. Especially in the second phase, when EITI 
participants looked into the details of how to design the initiative, policy-makers, 
companies and NGOs alike were very unsure as to how to design the initiative.
Rather than designing the initiative on the drawing board where none of the 
stakeholders was certain that the proposals would work in real life, they needed to 
have the practical input o f implementing countries. Therefore, EITI chose the 
approach o f looking for support from so-called pilot countries which would volunteer 
to try out EITI in their countries. This pilot-country approach allowed the 
stakeholders to adopt a ‘learning by doing’ approach whereby the pilot countries 
would have an immense impact on the design of the initiative.
However, finding pilot countries was crucial not only for the design of the 
EITI. It was also crucial for the survival of the fragile initiative in the first place.
Early on, there was only little tangible country support as the US was rather hesitant 
to commit and most of the host governments were reluctant to join the initiative. As a 
matter of survival, therefore, the EITI had to overcome theoretical debates on the 
fundamentals of the design and attract tangible interest from countries that wanted to 
implement it.
Among the two techniques of how to find resource-rich countries that would 
join EITI, pressure and persuasion, the initiative could only use the latter. Having 
emphasised the principle of state ownership and state sovereignty of national 
resources, the EITI could only rely on persuading resource-rich countries to support 
the initiative. The EITI campaign has always been a very technical process. Although 
the network mentioned the economic implications of corruption rather than human
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security in resource-rich countries, EITI supporters drew their discursive power from 
the economic benefits implementing countries could expect when cooperating. One 
can therefore call EITI’s approach to spreading the norm a mixture between technical 
persuasion and bargaining through incentives.
The LM-Group gained discursive power due to the fact that most of the 
resource-rich countries they engaged with suffered severely under the resource curse 
and had only little economic expertise on how to address their economic and political 
issues (e.g. the DRC or Chad). EITI stakeholders promoted the initiative through bi- 
and multi-lateral workshops and diplomatic meetings. The EITI was framed as a 
crucial instrument whereby corruption and rent-seeking could be reduced, civil 
conflict alleviated and poverty fought. By increasing transparency, trust between 
political elites and civil society could be rebuilt, which would in turn lead to greater 
political and social stability. EITI therefore would not only have immediate effects 
for the economic development of the respective country, but would also contribute to 
the political stabilisation of the country. Framing EITI benefits in this way was 
specifically important to obtain the support of countries that feared instability 
through the empowerment of civil society. EITI stakeholders argued that one of the 
direct benefits of cooperation is the possibility of prevention or mitigation of conflict 
and civil unrest. Increased transparency, reduced corruption and rent-seeking would 
also have an impact on the country’s international reputation and credibility. For 
instance, EITI can be considered as a strategy to increase its CPI ranking and, thus, 
improve the climate for FDI and developmental aid (see e.g. EITI 2005a; Eigen 
2007a).
Yet, as we can see from the case of Nigeria, the EITI depended on national 
policymakers sympathetic to fighting corruption and to galvanising political change. 
Moreover, these policymakers had to be situated within institutional arrangements 
that allowed them to become the drivers of change. Rather than addressing the 
ministries, the stakeholders directly addressed the presidents of the respective 
countries. Countries such as Russia, which lacked sympathetic interlocutors, were 
not addressed by the EITI at that stage. As discussed later, this represents a far- 
reaching limitation to EITI.
The first two countries that became interested in EITI were Nigeria and 
Azerbaijan. Both were convinced of the benefits the initiative could entail for their 
countries. Nigeria was especially interested in the initiative to increase the
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international credibility of the government to fight corruption in the oil sector. That a 
country like Nigeria -  in which political elites had misappropriated oil revenues for 
decades -  would be the first to embrace EITI, might come as a surprise. However, 
since the death of General Abacha in 1998 and the re-election of President Olusegun 
Obasanjo in 1999, the country had experienced profound reforms. We have already 
noted the involvement of Obasanjo in TI. In addition, Obasanjo also built up a “close 
and mutually advantageous relationship with Western governments and donor 
institutions” (Gillies 2007: 569) on this and other issues, such as Nigerian debt relief. 
Research suggests that Obasanjo was specifically interested in the reputational 
benefits provided both nationally and internationally by his alignment with the 
international donor community (ibid.). Considering that revenue transparency had 
become such a prominent issue within the Western donor community, becoming 
active in the EITI was an ideal way to improve his reputation internationally. In fact, 
Nigeria could demonstrate that a country’s reputation could be improved by publicly 
committing to EITI. According to analysts, the country’s reputation has soared even 
before Nigeria started to publish its oil revenues (Melville 2004).
For the EITI, Obansanjo’s openness to political ideas from the international 
community provided a crucial window of opportunity towards shaping the country’s 
resource politics. Being able to take Nigeria on board as a pilot country was equally 
advantageous for the EITI as it was for Obasanjo. Since the Nigerian oil industry has 
had a global reputation for its corrupt nature, EITI stakeholders considered that 
succeeding there meant being able to accomplish their goals anywhere else. From the 
very beginning, Nigeria wanted to convey that it was more than committed to 
fighting corruption: “Not only do we embrace it, we internalise it, we practise it and 
show the world that we practise it” (Agence France Presse 2004). Indeed, Nigeria 
was not only the first country to endorse and implement EITI, but it has developed 
into the EITI leader in the meantime. In 2004 it established its own country branch, a 
year later a global financial service firm completed the first independent audit of the 
Nigerian oil sector covering the period 1999 to 2004.143 In contrast to most EITI 
countries, Nigeria chose disaggregated reporting and therefore exceeds the 
international minimal standard. The audit also takes into account other aspects not
143 See http://eitransparency.org/Nigeria, last accessed on 17 September 2008.
242
included in the international EITI standard, such as government regulatory practices 
and state capacity issues (Gillies 2007).
Overall, finding producer countries to not only publicly commit to EITI but 
also to seriously engage with it was a very difficult task. As we can see from the case 
study of Nigeria, for Obasanjo, joining the EITI constituted the opportunity to 
promote transparency, a norm he had already subscribed to. As on previous 
occasions, the normative match was a crucial structural driver for its 
institutionalisation. However, it was not very often that the EITI could count on such 
circumstantial opportunities. Between 2003 and 2005,24 resource-rich countries 
publicly committed to EITI. However, after expressing their commitment, no further 
action followed in the majority of cases. At no point can we discern a dynamic 
reaching the tipping point as in the KP, where more and more countries emulated 
norm adoption. We return to this point later in this chapter to explain the divergence 
between the two cases.
7.3.4 Industry Structure as a Driver of and Constraint on Norm Diffusion
Given that the LM-Group could not incite an emulation dynamic in support of strong 
institutionalisation, EITI supporters had to look for other ways to diffuse the norm. 
One option might have been to exploit the close IOC-host country relations to 
increase support. In fact, NGOs have called on IOCs to play a more active role in 
norm diffusion (e.g. Save the Children UK 2005a). As we have learned throughout 
this chapter, at the international level, companies played a very mixed role in the 
institutionalisation of EITI. While they had pushed forward the initiative in many 
crucial ways, for instance when the companies had insisted on the principle of 
universality in EITI implementing countries, they also belonged to the main 
opponents of strong institutionalisation. This section turns to the question of to what 
extent resource companies contributed to further institutionalisation of EITI by 
acting as a norm entrepreneur in the countries. As we were able to see from the KP, 
the diamond industry played an important role in persuading countries not only to 
take part in the Scheme but also to strengthen it in a number of ways. The section 
contributes to the overall argument of the thesis as we see that power relations in the
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industry structure determine to what extent companies can act as drivers or 
contraints.
Overall, the role of companies in resource-rich countries regarding EITI has 
been very subtle. IOCs, even those very committed to the EITI, maintain that their 
role in persuading resource-rich countries to participate and implement the initiative 
is very limited. The companies refer to two reasons based on power relations. The 
first concerns market and competition dynamics in the sector. Companies are highly 
dependent on access to the resources in producer countries. IOCs consider securing 
access as their priority, paying only minor attention to the costs involved 
(Gulbrandsen and Moe 2007: 814).144 Although most of the IOCs dwarf oil- 
producing countries in economic terms, financial superiority and technical and legal 
expertise do not always translate into increased bargaining power as we discussed 
before. In fact, since the first nationalisation phase in the 1970s, growing competition 
and the governments’ ability to play companies off each other led to a collective 
action problem within the private sector. Although all IOCs have an interest in 
reducing levels of corruption in the countries where they operate, they are reluctant 
in pushing too much for transparency initiatives. The example of BP’s unilateral act 
of publishing a signature bonus for their operation in Angola is very instructive in 
this, as it shows the companies’ vulnerability vis-a-vis host governments. Currently, 
the specific market dynamics in which the companies operate, higher commodity 
prices and the increased competition in the industry work in favour of the host 
countries. In this respect, Angola was able to significantly increase its bargaining 
power during the last decade. As access to the oil resources is so crucial, companies 
are very reluctant to risk their good relationship with the governments. Since every 
company fears a disadvantage when pushing for more transparency, no company is 
actually willing to go through with it.
In addition to increasing the bargaining power of producer countries, 
decreasing the discursive power of companies to propagate change in host countries 
plays a role. After having experienced many scandals, resource companies were 
accused of political meddling with the host countries’ politics. They now lack the 
legitimacy to become openly involved in politics, as they fear detrimental publicity if
144 This is not to suggest that IOCs want to produce oil no matter the price. In fact, many oil projects, 
such as most o f the Tar Sands in Canada remain undeveloped due to escalating costs. However, given 
the expected profit, IOCs are prepared to take a lot of costs and risks to produce oil.
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they intervene too much or in the wrong ways. Although being an MSI, all 
companies emphasise that the EITI is a country-driven process, so the governments 
have to decide whether or not they want to participate.
It is therefore not surprising if, especially at the beginning of EITI, some 
companies were hesitant to lend their support to EITI as they feared inferring 
publicly that the host governments in which they operated were corrupt. This could 
have detrimental consequences when companies next bid for contracts (Sheperd- 
Smith 2008). One example for this is the Italian IOC ENI, operator of the major 
Kazakh oil field of Kashagan. During the first years of EITI, the company was absent 
from every meeting, claiming that being an official member of the OGP it did not 
need to attend the meetings. Observers, however, suggested that ENI’s reluctance to 
attend was more due to the fact that Kazakhstan for a long time had refused to 
participate in the EITI (Energy Compass 2004).145
The argument about market and competition dynamics is strengthened when 
looking at one case where an oil company actually helped in diffusing the norm. BP 
in Azerbaijan was one critical factor that led both to the country’s participation in 
EITI and to its support for strong institutionalisation. Research suggests that Shell 
played an equal role in Nigeria where it actively supported Obasanjo and the 
Nigerian NOC’s desire to become an EITI member (Schouten and Remme 2006). 
With respect to BP in Azerbaijan, Gulbrandsen and Moe (2007: 820) contend that 
there is very little information regarding the nature of company influence on 
government politics,146 but they show that the company has, indeed, spoken out on 
sensitive issues like corruption and revenue opacity. In 2002, the President of BP 
Azerbaijan David Woodward, for instance publicly stated that
“a clear distinction should be established between people in business and people in 
government, including a much clearer separation of the roles in those government 
bodies who currently act as both a regulator and provider o f services” (quoted in 
Gulbrandsen and Moe 2007: 820).
Guldbrandsen and Moe (2007) conclude that Azerbaijan’s leadership in the EITI is, 
amongst other factors, a result of BP’s critical involvement. However, the case of BP
145 In Kazakhstan a powerful domestic extractive industry was for a long time blocking EITI 
participation. After a number of corruption scandals such as ‘Kazakhgate’ the country finally 
addressed the issue more seriously as it wanted to become more integrated into the global economic 
system. In this respect, Kazakhstan’s entry into the WTO is one of the key priorities of the 
government (Global Witness 2004; Raballand and Gente 2008).
46 The reader should note that company representatives did not talk about these issues during the 
interviews with the author.
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in Azerbaijan is unique for various reasons. BP is by far the leading foreign oil 
company and foreign investor in the country.147 Moreover, BP is heavily involved in 
E&P operations and therefore has a greater requirement for a stable and predictable 
political and economic environment. Being the dominant company and sufficiently 
valuing the collective good of transparency, BP may be more willing to cover a 
significant proportion of the cost of establishing the good (Gulbrandsen and 
Humphreys 2006: 816). This prominent position gives BP more leverage in 
promoting transparency not least because the company has many more personal 
contacts to appropriate authorities than in other countries. Even in Azerbaijan, 
however, the company had to balance its norm promoting activities so as not to harm 
its business interests.
In addition to the company’s weight in the country, it was easier for BP to 
discuss transparency issues with Azerbaijan as some institutional structures for 
promoting transparency already existed and served as entry points for norm 
diffusion. In December 1999, a State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan was 
established which was responsible for redistributing a proportion of Azeri oil 
revenues to the poor (Luecke and Trofimenko 2008). Moreover, the President Ilham 
Aliyev had recently been elected and was looking for an opportunity to promote a 
good reputation internationally (Interview 25). BP also gained support from Soros’ 
foundation OSI, which had been active in Azerbaijan since 1996 and had developed 
close relations with the government since then.148
The Angolan case provides even further evidence that BP’s influence in 
Azerbaijan is mainly driven by the distinctive power relations in the industry 
structure of that country. In Angola, BP has to compete with a number of other IOCs 
and Chinese NOCs. Considering the high level of competition, BP would not be able 
to exert the same amount of policy influence. Nevertheless, on a very small scale, the 
company also tried to promote EITI there. BP tried to lobby the Angolan Finance 
Minister and together with the World Bank the company brought in expert advice 
from academia (Interview 21). However, as elaborated on in more detail below, the
147 BP is the biggest shareholder in Azerbaijan’s three most important oil and gas projects: Azeri- 
Chirag-Guneshli, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, and Shah Deniz, see 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryld=430&contentld=2000578, last accessed on 
17 September 2008.
148 See www.osi-az.org/anl6.shtml, last accessed on 11 May 2008, for more details on OSI operations 
in Azerbaijan.
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Angolan government decided to maintain its observer status and was eventually 
dropped from the EITI website altogether. The case studies of both countries 
demonstrate the limited ability of like-minded companies to promote EITI. Like EITI 
itself, they are dependent on the political will of the host governments. We can 
therefore conclude that the industry’s role as a driver is very small given the current 
structural dynamics.
The role of the industry in promoting EITI becomes more significant once the 
countries become interested in EITI. As such, we can draw a parallel between the 
diamond industry and the oil industry. In the KP, the diamond industry plays a key 
role in advising countries on how to design, implement and monitor their national 
certification schemes. With regard to EITI, the oil industry lobbies countries to 
support low or strong institutionalisation depending on their own strategy. When 
supporting stronger institutionalisation, they can help to facilitate the dialogue with 
other stakeholders, such as local and international civil society, and even assist in 
implementation by offering technical support (Gulbrandsen and Moe 2007).
Although BP played a crucial role in Azerbaijan, the case also shows that the 
government is still the key player when deciding on the level of institutionalisation.
In contrast to Nigeria which decided to adopt disaggregated reporting, Azerbaijan 
chose only to disclose the aggregate figure despite the fact that BP has always 
favoured disaggregate reporting.
Nevertheless, company-producer country relations varied significantly during 
the institutionalisation process depending on the countries and companies concerned. 
Some companies that favoured low institutionalisation during the international 
negotiations also aimed at pursuing the same strategy when engaging with producer 
countries. As mentioned previously, the discussion on aggregation versus 
disaggregation was one of the most contested ones at the international level. There, 
the issue was finally resolved by leaving it to the discretion of implementing 
countries. Not surprisingly, the issue was also one of the most contested ones on the 
domestic level (World Bank 2008). In Nigeria, for instance, US IOCs were at first a 
significant opponent of adopting higher standards domestically than at the 
international level (Eigen 2007a; Igbikiowubo 2005).149
149 After the EITI was established in Nigeria in 2003, the government chose to go beyond the basic 
level of aggregate reporting and demanded a breakdown by individual company, production field and 
category o f payment. Although ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco had agreed to comply with the legal
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The third phase represents a stalemate between the LM-Group and those preferring 
weak institutionalisation. As in the KP, the industry could benefit from their 
technical knowledge when negotiating the details of reporting. The US IOC 
particularly exploited this ability when preventing disaggregated reporting, fearing it 
would disclose any proprietary data. The NGOs could strengthen their future role in 
implementing resource-rich countries.
This sub-chapter also discussed ways in which the EITI could involve 
resource-rich countries. I argued that given their inability to exert direct pressure on 
resource-rich countries, the EITI had to rely on countries in which they could find 
interlocutors already sympathetic to fighting corruption. The normative match 
therefore was the political opportunity that drove institutionalisation in the early 
phases of EITI. However, given the current power relations in the market, IOCs can 
only act in very specific circumstances as norm entrepreneurs for strong 
institutionalisation of EITI on the country level. BP’s approach in Angola and 
Azerbaijan provides the best evidence for this as the industry structure differs widely 
in both countries. We return to this issue in the following sub-chapter.
7.4 Backlashes: Dwindling Support for Strong Institutionalisation
I now turn to the most recent phase of EITI. Currently, the initiative is in a peculiar 
shape. While it was significantly strengthened at the Oslo Conference 2006 by the 
launch of a monitoring and enforcement process the EITI remains very fragile.
The linchpin of the fragility is the very low level of membership. As we noted 
in Chapter 2, a high degree of membership is vital for a strong soft law institution to 
increase its credibility. To put it bluntly, the strongest institutional design is not 
worth the paper it is written on if no-one endorses it. Credibility is crucial for 
fostering the other two institutional features in which the EITI is rather weak -  
obligation and enforcement. After reviewing the consolidation of EITI (7.4.1), I turn 
to discussing the reasons for its inability to overcome its own weaknesses, in
requirements of their host governments they were now objecting to the requirements as they turned 
out to be much stricter. It took the personal intervention o f Soros and the Nigerian government for 
both companies to agree to disclose their disaggregated data (Interview 17, Eigen 2007a).
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particular, scrutinising why the political strategy of the LM-Group failed in this case. 
We see that the EITI has failed to galvanise support for stronger institutionalisation 
as it was neither able to incite learning processes (7.4.2), nor to trigger adaptation by 
allocating reputational (7.4.3) or financial benefits (7.4.4).
7.4.1 Consolidating the Initiative: Moving from London (2005) to Oslo (2006)
With the fundamentals of the initiative in place and more countries publicly 
expressing their commitment to EITI, the question arose of how to ensure that 
commitments would not just be whitewash. The companies especially saw the need 
to protect themselves against free-riders.
To this end, the IAG was mandated to develop suggestions as to how EITI 
could be strengthened. The approach taken by EITI differed significantly from the 
strategy the KP had adopted in order to push for stronger institutionalisation. As we 
noted, after the KPCS was launched, the LM-Group built issue-specific coalitions to 
determine how the Scheme could be strengthened. The coalitions then engaged with 
the key opponents and brokered compromises. Thus, other opponents found 
themselves marginalised and eventually agreed to the changes. In the EITI, the IAG 
was a fairly homogenous group consisting of countries and NSAs interested in 
strengthening the existing design.
Due to the homogeneity in the group, the IAG negotiations were rather 
smooth. The US IOCs along with the US government had drawn a top line long 
before the IAG was created by blocking anything mandatory and maintaining the 
focus on host government responsibilities rather than on company obligations. The 
fundamentals of the EITI were now in place and the US IOCs had set a top line for 
regulation. During the IAG, the different company attitudes on disclosure ceased to 
play a role. This might as first come at a surprise but can be explained by three 
reasons. First, those companies that were interested in going beyond EITI were able 
to do so in cases where the host countries allowed them to do. For BP and Shell, this 
served as an opportunity to present themselves as first movers with regard to 
transparency. Secondly, with the increase of NOC influence in Africa, the Anglo- 
Dutch companies realised that regulatory limitations were set by competition with 
those companies rather than the US IOCs. Finally, although previously there has
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been very little collective action within IOCs in the EITI, the way the IAG operated 
forced the IOCs to come to a consensus first amongst themselves before making 
suggestions to the IAG (Interview 25). This, for the first time during the EITI 
negotiations, fostered collective action. BP and Shell pursued a strategy of 
compromise by agreeing on the top line set by the Americans on the international 
level but supporting implementing countries to go beyond the minimal standards 
domestically. An example of this is Nigeria, where Shell supports disaggregated 
reporting and is open about sub-national reporting. American IOCs were opposed to 
sub-national reporting so as not to become embroiled in the debate over how 
revenues should be allocated between the federal government and the state level. As 
we noted at the beginning of this chapter, Shell was already consulting the Nigerian 
federal government on this issue (Litvin 2003). On other issues, however, they had 
found a shared interest, which was to prevent validation from becoming too onerous. 
This was specifically important with respect to company validation which should not 
replicate existing company audits (Baxter and Laidlaw 2006). Another important 
goal was to contain some NGO proposals that called for broadening the EITI focus to 
issues such as expenditure or even going beyond the extractive industry sector. From 
the companies point of view the purpose of EITI was not to achieve transparency for 
its own sake, but to make economic processes more transparent where it would lead 
to better governance (ibid.). To also contain far-reaching proposals, BP and 
ChevronTexaco, representing the companies in the LAG, adopted a strategy directly 
lobbying the EITI Secretariat without letting the NGOs know about it (Interview 24). 
Moreover, the US government supported the containment of the so-called EITI-plus 
issues (US Delegation 2006). Given that there was an urgent need to make the 
institutional design implementable in the first place, the IAG and the EITI Secretariat 
very quickly conceded that EITI first needed to be consolidated before its focus 
could be broadened. Proposals for EITI-plus requirements were not included in the 
IAG recommendations. A compromise was reached with the NGOs to leave EITI- 
plus issues at the discretion of the implementing countries.
Overall, the issue with the consolidation phase was not obtaining agreement 
for strengthening EITI with regard to monitoring and enforcement. The bigger issue 
was getting active agreement on supporting of the new institutional features by those 
actors which had not participated in the IAG. Although the institutional design of the 
EITI was significantly strengthened in 2006, the initiative has become neither a
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globally accepted standard nor a strong initiative. The negotiations on the 
institutional design of EITI were not subject to major obstructions by political 
opponents, but most governments that committed themselves to EITI opposed 
stronger institutionalisation (and implementation) by ‘passive’ opposition: they said 
the right thing but then did absolutely nothing (Energy Compass 2004).
7.4.2 Growing Normative Mismatch
We now turn to analysing why the political strategy of the LM-Group failed. Since 
E m ’s inception, the LM-Group has been largely unable to incite learning processes 
with most of the governments of resource-rich developing countries. In fact, 
throughout the institutionalisation process, the discursive power of the LM-Group 
stagnated. This was mainly due to the growing mismatch between the promoted 
norm and the established normative frameworks in resource-rich countries. The EITI 
aims to contribute to a profound policy change in the extractive industries of 
producer countries. For instance, one of the main pillars of the EITI is the 
empowerment of civil society in producer countries. As mentioned before, the EITI 
is only about laying open the revenue flows of resource-rich countries. The initiative 
does not prescribe any political consequences where cases of corruption have 
occurred. This is for the civil society in the various countries to decide. Therefore, 
EITI requires a significant shift in the government’s attitude to freedom of discourse 
in the public space (Eigen 2007a). Research on the policy diffusion by IFIs suggests 
that technical reforms such as new macroeconomic policies or trade liberalisation 
reforms as promoted by the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s and early 1990s 
could be successful when adopting a “top-down” approach (Naim 1995; Nelson et al. 
1994; Woods 2006). However, reforms aimed at improving transparency and good 
governance imply profound changes in the way politics operate in countries. They 
require ‘deep’ cognitive changes through persuasion and learning that are shared not 
only by a small number of bureaucrats. The LM-Group was successful in persuading 
countries as long as it could focus on those where it could find willing interlocutors 
in those countries that already adhered to normative frameworks close to the EITI 
objectives, as we saw in the cases of Nigeria and Azerbaijan. Hence, the 
circumstances and prevailing sets of ideas in the respective countries played a crucial
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role in the success of EITI in its early stages. Nigeria and Azerbaijan, the producer 
countries that contributed the most to the institutional design of EITI, already had a 
vibrant civil society before the EITI was put in place (e.g. Ibeanu and Luckham 
2007). There are also some examples in which countries have really strengthened 
their civil society and given them a genuine opportunity to contribute in the process. 
For instance we have Ghana, where civil society was able to push for the publication 
of payments from the federal government to provincial councils and publication of 
information about specific government expenditures (PWYP and Revenue Watch 
Institute 2006). In other countries, however, repressive governments are hesitant to 
give their civil society a greater role in political life. The strong role of civil society 
has been one of the main reasons for passively opposing EITI. Many countries that 
committed to the initiative act in ways that conflict with their EITI membership. 
Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo intimidate their civil society and invite 
handpicked civil society members to the committee meetings (DiNardo 2006; Eigen 
2007a). The same has happened in Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Mauritania and Mongolia 
(PWYP and Revenue Watch Institute 2006). Most of these countries fear that by 
increasing the power of civil society, secessionist or opposition movements could be 
strengthened.
Normative mismatch also explains why middle-income countries from the 
Middle East do not participate in the EITI. The countries have a very different 
perspective on NGOs due to their closed societies (Sheperd-Smith 2008). The same 
accounts for China and Russia. Early on, EITI chose not to engage with these 
countries knowing it would be very difficult to motivate them to cooperate 
(Interview 8), but since the EITI recognises that these countries can severely damage 
the objective of the initiative, the stakeholders increasingly turn to the emerging 
economies (EITI 2006a).
Normative mismatch was also an issue in the KP as more countries joined the 
negotiations. China, Israel, India and Russia were especially very concerned about 
the far-reaching role civil society had during the negotiations, and became even more 
alarmed when the LM-Group wanted them to occupy a role in monitoring. Diamond 
trade statistics were considered as a state secret in Russia, so that they had been very 
adamant that they should not be required to disclose these figures. The reader may 
recall that those countries mentioned above eventually conceded to the requirements 
-  albeit not by accepting the transparency norm, but rather by having to adapt to a
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new political environment. The chapter therefore turns to assessing the reasons why 
the EITI failed to incite adaptation processes as the KP did.
7.4.3 A ‘Bad Guys Club’
As mentioned before, learning is not the only way to strengthen institutionalisation. 
Actors may emulate a political strategy when expecting reputational benefits. That 
this strategy has largely failed can be seen by looking at the attempt to increase the 
level of membership.
Since its inception, the EITI has acquired a particular ‘branding’ which has 
turned the initiative into a victim of its own success. After having been able to attract 
the commitment of over 20 countries with severe governance and corruption issues, 
the EITI has acquired the reputation of a ‘bad guys club’ which has significantly 
weakened EITI stakeholders’ power to persuade more countries to join as they fear 
reputational disadvantages (Interview 25; Sheperd-Smith 2008). The ‘bad branding’ 
is due to two reasons.
First, as we already discussed in Chapter 6, the EITI disclosure requirements 
do not have general applicability among the participating countries. As countries 
such as Canada or the UK cooperate in the EITI by being donor countries, yet not by 
implementing it, the initiative lacks role models. Developed countries maintain that 
although many of them are home to important extractive industries, these normally 
do not dominate the government’s sources of income and export revenue. Moreover, 
many developed producer countries have always argued that they would not need to 
implement EITI, since they have mainstreamed transparency and revenue disclosure 
into their existing regulatory frameworks (Sheperd-Smith 2008; World Bank 2008). 
However, since the EITI has developed into an umbrella organisation for countries 
reputed to be suffering from high corruption, many resource-rich developing 
countries, such as Indonesia, do not identify with the initiative’s objectives. First and 
foremost they do not consider themselves as suffering from the resource curse to the 
extent many EITI participants do. Moreover, even if they benefit from implementing 
it, they shy away from it because they do not want to be branded as a corrupt EITI 
country. On the contrary, resource-rich countries which want to increase their 
transparency but do not suffer from the resource curse make great progress without
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the process. An example of this type of country is Trinidad and Tobago. The country 
has been an EITI member since the beginning of 2005 and is generally supportive of 
the initiative. However, it was able to increase its transparency in the resource sector 
without implementing EITI.150 The Finance Minister Christine Sahadeo therefore 
questioned to what extent her country’s economy can benefit from cooperating in 
EITI (Sahadeo 2005). The same applies to the Republic of Congo and Sao Tome and 
Principe, which make a slow effort in increasing their revenue transparency outside 
the EITI process (Energy Compass 2004). The reputation of EITI differs profoundly 
from that of the KP. In this case, its reputation as a ‘good guys’ club’ actually 
enabled strong institutionalisation. For instance, its strong monitoring requirements 
actually depend on positive peer pressure and the good reputation of the KPCS. No 
country wants to be seen as lagging behind in the fight against conflict diamonds.
Secondly, the fact that only developing countries implement EITI not only 
watered down the normative appeal of the initiative but also the discursive power of 
the LM-Group. Some countries, such as Angola and South Africa, now perceive the 
initiative as ‘colonial’, by which the West wants to push for a certain flavour of 
transparency (see e.g. Reed 2006). In this respect, a South African representative 
criticised the design of EITI as early as 2003 with the following statement:
“It is inequitable that only countries host to extractive industries are covered by the
EITI. This creates the impression that only developing countries, which tend to host the
extractive industries, are corrupt or are considered to be corrupt” (EITI 2003).
Only recently, the EITI began to address this issue when Norway decided to become 
an implementing country (United Press International 2007). The turning point came 
when the Norwegian government decided to house the EITI Secretariat. Oslo wanted 
to demonstrate it was committed to the success of EITI by becoming a role model. In 
contrast, suggestions to make only producing countries implement the certification 
scheme were overruled in the KP at an early stage. The EC especially was very 
committed to not placing the burden only on the developing countries, but rather 
spreading it evenly over all participants. Hence, although some African countries 
feared a ‘colonial’ attitude from Western actors those concerns could be contained 
very early.
150 Despite having concentrated on becoming more transparent outside the EITI, the country recently 
did not receive ‘Candidate Status’, (see www.eitransparency.org, last accessed on 29 June 2008).
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7.4.4 The Trouble with Competition: Declining EITI Benefits
The LM-Group also failed to trigger an adaptation process by offering financial 
benefits. This inability stems mainly from the current industry structure which serves 
as an opportunity for norm opponents.
The preceding chapter has already drawn attention to the recent ‘scramble for 
resources’, particularly in Africa, and the growing significance of Asia as an 
importer and Asian NOCs as new global players in the field. This has significantly 
altered the power relations in the industry. The intensified competition in the 
extractive industries significantly increases the bargaining power of producer 
countries and thereby reduces the incentive to become an EITI member. In order to 
illustrate this I first briefly compare the current industry structure with the more 
favourable circumstances in existence when the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project 
was created in the 1990s. Then, I look in more detail at how the current changes in 
the industry affect the institutional design of EITI by examining the case of Angola.
So as to better understand the significance o f recent shifts in the industry, we 
first turn to the power relations in existence when the Chad-Cameroon Project was 
created. In the 1990s, after the first Gulf war, commodity prices were at a low point 
(BP 2008). Moreover, producer countries, especially those seeking to develop new 
projects, such as those from the former USSR or Africa, were not able to plan and 
operate their projects alone. They lacked both the technological knowledge and the 
financial ability for necessary investments (O'Reilly and Aubertin-Giguere 2006). 
The IOCs (and thus their home-govemments) had both the financial ability and the 
technological knowledge, which they offered to the producer countries. The fact that 
the IOCs were necessary for operating projects the producer countries could not 
implement on their own significantly increased the bargaining power of oil 
companies and their home governments. Furthermore, since oil prices and demand 
for oil were much lower than they are today, producer countries did not have much 
leeway in negotiating PSAs with IOCs. Indeed, at the time a number of PSAs with 
unfavourable terms for the producer countries were negotiated.151 Western
151 One example of this is Russia’s Sakhalin-II. As the country urgently needed Western companies to 
produce their oil, a number of PSAs were concluded which turned out to be unbeneficial for Russia. 
With a stronger Russian government, higher commodity prices and more technological knowledge the
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governments and intergovernmental donor agencies would have been much more 
inclined to push for strong institutionalisation had the EITI movement existed at that 
time. This was especially true since competition in the bids was rather limited as 
Western governments and their IOCs were the only possible joint venture partners 
for engaging in oil production. In fact, the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project was 
negotiated at the time because investment and political risk management activities by 
the World Bank were vital for Exxon152 and for the governments of Chad and 
Cameroon to develop the project. Therefore, the joint venture partners accepted not 
only a comprehensive environmental assessment and public consultation with local 
communities but also to control over whether the project’s revenues would be well- 
managed (Brown 1997; Pegg 2006a; Horta and Djiriabe 2007). The governments of 
Chad and Cameroon would probably not have agreed to the far-reaching terms for 
revenue disclosure had China been interested in the project, offering more 
investment in the country’s infrastructure rather than good governance.
The example of Chad and Cameroon can be contrasted with that of Angola 
and its (non-) membership in the EITI. The case demonstrates to what extent the 
growing significance o f emerging economies in the commodity sector can be 
detrimental for the global institutionalisation of EITI. As the incident between BP 
and Sonangol in 2001 demonstrated, Angola has never been enthusiastic about 
Western-dominated revenue transparency. In fact, the IMF has been criticising 
Angola’s corruption and opaque revenue streams for a long time (Armitage 2007). 
IFIs, members of the EITI Secretariat and civil society therefore have engaged with 
key government officials since 2003 to convince Angola to cooperate. However, 
Angola has repeatedly rejected becoming an EITI member while emphasising how 
much progress it has already made by adopting good governance principles and 
becoming more transparent (see e.g. Gra?a 2003). As discussed above, Angola 
considered the initiative as a ‘colonial’ intrusion into interior affairs. Consequently, 
EITI stakeholders did not find any sympathetic interlocutors in the Angolan 
government with whom they could engage in a constructive way. For the LM-Group, 
Angola represented a tough case for their discursive power. As a result, they began to
government was recently able to improve the terms of the contract by pushing Gazprom into the 
project (Litvin 2007; Bradshaw 2006).
152 Exxon wished to avoid becoming entangled in regional and ethnic conflicts as Shell had done in 
Nigeria. By securing the World Bank’s investment and political risk management, Exxon hoped to 
attract other investors and to secure its assets on the ground (Horta and Djiriabe 2007; Brown 1997),
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rely more on the approach of bargaining through incentives. Angola’s interest to 
participate in an IMF programme to structure its debt was considered as a good 
window of opportunity. The IMF and EITI had finally found a way to give Angola 
an incentive to join the initiative. Policymakers tried to bargain with Angola by 
presenting the implementation of the EITI as an integral part to ease the country’s 
relationship with the IMF (Africa News 2005). The strategy seemed to yield success 
since, in 2005, the Angolan Finance Minister announced that his country might join 
EITI on the condition that the country could take part in certain IMF monitoring 
programmes (Fourie 2005). Between 2004 and 2005, it seemed as if the EITI 
stakeholders had made progress. In 2004, an important precedent was set when 
ChevronTexaco, the Government of Angola and Sonangol agreed to disclose the 
details for a payment made to secure an extension of Chevron’s concession of the 
offshore Block O (Save the Children UK 2005a: 23; ChevronTexaco 2004). 
However, during 2006 and 2007, the relationship between Angola and Western 
donors again turned sour, in particular over the issue of oil revenue disclosure. 
Angola pulled out of the negotiations with the IMF (Africa Research Bulletin 2007). 
At the Oslo EITI Plenary Conference 2006, the Angolan Finance Minister reiterated 
that Angola had made good progress in becoming more transparent due to its own 
policies and for the second time rejected EITI implementation (Gra?a 2006). Finally, 
in early 2007 the EITI excluded Angola as an observer from the initiative. Angola 
had repeatedly put under pressure companies that cooperate with EITI and wanted to 
disclose payments (Eigen 2007b). In the end, Angola was able to pay off most of its 
Paris Club debts without the help of the IFIs (Africa Research Bulletin 2007).
Angola was able to resist financial incentives to join EITI as it was able to play IFIs 
and companies off each other by preferring China as a business partner. China is 
Angola’s second biggest trading partner and pursues a ‘no strings attached’ policy in 
energy producing countries (Taylor 2006; Naim 2007; The Economist 2008b). Both 
China and Angola, are on common terms as they perceive EITI as an intrusion into 
the host countries’ internal affairs and therefore reject it (Interview 24). Thus, 
Chinese oil-backed loans gave Angola the outside-option of receiving financial 
benefits without improving its bad governance. China and other emerging economies
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destroy the level-playing field of EITI.153 Other countries might also find it more 
beneficial to rely on unconditional oil-backed loans rather than pursuing profound 
governance changes.154 The new competition with Asian NOCs also has serious 
consequences for Western companies operating in Angola. BP, for instance, would 
welcome a more transparent policy in Angola. Yet, the approach to revenue 
transparency taken by the government and Sonangol is preventing BP’s disclosure. 
For BP, Angola is an important country of operation and the company cannot afford 
to lose its concessions there. Trading oil outside the EITI framework has become 
even more lucrative since the recent rise in the oil prices. The promise of high profits 
incites more and more government leaders to remain outside the EITI.
As mentioned before, given that countries like China, Malaysia and Russia do 
not value transparency as Western countries do, it is impossible to get their support 
for the EITI. Moreover, since Western consumers have no reach to Asian NOCs, 
those actors cannot be put under pressure to join the EITI. However, these countries, 
including their NOCs, are very powerful players in the sector as the example of 
Angola demonstrates. Hence, normative and cultural differences in appreciating 
transparency and good governance are crucial for understanding the peculiar 
institutionalisation of EITI.
So far, structural reasons for supporting low institutionalisation for companies 
and producer countries have been looked at. The increasing competition and 
concerns over supply coupled with tight oil prices, however, also mean backlashes in 
the energy politics of major importing countries. Structural changes and outside 
pressures brought the question of energy security to the top of the international 
agenda. Whereas Islamic terrorism reinforced institutionalisation of the KP, it has 
had a weakening effect on EITI. Increasingly, major importing countries have to rely 
on energy supplies from places where security cannot be guaranteed. Energy supplies 
face other risks, too. In the summer of 2005 the hurricanes Katrina and Rita delivered 
the world’s first integrated oil shock by disrupting flows of oil, natural gas and 
electric power (Yergin 2006). A year later, the Russian-Ukrainian natural gas dispute
153 For instance, China has made a substantial commitment to rebuild the country in the form of oil- 
backed loans worth more than US$3 billion and further technical assistance (Reed 2006).
154 In late 2007, the government of the DRC announced cooperation with China. In exchange for the 
right to mine copper ore at a value o f US$ 12 billion, Chinese state-owned firms would construct or 
restore various railways, roads and mines around the country at an equivalent cost (The Economist 
2008b). As The Economist stresses the sum of US$ 12 billion is more than three times Congo’s 
annual budget and roughly ten times the aid guaranteed by Western donors until 2010.
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raised the EU’s concerns about their reliance on natural gas from Russia (Light 
2006). Finally, the high oil price empowers oil-rich countries. I argued above that in 
the 1990s, IOCs were largely able to dictate PSA terms. However, the higher the oil 
price, the more oil-rich countries become reluctant to host IOCs as providers of 
capital. The recent waves of resource nationalism in countries like Russia, Venezuela 
and Bolivia therefore further add to the political turmoil in the sector (Mouawad
2006). For IOCs the issue is not ‘peak oil’, but actual access is becoming a huge 
problem. Not surprisingly, energy security was the number one topic at the G8 
summit in St Petersburg, Russia, in 2006, only a few months before EITI convened 
its Third Plenary Conference in Oslo.
The NGOs tried to exploit the prominence of energy security by linking it to 
resource transparency. Fighting corruption in producer countries fits into the strategic 
approach on energy security (Global Witness 2007), but whereas similar framing was 
successful in the KP, policymakers thus far could not be convinced that an increase 
in transparency should be part of a strategic approach to their new energy politics.
In sum, given the peculiar structural circumstances of the industry, norm 
entrepreneurs were not able to exert structural power so as to force norm opponents 
to adapt.
*  *  *  *  ★
The sub-chapter scrutinised why the EITI is still fragile even after having been 
significantly strengthened recently by including a monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism. In summary, the three strategies available to the LM-Group to galvanise 
support for strong institutionalisation all failed. Emphasising the financial and 
political benefits was successful in Nigeria and Azerbaijan, but largely failed in the 
other cases due to the normative mismatch. The established normative frameworks 
differed too much from the new norm, specifically with regard to the far-reaching 
role of domestic NGOs in the EITI. Enticing support by offering reputational benefits 
failed because the EITI soon became branded as the initiative of corrupt countries. 
Finally, inciting an adaptation process because of fear of marginalisation failed due 
to structural changes in the industry. The changes in the material structure of the 
sector empowered those actors that did not value transparency and good governance. 
With China’s increasing demand for oil, it becomes impossible to exclude producer
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countries from investment benefits. Coupled with developing countries’ rising 
concerns with energy security, this casts a rather bleak outlook on strengthening of 
the scheme.
The Oslo Conference of 2006, in theory, strengthened the EITI. However, 
stronger institutionalisation did not translate into practice. As the initiative still lacks 
widespread support, one big discussion among the stakeholders was whether to 
actually implement enforcement, as they feared that most of the countries would 
have to be dropped from the participants list, completely undermining EITI’s 
credibility (Interview 22).155 This demonstrates that without increasing the level of 
membership, the EITI will not be able to overcome its other weaknesses in 
institutional design, low enforcement and moderate obligation.
7.5 Conclusion
When Global Witness first proposed the setting up of a revenue transparency regime 
to governments and companies “everybody laughed” (DiNardo 2006). The fact hat 
EITI exists is already a great achievement. To some extent, diverging perceptions of 
what role resource companies should play in host countries enabled the creation of 
the EITI. Had all oil companies adopted an opposing stance to the issue, the 
epistemic community would have been devoid of allies. However, disagreement over 
business strategy also contributed to a lower degree of institutionalisation. Twice, the 
US companies were able to avert tough regulations (arguably strongly supported by 
the US administration and producer countries). Diverging business strategies in 
implementing countries also seem to be crucial for the countries becoming involved 
in EITI, as the case of Azerbaijan suggests.
The small advances since Oslo 2006 should not obscure the fact that the 
institutional design remains weak. So far, the LM-Group has exercised only limited 
discursive power. By tracing the negotiations for the institutional design of EITI, this 
chapter placed little emphasis on norm diffusion by either learning or adaptation.
155 Shortly after the validation process was endorsed EITI was actually hesitant to drop participants 
from the list. For some time, a new status (Indeterminant), in addition to Candidate and Compliant, 
was created so as to give countries more time to reach Candidate status. Some months later, the 
Indeterminate status was dropped again. See http://eitransparency.org/newsletter/december2007 and 
http://eitransparency.org/implementingcountries, both last accessed on 19 September 2008.
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This stems from the failure of the LM-Group to initiate any meaningful norm 
diffusion either with host countries or with resource companies. Whereas in the KP, 
several actors -  such as Israel and the diamond industry -  changed their attitude 
towards a number of issues, in the EITI, no stakeholder did likewise. Those actors 
that were willing to contribute to strong institutionalisation did so because they were 
already sympathetic to the idea. BP and Shell had already focussed on the issue in 
their in-house policies as well as bilaterally with the NGOs. The same applies for 
Nigeria and Azerbaijan, the producer countries that were most active in pushing for a 
stronger institutional design. Other countries did not openly oppose 
institutionalisation, fearing that publicly opposing the fight against corruption would 
be badly received in the international community. However, those countries have 
since remained passive as far as actively endorsing the strengthened institutional 
design is concerned. In contrast to the KP which gave rise to new initiatives in the 
diamond industry sector, the oil industry has so far restricted its involvement to the 
EITI only. The companies have subdued any effort taken by NGOs to broaden the 
debate to encompass issues such as contract transparency.
Two structural factors can explain the failure of political strategy to diffuse 
the norm. First, we have the mismatches in normative structure. Norm entrepreneurs 
focussed on creating a link between the new norm of ‘revenue transparency’ and 
established norms (‘corruption’). They were successful, as hardly any country or 
company dared to reject the EITI. They also attempted to persuade countries by 
outlining economic benefits, but several issues such as normative mismatch with 
regard to the role of civil society, the selective applicability of disclosure 
requirements and reputational disadvantages for EITI participants, decreased the 
initiative’s discursive appeal.
Second, we have the industry structure. The high degree of fragmentation and 
the ever increasing intensity of competition in the oil and gas industry averted any 
possibility of norm diffusion between CSR leaders and laggards. Although the major 
IOCs often cooperate in joint ventures on the field, they remain fierce competitors 
concerned that the other might win a profitable block in the next bidding process. 
While the diamond industry created a new institution to increase its impact on the 
certification scheme, IOCs emphasised different attitudes to the role of companies in 
promoting transparency and details such as reporting templates. Most crucially 
however, the current changes in the industry structure empowered players that did
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not value transparency and good governance. Normative and cultural differences 
about those values are therefore important for understanding the case. With a greater 
number of oil companies operating in the field and resource nationalism decreasing 
access, competition has reached highly sensitive levels. IOCs are willing to pay a 
high price for the concessions but have lost the ability to dictate the terms. Given the 
increasing power of Asian NOCs, IOCs do not dare be overly critical of the host 
countries’ interior affairs. The same applies to their home governments, which are 
more than ever concerned about secure supplies. In the short run, it seems unlikely 
that developed countries will jeopardise their relationship with producer countries in 
order to push for a strong regime fighting revenue transparency.
Was political strategy an option to mitigate the impact of the structural 
factors? Being able to frame EITI in such a way that it could link to the wider anti- 
corruption discourse was crucial to get the initiative off the ground in the first place. 
Later, however, the agents contributed to the failure of norm diffusion to the extent 
that Western countries did not want to implement EITI like resource-rich countries 
did. With respect to inciting learning or adaptation processes, the LM-Group was 
however constrained by the specific set-up of the POS. Hence, in summary, this case 
is excellent for studying the failure of norm diffusion due to case-specific POS.
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C h a p t e r  8
The Institutional Design of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives: 
Conclusions and Implications
This research project set out to account for the variance in the institutional design of 
two MSIs in the extractive industries. I advanced a distinctive approach for 
accounting for the research puzzle by looking at the complex relationship between 
institutional design, norm diffusion and POS. By doing this, the thesis broadly 
speaks to two themes in IPE scholarship. First, it advances our understanding of new 
forms of governance by studying the institutional variety of MSIs. Second, we look 
at norm diffusion and POS as explanatory factors to account for institutional design. 
Thus, more generally, by holding a thin rationalist view of how ideas and norms 
matter in international relations, my study contributes to the debate on IR theory as I 
unveil the circumstances in which ideational facts do not make their way through.
I begin this final chapter by summarising the main insights and results of this study. I 
first turn to the dependent variable, institutional design of MSIs. Second, I 
summarise the theoretical framework of the independent and intervening variables 
and evaluate the findings of the empirical cases in light of the theoretical 
propositions. The added value of my distinctive approach becomes even clearer as I 
revisit three alternative explanations. Then, I proceed to show how my findings 
contribute to larger academic debates on the research of new forms of governance in 
IPE and the study of norms in IR theory. Particularly, I push the conclusions of my 
research by calling for more cooperation between rationalist and constructivist 
research. Fourthly, given the several limitations mentioned in Chapter 1 ,1 discuss 
possible directions for further research. I conclude this thesis by discussing the 
challenges arising from this research with regard to the future of CSR in the next 
phase of globalisation.
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8.1 MSIs, Institutional Design and the Future of Global Governance
The two cases examined in this thesis reveal a trend towards more participation 
rights for NSAs in global politics. NGOs and MNCs have long influenced 
international relations through lobbying (Coen 2005), providing technological 
solutions to environmental problems (Falkner 2005b), shaping discourses (Sell and 
Prakash 2004), and setting rules (Pattberg 2004b). Thus, increasingly, NSAs not only 
change the demand side of international politics156 but also fill the supply side by 
proposing how to design these institutions. MSIs acknowledge this role of NSAs in 
global politics as they allocate far-reaching participation rights to them when 
deciding on the design of the institution. As we have been able to see from the two 
case studies, participation does not end there but continues when the institutions 
come into operation. NSAs are involved in monitoring and enforcement and, by 
maintaining public pressure, they contribute to creating the obligation for the 
participants to comply with the requirements.
On the macro-level, the development of these institutions together with other 
forms of governance gives rise to a complex and multi-layered legalization not 
captured by the traditional understanding of international public law. Next to 
traditional intergovernmental public law, hybrid agreements and law-like 
arrangements co-exist. We demonstrated this complex structure by looking at the 
extractive industries in Table 1. This “complex legalization” (Brutsch and Lehmkuhl
2007) has a twofold characterisation. First, we have the fragmentation and 
multiplication of political agency. As we have been able to see, policy fields like the 
extractive industries are governed by a multitude of actors that create international 
institutions with and without the state. Second, with the greater role of NSAs comes 
an increase in consensual soft law. This form of law -  in contrast to hard law -  
allows for the active participation of NSAs in both the creation and implementation 
phases (Reinicke and Witte 2000).
Much has been written to describe and explain these characteristics of global 
governance along with greater participation of NSAs. What has been largely ignored,
156 Examples are not only the case studies o f this thesis but also the Ottawa Convention to Ban 
Landmines and the ICC where NGOs were calling for their creation rather than the states (Cameron 
2002; DeitelhofF2006). Similarly, other forms of regulation such as TRIPS were created due to the 
demand from MNCs (Sell and Prakash 2004).
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however, is that the institutional choice when creating new forms of governance 
differs as much as when creating intergovernmental regimes. However, the more of 
these institutions that are created, the more differences in the institutional features we 
can discern. Although most, if not all, of these initiatives are soft law mechanisms 
and are therefore not legally but only politically binding, we should not judge these 
mechanisms as having ‘no teeth’. Like the cases examined in this thesis, most of the 
so-called voluntary standards undergo an evolution process in which their 
requirements are strengthened. We were able to see this evolution process best in the 
KP, which at the time of its official launch lacked tough monitoring and enforcement 
rules. Nevertheless, as we learned from Chapters 4 and 6, MSIs vary to a great extent 
with regard to their degree of institutionalisation.
What do we learn, though from studying and assessing the differences in the 
institutional design features of MSI? Compliance theory on intergovernmental 
regimes asserted that the institutional setting is crucial for fostering compliance with 
the obligations (Shelton 2000; Chayes and Chayes 1995).157 Hence, although this 
thesis did not focus on compliance, institutional design is crucial for ensuring that the 
institution lives up to its expectations. As we discussed in Chapter 2, monitoring and 
publicly ‘naming and shaming’ can be the most effective ways of providing strong 
deterrents for non-compliance. Soft law has been criticised for lacking the credibility 
and strength of hard law. However, as I argued in this thesis, soft law and strong 
requirements on monitoring and enforcement coupled with a high degree of 
obligations do not contradict each other. As Shelton (2000) contends, sometimes 
actors may be prepared to commit to stronger requirements because of the non­
binding character of the institution.
To be able to assess the institutional design of the two cases, we first looked 
at the two existing theories, the legalization approach (Abbott et al. 2000) and 
rational design (Koremenos et al. 2001). However, as these approaches are not able 
to capture institutional variety within soft law by focussing on the dichotomy 
between hard and soft law, the research question required us to establish our own 
methodology for assessing institutional variance. The approaches of both Abbott et
157 Note that constructivists like Finnemore and Toope (2001: 743) disagree with this. They argue that 
the assessment of the formal characteristics of international institutions ignores the fact that 
legalization depends upon “deeply embedded practice, beliefs and traditions of society”.
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al. (2000) and Koremenos et al.’ (2001), together with the global governance 
literature, provided a good starting point from which to develop such a methodology. 
Four indicators were singled out for the analytical framework. The importance of 
monitoring has just been pointed out. Like monitoring, enforcement is a crucial 
component for strengthening the institution, as it creates disincentives for non- 
compliance. Given that soft law lacks contractual obligation, including obligation as 
an indicator for the degree of institutionalisation might be counter-intuitive. As we 
were able to see from the KP and the EITI, obligation can be created in a different 
way. For MSIs, peer pressure is a crucial component. Finally, we identified 
membership as an indicator for the degree of institutionalisation. As the case study 
on the EITI demonstrated, this indicator is crucial for safeguarding the credibility of 
MSIs. A high degree of membership is the precondition for being able to create 
obligation (through peer pressure) as well as monitoring and enforcement. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, the LM-Group of the EITI was hesitant over whether to 
actually implement its enforcement mechanisms, knowing it was lacking widespread 
support. Membership therefore is the linchpin of the institutionalisation of MSIs.
Figure 11 summarises and compares the institutional design o f the KP and the
1 SftEITI. We can see that both MSIs differ quite substantially in all but one indicator.
Of course, the analysis of to what extent MSIs differ from each other does not push 
knowledge about the potential success of new forms of governance very far. The 
more crucial question deriving from the assessment of institutional design is -  how 
can we account for the variance? The following sub-chapter summarises the findings 
of thesis on its main research question.
158 By the time this research project had started, the discrepancy in the institutional design of the two 
MSIs was even greater as the EITI was still lacking the monitoring provisions. As we noted in 
Chapter 7, the EITI LM-Group is trying to push the MSI towards stronger institutionalisation. 
However, it is questionable whether the EITI will reach the high degree of the KPCS.
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KP ETIT
M embership High Low
- Membership . Global . Restricted
- Application Yes No
procedures
Level o f inclusion - High - Low
Obligation High M oderate
- Type of obligation Performance Performance
based based
- Creation of - Peer pressure - Peer pressure
obligation
- Clarity Yes Yes
- Coherence with _ Yes Yes
other rules
- Technical assistance Yes Yes
- General _ Yes _ No
applicability
- Notion of necessity - Yes - No
M onitoring High High
- Monitoring Yes Yes (since
included October 2006)
- Mandatory or - Voluntary, de- - Mandatory
voluntary facto mandatory
- Who - Second-party - Third-party
- Systematic & • Yes . Yes
continuous
- Publication of . Yes _ Yes
reports
Enforcement High Low
- Type of . Exclusion Exclusion
enforcement
- Consequences - Exclusion from - None
legal trade
- Naming & shaming - Yes, on website - No, only
practices & NGOs NGOs
- IFI mainstreaming - No - No
Overall High Low
Figure 11 Assessing and Comparing the Institutional Designs of the KP and the EITI
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8.2 Political Opportunity Structures and Norm Diffusion in the 
Regulation o f Oil Revenues and the Diamond Trade
This thesis argued for a distinctive approach to accounting for the institutional design 
of the EITI and the KP. Starting with the ontologist assumption of boundedly rational 
actors, I adopted a multi-dimensional framework that focused both on POS and 
agency-centred political strategy to explain the success or failure of the diffusion of 
the new transparency norm. Strong institutionalisation is explained by the confluence 
of favourable POS and norm entrepreneurs who are able to successfully map and 
exploit those circumstances by using political strategies such as framing and 
structural power. In the case of weak institutionalisation, norm opponents were able 
to map and exploit favourable POS.
Why was the development of such an approach necessary? After all, there are 
two mainstream theories that have previously been used to explain the institutional 
design of intergovernmental regimes. Before summarising the main findings of the 
thesis I wish to revisit three alternative explanations: neo-realism, neo-liberal 
institutionalism and the specific product characteristics to explain institutional 
design. By critically reviewing these explanations I can point to the added value of 
my own approach.
8.2.1 Revisiting Alternative Explanations
Neorealism is highly sceptical about the relevance of international institutions to
global politics, and therefore has little to say about their design (Morgenthau 1953;
Waltz 1979). However, some realists consider international institutions as tools for
powerful states to further their influence and self-interest in global politics (e.g. Can-
1946). Pure coercion is costly and not always in the interests of the hegemon. The
creation of international institutions can therefore be explained by the aim of the
hegemon to strengthen its primary role in the international economic system without
having to bear the costs of unilateral action. To what extent can this approach be
used to explain the institutional design of the KP and the EITI? Without doubt, the
US is the most powerful actor in the international system, but would it be interested
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in regulating diamond trade or setting rules for revenue disclosure in resource-rich 
countries? As for the latter, the US does actually have an interest. It is not only home 
to many big IOCs but it also has the world’s biggest demand for oil imports. 
Satisfying this demand is crucial for the US to ensure economic growth and maintain 
its military leadership. Although roughly 35 percent of American oil imports stem 
from the Middle East and Latin America, the US is very interested in oil from Africa 
and the Caspian Sea Region, in order for it to diversify its imports.159 American IOCs 
especially have in the past made huge bids and invested vast amounts in oil 
exploration infrastructure in both regions. The nature of the petro-states with their 
great likelihood for conflict is therefore a danger to US commercial interests.
Creating international institutions that contribute to stabilising the political and 
economic climate in Africa and the Caspian Sea Region should therefore be of 
interest to the US. According to this, we can conclude that the US actually should 
have contributed to a strong institutionalisation of the EITI. With regard to the KP, 
although the US jewellery market is the biggest in the world, it does not contribute 
significantly to the GDP of the US economy (Even-Zohar 2002). Having no stake in 
the upstream diamond industry, a strong KPCS does not further any US interests. 
Overall, using the power-based approach would actually explain a different outcome, 
a strong EITI and a weak KP.160 Overall, neorealism as a structural theory does not 
attempt to make explicit predictions of specific cases (Waltz 1986). The same can be 
said about the Neo-Gramscian approach, which we discarded as a possible 
theoretical account in Chapter 1.
Neo-liberal institutionalism starts from the assumption that rational actors 
strive to create institutions as cooperation maximises their own benefits. Therefore, 
actors want to design the institution in such a way that it deals most effectively with 
the policy problem. The institutional design should therefore be similar according to 
the issue at stake. Collaboration problems, for instance, are created as the incentive 
for free-riding and cheating prevents cooperation. When designing institutions that 
tackle collaboration problems, actors therefore aim at formalising the institutions to
159 In contrast, the US imports an estimated 14 percent of its oil supply from West Africa and 3.4 
percent from the former USSR. The percentages are based on the data given at the BP Statistical 
Review 2008 (BP 2008). Data from inter-area movements is taken from 2007.
160 As explained in Chapter 7, for the US, the stabilisation o f both regions is important, so it actually 
does not want to rely on multilateral cooperation but rather on their military policies.
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prevent cheating. We should therefore have a closer look at the case study design and 
the policy issue concerned. The two cases were intentionally chosen to control for 
the policy issue. Both institutions address the ‘resource curse’ by aiming at 
mitigating the potential for conflict in resource-rich developing countries. Arguably, 
it was ultimately the actors in the countries concerned who were responsible for the 
conflicts. In the case of diamonds, rebels used the precious stones to fund their battle 
against the governments in civil wars which were started not because of diamonds 
but for other political reasons, long before the rebels discovered the gems as a 
financial resource. With regard to oil, corrupt elites seek to misappropriate revenues 
for their own enrichment rather than using them for the economic development of 
their country. Nevertheless, the extractive industries have to bear a share of 
responsibility as the way in which they operate enables conflict agents in the 
countries to misappropriate the resources. The underlying problem of both cases was 
industry opacity, which served as an enabling factor for conflict. So as to curtail this 
opacity, both initiatives aim to make industry operations more transparent. The 
KPCS concentrates on tracking to the origin of the goods entering the legal trade. 
Moreover, for the first time in the history of the diamonds trade, producer and 
consumer countries now publish and monitor trade statistics to prevent smuggling. 
The EITI focuses on the revenue side in the trade in natural resources by requiring 
both host governments and companies to publish what they pay or receive. In 
implementing countries, civil society groups are able for the first time to hold their 
governments to account over how they use the oil revenues. Although both initiatives 
differ in the substantive content of their regulation, central to both is a collaboration 
problem. If all companies and countries do not participate in the initiatives, free­
riders may gain immensely from cheating. We should expect that rational, efficiency- 
seeking actors create the two institutions alike with respect to the indicators, so as to 
prevent cheating and free-riding. Given the different outcomes we can therefore 
conclude that neo-liberal institutionalism fails to account for the outcome.
The last alternative explanation I want to discuss concerns product
characteristics as an industry opportunity structure. We have already alluded to this
several times. Despite important similarities, there have been noticeable differences
since the beginning of the institutionalisation process of the KP and the EITI. Most
strikingly, the initiatives deal with products whose characteristics could not differ
more. Oil is the most crucial single commodity that sustains the global economy. In
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contrast, notwithstanding the important contribution of the diamond industry to the 
economy of the producing countries, the stones are -  economically speaking -  not 
important for the world economy. The value o f diamonds is constructed by the 
notion of scarcity and their reputation as tokens for enduring love. Given this very 
important difference should we not expect this to be the explanation for the variation 
of the institutional design of the KP and the EITI? The difference in the product 
characteristics might provide an industry opportunity structure, empowering or 
disempowering civil society. As the diamond industry’s profits depend on the 
untainted reputation of their products and diamonds are not vital goods for daily 
industrial and personal life, organising a boycott would have been easy. Other 
campaigns against luxury products, such as fur, could already demonstrate this. By 
framing the stones as conflict diamonds, the epistemic community targeted the 
weakest spot in the industry. It is therefore conceivable that the diamond industry 
agreed to strong institutionalisation to protect its revenues. According to such an 
interpretation, the oil industry could not be put under pressure as it deals with a 
commodity without which we cannot carry out our daily lives. Lovers might stop 
considering a diamond ring as a romantic present confronted with media coverage of 
bloody civil wars in Africa, but would consumers really stop buying petrol because 
PSAs enable the misappropriation of oil revenues in resource-rich countries? Using 
its structural power, the oil industry was able to constrain strong institutionalisation.
The empirical evidence clearly does not support such an interpretation as both 
industries reacted very quickly to the pressure campaigns. The Conflict Diamonds 
Campaign started near the end of 1998 and De Beers began to take a proactive stance 
in March 2000. Two months later the stakeholders met for the first time in 
Kimberley. Given that oil is a strategic commodity, we would expect the oil industry 
to take longer to react to activist pressure. Global Witness wrote its first report on 
revenue transparency in 1999. Already by 2001, the NGO had won BP as a supporter 
which subsequently disclosed payments to the Angolan government for oil 
concessions (Gary and Karl 2003). The PWYP campaign was officially launched in 
June 2002 and already by March 2003 the stakeholders had met for the first EITI 
meeting in London. Notwithstanding the differences in product characteristics, both 
industries reacted quite quickly in light of the emerging civil societal criticism. That 
the diamond industry was more vulnerable than the oil industry cannot be confirmed.
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Therefore, product differences were not as important as it might seem at first glance. 
The above alternative explanation clearly overestimates the power of the oil industry 
vis-a-vis civil society pressure by lumping together different companies with varying 
ownership structures. The neo-pluralist conception of business coupled with an 
analysis of the consumer-producer relations introduced in Chapter 3 helps to explain 
the times when companies are vulnerable to civil society activism. The more 
companies invest in branding and have contacts with consumers, the more they can 
be pressured by them. This explains why vertically integrated oil companies like BP 
and Shell have already been successfully targeted by NGOs in the past. Shell 
especially provides a very good example for this. The company had to review its 
practices in light of consumer pressure. Reiterating the example of Shell planning to 
dump Brent Spar into the North Sea, Greenpeace Germany called for a boycott of 
Shell service stations. Consequently, the company’s sales dropped by a remarkable 
30 percent and Shell introduced a new policy on sustainability (Neale 1997).161
From the above discussion, we can conclude that alternative explanations cannot 
deepen our understanding of the two.
8.2.2 Summary of the Findings
The inability of the mainstream IR theories to explain the outcome justifies the need 
for a more refined theoretical account. The approach as outlined at the beginning of 
this sub-chapter has two advantages. First, by choosing the distinctive POS, it takes 
both power and normative diversity of the social world into account. Just how crucial 
a normative account is for explaining the outcome is demonstrated by the third 
alternative explanation -  trying to explain the outcome by looking at product 
characteristics. As we have noted, the explanation underestimates the importance of 
the normative framework in which MNCs -  even IOCs -  are embedded. Moreover, 
the failure of neo-liberal institutionalism points to the need to integrate power and 
norms as either a structural driver or constraint for strong institutionalisation. The 
explanatory power of neo-liberal institutionalism is limited as the focus on
161 Criticism o f Shell’s behaviour in Nigeria would be another example o f the dependence of IOCs on 
consumer perceptions.
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bargaining and the quest for efficiency of international institutions gives a very 
incomplete picture of the complex linkages of power and norms that shape the 
creation of institutions in international politics. However, as the failure of the power- 
based approach shows, international institutions are also not just a “direct 
manifestation of the actual relations of social power” (Hurrell 2000: 345). My 
approach puts a corrective to the oversimplistic assumptions of neo-realism and neo- 
liberal institutionalism. Second, by combining two levels of analysis, structure and 
agency, the approach acknowledges the complexity of the social world. This is 
especially important when examining the negotiations of MSIs, as they involve a 
broad range of stakeholders from a vast variety of normative, institutional and 
political backgrounds. Overall, the focus on POS is important as it explains the 
success and failure of the norm entrepreneurs in diffusing the new transparency 
norm. We have already noted that the policy issue is similar in both cases, but what 
makes the two cases even more intriguing for comparison is that the main norm 
entrepreneurs and their political strategies were similar at the beginning of the 
initiatives.
The remainder of this section revisits the institutionalisation process of the KP and 
the EITI by comparing to what extent POS served as drivers or constraints on the 
political strategy of the norm entrepreneurs to diffuse the transparency norm.
Let us begin by reviewing the similarities in the first phase of 
institutionalisation in both cases. At the end of the 1990s, the epistemic community, 
consisting primarily of NGOs and academics, was formed after Global Witness had 
begun to research the connection between diamonds and war in Angola (Global 
Witness 1998). In 2002, the same epistemic community formed the basis for the 
PWYP campaign. Having been very successful in putting conflict diamonds on the 
international agenda, the epistemic community used the same strategy to lobby for 
international support on revenue transparency. Thus, the beginning of both 
campaigns is characterised by the identification of MNCs as the most potent drivers 
for change and by the use of successful framing strategies to get these actors 
involved. Being able to re-frame the policy issues and link them to already- 
established normative frameworks, human security in the case of conflict diamonds 
and anti-corruption in revenue transparency, was especially important in putting both 
issues on the international agenda very swiftly. Being able to shape the discourse, the
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epistemic community clearly dominated the agenda in the very early phase of 
institutionalisation in both cases. The discursive power of NGOs was from the very 
beginning clearly boosted by their creation of a demand for a new institution and 
their proposing how the new institution should look like. Framing as a political 
strategy was crucial in obtaining the support of key like-minded governments. In 
both cases, the UK in particular stands out as a key supporter for strong 
institutionalisation. We discussed normative match as the reason behind the UK 
becoming involved. With regard to the KP, Canada as a crucial norm entrepreneur 
further strengthens the need for an explanation based on the normative match. By the 
time the KPCS became institutionalised, Canada had emerged as an important 
diamond producer. Having always been conflict free, Canada would have had a 
material interest in not supporting the KP. The issue of conflict diamonds would 
have given Canada a competitive edge, enabling it to market its diamonds as a 
unique Canadian conflict-free brand. For Canada, this would have entailed the 
specific benefit of being able to make up for a competitive disadvantage, as African 
diamonds are considered to be of higher quality.162
Despite these important similarities, both cases differ from early on in respect 
to how the MNCs reacted to being the focal point of the pressure campaigns. The 
diamond industry was largely inexperienced in dealing with such public pressure and 
needed some time to become proactive. In this case, we can see that changes in the 
industry structure were crucial for the success of the NGO campaign rather than the 
activists’ political strategy. The confluence of the outside pressure with the historical 
changes in the industry structure is more important for accounting for the proactive 
strategy of the diamond industry. De Beers, in particular, recognised early on the 
potential benefits deriving from the regulation of the diamond trade for its own 
change in business strategy, and began to drive industrial collective action. This was 
far from being easy, as the power of De Beers was already on the wane at the time.
In the end, De Beers was able to create a momentum for collective action by 
transferring its influence on the future certification scheme to a newly created 
industry body, the WDC.
162 Angolan diamonds particularly are regarded as being the highest quality in the market (Even-Zohar 
2002).
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The response of the oil industry to PWYP was very different. As the analysis of the 
company literature prior to the campaign revealed, uncertainty on the specific 
problem was not an issue for the IOCs. Revenue transparency already featured in 
their company reports outlining their specific policies. We discerned a rift regarding 
the IOC positions on the issue, which was in line with the overall CSR attitudes. The 
rift, specifically between the US and Anglo-Dutch firms, had arisen because of the 
firms’ diverging positions on appropriate behaviour in host countries. Whereas BP 
and Shell had adopted a much more proactive policy largely because they had 
previously been the focus of pressure campaigns, the US IOCs preferred to retreat 
from a politicised role in order to prevent any public criticism in the first place.
Given the different attitudes on this and other CSR issues, coupled with a high level 
of competition in the field, the IOCs saw no need to engage in collective action. Both 
groups of companies considered their stance as giving them a competitive advantage 
over the other group.
We noted in Chapter 1 that uncertainty is crucial for successful norm 
diffusion by serving as a road map when redefining preferences (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993). Uncertainty was the driver for norm diffusion in the case of the 
diamond industry. We pointed out the great shift the diamond industry underwent 
between 2000 and 2003 by finally acknowledging that it had to bear a share of 
responsibility for conflict diamonds. This change of position was partially induced 
by NGO framing and partially driven by the industry’s uncertainty. It was a crucial 
driver for the institutionalisation of the KP as the support of the diamond industry on 
issues such as monitoring and enforcement shifted the power balance in favour of the 
LM-Group. In contrast, the IOCs already had their policies formulated with respect 
to revenue transparency, which made norm diffusion much more difficult. In the end, 
the IOCs did not change their position on the issue.
Despite these differences, we can discern further commonalities with respect 
to NSA strategies to impact the institutional design during the negotiations for the 
KP and the EITL We noted that in both cases the NGOs were dominating the agenda 
at the beginning of the pressure campaigns. During the negotiations, however, the 
discursive power of the NGOs decreased whereas the MNCs could increase their 
clout. In comparing the two cases we can recognise a cyclical pattern o f who impacts 
and when. The NGOs clearly have an advantage when it comes to agenda-setting and
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raising awareness. This is not a new finding, as the literature on world civic 
governance has pointed to this before (e.g. Wapner 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
With further institutionalisation of the initiatives came a greater demand for 
technological expertise to shape the details of the regulation. In both cases, NGOs 
and MNCs competed in shaping the technical details of the institutions, trying to 
convince each other and the states that their own interpretation was the ‘better’ one. 
However, the greater demand for technological expertise empowered MNCs to shape 
institutional design. This finding on political strategy broadens our understanding 
about the roles of NSAs in the institutionalisation process of MSIs in two ways. First, 
the finding confirms a conjecture made in Chapter 3 that norm diffusion is multi­
dimensional. Rather than being just a social mechanism for norm entrepreneurs to 
impact politics, norm diffusion should be conceptualised as a contest between norm 
entrepreneurs and opponents over discourse domination. Both use norms to justify 
their policy preferences as there is no norm-free space. The finding therefore speaks 
to neo-pluralists who consider business not in terms of its domination, but as being 
privileged in certain situations because of its technological expertise. Second, on a 
more theoretical level, this finding demonstrates that ideas can only be diffused 
under certain enabling circumstances. The MNCs were only able to increase their 
discursive power because their ideas were needed by the state elites. We return to 
this in the following sub-chapter. Arguably, the political strategy of increasing 
MNCs’ discursive power was also important as the case of the diamond industry 
shows. In this case, the corporate actors were very inexperienced in international 
political negotiations, so they had to learn when and how to seize the moment to 
maximise their impact. Overall, this already points to the main finding of the thesis -  
the dependence of ideas on enabling circumstances.
With regard to states targets of norm diffusion, in the cases we can find both 
norm opponents and countries supportive of transparency. The KP was backed by 
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana largely due to their material interests, fearing 
that the Campaign could lead to a global consumer boycott of diamonds. The EITI 
could acquire support especially from Azerbaijan and Nigeria, which also wanted to 
benefit economically from more revenue disclosure. Here, material interests coupled 
with a normative match with regard to the fight against corruption can account for 
their backing EITI. In particular, Nigeria could serve as an example where the EITI 
served as an opportunity for President Obasanjo to strengthen an advantageous
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relationship with donor countries and agencies as well as to foster his own fight 
against corruption by implementing EITI.
Notwithstanding the support the LM-Group received both in the KP and the 
EUI, the institutionalisation processes were seriously constrained by norm 
opponents. In both cases, norm opposition can be explained by the differences in the 
normative frameworks. The KP and the EITI capture a great variety of actors with 
very different normative and historical backgrounds. While transparency is an 
established norm in Western countries, many African and Asian countries do not 
value it as much. However, given that powerful donor countries and agencies 
embraced transparency and good governance, the norm opponents had to find other 
ways to legitimise their opposition. As the framing strategies of the LM-Group 
failed, norm opponents also used this strategy by framing natural resources as 
strategic commodities. It proved to be an ideal strategy for containing overambitious 
transparency requirements. Next to framing and inciting learning processes, we 
identified another political strategy for diffusing the norm, exerting structural power. 
Whether this political strategy succeeded, however, depended ultimately on the 
specific set-up of the industry structure providing either entry points or constraints on 
norm diffusion.
As we noted, both industries experienced structural changes that started just 
before the two initiatives were created. While in the two cases the changes were the 
same (formerly powerful agents lose influence in the market), it is the effects of 
those changes on the market dynamics at the particular point of institutionalisation 
that differ -  and ultimately explain the outcome. When the KP was created, De 
Beers’ power to determine industry action was in decline. A number of former De 
Beers clients had lost the trust that the Group would further the collective interest of 
the industry and was not only acting in self-interest. However, in contrast to the oil 
industry, by the time the KPCS was negotiated, De Beers was not seriously 
confronted by industry challengers. Canada became the world’s third largest 
diamond producer by value in 2003. Given its positive contribution to the 
institutionalisation of the KPCS, the emergence of Canada as a major player in the 
industry did not actually endanger strong institutionalisation. The historical structural 
changes in the diamond industry that preceded De Beers’ decline in power provided 
opportunities for the group to turn conflict diamonds into an advantage. In contrast,
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the change of the industry structure in the oil sector had a profound effect on the 
power distribution and established normative frameworks. Ultimately, that change 
affected the degree of institutionalisation of the EITL As we noted in Chapters 6 and 
7, the oil industry has been dominated by increasing competition through a rising 
demand for access to the resources by new industrial players (globalising Asian 
NOCs) and growing consumer demand. Among other reasons, this has led to a rising 
oil price which has reinvigorated resource nationalism in Russia and Latin American 
countries, further decreasing access to E&P assets for IOCs. The rising competition 
coupled with higher oil prices empowers host governments vis-a-vis the IOCs. The 
majority of resource-rich countries oppose greater revenue transparency, as they fear 
competitive disadvantages when negotiating PSAs with companies. Moreover, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that some host governments oppose EITI as it closes 
the potential for enrichment of the political elites. With regard to not like-minded 
IOCs, we already discussed their opposition in respect to the normative mismatch. 
More importantly, the development in the oil market provided them with the political 
opportunity to legitimise their opposition to more transparency. They feared that 
more requirements for transparency would raise the benefits for those actors that 
remain outside the EITI, in particular the globalising Asian NOCs.
With regard to opposing governments in the KP, the more favourable industry 
structure enabled the LM-Group to exert discursive and instrumental power by 
marginalising norm opponents and inciting adaptation processes. Neither the 
diamond industry nor the producer countries could exploit structural opportunities to 
legitimise their opposition. Even more so, 11 September 2001 served as a political 
opportunity for the LM-Group -  not so much because the US considered conflict 
diamonds funding Al-Qaeda as a real threat to its homeland security -  but because 
the notion of ‘terrorist diamonds’ brought the terror home to the consumers, affecting 
the industry.
The political strategies of framing and marginalisation could have been 
successful in the oil industry too -  if only the industry structure had been more 
favourable. In Chapter 7, we compared the current industry with that in the 1990s, 
where oil prices were considerably lower and resource-rich countries were in need of 
FDIs to produce the oil. Given that Chinese NOCs did not provide an outside option, 
the governments of Chad and Cameroon depended on the Western donor community.
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This is the reason why the World Bank was able to successfully create the Chad- 
Cameroon Pipeline Project, a regionally limited revenue transparency regime.
We can therefore conclude that the empirical evidence confirms the thesis that 
the degree of institutionalisation is determined by the confluence of political strategy 
and POS. Could we make the argument that it was simply the variance of structural 
factors, thereby ignoring the agency part? The answer to this has to be no, as I 
demonstrated in the KP case that structure was an enabling factor, but strategy was 
crucial for achieving specific institutional design features. Particularly, the strategy 
to force adaptation through structural power after the launch of the KPCS shows 
deliberate intention on the part of the LM-Group to strengthen the institutional 
design. In contrast, the analysis of the EITI focused on unfavourable POS which put 
constraints on the ability of the LM-Group to diffuse the norm and gave norm 
opponents more leverage to oppose strong institutionalisation.
8.3 Implications for the Findings for Debates in IPE
The cases point to the importance of further study regarding the institutionalisation 
of new forms of governance and the role of norms in IR. In this thesis, we looked at 
two very specific institutions in the extractive industry. Nevertheless, the findings 
allow us to draw some general conclusions, thus contributing to the current debates 
in IPE and IR theory. I concentrate on three themes which have been crucial in my 
thesis.
First, the thesis advances our understanding of the institutional variety of new
forms of governance and thus speaks both to critics and supporters of global
governance. With the multiplicity of new institutions, global governance as such
changes its character by giving rise to a complex and multilayered legalization
(Briitsch and Lehmkuhl 2007). However, in contrast to traditional intergovernmental
governance, political agency is fragmented. Furthermore, with global governance,
consensual forms of law, such as soft law, become more prominent. The features of
the “complex sovereignty” (Pauly and Grande 2005) have already been well-
researched. Yet, both scholars and practitioners have only scant knowledge of the
conditions for success for international institutions -  particularly in the realm of new
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forms of governance. Sceptics of global governance have repeatedly criticised new 
forms of governance as ineffective since they lack the legally binding elements of 
hard law. I challenged this view by assessing the institutional design of two MSIs. 
Based on the analytical framework I developed from existing institutional design 
theories and the global governance literature, I demonstrated that new forms of 
governance exist in great institutional variety, ranging from weakly to very strongly 
institutionalised initiatives. In doing so, the thesis contributed to a better theoretical 
understanding of new forms of governance. Soft law agreements are not per se weak 
regulatory institutions. Rather, it depends on the specific institutional set up of the 
requirements. Thus, global governance is able to produce ‘institutions with teeth’ 
even if it is confined to the soft law approach. In summary, my findings reveal the 
need for further research. While much energy in IPE has been spent on describing 
new forms of governance and accounting for why they emerge, we now need to 
move on, explaining why some of the institutions were able to generate strong 
institutional designs whereas others were not. While my thesis contributes to that 
new endeavour, we now have to broaden the empirical focus by conducting more 
comparative case studies. We need to reveal institutional diversity of new forms of 
governance, looking at which institutional design features are sector-specific and 
which are more universal.
Considering the growing role of NSAs in global politics, to what extent does 
that mean that the state is in “retreat” (Strange 1996)? As I argued in Chapter 2, the 
emergence of NSAs reconfigures -  but does not diminish -  state power and 
authority. Compared to other new forms of governance such as industrial self- 
regulation and private-private partnerships, MSIs actually recapture state power. As 
we were able to see from the case studies, states were crucial for the 
institutionalisation of the KP and the EITI. In both cases, NSAs first tried to find a 
solution for themselves. It is at these he EITI is most instructive on, as Global 
Witness and BP worked towards voluntary disclosure of IOCs as a global standard. 
Yet, given the policy issue and not least the role of producer states, private 
governance was not an option. Natural resources are more than any other product 
subject to state sovereignty by international law. It is therefore not surprising that 
producer countries defended their right to have a say in setting up regulations. 
Overall, the case studies demonstrated that although states failed to produce an
intergovernmental hard law agreement, they must still be part of the solution. Private 
governance has as yet failed to produce reliable solutions. Many CSR initiatives lack 
appropriate compliance and enforcement mechanisms. MSIs are a third way between 
public and private governance. Their advantages are manifold. They integrate the 
structural power of MNCs and the discursive power of NGOs. States are able retain 
their regulatory power, but in a different way. They are no longer the sole actors 
negotiating rules, but they are cmcial as they ensure legitimacy and the institutional 
setting. Ultimately, states are able to retain their power and authority since they 
decide which NSA joins the initiative and how much autonomy the actor should 
have. It is in this regard that states still retain control over global governance (for a 
different view see Drezner 2007a).
Last but not least, this thesis contributes to the debate on IR theory by
criticising mainstream theories as being too simplistic to account for the institutional
variance of MSIs. On a more general level, by looking at the issue of institutional
design the study also contributed to research on the role of ideas and norms in IR.
Reviewing mainstream IR theories, we criticised neorealism for overestimating
power as a direct manifestation of social control in international relations. Power
manifests itself in much more subtle ways than direct imposition. Social power
establishes itself in the hegemonic discourses and social norms that govern
international institutions. With its emphasis on coercion and imposition, neorealism
lacks the analytical tools to understand that social component of political power. To
solve these issues, neo-liberal institutionalism overestimates the human capacity to
fully understand complex issues and the consequences of their actions. Actors might
seek to design institutions in an effective way, but what they consider as effective
depends on their adopted normative frameworks with which they interpret the policy
issue and for which they seek solutions. The concept of bounded rationality -
according to which actors do not dispose of complete knowledge and the time to
evaluate all options when designing institutions -  makes our framework much more
grounded in the reality of daily political and social life. The case studies emphasised
that the uncertainty as to how to best design MSIs was very high. Looking at other
examples, such as the global climate regime or the attempt to regulate novel
technologies such as nanotechnology, actors always have to make decisions about
institutional design features without being able to fully assess their consequences.
Moreover, the institutional choice also depends on their position in the international
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system. Powerful actors have more choices at hand than weaker ones. Considering 
these criticisms, constructivism might be the solution. However, when looking at this 
approach we noted that it falls short of delivering the evidence for its assumptions. 
For instance, the landmark study on socialisation by Risse et al. (1999) could not 
provide evidence for norm adoption and internalisation without acknowledging that a 
power shift ultimately accounted for the establishment of human rights as accepted 
norms. To give another example, Deitelhoff and Muller (2005) recently conceded 
that they failed to find evidence for the empirical distinction between constructivist 
arguing and instrumentalist bargaining. Both appeared simultaneously in 
international negotiations.
Given the methodological issues, I discarded a pure constructivist framework 
for this thesis. That ideas and norms matter in international relations remains 
uncontested. In light of the constructivist pitfalls and methodological issues, I chose 
to contribute to the thin rationalist understanding of how norms and ideas matter. I 
advanced a very distinct understanding of norm diffusion by looking at POS either 
driving or constraining norms. Thus, on a fundamental level, I argued that ideas can 
have diverging impacts in different structural settings. The case studies have shown 
that ideas sometimes do not make their way through as they can become constrained 
both by material and normative factors. As Ikenberry (1993) pointed out, many good 
ideas will never become accepted as norms of international society, while many bad 
norms have been around for a long time. The thesis therefore confirms and 
contributes to existing thin rationalist research arguing that “ideas and normative 
frames cannot be examined without specifying whose interests they serve” (Sell and 
Prakash 2004: 168; see also Ikenberry 1993). In this respect, ideas are very fragile. 
The case studies could show that norm entrepreneurs create policy crises themselves, 
in which norm opponents are uncertain about their behavioural options. It is in these 
crucial turning points that the practical value of new ideas at that particular point of 
time causes ideas to become sufficiently powerful so as to become accepted in the 
normative framework. Actors, however, whether they are stakeholders of MSIs or 
states in intergovernmental negotiations, come from very different normative and 
historical backgrounds. By conceptualising normative frameworks and power 
relations in the specific market as POS, my approach acknowledges the complexity 
of the social world. Norm entrepreneurs also have to take into account that different 
strategies of diffusing norms might work with different actors. Therefore, when
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looking at the agency side of the framework, we could see that structural power was 
also a crucial strategy. Powerful actors are able to subtly impose new ideas by 
institutionalising them as norms in institutions, therefore forcing weaker actors to 
adapt to the new political environment. Yet, in cases of unfavourable POS or inept 
norm entrepreneurs, ideas will forever remain as just ideas.
Overall, my argument calls for more cooperation of rationalist and 
constructivist informed research. A thin rationalist understanding holds that accepted 
norms are the ideas of those in power, but the constructivist informed concept of 
framing as a political strategy is crucial for understanding how new ideas become 
accepted as norms. Framing is a form of discursive power that exploits the link with 
existing normative frameworks. Agents are therefore crucial in the analysis as they 
can let those opportunities pass unless the appropriate strategy is used. 
Constructivism is right in arguing that international society is not a norm-free space. 
The case studies pointed to norm opponents who use the same strategies as norm 
entrepreneurs to further their own policy preferences. They do so by framing 
established norms, thus making them more resilient to normative change. In 
conclusion, norm diffusion is a contest between new ideas and established normative 
frameworks.
8.4 Outlook: Further Directions for Research
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the study was constrained by a number o f limitations. 
This was important for maintaining the analytical focus and elaborating a 
parsimonious theoretical account. However, both the insights and limitations of this 
study suggest promising avenues for further research.
The first concerns the analytical framework to assess the institutional design 
of MSIs. As I established in the thesis, MSIs exist in a great institutional variety 
ranging from weakly to strongly institutionalised initiatives. Since the study 
concentrated on one industry sector, the question arises whether in some sectors low 
institutionalisation occurs more often than in others. For instance, in the financial 
sector both the Wolfsberg Principles and the Equator Principles are only weakly 
institutionalised whereas in the apparel industry very elaborate certification schemes 
have evolved since the late 1990s (Social Accountability International, Fair Labor
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Association and the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production) (Meidinger 2007). 
The question therefore arises whether commonalities and differences in the industry 
sectors provide structural opportunities for weak or strong institutionalisation.
Secondly, moving on to the theory for accounting for the institutional design 
of MSIs, I argued in Chapter 1 that my framework would not be a definite conclusion 
on the validity of my hypotheses. The research was only based on a small-n case 
study design so the aim was to develop a first step towards an institutional design 
theory on new modes of governance. In order to test and refine the conjectures made 
in the above, the focus needs to be extended to a broader selection o f cases. Again, 
combining several cases from different industry sectors, for instance, the sustainable 
logging and fisheries, would present a promising step towards testing and refining 
my theoretical approach.
Finally, with regard to the emergence and diffusion of new ideas, the study 
has mostly concentrated at the international level. However, as Risse-Kappen (1994) 
emphasises, ideas do not float freely at the international level. Often, they emerge in 
a national setting and only later diffuse to the international level. To give a more 
coherent picture of how new ideas successfully emerge (or not), it is important to 
study how the actors at the national and international level interact. One model that 
successfully integrated the two levels is Putnam’s (1988) ‘two-level game’. It seeks 
to organise the interaction between domestic and international factors in negotiations. 
In the case of the EITI, for example, revenue transparency was an issue that had been 
discussed among national policy-makers and NGOs long before it was put on the 
global agenda. Early on, revenue transparency was discussed as a domestic policy 
issue in the context of poverty reduction between the UK Cabinet Office and Global 
Witness. At the time poverty reduction in Africa was one focus of New Labour’s 
foreign policy. It was only when BP and Shell joined the discussions emphasising the 
international competitive constraints of IOCs and Global Witness began to draw in 
US State Department Officials that the UK began to understand the issue as an 
international one. Applying Putnam’s two-level game and analysing in more detail 
the very early phases of norm emergence in the KP and EITI would help us to shed 
more light on how new ideas are successfully created by norm entrepreneurs.
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8.5 W hither CSR in the Next Phase o f Globalisation?
I conclude this thesis with a discussion of the practical implications of the findings 
regarding the challenges and opportunities for CSR in the next phase of 
globalisation.
Governance gaps provide the roots for a “permissive” environment in which MNCs 
can commit harmful acts without being held accountable (UN Human Rights Council
2008). Like the problem, the solution, CSR, is a product of the globalisation of neo­
liberal ideas and the anti-globalisation movement. For states, CSR seems like a 
convenient way of outsourcing costly public regulation. For companies, CSR is a 
way to counter and pre-empt NGOs’ criticism. Hence, in the last decades, numerous 
codes of conduct and private-private partnerships have emerged which were 
supposed to set new standards for corporate behaviour. Only recently, the initiatives 
have become more sophisticated. This subsequent phase, which I would call the 
‘second generation CSR’, moved from codes of conduct and private regimes to the 
quasi-legal arrangements as discussed in this thesis. Chapter 1 referred to John 
Ruggie (2001), who designed the Global Compact as a learning forum without any 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. I was curious whether my research could 
support such a constructivist hypothesis. However, the empirical evidence of the case 
studies demonstrated that learning and the diffusion of ideas is dependent on 
circumstantial factors such as the industry structure or whether there is a demand for 
new ideas. CSR initiatives therefore should not rely solely on ‘soft’ norm diffusion 
like learning. The more sophisticated ‘second generation CSR’, which increasingly 
relies on stricter monitoring and enforcement regimes, is therefore an important 
opportunity for embedding corporate responsibility into the global normative 
framework
However, the greater institutionalisation and sophistication of CSR should not 
conceal the fact that there is still a political struggle over the meaning of corporate 
responsibility. The cases of both diamonds and the oil demonstrate this discursive 
contest between NGOs and business, with each having a different understanding of 
its meaning. Whichever one is more powerful in shaping that discursive struggle will 
be able to dominate the debate in the coming decades. It remains to be seen whether 
the report on the framework for business and human rights written by the Special
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Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (SRSG), John Ruggie 
(UN Human Rights Council 2008) makes an authoritative contribution towards 
filling the concept with more meaning.
There is good and bad news about CSR in the current phase of globalisation. 
Whether or not CSR is successful is still a contested issue (e.g. Frynas 2005; 
Blowfield 2007), but at the most general level we can attest that the social demand 
for more responsibility on behalf of Western consumers guarantees that managers in 
the boardrooms will continue to engage with CSR policies. The greater 
sophistication of international initiatives gives evidence for that increasing social 
demand. Moreover, for many companies, most certainly in the extractive industries, 
CSR has become a tool for political risk management. Given the increasing demand 
for natural resources, companies are forced increasingly to access resources in 
politically sensitive areas. However, more companies are forced to concede that they 
cannot afford to take the risks of operating in inhospitable environments -  a 
development which accounts for allegedly dwindling operations onshore in Nigeria 
(The Economist 2008c).
In this thesis I have drawn attention to a change in the structure of the 
political economy of the 21st century in which Asia re-emerges as a new player. We 
noted that NOCs, not being vertically integrated, are independent from the Western 
social demand regarding CSR. We can generalise this insight by looking at 
developments in other industry sectors. In the financial services sector, for instance, 
the same development takes place where Chinese state-owned banks venture to 
finance projects and companies that Western banks would no longer touch (Newton
2006). As in the extractive industries, Chinese banks thereby undermine newly 
developed standards such as the Equator Principles.
This thesis has argued that CSR initiatives, if cleverly designed, have the 
potential of developing into soft law with teeth, but considering that CSR is still a 
discursive struggle, is the second generation of CSR doomed to falter in light of 
powerful norm opponents such as China, India and Russia? At least when looking at 
the case of EITI, this seems to be a reasonable concern.
Arguably, the emerging multi-polar structure of the political economy
provides a challenge for the future of CSR. Most emerging economies do not have
well funded and well staffed advocacy organisations like Global Witness, who can
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hold their globalising firms to account. Whilst being a danger to the global adoption 
of CSR, a new debate on its added-value can also be exploited as an opportunity. I 
suggest two ways of safeguarding CSR in the next phase of globalisation. First, 
NGOs, Western governments and donor agencies should put more emphasis on the 
business case for CSR rather than on the moral imperative. In the extractive 
industries, conflict-ridden Africa in particular places high demands on the practices 
of the operating MNCs. The more companies from emerging economies choose to 
operate in these regions, the more they will be exposed to the same structural 
constraints and political risks as their Western peers. Already now, Chinese oil 
workers face the same level of violence as Shell employees (Agence France Presse
2007). In the long run, Chinese firms will look for ways to limit political risks to 
their investments.163 Western actors should be prepared to frame CSR as an answer 
to this risk. Second, the strategy of Western advocacy must change. We noted that 
international advocacy networks such as PWYP do not have access to MNCs from 
emerging economies. Shareholder activism, which is already quite successful in the 
Western hemisphere, might prove more successful in targeting at least emerging 
economies’ listed companies. A recent example is provided by activists who forced a 
Western fund to sell most of its US holdings in PetroChina to protest against the 
companies operations in Darfur, Sudan (McGregor 2007). Hence, while the next 
phase of globalisation creates crucial challenges for CSR, it is within our power to 
turn these challenges into opportunities.
163 Another example is the Indian mining industry, which is beginning to consider the concern of local 
communities when planning a new project (Litvin and Kantz 2007).
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Kimberley Process
Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel, US State Department, former Special US 
Negotiator for “Conflict Diamonds”. Chicago on 2 March 2007.
Mark van Bockstael, High Diamond Council, Director/ HRD International 
Affairs & Trade. Antwerp, Telephone Interview on 8 September 2006.
Stephane Chardon, European Commission, Directorate General for External 
Relations. Brussels on 16 May 2007.
Kim Eling, European Commission, Geneva, formerly Directorate General for 
External Relations. Telephone Interview on 3 May 2007.
Cecilia Gardner, Jewelers Vigilance Committee, President and CEO. New York 
on 8 March 2007.
Simon Gilbert, De Beers, External Affairs. London, on 10 August 2006 and 
Follow-up Interview. London on 12 September 2006.
Matt Runci, Jewelers of America, President and CEO. New York on 7 March 
2007.
Sue E. Saamio, US State Department, Special Advisor for Conflict Diamonds. 
Washington D.C. on 6 March 2007.
Ian Smillie, Partnership Africa Canada. Ottawa, Telephone Interview on 12 
September 2006.
Ben Stride, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government Diamond 
Office. London on 2 May 2002.
Ton De Vries, European Commission, Directorate General for External 
Relations. Brussels on 16 May 2007.
Clive Wright, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Embassy Washington. 
D.C. Telephone Interview on 24 July 2006, and Follow-up Interview in 
Washington, D.C. on 6 March 2007.
Alex Yearsley, Global Witness. London on 30 January 2006.
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EITI
Graham Baxter, BP, Vice President for Corporate Responsibility, member of 
IAG and EITI Board. London on 7 June 2007.
Gavin Hayman, Global Witness, member of IAG and EITI Board. London on 13 
September 2006.
Khatira Iskender, BP, former BP Community Relations Manager in Azerbaijan. 
London on 31 July 2007.
John Kelly, ExxonMobil, Coordinator, Upstream Policy Issues, Public Affairs, 
member of EITI Board. Houston, Telephone Interview on 8 August 2007.
Karin Lissakers, Revenue Watch Institute, Director, member of IAG and EITI 
Board. New York, Telephone Interview on 22 July 2007.
Julie McCarthy, Revenue Watch Institute. New York, Telephone Interview, on 
30 May 2007.
Charles McPherson, IMF, formerly World Bank. Washington, D.C. on 6 March 
2007.
Ben Mellor, UK Department for International Development, former Head of EITI 
Secretariat. London, Telephone Interview on 2 February 2007.
Sarah Pray, PWYP Washington, US Coordinator, D.C. Telephone Interview on 3 
July 2007.
Henry Parham, PWYP International Coordinator. London on 23 July 2007.
Hattie Park, Lehman Brothers, Sustainability. London on 27 June 2008.
Anwar Ravat, World Bank. Washington, D.C. on 5 March 2007.
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Appendix 2: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
PREAMBLE
PARTICIPANTS,
RECOGNISING that the trade in conflict diamonds is a matter of serious 
international concern, which can be directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, 
the activities of rebel movements aimed at undermining or overthrowing legitimate 
governments, and the illicit traffic in, and proliferation of, armaments, especially 
small arms and light weapons;
FURTHER RECOGNISING the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade 
in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries 
and the systematic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in 
such conflicts;
NOTING the negative impact of such conflicts on regional stability and the 
obligations placed upon states by the United Nations Charter regarding the 
maintenance of international peace and security;
BEARING IN MIND that urgent international action is imperative to prevent the 
problem of conflict diamonds from negatively affecting the trade in legitimate 
diamonds, which makes a critical contribution to the economies of many of the 
producing, processing, exporting and importing states, especially developing states;
RECALLING all of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, including the relevant provisions of 
Resolutions 1173 (1998), 1295 (2000), 1306 (2000), and 1343 (2001), and 
determined to contribute to and support the implementation of the measures provided 
for in these resolutions;
HIGHLIGHTING the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 (2000) on 
the role of the trade in conflict diamonds in fuelling armed conflict, which called on 
the international community to give urgent and careful consideration to devising 
effective and pragmatic measures to address this problem;
FURTHER HIGHLIGHTING the recommendation in United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 55/56 that the international community develop detailed 
proposals for a simple and workable international certification scheme for rough 
diamonds based primarily on national certification schemes and on internationally 
agreed minimum standards;
RECALLING that the Kimberley Process, which was established to find a solution to 
the international problem of conflict diamonds, was inclusive of concerned stake 
holders, namely producing, exporting and importing states, the diamond industry and 
civil society;
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CONVINCED that the opportunity for conflict diamonds to play a role in fuelling 
armed conflict can be seriously reduced by introducing a certification scheme for 
rough diamonds designed to exclude conflict diamonds from the legitimate trade;
RECALLING that the Kimberley Process considered that an international 
certification scheme for rough diamonds, based on national laws and practices and 
meeting internationally agreed minimum standards, will be the most effective system 
by which the problem of conflict diamonds could be addressed;
ACKNOWLEDGING the important initiatives already taken to address this problem, 
in particular by the governments of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Guinea and Sierra Leone and by other key producing, exporting and importing 
countries, as well as by the diamond industry, in particular by the World Diamond 
Council, and by civil society;
WELCOMING voluntary self-regulation initiatives announced by the diamond 
industry and recognising that a system of such voluntary self-regulation contributes 
to ensuring an effective internal control system of rough diamonds based upon the 
international certification scheme for rough diamonds;
RECOGNISING that an international certification scheme for rough diamonds will 
only be credible if all Participants have established internal systems of control 
designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds in the chain of producing, 
exporting and importing rough diamonds within their own territories, while taking 
into account that differences in production methods and trading practices as well as 
differences in institutional controls thereof may require different approaches to meet 
minimum standards;
FURTHER RECOGNISING that the international certification scheme for rough 
diamonds must be consistent with international law governing international trade;
ACKNOWLEDGING that state sovereignty should be fully respected and the 
principles of equality, mutual benefits and consensus should be adhered to;
RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:
SECTION I 
Definitions
For the purposes of the international certification scheme for rough diamonds 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Certification Scheme”) the following definitions 
apply:
CONFLICT DIAMONDS means rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their 
allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described 
in relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they 
remain in effect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the
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future, and as understood and recognised in United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which may be 
adopted in future;
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN means the country where a shipment of rough diamonds 
has been mined or extracted;
COUNTRY OF PROVENANCE means the last Participant from where a shipment 
of rough diamonds was exported, as recorded on import documentation;
DIAMOND means a natural mineral consisting essentially of pure crystallised 
carbon in the isometric system, with a hardness on the Mohs (scratch) scale of 10, a 
specific gravity of approximately 3.52 and a refractive index of 2.42;
EXPORT means the physical leaving/taking out of any part of the geographical 
territory of a Participant;
EXPORTING AUTHORITY means the authority(ies) or body(ies) designated by a 
Participant from whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is leaving, and which 
are authorised to validate the Kimberley Process Certificate;
FREE TRADE ZONE means a part of the territory of a Participant where any goods 
introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, 
as being outside the customs territory;
IMPORT means the physical entering/bringing into any part of the geographical 
territory of a Participant;
IMPORTING AUTHORITY means the authority(ies) or body(ies) designated by a 
Participant into whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is imported to conduct 
all import formalities and particularly the verification of accompanying Kimberley 
Process Certificates;
KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATE means a forgery resistant document with 
a particular format which identifies a shipment of rough diamonds as being in 
compliance with the requirements of the Certification Scheme;
OBSERVER means a representative of civil society, the diamond industry, 
international organisations and non-participating governments invited to take part in 
Plenary meetings; (Further consultations to be undertaken by the Chair.)
PARCEL means one or more diamonds that are packed together and that are not 
individualised;
PARCEL OF MIXED ORIGIN means a parcel that contains rough diamonds from 
two or more countries of origin, mixed together;
PARTICIPANT means a state or a regional economic integration organisation for 
which the Certification Scheme is effective; (Further consultations to be undertaken 
by the Chair.)
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REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ORGANISATION means an 
organisation comprised of sovereign states that have transferred competence to that 
organisation in respect of matters governed by the Certification Scheme;
ROUGH DIAMONDS means diamonds that are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved 
or bruted and fall under the Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and 
Coding System 7102.10, 7102.21 and 7102.31;
SHIPMENT means one or more parcels that are physically imported or exported;
TRANSIT means the physical passage across the territory of a Participant or a non- 
Participant, with or without transhipment, warehousing or change in mode of 
transport, when such passage is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and 
terminating beyond the frontier of the Participant or non-Participant across whose 
territory a shipment passes;
SECTION II 
The Kimberley Process Certificate
Each Participant should ensure that:
(a) a Kimberley Process Certificate (hereafter referred to as the Certificate) 
accompanies each shipment of rough diamonds on export;
(b) its processes for issuing Certificates meet the minimum standards of the 
Kimberley Process as set out in Section IV;
(c) Certificates meet the minimum requirements set out in Annex I. As long as these 
requirements are met, Participants may at their discretion establish additional 
characteristics for their own Certificates, for example their form, additional data or 
security elements;
(d) it notifies all other Participants through the Chair of the features of its Certificate 
as specified in Annex I, for purposes of validation.
SECTION III 
Undertakings in respect o f the international trade in rough diamonds
Each Participant should:
(a) with regard to shipments of rough diamonds exported to a Participant, require that 
each such shipment is accompanied by a duly validated Certificate;
(b) with regard to shipments of rough diamonds imported from a Participant:
• require a duly validated Certificate;
• ensure that confirmation of receipt is sent expeditiously to the relevant 
Exporting Authority. The confirmation should as a minimum refer to the
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Certificate number, the number of parcels, the carat weight and the details of 
the importer and exporter;
• require that the original of the Certificate be readily accessible for a period of 
no less than three years;
(c) ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a 
non-Participant;
(d) recognise that Participants through whose territory shipments transit are not 
required to meet the requirement of paragraphs (a) and (b) above, and of Section II 
(a) provided that the designated authorities of the Participant through whose territory 
a shipment passes, ensure that the shipment leaves its territory in an identical state as 
it entered its territory (i.e. unopened and not tampered with).
SECTION IV 
Internal Controls
Undertakings by Participants
Each Participant should:
(a) establish a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of 
conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into and exported 
from its territory;
(b) designate an Importing and an Exporting Authority(ies);
(c) ensure that rough diamonds are imported and exported in tamper resistant 
containers;
(d) as required, amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and 
enforce the Certification Scheme and to maintain dissuasive and proportional 
penalties for transgressions;
(e) collect and maintain relevant official production, import and export data, and 
collate and exchange such data in accordance with the provisions of Section V.
(f) when establishing a system of internal controls, take into account, where 
appropriate, the further options and recommendations for internal controls as 
elaborated in Annex II.
Principles of Industry Self-Regulation
Participants understand that a voluntary system of industry self-regulation, as 
referred to in the Preamble of this Document, will provide for a system of warranties 
underpinned through verification by independent auditors of individual companies 
and supported by internal penalties set by industry, which will help to facilitate the 
full traceability of rough diamond transactions by government authorities.
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Section V
Co-operation and Transparency
Participants should:
(a) provide to each other through the Chair information identifying their designated 
authorities or bodies responsible for implementing the provisions of this Certification 
Scheme. Each Participant should provide to other Participants through the Chair 
information, preferably in electronic format, on its relevant laws, regulations, rules, 
procedures and practices, and update that information as required. This should 
include a synopsis in English of the essential content of this information;
(b) compile and make available to all other Participants through the Chair statistical 
data in line with the principles set out in Annex HI;
(c) exchange on a regular basis experiences and other relevant information, including 
on self-assessment, in order to arrive at the best practice in given circumstances;
(d) consider favourably requests from other Participants for assistance to improve the 
functioning of the Certification Scheme within their territories;
(e) inform another Participant through the Chair if it considers that the laws, 
regulations, rules, procedures or practices of that other Participant do not ensure the 
absence of conflict diamonds in the exports of that other Participant;
(f) cooperate with other Participants to attempt to resolve problems which may arise 
from unintentional circumstances and which could lead to non-fulfilment of the 
minimum requirements for the issuance or acceptance of the Certificates, and inform 
all other Participants of the essence of the problems encountered and of solutions 
found;
(g) encourage, through their relevant authorities, closer co-operation between law 
enforcement agencies and between customs agencies of Participants.
Section VI 
Administrative Matters
MEETINGS
1. Participants and Observers are to meet in Plenary annually, and on other occasions 
as Participants may deem necessary, in order to discuss the effectiveness of the 
Certification Scheme.
2. Participants should adopt Rules of Procedure for such meetings at the first Plenary 
meeting.
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3. Meetings are to be held in the country where the Chair is located, unless a 
Participant or an international organisation offers to host a meeting and this offer has 
been accepted. The host country should facilitate entry formalities for those attending 
such meetings.
4. At the end of each Plenary meeting, a Chair would be elected to preside over all 
Plenary meetings, ad hoc working groups and other subsidiary bodies, which might 
be formed until the conclusion of the next annual Plenary meeting.
5. Participants are to reach decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus 
proves to be impossible, the Chair is to conduct consultations.
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT
6. For the effective administration of the Certification Scheme, administrative 
support will be necessary. The modalities and functions of that support should be 
discussed at the first Plenary meeting, following endorsement by the UN General 
Assembly.
7. Administrative support could include the following functions:
a) to serve as a channel of communication, information sharing and consultation 
between the Participants with regard to matters provided for in this 
Document;
b) to maintain and make available for the use of all Participants a collection of 
those laws, regulations, rules, procedures, practices and statistics notified 
pursuant to Section V;
c) to prepare documents and provide administrative support for Plenary and 
working group meetings;
d) to undertake such additional responsibilities as the Plenary meetings, or any 
working group delegated by Plenary meetings, may instruct.
PARTICIPATION
8. Participation in the Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory 
basis to all Applicants willing and able to fulfill the requirements of that Scheme.
9. Any applicant wishing to participate in the Certification Scheme should signify its 
interest by notifying the Chair through diplomatic channels. This notification should 
include the information set forth in paragraph (a) of Section V and be circulated to all 
Participants within one month.
10. Participants intend to invite representatives of civil society, the diamond industry, 
non-participating governments and international organizations to participate in 
Plenary meetings as Observers.
PARTICIPANT MEASURES
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11. Participants are to prepare, and make available to other Participants, in advance 
of annual Plenary meetings of the Kimberley Process, information as stipulated in 
paragraph (a) o f Section V outlining how the requirements of the Certification 
Scheme are being implemented within their respective jurisdictions.
12. The agenda of annual Plenary meetings is to include an item where information 
as stipulated in paragraph (a) of Section V is reviewed and Participants can provide 
further details of their respective systems at the request of the Plenary.
13. Where further clarification is needed, Participants at Plenary meetings, upon 
recommendation by the Chair, can identify and decide on additional verification 
measures to be undertaken. Such measures are to be implemented in accordance with 
applicable national and international law. These could include, but need not be 
limited to measures such as;
a. requesting additional information and clarification from Participants;
b. review missions by other Participants or their representatives where there are 
credible indications of significant non-compliance with the Certification 
Scheme.
14. Review missions are to be conducted in an analytical, expert and impartial 
manner with the consent of the Participant concerned. The size, composition, terms 
of reference and time-frame of these missions should be based on the circumstances 
and be established by the Chair with the consent of the Participant concerned and in 
consultation with all Participants.
15. A report on the results of compliance verification measures is to be forwarded to 
the Chair and to the Participant concerned within three weeks of completion of the 
mission. Any comments from that Participant as well as the report, are to be posted 
on the restricted access section of an official Certification Scheme website no later 
than three weeks after the submission of the report to the Participant concerned. 
Participants and Observers should make every effort to observe strict confidentiality 
regarding the issue and the discussions relating to any compliance matter.
COMPLIANCE AND DISPUTE PREVENTION
16. In the event that an issue regarding compliance by a Participant or any other issue 
regarding the implementation of the Certification Scheme arises, any concerned 
Participant may so inform the Chair, who is to inform all Participants without delay 
about the said concern and enter into dialogue on how to address it. Participants and 
Observers should make every effort to observe strict confidentiality regarding the 
issue and the discussions relating to any compliance matter.
MODIFICATIONS
17. This document may be modified by consensus of the Participants.
18. Modifications may be proposed by any Participant. Such proposals should be 
sent in writing to the Chair, at least ninety days before the next Plenary meeting, 
unless otherwise agreed.
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19. The Chair is to circulate any proposed modification expeditiously to all 
Participants and Observers and place it on the agenda of the next annual Plenary 
meeting.
REVIEW MECHANISM
20. Participants intend that the Certification Scheme should be subject to periodic 
review, to allow Participants to conduct a thorough analysis of all elements contained 
in the scheme. The review should also include consideration of the continuing 
requirement for such a scheme, in view of the perception of the Participants, and of 
international organisations, in particular the United Nations, of the continued threat 
posed at that time by conflict diamonds. The first such review should take place no 
later than three years after the effective starting date of the Certification Scheme. The 
review meeting should normally coincide with the annual Plenary meeting, unless 
otherwise agreed.
THE START OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHEME
21. The Certification Scheme should be established at the Ministerial Meeting on the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds in Interlaken on 5 
November 2002.
A N N E X I
Certificates
A. Minimum requirements for Certificates
A Certificate is to meet the following minimum requirements:
• Each Certificate should bear the title “Kimberley Process Certificate” and the 
following statement: “The rough diamonds in this shipment have been 
handled in accordance with the provisions of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme for rough diamonds”
• Country of origin for shipment of parcels of unmixed (i.e. from the same) 
origin
• Certificates may be issued in any language, provided that an English 
translation is incorporated
• Unique numbering with the Alpha 2 country code, according to ISO 3166-1
• Tamper and forgery resistant
• Date of issuance
• Date of expiry
• Issuing authority
• Identification of exporter and importer
• Carat weight/mass
• Value in US$
• Number of parcels in shipment
• Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System
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• Validation of Certificate by the Exporting Authority
B. Optional Certificate Elements
A Certificate may include the following optional features:
• Characteristics of a Certificate (for example as to form, additional data or 
security elements)
• Quality characteristics of the rough diamonds in the shipment
• A recommended import confirmation part should have the following 
elements:
Country of destination 
Identification of importer 
Carat/weight and value in US$
Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System 
Date of receipt by Importing Authority 
Authentication by Importing Authority
C. Optional Procedures
Rough diamonds may be shipped in transparent security bags.
The unique Certificate number may be replicated on the container.
Annex II 
Recommendations as provided for in Section IV, paragraph (f)
General Recommendations
1. Participants may appoint an official coordinator(s) to deal with the 
implementation of the Certification Scheme.
2. Participants may consider the utility of complementing and/or enhancing the 
collection and publication of the statistics identified in Annex HI based on the 
contents of Kimberley Process Certificates.
3. Participants are encouraged to maintain the information and data required by 
Section V on a computerised database.
4. Participants are encouraged to transmit and receive electronic messages in 
order to support the Certification Scheme.
5. Participants that produce diamonds and that have rebel groups suspected of 
mining diamonds within their territories are encouraged to identify the areas 
of rebel diamond mining activity and provide this information to all other 
Participants. This information should be updated on a regular basis.
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6. Participants are encouraged to make known the names of individuals or 
companies convicted of activities relevant to the purposes of the Certification 
Scheme to all other Participants through the Chair.
7. Participants are encouraged to ensure that all cash purchases o f rough 
diamonds are routed through official banking channels, supported by 
verifiable documentation.
8. Participants that produce diamonds should analyse their diamond production 
under the following headings:
• Characteristics of diamonds produced
• Actual production
Recommendations for Control over Diamond Mines
9. Participants are encouraged to ensure that all diamond mines are licensed and 
to allow only those mines so licensed to mine diamonds.
10. Participants are encouraged to ensure that prospecting and mining companies 
maintain effective security standards to ensure that conflict diamonds do not 
contaminate legitimate production.
Recommendations for Participants with Small-scale Diamond Mining
11. All artisinal and informal diamond miners should be licensed and only those 
persons so licensed should be allowed to mine diamonds.
12. Licensing records should contain the following minimum information: name, 
address, nationality and/or residence status and the area of authorised 
diamond mining activity.
Recommendations for Rough Diamond Buyers, Sellers and Exporters
13. All diamond buyers, sellers, exporters, agents and courier companies 
involved in carrying rough diamonds should be registered and licensed by 
each Participant’s relevant authorities.
14. Licensing records should contain the following minimum information: name, 
address and nationality and/or residence status.
15. All rough diamond buyers, sellers and exporters should be required by law to 
keep for a period of five years daily buying, selling or exporting records 
listing the names of buying or selling clients, their license number and the 
amount and value of diamonds sold, exported or purchased.
16. The information in paragraph 14 above should be entered into a computerised 
database, to facilitate the presentation of detailed information relating to the 
activities of individual rough diamond buyers and sellers.
Recommendations for Export Processes
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17. A exporter should submit a rough diamond shipment to the relevant 
Exporting Authority.
18. The Exporting Authority is encouraged, prior to validating a Certificate, to 
require an exporter to provide a declaration that the rough diamonds being 
exported are not conflict diamonds.
19. Rough diamonds should be sealed in a tamper proof container together with 
the Certificate or a duly authenticated copy. The Exporting Authority should 
then transmit a detailed e-mail message to the relevant Importing Authority 
containing information on the carat weight, value, country of origin or 
provenance, importer and the serial number of the Certificate.
20. The Exporting Authority should record all details of rough diamond 
shipments on a computerised database.
Recommendations for Import Processes
21. The Importing Authority should receive an e-mail message either before or 
upon arrival of a rough diamond shipment. The message should contain 
details such as the carat weight, value, country of origin or provenance, 
exporter and the serial number of the Certificate.
22. The Importing Authority should inspect the shipment of rough diamonds to 
verify that the seals and the container have not been tampered with and that 
the export was performed in accordance with the Certification Scheme.
23. The Importing Authority should open and inspect the contents of the 
shipment to verify the details declared on the Certificate.
24. Where applicable and when requested, the Importing Authority should send 
the return slip or import confirmation coupon to the relevant Exporting 
Authority.
25. The Importing Authority should record all details of rough diamond 
shipments on a computerised database.
Recommendations on Shipments to and from Free Trade Zones
26. Shipments of rough diamonds to and from free trade zones should be 
processed by the designated authorities.
Annex III
Statistics
Recognising that reliable and comparable data on the production and the
international trade in rough diamonds are an essential tool for the effective
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implementation of the Certification Scheme, and particularly for identifying any 
irregularities or anomalies which could indicate that conflict diamonds are entering 
the legitimate trade, Participants strongly support the following principles, taking 
into account the need to protect commercially sensitive information:
(a) to keep and publish within two months of the reference period and in a 
standardised format, quarterly aggregate statistics on rough diamond exports and 
imports, as well as the numbers of certificates validated for export, and of imported 
shipments accompanied by Certificates;
(b) to keep and publish statistics on exports and imports, by origin and provenance 
wherever possible; by carat weight and value; and under the relevant Harmonised 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) classifications 7102.10; 7102.21; 
7102.31;
(c) to keep and publish on a semi-annual basis and within two months of the 
reference period statistics on rough diamond production by carat weight and by 
value. In the event that a Participant is unable to publish these statistics it should 
notify the Chair immediately;
(d) to collect and publish these statistics by relying in the first instance on existing 
national processes and methodologies;
(e) to make these statistics available to an intergovernmental body or to another 
appropriate mechanism identified by the Participants for (1) compilation and 
publication on a quarterly basis in respect of exports and imports, and (2) on a 
semiannual basis in respect of production. These statistics are to be made available 
for analysis by interested parties and by the Participants, individually or collectively, 
according to such terms of reference as may be established by the Participants;
(f) to consider statistical information pertaining to the international trade in and 
production of rough diamonds at annual Plenary meetings, with a view to addressing 
related issues, and to supporting effective implementation of the Certification 
Scheme.
302
Appendix 3: EITI Principles and Criteria
Principles
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be 
an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if  not managed 
properly, can create negative economic and social impacts.
2. We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a 
country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be 
exercised in the interests of their national development.
3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue 
streams over many years and can be highly price dependent.
4. We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and 
expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of 
appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development.
5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and 
companies in the extractive industries and the need to enhance public 
financial management and accountability.
6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the 
context of respect for contracts and laws.
7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct 
investment that financial transparency may bring.
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government 
to all citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public 
expenditure.
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and 
accountability in public life, government operations and in business,
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the 
disclosure of payments and revenues is required, which is simple to 
undertake and to use.
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all 
extractive industry companies operating in that country.
12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and 
relevant contributions to make -  including governments and their 
agencies, extractive industry companies, service companies, multilateral 
organisations, financial organisations, investors, and non-governmental 
organisations
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Criteria
1. Regular publication of all material oil, gas and mining payments by 
companies to governments (“payments”) and all material revenues 
received by governments from oil, gas and mining companies 
(“revenues”) to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive 
and comprehensible manner.
2. Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues are the 
subject of a credible, independent audit, applying international auditing 
standards.
3. Payments and revenues are reconciled by a credible, independent 
administrator, applying international auditing standards and with 
publication of the administrator’s opinion regarding that reconciliation 
including discrepancies, should any be identified.
4. This approach is extended to all companies including state-owned 
enterprises.
5. Civil society is actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring 
and evaluation of this process and contributes towards public debate.
6. A public, financially sustainable work plan for all the above is developed 
by the host government, with assistance from the international financial 
institutions where required, including measurable targets, a timetable for 
implementation, and an assessment of potential capacity constraints.
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